CHARLES—^ 
MALMERIi 
MAR5MI 


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THE  FUNDAMENTALS 
OF   DEBATE 


BY 

HARRY  FRANKLIN   COVINGTON 

PROFESSOR  OF  ENGLISH  IN  PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 


CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 

NEW  YORK        CHICAGO  BOSTON 


Copyright,  1918,  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


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TO 

THE  MANY  EMINENT  GRADUATES 

OF 

THE  CLIOSOPHIC  AND  AMERICAN  WHIG  SOCIETIES 
OF  PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 


PREFACE 

As  a  teacher  of  argument  and  debate  for  more  than 
a  generation,  I  have  long  been  convinced  that  these 
subjects  are  not  so  much  an  applied  logic  as  an  applied 
psychologic;  that,  indeed,  there  are  other  powers  of 
the  mind  than  the  purely  logical  which  are  fundamental, 
and  that  the  principles  governing  them  are  capable  of 
a  more  thoroughly  scientific  exposition  than  has  ap- 
peared in  our  manuals.  I  have  thus  endeavored  to  write 
a  modern  text-book  on  debating,  grounded  on  psychology 
as  well  as  on  logic,  and  to  set  forth  principles  and  methods 
tested  by  actual  experience. 

I  have  presented  the  material  which  I  believe  to  be 
necessary  to  a  full  understanding  of  argument  and  de- 
bate in  two  parts,  Logical  Organization  and  The  Pres- 
entation. In  considering  Logical  Organization,  I  have 
retained  the  conventional  view-point,  dealing  with  Briefs 
and  Brief-making,  Argument,  and  Evidence,  and  have 
endeavored  to  weld  them  into  a  whole.  Highly  valuable 
to  the  student  as  the  conventional  stress  upon  the  pure 
logic  of  the  subject  is,  it  has  been  found  by  the  writer 
to  be  utterly  inadequate  even  when  followed  later  by 
a  treatment  of  Persuasion. 

The  unique  feature  of  the  present  text  lies  in  the  fact 
that  it  recognizes  more  fully  than  has  hitherto  been  the 
case  in  text-books  on  argument  the  function  of  imag- 
ination in  reasoning;    that  the  unconscious  association 


vi  PREFACE 

of  images  in  the  mind  leads  to  new  ideas  and  progress, 
and  that,  in  presenting  our  ideas  after  they  have  been 
logically  organized,  they  must  be  imaged  suggestively  on 
the  minds  of  the  audience.  Part  II,  therefore,  explains 
the  elemental  nature  of  Imagination,  and  treats  the 
subject  of  what  is  usually  called  the  Presentation  as 
Imaginative  Suggestion.  Whenever  this  view-point 
and  conception  have  been  presented  in  the  classroom, 
they  have  aroused  interest  by  supplementing  the  formal- 
ism of  the  older  treatises  and  by  opening  new  avenues 
of  thought  and  suggesting  original  ways  of  approach. 
For,  after  all,  the  debater  and  student  of  English  com- 
position m  general  should  be  free  to  act  on  his  own 
initiative,  to  express  his  own  individuality. 

All  students  in  this  field  will  gladly  acknowledge  their 
indebtedness  to  the  pioneer  work  of  Professor  George 
P.  Baker,  of  Harvard,  author  of  "The  Principles  of  Ar- 
gumentation" (1895),  and  also  to  Professor  Walter 
Dill  Scott,  author  of  "The  Psychology  of  Public  Speak- 
ing" (1910). 

I  wish  to  express  my  especial  obligation  to  Professor 
Howard  C.  Warren,  of  Princeton  University,  for  his 
helpful  criticism  of  the  psychological  foundations.  To 
Doctor  Theodore  W.  Hunt,  for  many  years  head  of  the 
EngHsh  Department,  now  Professor  Emeritus,  I  wish 
also  to  express  my  appreciation  for  his  interest  and  en- 
couragement. 

Princeton  University,  June,  1918. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Chapter  I.    Introductory i 

The  Fundamentals  of  Debate — Logic— Evidence — Rhetoric 
— Oratory — Psychology — Constructive  Thinking — Minds,  Is- 
sues, and  Audiences:  Two  T3^es — Persuasion — The  Debater 
Himself — Plan  of  the  Book. 


PART  I.    LOGICAL  ORGANIZATION 
Chapter  IL    Briefs  and  Brief-Making 15 

Need  of  a  Plan— The  Brief  Defined— The  Making  of  a  Brief 
— The  Process — Analysis — Classification — Arrangement — The 
Result — Unity — Logical  Sequence — Proportion — Process  and 
Result — Unity — Climax — Two  Laws  of  Structure — Rules  for 
Brief-Making — The  Three  Main  Parts  of  a  Brief — Specimen 
Brief. 


Chapter  III.    Argument 39 

The  View-Point — Name — Effectiveness — Unity  of  Classifica- 
tion. 

Classes  of  Argument — I.  Association,  Argument  from  Sign — 
Sign  Argument  Expounded — Force — Observation  and  Infer- 
ence— Common  Sources  of  Error. 

II.  Argument  from  Example^A.  Resemblance  (i)  By  Gen- 
eralization— Illustrations  in  Law  and  in  Parliamentary  De- 
bates^Further  Analysis  of  the  Process — Definition  of  Rel- 
evancy and  Rules — The  Fallacy,  Begging  the  Question — 
Answering  a  Causal  Example  by  Alleging  a  Different 
Cause — (2)   By  Analogy — Definitions— Uses — Illustrations. 

B.  Contrast — A  Principle  of  Association — Uses  in  Debating — 


viii  CONTENTS, 

PAGE 

Uses  in  Refutation — Types  of  Argument  by  Contrast — (i)  Re- 
dtictio  ad  absurdmn — Definition  and  Illustrations — Manner  of 
Treatment — How  Answered — Its  Special  Value — (2)  The 
Dilemma — Definition  and  Illustrations — Two  Kinds — Its  Use — 
How  Answered — (3)  The  Method  of  the  Residue — Definition 
and  Illustrations. 

Chapter  IV.    Argument  (continued) 87 

III.  Argument  from  Causal  Relation — Definition — Rule  of 
Adequacy,  Involving  Parallelism  or  Difference,  Other  Com- 
peting or  Co-operating  Causes,  Law  of  Progress — Illustra- 
tions— Causal  Argument,  and  the  Other  Sources  of  Reasoning — 
Differences  of  View-Point. 

IV.  Inductive  and  Deductive  Arguments — Induction — The 
Inevitable  Assumption — The  Inductive  Formula — Induction, 
the  Scientific  Method  of  Investigation — Kinds  of  Induction. 

Deduction,  a  Ready  Mode  of  Reasoning — Deduction  Sup- 
plemented by  Induction — Deduction,  a  Method  of  Criticism — 
The  Syllogism — The  Enthymeme — The  Chain  of  Reasoning — 
Two  Classes  of  Fallacies — A  Common  Ground  in  Argument. 

Refutation — Character — Preparation — An  Important  Limi- 
tation —  Selection  —  Fundamental  Criticism  —  Two  General 
Methods  of  Refutation:  Overthrowing  the  Supporting  Argu- 
ment and  Proving  the  Contradictory. 

Chapter  V.    Evidence 112 

The  Proof — Meaning  of  Term — The  Need  of  Evi- 
dence— The  Need  of  Assumptions — Classes  of  Evidence — 
Direct  and  Circumstantial— Jury  Verdicts  upon  Circumstan- 
tial Evidence — Personal,  Real,  and  Documentary  Evidence — 
The  Law  of  Evidence — Examining  Testimony — Consistency — 
the  One  Great  Test — (i)  Internal — (2)  External,  General,  or 
Particular. 

The  Use  of  Evidence  Outside  the  Courts — The  Debater's 
Chief  Source  of  Evidence,  Authority — Two  Classes  of  Au- 
thority— Examining  Evidence  from  Authority — Rules  for  the 
Interpretation  of  Documents — Suggestions  for  Reporting  Evi- 
dence— The  Reasonableness  of  an  Opinion — ^The  Danger  of 
Partial  Quotation — The  Card  System. 


CONTENTS  ix 


PART  II.    THE  PRESENTATION 

PAGE 

Chapter  VI.    Imagination  in  Argument      ....     150 

The  Need  of  Imagination  in  Argument — The  Logical 
and  the  Psj'chological — Images  Are  a  Psychological  Infer- 
ence— Mental  Processes — The  Creative  Imagination — The 
Poverty  of  Mere  Facts — The  Vision  of  New  Ideas — Anticipa- 
tion Images — Perceptual  Aspect  of  Imagery — Imaging  a  Con- 
cept— Imaging  (i)  an  Analogy;  (2)  a  Cause;  (3)  a  Conclusion; 
(4)  Affection  and  Desire;  (5)  in  a  Team  Debate;  (6)  in  General — 
The  Advantage  of  the  Conceptual  View-Point  to  the  Debater — 
Types  of  Imagery — Memory  Images — Imagination  Images  of 
the  Past,  the  Present,  and  the  Future — Summary. 

Chapter  VII.    Suggestion  in  Argument i88 

Laws  of  Suggestion  and  Their  Use  in  Debating — Avoiding 
and  Removing  Inhibitions — Hurtful  Admissions  as  Inhibi- 
tions— Immediate  Removal  of  Inhibitions  Introduced  by  an 
Opponent — Logical  Fallacies  as  Inhibitions — Removing  an 
Inhibiting  Wish  by  the  Image  ad  Absurd um — Conclusions. 

Instruments  of  Suggestion — Gesture  Images  as  Instruments 
of  Suggestion — Word  Images  as  Instruments  of  Suggestion — 
Variability  of  Meanings,  Due  to  the  Speaker,  Vocal  Shadings — 
Due  to  the  Listener,  The  Mental  Level,  The  Psychological 
Moment — Imagery  an  Imperfect  Means. 

Chapter  VIII.    Instruments  of  Suggestion  ...     212 

Tonal  Imagery— Illustrative  Imagery — Avoiding  Personal- 
ities— Subjective  Images — Personal  Adjectives — All  the  Parts 
of  Speech — The  Phrase — Sentence  Forms — Climax  —  Repe- 
tition —  Variety — Paraleipsis — Confidence  —  Interestedness — 
Avoiding  Common  Defects  in  Delivery — The  Decision. 


APPENDICES 
Appendix  A 


Specimen  Briefs — The  First  Jiinius  Letter — In  Defense  of 
Damay. 


247 


X  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Appendix  B     255 

Questions  and  Exercises :  In  General — On  Specific  Speeches — 
In  Association-Reactions. 

Appendix  C 261 

The  Special  Study  of  Imagery — Varied  Imagery  Appeals — 
Auditory  Imagery  and  the  Disagreeable — MLxed  Imagery 
Types. 

Appendix  D 269 

The  Imagery  of  Argument  and  of  Poetry. 

Appendix  E     272 

Addresses :  Premier  Lloyd  George's  "Peace  Founded  on  the 
Rock  of  Vindicated  Justice"  and  President  Wilson's  "Force  to 
the  Utmost." 

Appendix  F     283 

Bibliography. 

Appendix  G 284 

Resolutions  for  Debate. 


Index 287 


THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 


THE 
FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTORY 

The  Fundamentals  of  Debate 

On  turning  to  the  dictionary  you  will  find  that  the 
word  "debate"  formerly  meant  "strife,  contention." 
For  example,  Robert  of  Gloucester  says  in  the  thirteenth 
century — "in  the  days  of  Trinity  next  ensuing  was  a 
great  debate  and  in  that  murder  there  were  slain  four- 
score." Sir  Walter  Scott  uses  the  term  as  applied  to 
physical  contest: 

"But  question  fierce  and  proud  reply 
Gave  signal  soon  of  dire  debate." 

The  term  is  appHed  usually  to  intellectual  disputes; 
its  field  is  not  actually  but  figuratively  a  battle-ground. 
Its  province  is  coextensive  with  the  whole  domain  of 
thought.  Wherever  there  are  propositions  in  dispute, 
ideas  attacked  and  defended,  there  is  debate.  In  law 
before  the  court,  in  theology  before  the  synod,  in  politics 
on  the  stump  or  in  Congress — indeed,  in  almost  all  scien- 
tific, philosophic,  or  popular  speeches  and  writings.  Its 
instruments  are  not  swords,  shields,  or  arrows  but  argu- 
ments.   The  arms  of  the  contest  are  intellectual  ones, 

1 


2  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

the  contest  one  of  reasons.  According  to  the  present 
use  of  the  word,  if  A  by  chance  meets  B  and  makes  an 
assertion  which  is  denied  by  B,  whereupon  A  offers 
reasons  for  his  belief  which  are  met  by  contrary  reasons 
from  B,  there  is  debate.  "A  thesis  is  set  down;  you 
attack,  I  defend  it;  you  insist,  I  reply;  you  deny,  I  prove; 
you  distinguish,  I  destroy  your  distinctions;  my  replies 
balance  or  overturn  your  objections — such  is  debate." 
You  assert  your  intention  of  pursuing  a  certain  line 
of  action,  I  reason  with  you  to  do  the  opposite — such 
is  debate. 

Debating  is  not  confined  to  formal  tribunals.  The 
college  student  arguing  upon  the  prospects  of  a  base- 
ball championship  is  as  much  a  debater  as  the  disputant 
in  an  intercollegiate  contest.  An  amusing  controversy 
showing  the  origin  and  conduct  of  a  not  uncommon 
type  of  debate  may  be  found  in  Scott's  "Antiquary" 
relating  to  the  racial  connection  of  the  ancient  Picts. 
Were  they  Teutons  or  Celts?  Here  we  have  assertion 
and  denial,  citation  of  authorities,  pro  and  con,  with 
distinctions,  until  as  too  often  happens,  the  disputants 
lose  their  tempers,  and  Sir  Arthur  flounces  out  of  the 
parlor  in  high  dudgeon — 

"...  Why,  man,  there  was  once  a  people  called  the 
Piks " 

"More  properly  Picis,"  interrupted  the  Baronet. 

"I  say  the  Pikar,  Pihar,  Piochtar,  Piaghter,  or  Peughtar," 
vociferated  Oldbuck;    "they  spoke  a  Gothic  dialect " 

"Genuine  Celtic,"  again  asseverated  the  knight. 

"Gothic!  Gothic!  I'll  go  to  death  upon  it!"  counter-as- 
severated the  squire. 

"Why,  gentlemen,"  said  Lovel,  "I  conceive  that  is  a  dis- 
pute which  may  be  easily  settled  by  philologists,  if  there  are 
any  remains  of  the  language." 


INTRODUCTORY  3 

"There  is  but  one  word,"  said  the  Baronet,  "but,  in  spite 
of  Mr.  Oldbuck's  pertinacity,  it  is  decisive  of  the  question." 

"Yes,  in  my  favor,"  said  Oldbuck;  "Mr.  Lovel,  you  shall 
be  judge — I  have  the  learned  Pinkerton  on  my  side." 

"I,  on  mine,  the  indefatigable  and  erudite  Chalmers.  .  .  ." 

"Truly,  gentlemen,"  said  Lovel,  "before  you  muster  your 
forces  and  overwhelm  me  with  authorities,  I  should  like  to  know 
the  word  in  dispute." 

"Benval,"  said  both  disputants  at  once. 

"Which  signifies  capid  valli,"  said  Sir  Arthur. 

"The  head  of  the  wall,"  echoed  Oldbuck. 

There  was  a  deep  pause.  "It  is  rather  a  narrow  foundation 
to  build  a  hypothesis  upon,"  observed  the  arbiter. 

"Not  a  whit,  not  a  whit,"  said  Oldbuck;  "men  fight  best 
in  a  narrow  ring — an  inch  is  as  good  as  a  mile  for  a  home-thrust." 

"It  is  decidedly  Celtic,"  said  the  Baronet;  "every  hill  in 
the  Highlands  begins  with  Ben.^' 

"But  what  say  you  to  Val,  Sir  Arthur;  is  it  not  decidedly 
the  Saxon  wall  ?  " 

"It  is  the  Roman  vallum,''  said  Sir  x\rthur;  "the  Picts  bor- 
rowed that  part  of  the  word." 

"No  such  thing;  if  they  borrowed  anything,  it  must  have 
been  your  Ben,  which  they  might  have  from  the  neighboring 
Britons  of  Strath  Cluyd.  .  .  ." 

Debating  generally  originates  from  conflicting  opin- 
ions. "You  say  we  are  sectional!"  exclaimed  Lincoln 
in  his  Cooper  Institute  address.  "We  deny  it.  That 
makes  an  issue;  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  you." 
The  common  mode  of  procedure,  in  starting  an  action 
at  law,  is  for  the  plaintiff  to  file  a  paper  which  is  fol- 
lowed by  another  paper  from  the  defendant  which  is 
called  an  answer;  at  length,  argument  ensues,  if  not 
upon  the  general  issue,  upon  special  issues  arising  dur- 
ing the  course  of  the  trial,  which  are  successively 
weighed,  till  the  final  issue  emerges  and  is  weighed  and 
the  case  solved. 


^4  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

In  formal  debating  contests,  tlie  questions  discussed 
do  not  arise  from  conflicting  opinions  actually  existing 
among  the  debaters  themselves ;  the  questions  are  chosen 
by  joint  agreement,  or  by  one  party  to  the  discussion, 
and  presented  to  the  other  for  the  choice  of  sides.  The 
two  sides  are  called,  respectively,  the  affirmative  and  the 
negative,  the  former  being  that  side  which  maintains 
the  proposition  (which  may  be  negatively  stated)  and 
the  latter  the  side  which  denies  the  proposition.  The 
proposition  is  usually  stated  affirm'atively, 

' Argument  is  the  process  of  resolving  differences  of 

opinion  by  assertion  and  denial,  followed  by  proof  and 
counter-proof  with  distinctions.  If  the  opponent  is 
present  and  is  heard,  we  call  the  argument  a  debate 
{debatere — to  beat  off).  By  it  we  aun  to  influence  the 
opinions,  beliefs,  or  actions  of  others.  It  thus  presup- 
poses the  possibility  at  least  of  an  opposing  view,  a  dif- 
ference of  opinion.  It  presupposes  also  a  knowledge  of 
facts,  an  ability  to  correlate  them,  as  well  as  the  power 
to  present  them  effectively.  Viewed  as  an  art,  then, 
argument  may  be  regarded  as  applying  (i)  the  rules 
of  evidence  such  as  maintain  in  our  courts  of  law,  (2) 
the  rules  of  reasoning  such  as  exist  in  common  sense 
or  have  been  developed  in  text-books  on  logic,  and  (3) 
the  principles  of  Hterary  art  and  oratory  or  pubUc  speak- 
ing, at  the  basis  of  which  we  now  know  (4)  must  rest 
a  sound  psychology.  This  forms  a  large  and  varied 
background,  from  which  the  debater  and  the  writer 
on  debating  must  draw  his  material  if  he  is  to  grasp 
his  subject  fully  or  treat  it  as  a  whole. 

^]]fi.t  are  \he.  facts?  What  happened?  What  was 
done?  These  are  the  first  questions  which  the  lawyer 
asks  of  his  client.    They  are  equally  important  for  the 


INTRODUCTORY  5 

student  of  debate.  The  debater  should  be  first  of  all 
the  painstaking  investigator.  Even  if  the  reasoning 
is  valid,  conclusions  based  on  unsupported  assertions 
may  be  entirely  unwarranted.  You  say  that  we  should 
grant  the^  Philippine  Islands  complete  independence 
within  five  years  because  they  have  shown  themselves 
to  be  capable  of  self-government.  But  have  they?  What 
is  the  evidence  in  the  case?  On  whose  authority  does 
it  rest?  Is  he  qualified  to''speak_as  an  authority?  If 
so,  are  his  statements  probable  on  their  face,  uncon- 
tradicted by  others  who  have  an  equal  right  to  be  heard 
— and  so  on? 

The  legal  rules  of  evidence  are  an  important  guide 
in  any  procedure  in  debating  where  the  attempt  is  to 
resolve  such  issues  of  fact;  for  they  have  grown  up 
through  years  of  custom  and  practice,  and  though  some- 
times deeply  embedded  in  legal  subject-matter,  have  as  a 
rule  come  to  be  recognized  as  a  safe  and  just  mode  of 
procedure  in  general.  The  debater  should  know,  for 
instance,  such  things  as  the  difiference  between  testi- 
mony and  authority,  hearsay  and  first-hand  testimony, 
primary  and  secondary  evidence,  and  the  important 
rules  governing  the  production  of  testimony  in  courts 
of  law.  The  law  of  evidence,  according  to  Stephen,  is 
that  part  of  procedure  which  with  a  view  to  ascertain- 
ing the  individual  rights  and  liabilities  in  particular 
cases  decides :  (i)  What  facts  m-'^y  nnH  rnny  not  he 
proved.  (2)  Wliat  sort  of  evidence  must  be  given  of  a 
fact  which  may  be  proved,  and  (3)  by  whom  and  Tn 
what  manner  the  evidence  must  beproduced  by^wKch 
any  fact  is  to  be  proyfid,^ 

The  facts  being  established  as  true,  what  do  such 

*  James  F.  Stephen,  "A  Digest  of  the  Law  of  Evidence,"  p.  6. 


6  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

%gtsJm2prL  with  reference  to  the-Substantial  things  in 

doubt? To  exactly  what  are  they  relevimt?  _  .WJm.t  is 

the  nature~onEis  relevajjgY^;;:;£ausaLi£)r  example?  Ar- 
gumentativFskill  and  the  abiHty  to  think  readily  on  one's 
feet  should  be  based  on  an  abiHty  to  reason  soundly. 
The  debater  must  know  the  natuje,  of  the  relations  exist- 
ing  belwccn  propositions^  the  ground  of  warrant  for 
their  assertion  in  ari  argument.  Apprehension,  judg- 
ment,  and  "reasoning,  according  to  Jevons/  form  the  chief 
parts  of  logical  doctrine.  Certainly,  a  debater  must 
be  able  to  perceive  the  truth,  be  wise  and  discriminat- 
ing in  his  judgments,  scrupulous  and  sensible  in  his  in- 
ferences. Now,  the  proposition  is  the  formal  unit  of 
argument,  whether  employed  as  a  premise  or  a  con- 
clusion. It  is  regarded  in  logic  as  divisible  into  two 
parts  called  terms,  and  the  process  of  formulating  a 
proposition  is  the  process  of  expressing  some  judgment 
between  these  terms.  Grammatically,  a  proposition 
consists  of  a  subject  and  a  predicate,  while  mathemat- 
ically it  may  be  defined  as  an  equation  between  two 
terms.  Of  course,  the  discovery,  analysis,  and  ar- 
rangement of  the  material  so  as  to  appeal  to  the 
understanding  involve,  first  and  foremost,  reasoning 
processes.  The  main  and  subordinate  argument,  heads 
and  subheads,  in  the  outhne  of  a  case  are  step-by-step 
processes — links  in  a  chain  of  reasoning;  and  in  fine, 
as  a  perfect  brief  shows,  a  debate  is  an  organic,  logical 
structure. 

Since  logic  treats  of  the  laws  of  reasoning,  the  rational 
groundwork  of  the  art  of  debate  may  be  found  in  sys- 
tematic shape  in  the  science  of  logic.    Its  study  there- 
fore, if  properly  conducted,  should  mean  for  the  de- 
^W.  Stanley  Jevons,  "Elementary  Lessons  on  Logic,"  p.  ii. 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

bater  not  only  stability  of  foundation  but  a  real  gain 
in  argumentative  skill.  Speaking  of  Junius,  Professor 
Gk)odrich  says:  "His  mind,  in  early  life,  had  clearly 
been  subjected  to  the  severest  logical  training.  Com-^ 
position,  with  him,  was  the  creation  of. a  svstem  of 
thought,  in  which  everything  is  made  subordinate  to_ 
a  just  order  and  sequence  ol  ideas.  One  thought  grows 
oiit  of  another  m  regular  succession.  His  reasonings 
often  take  the  form  of  a  syllogism,  though  usually  with 
the  omission  of  one  of  the  terms;  and  we  never  find 
him  betrayed  into  that  careless  diffusion  of  style  so 
common  with  those  who  are  ignorant  of  the  principles 
of  logic.  In  this  respect,  the  writing  of  Junius  will  am'ply 
repay  the  closest  study  and  analysis.  Let  the  young 
orator  enter  completely  into  the  scope  and  design  of 
the  author.  Let  him  watch  the  undercurrent  of  his 
thoughts  and  feelings.  Let  him  observe  how  perfectly 
everything  coincides  to  produce  the  desired  impression 
— the  statement  of  principles  and  the  reference  to  facts, 
the  shading  of  thought  and  the  colorings  of  imagery. 
Let  him  take  one  of  the  more  striking  passages  and  re- 
mark the  dexterous  preparation  by  which  each  of  its 
several  parts  is  so  shaped  that  the  leading  thoughts 
come  forward  to  the  best  advantage — clear  in  all  their 
relations,  standing  boldly  out,  unencumbered  by  secon- 
dary ideas,  and  thus  fitted  to  strike  the  mind  with  full 
and  undivided  force.  Such  a  study  of  Junius  will  pre- 
pare the  young  reader  to  enter  into  the  logic  of  thought. 
It  will  lead  to  the  formation  of  a  severe  intellectual 
taste,  which  is  the  best  guard  against  the  dangers  of 
hasty  composition,  and  the  still  greater  dangers  of  ex- 
temporaneous speaking.  Such  speaking  cannot  be  dis- 
pensed with.     On  the  contrary,  it  is  becoming  more 


8  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

and  more  essential  to  the  success  of  public  men  in  every 
part  of  public  life."  ^ 

Debating  means  also  the  expression  of  ideas  in  speech 
or  writing,  and  so  must  be  classified  as  a  species  both 
of  oratory  and  of  literary  composition.     It  is  well  for 
the  college  debater  if  he  seeks  to  acquire  the  technic 
both  of  the  finished  speaker  and  of  the  Hterary  artist. 
The  distinguishing  characteristics  of  debating  as  a  type 
of  expression  seem  to  lie  in  its  argumentative  and  in 
its  dialogue  character.     Debating,  however,  is  not  only 
an  expression  of  ideas,  but  a  presentation  of  them  to 
others;   it  is  not  only  an  appeal  from  reason  to  reason, 
but  from  one  state  of  consciousness  to  another  state 
of  consciousness.     The  facts  being  known  and   their 
relations,   the  question  arises:    ''How  shall  I  present 
them?  "    The  answer  is  that  we  may  view  logical  reason- 
ing and  judgments  as  concepts,  and  image  them  sug- 
gestively within  the  experience  of  the  persons  addressed. 
Suggestion  is  the  broadest  term  used  for  the  process 
of  conveying  our  ideas  to  others.     Since  objects  and 
things,  to  which  ideas  refer,  cannot  always  be  present 
to  the  senses,  we  are  in  the  habit  of  recalling  them  to 
consciousness  by  suggesting  an  image  of  our  idea  with 
its  understood  meanings  and  with  its  natural  associa- 
tions.    Imagination   or   the   image-making   process   is 
therefore  a  process  of  reducing  general  or  abstract  ideas 
to   sense-perception.     It  has  a  basis  in  feeling  as  well 
as  in  memory,  and  furnishes  the  true  method  of  gain- 
ing interest  and  attention,  as  well  as  of  producing  con- 
viction and  behef.    Anterior  to  the  association  of  ideas, 
be  it  remembered,"  is  the  association'  ot'  images,  with 
— ^l^ndieii,  uiid  with  aitistg:  "~ — — '        * 

iC.  A.  Goodrich,  "British  Eloquence,"  p.  153. 


INTRODUCTORY  9 

Psychologically,  therefore,  debating  is  the  art  of  the 
associ_ative  and  suggestive  or  inhibitmg  imagination. 
The  successful  arguer  will  seek  to  remove  all  inhibitions, 
of  whatever  sort,  which  tend  to  interfere  with  the  ac- 
ceptance by  another,  at  their  proper  weight  and  value, 
of  the  facts  and  logic  of  his  case.  He  will  also  on  his 
own  part  seek  to  interpose  objections  which  tend  to 
inhibit  the  case  presented  by  his  opponent.  Psychology, 
the  ultimate  basis  of  argument,  is  the  science  of  mental 
phenomena. 

The  media  or  symbols  of  imagery  are  words  (written 
or  spoken)  and  gesture  (including  facial  expression). 
Their  suggestions  are  carried  by  the  physical  vibrations 
of  light  and  sound.  y 

;<^The  same  principle — adaptation — which   causes   the  / 
^eye  to  close  when  blinded  by  light,  which  makes  one  V 
(   man  succeed  and  another  fail  in  the  race  of  life,  defines  f 
the  good  debater  as  the  man  who  does  the  right  thing   V 
at  the  right  time— and  in  the  right  way.     Arguments      \ 
are  not  absolute,  but  relative  in  character.  ^^^ 

c  Constructive  Thinking. — Logical  rigor  is  essential  for 

^^  the  foundation  and  structure  of  an  argument,  but  it 
should  not  be  so  stressed  in  the  teaching  of  debating 
as  to  interfere  with  the  use  and  free  play  of  the  imagina- 
tive powers  nor  with  their  growth  and  development. 

Creative  ability  is  more  or  less  present  in  all  men. 
Fairy-tales  and  child  myths  find  their  counterpart  among 
older  people  in  the  projection  of  business  enterprises 
and  idealistic  plans  in  every  sphere.  Assuredly,  the 
man  who  debates  needs  to  develop  his  analytical  and 
discriminating  powers,  but  he  will  need  more.  I  have 
before  me  a  report  of  a  committee  on  prison  reform 
containing   very   detailed   statements   numbered   from 


10  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

one  to  twelve,  and  giving  conclusions  and  recommen- 
dations as  to  facts  and  conditions.  The  preliminary 
data  based  on  a  personal  inspection  of  the  prisons  was 
of  course  necessary  to  the  making  of  sound  recommen- 
dations, but  the  recommendations  which  were  made  pre- 
sented a  new  view  of  prison  reform  and  in  fact  a  new 
prison.  Thus,  the  data  drawn  from  observation  and  ex- 
perience were  combined  with  new  ideas  in  the  minds  of  the 
reform  committee.  Moreover,  in  presenting  their  report 
to  the  assembly,  they  will  defend  their  findings  of  things 
as  they  unfortunately  are  in  connection  with  their  recom- 
mendation as  to  what  they  would  have  them  to  be.  Is 
it  not  clear  from  this  illustration  that  any  theory  of 
argumentation  which  makes  it  one  only  of  logical  analy- 
sis and  logical  classification  is  partial  and  inadequate? 
Argument  depends  not  only  on  past  experience  but 
on  past  experience  plus  creative  thinking  applied  to 
the  work  at  hand.  Any  other  theory  forced  upon  the 
undeveloped  student  tends  to  dull  and  deaden  his  imag- 
inative powers  at  the  very  time  they  are  longing  for 
expression.  The  bird  that  does  not  learn  to  sing  when 
it  is  young  rarely  learns  at  all.  Argument  should  be 
taught  as  both  analytic  and  synthetic,  destructive  and 
constructive,  and  with  a  full  appreciation  of  its  psy- 
chological and  its  logical  basis. 

Minds,  Issues,  and  Audiences:  Two  Types. — There 
are  indeed  two  types  of  minds:  the  one  conservative 
and  retrospective,  the  other  progressive  and  prospec- 
tive. The  first  type  is  guided  by  authority,  habit,  and 
imitation,  the  second  by  the  constructive  and  destruc- 
tive tendencies  in  the  changing  world  about  us.  The 
one  obeys  fixed  immutable,  absolute,  and  dogmatic 
principles  or  laws;  the  other,  knowing  that  conditions 


INTRODUCTORY  11 

are  never  identical  except  in  purely  scientific  experi- 
ments, recognizes  first  of  all  the  facts  perceived  and  or- 
ganizes them  at  once  into  a  clear  conception  or  judg- 
ment. It  is  naturally  this  second  type — and  it  contains 
geniuses  and  leaders  of  thought  and  action — which 
sees  the  necessity  and  value  of  the  argument  from  sign. 
For  they  see  in  it  as  nearly  as  can  be  had  an  approxima- 
tion '  to  the  reasoning  which  they  constantly  employ 
and  recognize  as  their  own. 

Just  as  there  are  two  types  of  mind,  there  are  two 
types  of  opinion  over  which  differences  may  arise,  and 
hence,  two  types  of  issues:  issues  of  stability  and  issues 
of  change.  To  the  first  class  belong  the  issues  adjudicated 
in  law-courts,  to  the  second  the  resolutions  and  bills 
adopted  by  parHamentary  assembhes.  The  issues  in 
academic  debates  are  the  issues  of  parliamentary  bodies 
— issues  of  change.  And  since  the  democracies  of  the 
world  are  almost  equally  divided  into  great  liberal 
and  conservative  parties,  the  sharpest  division  which 
we  may  make  of  audiences  is  also  twofold:  ^Chose  jfho 
look  back  before  going  forward,  and  those  who  go  for- 
'ward  without  losing  back."'         -— — --  - 

Persuasion. — Persuasion  may  be  defined  as  an  ap- 
peal for  decision  through  logic  and  the  emotional  re- 
actions to  imagery.  Psychologically,  a  speaker  is  related 
to  his  hearers  as  stimulus  to  reaction;  logically,  as  cause 
to  effect.  The  suggested  images  of  objects  which  exist 
in  the  external  world  may  be  necessary  to  enable  others 
to  accept  our  ideas.  Such  images,  moreover,  may  awaken 
in  others  pleasurable  or  unpleasurable  feelings  with  re- 
gard to  these  ideas.  Experience  shows  that  in  debating 
it  is  almost  impossible  at  times  to  avoid  either  an  ex- 
pression of  our  own  feelings  or  an  appeal  of  some  sort 


12  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

to  the  feelings  of  others.  The  affirmative  side,  for  in- 
stance, will  make  use  of  the  emotions  of  approbation; 
the  negative,  those  of  disapprobation.  A  speaker  ap- 
peals to  the  emotions  legitimately,  when  he  does  so  to 
overcome  prejudice,  to  prevent  fatigue,  or  otherwise 
to  facilitate  thinking.  Such  appeals  are  at  times  not 
only  so  instinctive  as  to  be  inevitable,  but  are  essential 
to  the  end  in  view — decision.  They  may  create  sym- 
pathy or  antagonism,  suspense  or  surprise,  desire,  mo- 
tive, or  sheer  determination  of  the  will,  but  they  should 
always  leave  reason  enthroned  and  be  supported  by 
justice  and  right. 

The  Debater  Himself. — As  to  the  debater  himself, 
he  should  be  a  man  of  individuality,  should  possess  con- 
structive as  well  as  analytical  powers  and,  without  run- 
ning into  the  fallacies  of  the  persuasive  orator,  should 
always  be  able  to  give  a  personal  touch  which  adds  so 
much  to  human  interest. 

No  mere  formal  study  of  the  elements  of  debate  will 
make  a  debater.  No  body  of  knowledge,  no  rules  of 
thinking,  no  principles  of  expression  or  suggestion  can 
take  the  place  of  the  indefinable  power  of  the  speaker 
himself.  There  is  in  every  great  orator,  every  great 
debater,  an  individuality,  a  creative  impulse  which 
masters  formal  rules  so  thoroughly  that  the  mechanical 
process — the  technic — is  lost  in  the  earnest  expression  of 
ideas  and  beliefs.  Facts,  principles,  illustrations,  phrases, 
rhythm,  even  processes  of  thought  are  all  transmuted 
by  the  alchemical  power  of  the  great  artist,  who  knows, 
who  thinks,  who  feels,  who  images  not  after  a  pattern. 
He  combines  what  he  gets  from  without  with  that  which 
comes  from  within  and  in  so  doing  transforms  and  turns 
into  gold — true  to  reality,  true  to  himself.    Originality 


INTRODUCTORY  13 

or  genius  is  fed  by  innumerable  sources,  most  of  which 
are  too  delicate,  too  subtle,  too  varied  to  be  easily  recog- 
nized, even  by  the  man  himself,  at  the  time.  In  addition 
to  formal  rules,  therefore,  it  is  beheved  that  the  growth 
of  such  a  power  is  to  be  encouraged  in  other  ways,  such 
as  by  (i)  famiharity  and  association,  with  the  speeches 
and  writings  of  the  great  debaters  and  a  careful  study 
and  analysis  of  their  productions,  and  (2)  by  frequent 
practice  in  impromptu  public  speaking  and  debate — 
done  under  such  circumstances  and  on  such  occasions 
as  will  arouse  and  command  the  highest  psychological 
interest. 

Plan  of  the  Book 

In  one  of  his  greatest  speeches,  Lincoln  once  said 
with  rare  simplicity  and  common  sense:  "If  we  could 
first  know  where  we  are  and  whither  we  are  tending, 
we  could  better  judge  what  to  do  and  how  to  do  it." 
The  larger  divisions  of  the  subject  as  treated  in  this 
book  are:  (i)  logical  organization;  and  (2)  presenta- 
tion. 

Under  the  term  logical  organization,  we  will  con- 
sider first,  briefs  and  brief-making,  or  the  analysis  and 
synthesis  of  a  particular  proof  in  a  special  skeletonized 
form  with  its  special  features;  second,  arguments,  or 
the  important  types  of  associative  processes  which  form 
the  basis  of  logical  inference  and  which  have  been  desig- 
nated with  special  names  as  arguments ;  third,  evidence, 
or  facts  and  opinions  derived  from  others,  as  used  in 
debating  in  comparison  and  contrast  with  the  prescribed 
or  customary  use  of  evidence  in  courts  of  law. 

We  shall  then  perhaps  be  ready  to  consider  the  final 
topic  of  presenting  our  ideas  in  an  argument  before  an 


14  THE  FUNDAMENTALS    OF   DEBATE 

audience,  or  the  subject  of  presentation.  This  will  be 
shown  to  involve  imaginative  suggestion,  including,  as 
always,  the  need  of  adaptation  to  ends  and  circum- 
stances. It  involves  further  the  viewing  of  our  judg- 
ments and  reasons  as  concepts,  for  the  purpose  of  bringing 
them  within  local  experience  for  recognition,  compar- 
ison, and  decision.  The  presentation  is  treated  in 
chapters  on  imagination  in  argument,  suggestion  in  ar- 
gument, and  the  instruments  of  suggestion. 


PART  I 
LOGICAL   ORGANIZATION 

CHAPTER  II 

BRIEFS   AND   BRIEF-MAKING 

Need  of  a  Plan. — In  our  moments  of  appreciation 
of  any  work  of  art,  it  is  perhaps  natural  for  us  to  think 
of  it  more  for  itself  than  as  the  product  of  a  mind  that 
had  carefully  planned  and  a  hand  that  had  skilfully 
executed.  And  yet  we  know  that  every  worthy  artistic 
product  means  skill  both  in  designing  and  in  execution. 
In  these  respects,  the  art  of  composition  closely  resembles 
the  art  of  architecture.  Just  as  the  architect  makes 
his  drawings  and  specifications  in  advance  of  the  con- 
struction of  a  building,  so  too  the  writer  of  any  sub- 
stantial work  must  give  careful  thought  to  the  way  his 
material  is  to  be  put  together,  what  purpose  it  is  to 
serve,  and  what  impression  it  is  to  make  when  finished. 
The  plan  of  an  argumentative  composition  when  care- 
fully worked  out  and  with  appropriate  details  is  called 
a  brief;  but  a  brief  must  follow  certain  elementary  rules 
of  construction.  It  does  not  consist  merely  of  a  few 
"speaking  notes,"  but  should  be  so  full  in  material  and 
so  exact  in  statement  and  in  suggestion  of  method  as 
to  be  intelligible  and  convincing  to  another. 

15 


16  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

The  Brief  Defined. — The  brief  of  an  argument  is 
the  record  of  the  analysis,  classification,  and  arrange- 
ment of  everything  of  importance  which  is  necessary 
to  the  explanation  of  the  issues  and  to  the  process  of 
proof.  It  should  disclose  the  material  to  be  employed 
as  evidence;  it  should  indicate  in  the  clearest  fashion 
the  method  of  the  process;  and  it  should  be  in  the  form 
of  a  series  of  propositions  put  together  according  to 
some  plan  and  arranged  in  such  a  sequence  as  to  pro- 
duce a  single  and  cumulative  effect.  It  is  analogous  to 
the  plans  and  specifications  of  the  architect. 

The  Making  of  a  Brief. — The  elements  of  a  good  brief 
are  a  valuable  subject-matter,  a  logical  method,  and  an 
artistic  form.  Of  these  the  first  two  are  controlhng; 
for  aside  from  mere  details  of  exterior  adornment,  the 
form  of  a  brief  is  determined  largely  by  its  material 
and  its  structure.  Here,  again,  the  brief  resembles  a 
work  of  architecture;  for  the  form  of  a  building  depends 
of  course  upon  the  material  of  which  it  is  built  and  its 
mode  of  design  and  construction.  Compare,  for  instance, 
the  workman's  "tool  shanty"  with  the  massive  stone 
structure  standing  beside  it.  The  material  which  is 
organized  into  a  brief  should  be  drawn  not  merely  from 
a  fund  of  general  knowledge,  but  should  be  acquired 
by  diligent  reading  and  study.  There  is  a  value  or  force 
of  argument  in  the  subject-matter  quite  apart  from 
the  way  such  matter  is  put  together.  It  was  said  of 
Burke,  that  one  could  hardly  stop  with  him  during  a 
thunder-shower  under  an  awning  without  being  im- 
pressed with  the  idea  that  he  was  the  most  learned  man 
in  England.  The  brief-maker  should  endeavor  to  know 
everything  of  value  pertaining  to  his  subject;  he  should 
be  saturated  with  his  material. 


BRIEFS  AND   BRIEF-MAKING  17 

I.    The  Process 

The  chief  steps  in  the  process  of  brief-making  are: 
(i)  Analysis,  constructive  and  destructive;  (2)  Clas- 
sification;   (3)  Arrangement. 

I.  Analysis. — The  first  step  in  brief-making  is  analy- 
sis, by  which  is  meant  the  separation  of  everything  per- 
taining to  the  subject  into  its  component  parts  and 
isolating  them  for  the  purpose  of  studying  (i)  their 
truth  and  (2)  their  relations. 

The  unit  of  the  brief  is  the  proposition.  It  is  not 
meant  by  this  that  a  proposition  is  indivisible,  for  it 
can  be  separated  into  its  terms;  but  rather  that  it  is 
the  necessary  unit  of  any  formal  course  of  reasoning,  as 
a  premise  or  a  conclusion.  We  cannot  argue,  for  in- 
stance, from  or  to  the  single  idea  or  term,  war,  but  we 
may,  however,  argue  from  the  proposition  that  war  is 
an  evil  to  the  conclusion  that,  let  us  say,  war  should  be 
abolished. 

The  first  consideration  then  in  the  making  of  a  brief 
on  any  subject  is: 

A  complete  analysis  of  the  subject  itself,  involving: 

A.  An  analysis  of  all  the  propositions  necessary  to  sustain 

the  side  of  the  case  which  the  brief-maker  is  attempting 
to  establish. 

B.  A  complete  analysis  of  all  the  propositions  which  an  op- 

ponent is  obliged  to  establish  in  order  to  sustain  his 
side  of  the  case. 

Just  as  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  understand  the  com- 
plete workings  of  any  mechanism,  to  take  apart  and 
examine  its  parts  separately,  so  it  is  necessary  to  any 


18  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

general  mental  conception  of  a  subject  to  separate  this 
conception  into  all  the  various  steps  of  reasoning  by 
which  such  mental  conception  is  reached  as  a  conclu- 
sion. 

If  you  are  obliged  to  establish  either  the  affirmative 
or  negative  of  any  proposition,  this  analysis  is  neces- 
sary, in  order  that  you  may,  first,  ascertain  the  strength 
or  weakness  of  the  various  propositions  necessary  in 
order  to  establish  the  conclusion  which  you  are  bound 
to  prove;  and  second,  see  the  proper  relation  which  each 
proposition  bears  to  the  conclusion  that  you  are  bound 
to  sustain  and  thus  be  in  a  position,  when  you  reach 
the  constructive  part  of  the  argument,  to  arrange  the 
same  in  such  relation  with  ease. 

After  you  have  thoroughly  tested  by  analysis  the 
strength  of  your  own  case,  the  same  analytical  test  should 
be  applied  to  your  opponent's  case,  for  the  same  reasons 
and  this  additional  one:  it  is  only  by  analysis  that  any 
latent  defect  in  an  opponent's  structure  can  be  deter- 
mined; and  such  analysis,  before  proceeding  with  the 
brief,  will  make  the  brief-maker's  work  in  this  regard 
simply  a  matter  of  establishing  the  authority  or  evidence 
which  proves  the  inherent  defect,  or  in  the  event  that 
such  inherent  defect  is  a  non  sequitur,  or  is  otherwise 
illogically  supported,  tlien  the  brief-maker's  construc- 
tive work  will  be  merely  a  matter  of  exposing  the  fal- 
lacy discovered. 

After  this  introductory  work,  the  brief-maker  is  pre- 
pared to  construct  his  brief,  and  his  work  is  usually 
constructive  or  destructive. 

2.  Classification. — A  second  consideration  in  the 
making  of  a  brief  is  classification,  involving:  (i)  The 
classification  of  the  propositions  to  be  presented  in  sus- 


BRIEFS  AND   BRIEF-MAKING  19 

taining  the  side  of  the  case  which  the  brief-maker  is 
attempting  to  establish;  (2)  the  classification  of  the 
propositions  which  an  opponent  is  obhged  to  establish 
in  order  to  sustain  his  side  of  the  case. 

Instead  of  writing  down  a  short  Hst  of  unassorted 
reasons  or  ill-digested  bits  of  evidence,  the  brief-maker 
should  attempt  to  synthetize  his  material,  to  reduce  it 
to  principles,  to  classify  it;  and  so  put  it  into  the  form 
of  a  few  main  headings  or  points,  easy  to  understand 
and  to  remember,  and  which  will  give  a  view  of  his  case 
as  a  whole.  These  main  divisions,  of  course,  must  be 
so  chosen  that  when  properly  supported  they  will  form 
a  proof  of  the  case. 

If  an  opponent's  case  is  to  be  understood  and  an- 
swered most  eft'ectively  it  is  equally  necessary  that  the 
propositions  essential  to  an  opponent's  case  should  be 
made  clear  and  simple  through  this  same  process  of 
classification. 

After  the  main  headings  are  formed,  the  brief  should 
be  filled  in;  that  is,  the  other  propositions  studied  as 
supporting  reasons,  should  be  put  in  a  logical  sequence, 
classified,  when  possible,  and  inserted  in  the  brief  in 
their  proper  places  and  series  as  subheadings. 

ILLUSTRATION  A 

BODY   OF   PROOF 

The  removal  of  troops  is  necessary,  because: 

I.     It  will  show  the  willingness  of  the  English  to    treat 

amicably. 
II.     The  resistance  of  the  Americans  was  necessary. 
III.    The  means  of  enforcing  the  measures  of  Parliament 
have  failed. 


20  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

IV.     If  Parliament  tries  by  the  aid  of  the  army  to  enforce 

its  measures  the  result  will  be  bad. 
V.     The  statement  that  "the  union  in  America  cannot  last" 
is  untrue. 
VI.     The  statement  that  the  Americans  should  be  punished 

for  illegal  violence  is  untrue. 
VII.     This  removal  of  the  troops  must  precede  any  other  step. 
VIII.     The  views  of  Congress  are  moderate  and  reasonable. 
IX.     It  is  an  old  maxim  that  the  first  concession  comes  most 

freely  from  the  superior. 
X.     While  every  policy  urges  withdrawal  of  the  troops  every 
danger  warns  the  English  from  keeping  to  the  old 
course. 

In  this  illustration,  it  is  apparent  (i)  that  the  points 
are  too  numerous.  The  mind  cannot  readily  carry 
as  many  as  ten  reasons  for  accepting  a  conclusion. 
This  is  so,  even  where  the  sequences  are  obvious.  But 
here,  again  (2),  the  sequences  are  not  obvious.  The 
mind  is  carried  forward  by  uneven  steps,  with  a  result- 
ing jolt  to  the  attention.  For  instance,  while  the  first 
reason  offered  to  prove  the  need  of  removing  the  troops 
asserts  clearly  that  "it  will  show  the  willingness  of  the 
English  to  treat  amicably,"  the  second  asserting  that 
*'the  resistance  of  the  Americans  was  necessary"  does 
not  seem  to  come  naturally  after  the  first,  and  does  not 
appear  to  be  a  reason  at  all  for  the  necessity  of  remov- 
ing the  troops.  To  put  it  in  another  way,  the  two 
propositions  do  not  belong  in  the  same  logical  series. 
Any  plan  which  is  to  form  the  synthesis  of  the  materials 
into  a  logical  proof  must  not  be  a  mere  enumeration 
or  catalogue  of  points.  The  main  points  must  be  stated 
in  an  easy  sequence,  and  so  classified  as  to  be  few  in 
number  and  easily  comprehended. 


BRIEFS  AND   BRIEF-MAKING  21 

ILLUSTRATION  B 

BODY    OF   PROOF 

The  measure  proposing  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  troops 
should  be  adopted,  for: 

I.     Measures  preparatory  to  peace  and  prosperity  should  be 

adopted. 
II.     This  measure  is  preparatory  to  peace  and  prosperity,  for: 

A.  This  measure  will  be  conciliatory,  for: 

I.  It  will  show  our  willingness  to  treat  amicably. 

B.  Only  conciliatory  measures  are  preparatory  to  peace 

and  prosperity,  for: 

1.  All  other  plans  will  fail,  for: 

a.  Force  is  unwise.. 

b.  Inaction  will  avail  nothing. 

c.  Coercion  is  unwarranted. 

2.  The  remaining  plan,  conciliation,  will  succeed  if  we 

withdraw  the  troops  as  a  first  step. 

From  illustration  B  it  is  apparent  that  classification 
involves  two  steps — co-ordination  and  subordination. 
For  instance,  since  the  main  points  of  a  brief  are  in  a 
logical  sequence,  they  should  appear  in  the  brief  as  co- 
ordinate. Then,  for  the  next,  or  lower,  order  each  main 
proposition  should  be  supported  by  a  minor  proposition 
or  sequence  of  propositions  immediately  subordinate 
to  it.  If  there  is  a  series  of  such  minor  propositions 
immediately  subordinate  to  a  main  proposition,  all  such 
propositions  should  be  co-ordinated  in  the  brief.  They 
must  be  classified  as  subordinate  to  the  main  proposi- 
tion immediately  above  it  and  placed  in  sequence.  This 
double  process  of  co-ordination  and  subordination  is 
continued  in  the  other  orders  until  the  proof  is  com- 
plete.   In  this  view,  a  brief  is  a  regular  series  of  parallel 


22  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

and  descending  propositions  by  which  the  mind  may, 
by  natural  and  even  stages,  reach  the  main  conclu- 
sion. 

Illustration  B  is,  of  course,  not  an  illustration  of  a 
complete  proof  of  the  case,  but  rather  of  a  mode  of  clas- 
sification through  co-ordination  and  subordination.  It 
will  be  noted,  too,  that  the  method  of  classification  here 
employed  for  the  headings  I,  II,  and  A  and  B  consists 
(i)  in  laying  down  a  general  principle;  (2)  in  making 
a  particular  statement  which  is  included  within  the 
general  principle. 

There  are  various  ways  of  classifying.  The  experi- 
enced debater  is  quick  to  perceive  that  his  arguments, 
however  diversified  or  compHcated  they  may  seem, 
are  reducible  to  a  few  simple  headings  or  categories, 
which  may  be  stated  in  the  form  of  a  proposition.  Some 
of  the  simple  and  most  common  methods  may  be  in- 
dicated: 

The  plan  proposed  should  be  adopted,  because: 

1.  It  is  necessary. 

2.  It  is  desirable. 

1.  It  is  sound  in  theory. 

2.  It  will  work  well  in  practice. 

1.  It  is  sanctioned  by  authority. 

2.  It  is  sanctioned  by  reason. 

It  is  demanded  for  (i)  political  reasons. 

(2)  social  reasons. 

(3)  economic  reasons. 

Its  effect  will  be  good  upon  (i)  the  state. 

(2)  the  nation. 


BRIEFS   AND   BRIEF-MAKING  23 

1.  There  is  need  of  a  remedy  for  existing  evils. 

2.  The  plan  proposed  will  remedy  existing  evils. 

3.  The  plan  proposed  will  remedy  existing  evils  better  than 

any  other  plan. 

Such  illustrations  may  be  extended  almost  indefinitely. 
Those  given  are  merely  suggestive. 

3.  Arrangement. — A  third  consideration  in  the  making 
of  a  brief  is  an  arrangement  for  climax. 

The  grouping  of  the  main  divisions  of  a  proof  should 
be  made  not  only  in  accord  with  some  central  idea,  but 
these  divisions  should  be  arranged  in  such  an  order  that 
there  vdll  be  a  growth  of  thought,  an  onward  movement. 

The  most  common  or  t3^ical  arrangement  is  that 
in  which  the  main  parts  rise  or  grow  successively  in 
importance  or  force.  There  are  variations  from  the 
type;  but  in  all  cases  a  composition  should  gain  an 
increasing  hold  on  the  attention  and  interest  of  the 
audience.  Indeed,  there  must  be  in  the  mind  of  the 
brief-maker,  from  the  beginning  and  throughout,  some 
general  plan  or  mode  of  procedure  so  conceived  and 
developed  as  to  secure  for  the  composition  as  a  whole 
the  highest  cumulative  effectiveness.  Likewise  it  is 
desirable  that  whenever  possible  the  subheadings  should, 
also,  be  arranged  in  the  order  of  climax. 

We  cannot  reason  without  either  progress  or  unity. 
We  get  nowhere,  for  instance,  by  repeating  the  sentence: 
"All  men  are  mortal."  If,  however,  after  declaring 
that  all  men  are  mortal,  we  add  simply  that  Mr.  Jones 
is  a  man,  we  have  taken  a  step  forward  which  allows  us 
to  conclude  that,  therefore,  Mr.  Jones  is  mortal.  We 
have  done  this,  moreover,  through  the  central  or  unify- 
ing idea  that  Mr.  Jones  is  a  man,  that  is,  belongs  to  the 
class,  man,  known  to  be  mortal.    Further,  where  there 


24  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

is  a  series  of  such  arguments,  and — as  is  usually  the 
case — an  option  as  to  the  order  of  arrangement,  the 
brief-maker  will  invariably  choose  the  order  of  climax 
as  sanctioned  by  experience  and  by  common  sense.  Take, 
for  example,  the  First  Letter  in  which  Junius  attacked 
the  King  and  his  ministry.  When  he  was  attempting 
to  prove  that  "the  true  cause  of  our  misfortunes  lies 
in  the  distribution  of  the  departments  of  state,"  there 
was  no  inevitable  order,  from  a  logical  standpoint,  in 
which  all  the  heads  of  the  departments  must  be  taken 
up.  Junius  chose  an  order  of  climax.  He  began  with 
the  Duke  of  Grafton,  first  lord  of  the  treasury,  and  Lord 
North,  chancellor  of  the  exchequer;  then  he  took  up, 
in  turn,  Hillsborough  of  the  foreign  department,  Wey- 
mouth of  the  home  department,  Granby  of  the  army, 
Hawke  of  the  navy,  and  finally  the  powerful  and  able 
Lord  Mansfield,  head  of  the  department  of  justice. 

Without  interfering  with  the  logic  of  the  case,  the 
use  of  climax  is  grounded  in  sound  principles  of  psy- 
chology which  lie  at  the  basis  of  art.  Practically,  this 
means  that  a  climactic  order  is  calculated  to  reach  after 
the  waning  attention  and  interest  of  the  reader  or  hearer 
at  the  time  when  he  is  becoming  inattentive  or  disin- 
terested, through  fatigue. 

11.    The  Result 

The  marks  of  a  good  brief,  and  therefore  the  ends 
to  be  striven  for  by  the  brief -maker,  are:  (i)  Unity, 
(2)  Logical  sequence,  (3)  Proportion. 

These  principles  are  not  only  logical  but  sesthetic 
in  their  nature.  They  underlie,  shghtly  modified  (unity, 
continuity,  proportion),  the  technic  of  such  arts,  for 
example,  as  architecture,  sculpture,  and  painting.     In 


BRIEFS  AND   BRIEF-MAKING  25 

the  text-books  on  English  composition  they  are  gen- 
erally treated  as  the  most  important  principles  which 
can  be  laid  down  for  writing  "whole  compositions," 
not  only  because  they  are  regarded  as  essential  marks 
of  a  good  structure,  but  because  when  properly  applied, 
they  afford  a  certain  literary  delight.  Thus,  a  finished 
argumentative  composition,  whose  chief  aim  is  con- 
viction, may  through  skill  in  design  and  workmanship 
appeal  also  to  the  aesthetic  sense. 

1.  Unity. — The  first  principle  determining  the  form  of 
the  brief  is  unity.  One  dominant  idea  or  related  group 
of  ideas  vnll  guide,  direct,  and  centralize  the  attention 
of  the  mind  and  hold  the  interest.  Such  a  structure 
strikes  the  mind  with  single,  undivided,  force.  Every 
part  adds  to  and  helps  to  complete  the  whole.  In  his 
own  mind  the  brief-maker  has  taken  the  machine  apart 
by  the  analytical  process  which  he  has  practised  before 
starting  work.  By  the  machine  I  mean  the  material 
to  be  employed  in  the  proof.  This  material  has  been 
not  only  separated  into  propositions  but  in  some  way 
grouped  or  classified.  Now  all  these  parts  must  be 
properly  united;  nothing  must  be  left  out.  And  when 
the  structure  is  complete,  it  stands  out  as  one  complete 
whole,  each  integer  present  in  the  unit. 

2.  Logical  Sequence. — The  second  principle  deter- 
mining the  form  of  the  brief  is  logical  sequence.  Often 
there  are  various  ways  in  which  the  machine  may  be 
constructed  so  that  it  will  work;  hence,  the  best  ar- 
rangement of  the  parts  must  be  found.  The  value  of 
a  logical  arrangement  is  that  it  is  a  step-by-step  process 
in  which  each  rung  of  the  ladder  appears  in  its  proper 
place,  making  it  possible  for  a  reader  to  climb  regularly 
and   methodically   to   the   top—the   conclusion.     This 


26  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

logical  sequence  tends  to  make  for  clearness;  it  also 
makes  the  conclusion  and  the  processes  more  easily 
retained  in  the  memory.  But  particularly  for  the  reader 
of  a  brief,  it  obviates  the  necessity  of  retracing  one's 
steps  and  reading  over  again,  several  pages  back,  propo- 
sitions which,  if  they  had  been  placed  in  their  proper 
order,  would  have  been  easily  understood  and  retained. 

3.  Proportion. — The  third  principle  governing  form 
is  proportion.  This  principle  requires  that  space  in 
the  brief  shall  be  allotted  according  to  the  needs  of  the 
proof.  It  necessitates  cutting  out  and  filling  in;  and 
requires  careful  attention  and  good  judgment. 

The  object  of  a  brief  is  to  convince,  and  conviction 
is  attained  by  a  step-by-step  process  from  one  proposi- 
tion to  another.  Now  some  of  these  steps  require  con- 
siderable support  by  the  brief-maker  before  he  can  make 
it  seem  to  another  safe  to  stand  upon  them.  Others 
require  very  little  support  for  that  purpose,  and  still 
others  are  axiomatic  and  require  none. 

A  brief  which  does  not  give  to  each  step  its  proper 
amount  of  support  and  no  more,  is  necessarily  out  of 
proportion.  Too  much  elucidation  and  proof  of  simple 
propositions  is  apt  to  tire  the  reader  who  has  to  climb 
the  ladder,  and  might  result,  and  often  does  in  court 
cases,  in  a  refusal  to  take  the  other  steps  and  a  return  to 
the  ground. 

Too  little  elucidation  leaves  too  much  to  the  reason- 
ing process  of  the  reader;  and  in  case  his  mental  equip- 
ment or  general  knowledge  is  inadequate,  he  may  re- 
gard his  footing  as  unsafe,  and  refuse  to  proceed  further. 

What  has  been  said  in  regard  to  the  steps  necessary 
to  reach  any  conclusion  is  equally  true  when  there  are 


BRIEFS  AND  BRIEF-MAKING  27 

several  points  to  be  established,  when  there  are  several 
ladders  to  climb.  Frequently  there  are  one  or  more 
ladders  which  it  is  much  more  important  that  the  reader 
should  climb  than  all  the  others  which  have  been  offered 
to  him.  A  brief  which  gives  more  space  and  time  to 
the  unimportant  than  to  these  one  or  two  important 
ladders  is  of  course  out  of  proportion.  The  most  im- 
portant propositions  are  apt  to  be  those  supported  by 
arguments  of  greatest  difficulty  or  complexity,  of  greatest 
force,  or  of  greatest  cogency. 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  said  that  while  much  de- 
pends upon  analysis,  classification,  arrangement,  unity, 
sequence,  and  proportion,  the  fact  must  never  be  lost 
sight  of  that  no  finished  brief-maker  will  stop  there. 
The  finesse  of  the  art,  of  which  all  these  things  are  the 
soHd  structure,  is  in  making  the  brief  so  thoroughly 
readable,  so  happy  in  its  selection  of  words  and  phrases, 
so  clear  in  its  expression,  that  it  is  a  pleasure  to  read  it, 
that  it  entertains  while  it  elucidates,  that  it  dehghts 
while  it  convinces,  for  the  human  element  in  all  readers 
is  such  that  intellectual  delight  will  make  the  road  to 
conviction  much  easier.  A  brief  will  be  much  more 
thoroughly  read  if  it  dehghts  and  entertains  while  it 
elucidates  and  convinces. 

III.    Process  and  Result 

Unity. — The  most  important  principle  of  structure 
is  unity.  This  is  true  both  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
process  and  the  result.  With  a  single  exception,  all 
the  ideas  hitherto  mentioned  as  involved  in  brief-making 
(analysis,   classification,   logical  sequence,   and  propor- 


28  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

tion)  are  contributory  to  unity  and  the  means  of  ob- 
taining it.  If,  then,  we  inquire  how  unity  is  to  be  ob- 
tained, the  answer  is: 

1.  By  the  separating  and  combining  process  of  analy- 
sis and  classification,  so  that  the  various  logical  sequences, 
horizontal  and  perpendicular,  lead  the  mind  inevitably 
to  one  thing — the  conclusion — no  logical  breaks,  no 
disproportion;   and 

2.  By  an  expression  in  language  which  adequately 
records  the  above  unified  mental  conceptions.  In  ar- 
gument or  debate  unity  of  thought  fails  without  unity 
of  expression. 

a.  It  is  perhaps  a  truism  to  say  that  all  such  con- 
ceptions should  be  expressed  with  clearness  and  pre- 
cision. It  is  not,  however,  a  truism  but  a  truth  to  say 
that  the  brief-maker  may  use  such  apt  and  striking 
forms  of  expressions  that  they  will  easily  arrest  the  at- 
tention and  stick  in  the  memory.  Indeed  a  sharp,  terse, 
and  sometimes  an  antithetical  statement  will  often  so 
arrest  the  attention  that  it  will  remain  in  the  mem- 
ory long  after  the  body  of  the  proof  has  been  for- 
gotten. 

b.  But  these  conceptions  must  be  expressed  in  lan- 
guage which  will  not  only  reveal  themselves  but  which 
vnll  also  disclose  their  relations  to  other  propositions; 
for,  in  a  brief  no  proposition  stands  alone,  each  is  re- 
lated to  another  and  to  the  whole.  And  always  to  show 
the  relationships  involved  requires  good  workmanship. 
Indeed,  where  a  number  of  conceptions  are  to  be  stated 
as  in  a  brief,  and  stated  of  course  successively,  he  is 
really  an  artist  in  language  who  can  relate  them  all  so 
aptly  and  in  such  a  manner  as  to  impress  the  reader 
with  an  idea  of  the  whole.    ''Clear  thinking,"  valuable 


BRIEFS   AND   BRIEF-MAKING  29 

as  it  is,  does  not  necessarily  mean  clear  writing;  for,  good 
writing  requires  the  work  both  of  a  good  architect  and 
a  good  carpenter. 

There  are  a  few  formal  rules  of  rhetoric,  which  are 
supposed  to  afford  some  help  in  giving  expression  to 
conceptions,  which  in  the  mind  are  properly  classified, 
and  stand  in  their  proper  sequence.    They  are: 

(i)  Parallel  structure,  or  phrasing  every  one  of  a 
series  of  conceptions  in  any  sequence  in  a  similar  form 
of  language;  (2)  emphasizing  the  relation  between 
propositions  by  hack  references,  involving  repetitions  of 
phrases  or  ideas,  the  use  of  this,  that,  these,  those,  the 
former,  the  latter,  such  a,  etc.,  (3)  and  joining  proposi- 
tions by  the  use  of  conjunctions — because,  for,  since, 
but,  moreover,  and  beside,  etc. 

For  an  appHcation  of  these  rules  the  student  is  re- 
ferred to  the  specimen  brief  on  the  First  Junius  Letter 
and  the  other  briefs  in  this  volume.  He  may,  however, 
for  himself  apply  them  by  taking,  let  us  say,  the  six 
capital  causes  for  the  colonists'  love  of  liberty  in  Burke's 
speech  on  conciUation,  formulating  the  six  causes  enu- 
merated, in  carefully  phrased  propositions. 

The  following  extract  from  Matthew  Arnold's  essay 
on  "The  Function  of  Criticism  at  the  Present  Time" 
will  illustrate  a  dexterous  use  of  these  devices.  A  little 
study  of  the  italicized  words  will  show  by  what  means 
the  main  proposition  is  here  made  to  appear  so  closely 
related  both  to  its  supporting  propositions  in  this  para- 
graph and  to  the  main  proposition  of  the  essay. 

It  is  of  the  last  importance  that  English  criticism  should 
cleady  discern  what  rule  for  its  course,  in  order  to  avail  itself 
of  the  field  now  opening  to  it,  and  to  produce  fruit  for  the  future, 
it  ought  to  take.     The  rule  may  be  summed  up  in  one  word — 


30  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

disinterestedness,  (i)  And  how  is  criticism  to  show  disinterested- 
ness ?  By  keeping  aloof  from  what  is  called  "  the  practical  view" 
of  things;  by  resolutely  following  the  law  of  its  own  nature, 
which  is  to  be  a  free  play  of  the  mind  on  all  subjects  which  it 
touches.  By  steadily  refusing  to  lend  itself  to  any  of  those 
ulterior,  political,  practical  considerations  about  ideas,  which 
plenty  of  people  will  be  sure  to  attach  to  them,  which  perhaps 
ought  often  to  be  attached  to  them,  which  in  this  country  at 
any  rate  are  certain  to  be  attached  to  them  quite  sufficiently, 
but  which  criticism  has  really  nothing  to  do  with.  Its  business 
is,  as  I  have  said,  simply  to  know  the  best  that  is  known  and  thought 
in  the  world,  and  by  in  its  turn  making  this  known,  to  create 
a  current  of  true  and  fresh  ideas.  Its  business  is  to  do  this  with 
inflexible  honesty,  with  due  ability;  but  its  business  is  to  do 
no  more,  and  to  leave  alone  all  questions  of  practical  consequences 
and  applications,  questions  which  will  never  fail  to  have  due 
prominence  given  to  them.  Else  criticism,  besides  being  really 
false  to  its  own  nature,  merely  continues  in  the  old  rut  which 
it  has  hitherto  followed  in  this  country,  and  will  certainly  miss 
the  chance  now  given  to  it.  (2)  For  what  is  at  present  the  bane 
of  criticism  in  this  country?  It  is  that  practical  considerations 
cling  to  it  and  stifle  it.  It  subserves  interests  not  its  own.  Our 
organs  of  criticism  are  organs  of  men  and  parties  having  prac- 
tical ends  to  serve,  and  with  them  those  practical  ends  are  the 
first  thing  and  the  play  of  mind  the  second;  so  much  play  of 
mind  as  is  compatible  with  the  prosecution  of  those  practical 
ends  is  all  that  is  wanted.  An  organ  like  the  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes,  having  for  its  main  function  to  understand  and  utter 
the  best  that  is  known  and  thought  in  the  world,  existing,  it  may 
be  said,  as  just  an  organ,  for  a.  free  play  of  the  mind,  we  have  not. 
But  we  have  the  Edinburgh  Review,  existing  as  an  organ  of  the 
old  Whigs.  .  .  .  No  other  criticism  will  ever  attain  any  real 
authority  or  make  any  real  way  toward  its  end — the  creating  a 
current  of  true  and  fresh  ideas. 

Climax. — It  has  been  said  that  all  the  ideas  previously 
mentioned  as  involved  in  brief-making  (analysis,  clas- 
sification, logical  sequence,  and  proportion),  with  a  soli- 
tary exception,  contribute  to  unity  and  are  the  means 


BRIEFS   AND   BRIEF-MAKING  31 

of  obtaining  it.  This  exception  is  arrangement  in  the 
order  of  climax. 

The  term  climax  means  either  one  of  two  things: 
(i)  A  mode  of  arrangement  in  which  the  parts  grow  or 
rise  successively  in  importance  or  force,  or  (2)  the  final 
or  last  part  of  such  an  arrangement.  It  is  either  a  ladder 
in  which  the  rungs  are  strengthened  as  we  ascend,  or 
the  top  rung  of  such  a  ladder. 

In  making  a  brief,  it  is  frequently  not  the  sole  de- 
sideratum that  the  propositions  should  be  arranged  in 
a  logical  sequence.  There  may  be  several  modes  of 
arrangement  all  of  which  are  strictly  logical,  so  that 
the  brief-maker  may  have  offered  to  him  a  choice  of 
arrangements.  He  will  then  doubtless  select  the  ar- 
rangement which  he  believes  will  be  most  effective. 

Climax  seems  to  be  a  perfectly  natural  process.  Even 
in  driving  a  nail,  the  last  stroke  is  often  the  hardest. 
And  as  an  informal  discussion  proceeds,  it  is  apt  to  grow 
in  warmth.  Climax  is  an  attempt  either  to  overcome 
any  possible  lack  of  interest  or  fatigue  as  a  discourse 
proceeds,  or  to  make  the  final  impression  the  strongest. 
Climax  is  generally  recognized  and  employed  in  fiction, 
in  the  drama,  and  in  the  sonnet  as  well  as  in  public 
speaking  and  debate. 

Two  Laws  of  Structure. — If  unity  consists  in  direct- 
ing all  parts  naturally  toward  one  thing — the  conclu- 
sion— climax  is  a  progressive  unity.  It  looks  not  only 
toward  a  single  but  a  cumulative  effect.  The  process 
presupposes  unity,  presupposes  progress.  Indeed,  Cole- 
ridge long  ago  expressed  clearly  the  principles  under- 
lying the  expression  of  thought  in  composition,  when 
he  said  that  the  essential  marks  of  method  are  "unity 
with  a  progression."    Thus,  it  would  appear  that  the 


32  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

fundamental    Laws    of  Structure    are  two:    Unity  and 
Climax. 

IV.     Rules  for  Brief-Making 

The  Three  Main  Parts  of  a  Brief. — The  propositions 
of  a  brief  fall  into  three  separate  divisions;  first,  those 
which  explain  the  issue;  second,  those  which  present 
evidence  in  proof  of  the  issue;  and  third,  those  which 
sum  up.  The  first  set  of  propositions  would  constitute 
an  Introduction,  the  second  set  a  Body  of  Proof,  and 
the  third  a  Conclusion.  These,  then,  make  three  main 
parts  for  a  brief. 

I.  The  Introduction. — The  process  employed  in  the 
introduction  is  entirely  different  from  that  used  in  the 
body  of  proof.  The  one  is  exposition;  the  other  is  argu- 
ment. Its  function  is  to  explain  whatever  is  necessary 
to  an  understanding  of  the  issues.  It  must  contain  no 
matter  of  a  disputable  character.  Given  a  question 
(carefully  formulated),  the  problem  is  to  lead  the  mind 
by  natural  sequence,  through  steps  carefully  marked, 
to  a  full  understanding  of  the  specific  point  or  points 
in  dispute.  The  great  aim  should  be  impartiahty  of 
attitude,  clearness  of  expression,  and  orderliness  of  struc- 
ture. 

In  the  academic  debates  upon  questions  of  public 
policy,  the  steps  usually  employed  may  be  briefly  in- 
dicated. First,  the  situation,  including  the  origin  of 
the  question,  is  explained.  Second,  since  any  ambiguity 
in,  or  ignorance  of,  the  exact  meaning  of  an  essential 
term  may  result  in  confusion,  the  next  step  is  to  define 
or  expound  all  such  terms.  And  third,  since  the  dis- 
cussion of  apparently  related  and  of  admitted  proposi- 
tions would  obscure  the  issue,  it  is  necessary  to  eliminate 


BRIEFS  AND   BRIEF-MAKING  33 

them.  And  finally,  as  a  consequence  of  these  three 
steps,  the  specific  issue,  or  issues,  may  be  stated  in  exact 
form.    The  introduction,  then,  consists  of: 

I.  The  situation,  involving  the  origin  of  the  question. 

II.  Definition  of  words,  or  exposition  of  phrases,  contained 
in  the  statement  of  the  question  or  to  be  employed  in 
the  discussion. 

III.     The  eHmination. 

A.  Of  admitted  propositions. 

B.  Of  extraneous  propositions. 

IV.     The  formal  statement  of  the  specific  issue,  or  issues, 

II.  The  Body  or  Brief  Proper. — The  function  of  the 
body  of  a  brief  is  to  set  forth  formally  for  the  inspec- 
tion of  another  all  the  means  and  processes  employed 
as  the  proof  or  compelling  reason  for  accepting  the  main 
conclusion.  It  consists  of  the  propositions  to  be  proved 
and  the  subject-matter  of  their  proof,  each  proposition 
stated  in  the  form  of  reasons,  and  all  the  propositions 
so  carefully  correlated  as  readily  to  disclose  the  nature, 
relevancy,  and  force  of  each  part  of  the  proof,  and  the 
proof  as  a  whole. 

Rule  I.  The  headings  should  be  in  the  form  of  a 
declarative  statement  or  proposition;  not  mere  topics. 

Rule  II.  The  headings  should  read  as  reasons;  the 
correct  order  being  first,  proposition;  then,  proof,  and 
the  correct  connectives  being  because,  for,  since,  etc. 

Rule  III.  The  headings  should  be  carefully  cor- 
related and  marked  in  order  by  appropriate  symbols: 
I,  II,  III,  etc.;  A,  B,  C,  etc.;  i,  2,  3,  etc.;  a,  b,  c,  etc.; 
(i),  (2),  (3),  etc. 

Rule  IV.     The  main  headings  should  be  statements, 


34  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

carefully  phrased  to  include  the  proof  to  follow;  and 
they  should  be  few  in  number. 

Rule  V.  Each  main  heading  should  be  elaborated 
or  developed  by  subordinate  headings  until  its  truth 
is  made  apparent. 

Rule  VI.  Refutation,  if  used  at  length,  should  be 
indicated  by  marking  the  proposition  to  which  it  ap- 
plies with  the  word  "Refutation,"  or  it  may  appear 
in  the  brief  in  its  proper  place  stated  as  the  negative 
of  the  proposition  to  be  refuted. 

III.  The  Conclusion. — The  function  of  the  conclu- 
sion is  to  sum  up.  It  consists  usually  of  a  restatement 
of  the  propositions  used  as  main  headings  in  the  body 
of  the  proof. 

It  is  sometimes  possible,  however,  to  vary  the  re- 
capitulation from  such  an  obvious  process.  As,  for 
example,  by  drawing  some  inference  from  the  main 
headings  in  combination;  making  some  effective  ap- 
plication of  them;  comparing  them  for  the  purpose  of 
emphasizing  one  in  particular  as  most  important,  or 
decisive  in  turning  the  scale;  or  illustrating  them  in 
relation  to  some  underlying  principle  or  course  of  reason- 
ing. However  varied  the  method,  the  purpose  of  the 
conclusion  is  always  that  of  a  summary. 

SPECIMEN   BRIEF 

ON  THE  REMOVAL  OF  TROOPS^ 

Introduction 
I.    The  Ministry  have  at  length  after  long  delay  condescended 

to  submit  to  this  House  news  from  America. 
II.     The  present  alarming  state  of  America  is  due  to  the  mis- 
advice  of  the  Ministry,  for 
A.  It  is  based  on  misrepresentation. 

1  Drawn  from  Lord  Chatham's  address  delivered  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  Jcmuary  20,  1775. 


BRIEFS  AND   BRIEF-MAKING  35 

III.  To  rescue  my  unhappy  country  and  his  Majesty  from 
the  misadvice  of  his  ministers  I  submit  to  him  through 
this  House  "An  address  to  his  Majesty  for  the  imme- 
diate removal  of  the  troops  from  Boston." 

IV.  The  crisis  is  so  pressing  and  urgent  as  to  admit  of  no  de- 
lay. 

V.  My  contention  is  not  for  indulgence  but  justice,  for 

A.  I  admit  that  obedience  is  properly  due  from  America — 

an  obedience  limited,  however,  to  our  laws  of  trade 
and  navigation,  but 

B.  I  contend  that  the  property  of  the  Americans  must 

remain  sacred — that  is,  taxable  by  their  own  consent 
given  in  their  provincial  assemblies. 

VI.  The  specific  issue  is  the  restoration  of  peace  and  pros- 

perity by  the  adoption  of  this  measure  proposing  the 
immediate  withdrawal  of  troops  from  Boston. 

Argument 
The  measure  proposing  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the 
troops  from  Boston  should  be  adopted,  because 

I.     Just  measures  preparatory  to  peace  and  prosperity  should 

be  adopted. 
II.    This  just  measure  is  preparatory  to  peace  and  prosperity, 
for 

A.  This  measure,  if  adopted,  will  be  conciliatory,  for 

I.  It  will  show  our  willingness  to  treat  amicably  and 
equitably. 

B.  Conciliatory  measures  are  preparatory  to  peace  and 

prosperity,  for 

1.  It  is  necessary  to  show    our  willingness  to  treat 

amicably  and  equitably,  for 
a.  Your  own  declarations  and  doctrines  have  made 
American  resistance  necessary  and  will  in  fu- 
ture be  as  ineffective. 

2.  All  other  plans  will  fail,  for 
a.  Force  is  unwise,  for 

(i).  The  army  is  held  in  contempt,  and 
(2).  General  Gage  must  not  act. 
'  (a).   The  first  drop  of  blood  means  civil  war. 


36  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

(3).  If  reconciliation  is  attempted,  it  must  be  done  im- 
mediately. 
(4).  If  Parliament  tries  to  enforce  its  measures  by  means 
of  the  army,  the  results  will  be  bad,  for 
(a).  If  they  were  victorious,  it  would  be  over  an 

embittered  people,  but 
(b).  The  troops  are  not  strong  enough  to  resist  the 
people,  because  of 
Their  numbers,   their  unity  and  courage,  and 
their  descent  from  people  who  left  their  na- 
tive land  to  escape  tyranny. 
(5).  It  must  fail,  for  it  is  an  unjust  persecution. 
b.  Inaction  on  the  part  of  England  will  avail  us  nothing, 
for 
(i).  The  assertion  that  the   union   in  America   cannot 
last  is  false,  for 
(a).  The    evidence    of    the    so-called    "commercial 

bodies"  is  unreliable,  for 
(b).  They  are  not  representative,  and 
(c).  They  are  paid  agents  of  the  government. 
(2).  Even  the  evidence  of  the  real   commercial   class 
would  be  untrustworthy,  for 
(a).  The  farming  class  represents  the  real  strength 

of  the  country,  and 
(b).  The  American  farmers  are  united  for  liberty, 
for 
The  testimony  of  Dr.  Franklin  upholds  it. 
C.  Coercion  is  unwarranted,  for 

(i).  Even  if  illegal  violences  have  been  committed  in 
America,  a  policy  of  coercion  should  not  be  fol- 
lowed, for 
(a).  An  opportunity  for  reconciliation  should  not  be 

missed. 
(6).  A  whole  people  should  not  be  punished  for  the 

faults  of  a  few. 
(c).  Such   severity   will    arouse   the    unappeasable 

wrath  of  all  the  Colonies. 
{d).  Even  if  the  army  is  victorious,  it  cannot  control 
I  the  great  tracts  of  conquered  country. 


BRIEFS   AND   BRIEF-MAKING  37 

(e).  Resistance  to  such    measures   ought   to    have 
been  foreseen. 
It  is  the  animating  principle  of  all  men  of  Eng- 
lish stock  to  resist  taxation  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  taxed. 
(J).  This  resistance  will  become  too  strong  to  be 
overcome,  for 
The  English  Whigs  will  aid  them,   since  the 
spirit  that  moves  the  Americans  has  always 
belonged  to  them. 
The  Irish  will  aid  them,  for  they  have  always 
maintained  the  ideas  the  Americans  support. 
(g).  England  has  a  right  only  to  regulate  the  com- 
merce and  navigation  of  the  Americans,  for 
Their  property  is  private,  individual,  and  ab- 
solute. 
{h).  The  means  to  oppose  this  united  body  is  weak,  for 
A  few  regiments  in  America  and   18,000  men 
at  home  must  oppose  3,000,000  Americans, 
millions  of  Englishmen,  and  all  the  Irish,  and 
The  tricks  of  the  Ministry  against  it  must  fail. 
The  remaining  plan,  conciliation,  will  succeed  if  we 
withdraw  the  troops  from  Boston  as  a  first  step,  for 

a.  It  is  the  main  cause  of  the  fear  and  the  resentment 

of  the  Americans,  for 
(i).  While  the  troops  remain,  resentment  will  re- 
main. 

b.  Even  if  the  Colonies  should  concede,  her  conces- 

sions would  be  suspicious  and  unsecure,  for 
(i).  They  would  be  the  dictates  of  fear  and  ex- 
tortions of  force. 

c.  Servitude  cannot  be  imposed  upon  such  men  as 

compose  the  American  Congress  at  Philadel- 
phia, for 
(i).  They  have  shown  solidity  of  reasoning,   force 
of  sagacity,  and  wisdom  of  conclusion,  un- 
der such  a  complication  of  difficult  circum- 
stances. 


':  r^  >i 


38  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

d.  Concession  should  come  from  England  first,  for 
(i).  Concession  from  a  superior  power  reconciles 
the  feelings  of  men  and  establishes  confi- 
dence in  it. 

Conclusion 

I.  Every  motive,  therefore,  of  justice  and  of  policy,  of  dignity 
and  of  prudence,  urges  the  removal  of  the  troops  from 
Boston,  the  repeal  of  the  acts  of  Parliament,  and  a  demon- 
stration of  amicable  dispositions  toward  the  Colonies. 

A.  Disturbances  in  America  may  mean  foreign  war,  for 

I.  France  and  Spain  are  watching  for  an  advantageous 
chance  to  interfere. 

B.  And  it  also  may  mean  domestic  trouble,  for 

1.  The  king  will  aUenate  the  affections  of  his  subjects 

and  will  lose  his  power. 

2.  The  nation  will  be  utterly  undone. 


CHAPTER  III 
ARGUMENT 

The  View-Point. — Argument,  it  has  been  said,  is  a  proc- 
ess of  resohdng  differences  of  opinion  by  means  of  as- 
sertion and  denial,  followed  by  proof  and  counter-proof 
or  distinctions.  In  one  aspect,  this  process  consists  sim- 
pl}^  in  suggesting  to  another  the  relations  which  exist  be- 
tween two  or  more  ideas  or  judgments  so  as  to  enable 
him  to  form  a  correct  opinion  concerning  some  partic- 
ular matter  of  uncertainty  or  disagreement. 

On  the  basis  of  the  kind  of  relations  thus  employed, 
argum_ents  may  be  divided  into  four  classes,  as  follows: 

1.  Arguments  involving  the  relation  of  simple  as- 
sociation. 

2.  Arguments  involving  the  relation  of  resemblance 
or  contrast. 

3.  Arguments  involving  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect,  antecedent  and  consequent,  or  motive  and  deed. 

4.  Arguments  involving  the  relation  of  particular 
and  general. 

Though  arguments  are  thus  easily  classified  into  four 
definite  groups,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  these  groups 
are  commonly  exclusive.  For  all  arguments,  in  their 
final  analysis  and  when  carried  to  completion,  will  in- 
volve an  inference  from  the  complex  relations  of  asso- 
ciation, resemblance  or  contrast,  particular  and  gen- 
eral, and  cause  and  effect. 

For  example,  if  we  should  conclude,  because  of  the 

39 


40  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF   DEBATE 

issuance  of  smoke  from  a  chimney,  that  there  was  a 
fire  below,  we  should  find  on  analysis  that  our  reasoning, 
when  fully  developed,  might  easily  involve  these  four- 
fold relations: 

1.  Smoke  means  fire — (association). 

2.  In  other  cases  where  I  have  found  smoke  I  have  found 

fire — (resemblance) . 

3.  Smoke  is  an  effect  produced  only  by  fire — (cause  and  ef- 

fect). 

4.  Where  there  is  smoke  there  is  fire — (particular  and  gen- 

eral). 

The  conclusion  that  there  is  fire,  here  drawn  from 
the  presence  of  smoke,  involves  fundamentally  an  in- 
ference grounded  in  all  four  of  the  relations  mentioned. 
Similarly,  an  argument  based  first  on  the  resemblance 
between  two  parallel  cases  may  be  shown  to  involve 
the  relation  of  particular  and  general,  and  also  of  cause 
and  effect.  Moreover,  all  inductive  reasoning  (that  is, 
from  particular  to  general)  involves  finally  a  search 
for  a  cause. 

While  it  is  ideally  true  that  every  argimient  may  in- 
volve all  these  relations,  it  does  not  follow  that  every 
argument  must  always  set  them  forth.  In  practice, 
arguments  may  not  be  developed  sufficiently  to  suggest 
all  the  relations  involved,  for  two  reasons: 

1.  Because  it  is  sometimes  impossible  from  a  sheer 
inadequacy  of  knowledge. 

2.  Because  it  is  not  necessary  or  desirable  for  the 
accompHshment  of  the  object  in  view. 

The  reasoner  or  investigator  will  sometimes  associate 
things  together— the  causes  of  which  and  the  principles 
underlying  which  he  does  not  know — and  still  feel  justi- 


ARGUMENT  41 

fied  in  drawing  conclusions  from  the  slight  relationship 
he  does  recognize.  Otherwise  he  could  not  go  forward, 
and  tlie  problem  would  be  at  a  standstill.  As  instinct 
or  feeling  precedes  positive  proof,  so  a  very  slight  reason 
may  point  the  way  to  truth  and  behef.  This  is  so  not 
merely  in  ordinary  affairs,  but  even  in  science,  as,  for 
instance,  in  the  following  conclusion  in  the  field  of 
zoology : 

The  presence  of  occipital  condyles  is  uniformly  associated 
with  the  presence  of  mammal  and  of  warm  red  blood,  and  this 
general  fact  is  treated  as  a  quasi-induction.  Hence  when  the 
remains  of  a  new  animal  are  discovered,  exhibiting  such  con- 
dyles, the  zoologist  infers,  by  deduction,  that  the  animal  be- 
longed to  the  class  mammalia. 

Moreover,  it  is  not  usually  necessary  or  desirable  to 
develop  an  argument  any  further  than  is  needed  to 
secure  its  acceptance  and  belief.  To  set  forth,  in  every 
argument  employed,  the  several  kinds  of  relationships 
involved,  would  certainly  mean  an  elucidation  of  the 
obvious,  an  attempted  proof  of  much  that  is  admitted, 
would  be  a  waste  of  time.  A  mere  suggestion  of  a  re- 
lation easily  recognized  is  frequently  sufficient,  as  for 
instance,  that  the  leaden  clouds  indicate  rain  or  snow, 
that  the  thick  ice  means  cold  weather,  that  the  rain- 
bow denotes  the  end  of  the  storm.  Conclusions  are 
constantly  accepted  without  opposition  with  no  develop- 
ment of  the  reasoning  on  which  they  are  grounded. 

Of  course,  we  reason  habitually,  in  the  ordinary  af- 
fairs of  life  from  premises  to  conclusions,  without  any 
conscious  appreciation  of  the  nature  of  the  relation  in- 
volved. Thus,  in  shooting  at  a  target  in  a  lake,  we  might 
infer  that  the  target  was  struck  because  it  sank,  with- 


42  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

out  troubling  ourselves  to  consider  that  we  were  reason- 
ing from  an  effect  to  its  cause;  we  might  buy  a  horse 
wdthout  consciously  realizing  that  we  were  applying 
our  ideas  of  a  good  horse,  such  ideas  being  derived  from 
past  experience;  we  might  attribute  a  painting  to  a 
certain  artist  almost  intuitively  without  thinking  of 
the  painting  like  it  we  had  seen  by  the  same  artist;  or 
startled  by  a  sudden  noise  we  might  conclude  that  a 
gun  had  been  fired,  obHvious  of  the  idea  of  association 
in  the  process  employed. 

But  the  debater  and  student  of  argument  must  be 
able  to  analyze  and  test  the  nature  of  the  relations  in- 
volved, must  become  conscious  of  the  processes  em- 
ployed in  argument,  whether  such  processes  are  ex- 
pressed or  implied. 

The  name  ordinarily  given  to  any  argument  is  usually 
derived  from  the  kind  of  relation  first  recognized  be- 
tween the  phenomenon,  circumstance,  or  principle  first 
observed  and  the  conclusion  drawn.  If  the  relation  is 
that  of  simple  association,  it  may  be  called  argument 
from  sign;  if  that  of  resemblance,  argument  from  ex- 
ample or  analogy;  if  that  of  particular  to  general,  in- 
duction, and  if  general  to  particular,  deduction;  if  cause 
to  effect  or  effect  to  cause,  causal  relation. 

The  efectiveness  of  any  argument  will  depend  upon 
the  recognition  and  acceptance,  by  another,  of  the  truth 
of  the  relations  between  the  conceptions  or  judgments 
presented.  On  this  basis  of  effectiveness  or  force,  ar- 
guments may  be  further  classified  as  (i)  probable  or 
moral,  and  (2)  certain  or  demonstrative. 

Unity  of  Classification. — Arguments  have  been  clas- 
sified in  rhetoric,  as  antecedent  probability,  sign,  and 
example;  a.nd  in  logic,  as  induction  a.nd  deduction.    The 


ARGUMENT  43 

following  treatment  of  the  classes  of  argument  removes 
these  distinctions  and  brings  all  classes  of  argument 
under  a  single  principle  of  unity. 

Classes  of  Argument 
/.     Association — Argument  from  Sign 

If  the  relation  from  which  the  conclusion  is  drawn 
is  regarded  as  one  of  simple  association,  the  argument 
may  be  called  argument  from  sign. 

Reasoning  from  sign  is  the  simplest  and  earliest  mani- 
festation of  mental  activity.  It  appears  not  only  in 
children,  but  in  the  childhood  of  the  race. 

Motion  signs — nods,  becks,  gestures— and  auditory 
signs — calls,  whistles,  etc. — are  given  a  definite  meaning 
almost  instinctively,  a  meaning  whose  certainty  is 
strengthened  by  experience.  Even  animals  manifest 
the  ability  to  act  upon  sign  suggestions  or  reasoning. 
Olfactory  images  acting  on  the  brain  of  the  dog  through 
many  generations  have  developed  a  remarkable  facility 
in  the  use  of  signs  conveyed  through  this  sense.  An 
excellent  example  of  animal  intelligence  is  provided  in 
the  case  of  Clever  Hans,  the  trained  horse  which  so 
long  deceived  psychologists :  This  horse  had  been  trained 
by  the  owner  to  "count  and  calculate  so  it  could  retain 
in  mind,  and  when  questioned  indicate  its  own  age,  the 
age  of  its  master,  and  many  other  numbers.  The  ex- 
planation of  the  horse's  apparent  mental  feats,  which 
a  few  years  ago  created  considerable  psychologic  in- 
terest in  Berlin,  is  due  to  the  psychologist  Stumpf  and 
his  pupil  Pfungst.  Both  these  gentlemen  showed  that 
Clever  Hans,  whenever  making  a  calculation,  kept  close 
watch  on  the  expressional  movements  of  the  interrogator, 


44  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

especially  toward  the  end.  If,  for  instance,  the  horse 
were  asked  to  give  the  product  of  five  times  seven,  it 
scraped  a  hoof  on  the  ground  repeatedly  until  a  slight 
movement  of  the  head  or  even  a  minimal  twist  of  the 
eye  gave  the  animal  the  signal  to  cease  pawing.  As 
soon  as  the  horse's  eyes  were  covered  with  bhnders,  or 
it  was  prevented  in  some  other  way  from  watching  the 
questioner,  its  remarkable  mathematical  ability  was 
absent.  Moreover,  the  expressional  movements  of  Von 
Osten  Sacken  or  of  any  other  examiner  were  not  pre- 
meditated or  intentional,  as  tricks  designed  to  deceive 
the  public,  but  they  occurred  entirely  involuntarily 
when  the  animal  reached  the  figure  which  represented 
the  answer  to  the  question."^ 

All  human  communication  by  means  of  language 
involves  sign  reasoning. 

Words  .  .  .  have  no  character  in  themselves.  They  are 
merely  conventional  signs,  and  consequently  they  can  be  good 
or  bad,  dignified  or  vulgar,  only  in  accordance  with  the  ideas 
they  conventionally  denote  or  suggest  in  the  mind  of  the  speaker 
and  his  hearers.  Yet  under  this  head  of  suggestions  comes  in 
an  important  consideration,  which  accounts  for  a  great  deal 
that  would  otherwise  be  inexplicable.  Most  words  from  their 
use  acquire  general  connotations  or  associations,  which  almost 
seem  to  give  them  a  character  of  their  own. 

Thus  the  word  fist  means  simply  "the  hand  with  the  fingers 
doubled  up  against  the  palm."  In  the  idiomatic  comparison 
"as  big  as  your  fist,"  it  is  purely  descriptive,  and  has  no  partic- 
ular character,  good  or  bad.  The  use  of  the  fist  in  fighting,  how- 
ever, has  given  a  peculiar  connotation  to  the  term.  We  may 
say,  "He  hit  his  opponent  with  his  clinched  fist,"  for  here  again 
fist  is  purely  descriptive,  and  occurs  in  an  appropriate  environ- 
ment. Similarly,  we  may  say,  "The  boy  cried  dismally,  wiping 
his  eyes  with  his  dingy  fist,"  for  here  there  is  a  certain  grotesque- 

1  "  Suggestion  and  Psychotherapy,"  by  George  W.  Jacoby. 


ARGUMENT  45 

ness  in  the  scene  which  justifies  the  use  of  undignified  language. 
But  we  can  no  longer  say,  as  was  formerly  possible,  "The  lady 
held  a  lily  in  her  deUcate  fist."  In  other  words,  the  associations 
of  fist  are  either  pugnacious,  vulgar,  or  jocose. 

These  suggestive  associations  are  partly  general  and  partly 
individual.  If  certain  phrases  are  habitually  associated  in  our 
minds  with  low  or  disagreeable  persons  or  things,  they  will  in- 
evitably be  relegated  to  the  category  of  unseemly  terms,  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  phrases  that  are  associated  with  dignified 
and  reputable  persons  or  circumstances,  will  acquire  a  kind  of 
respectabihty  independent  of  the  exact  meaning  which  they 
convey. 

The  associations  in  question  may  be  purely  personal.  Every- 
body remembers  certain  words  which  he  dislikes  intensely,  though 
they  are  in  common  use,  convey  no  bad  or  disagreeable  meaning, 
and  are  quite  euphonious.  We  may  even  remember  our  reason 
for  such  dislikes.  Perhaps  the  word  is  associated  with  an  un- 
pleasant experience;  more  likely,  however,  our  antipathy  is 
due  to  its  habitual  use  by  some  one  we  do  not  fancy.  Or  we 
may  have  been  bored  by  hearing  the  word  overused,  so  that 
every  new  repetition  gives  us  a  feeling  of  satiety. 

It  is  largely  these  indefinite  connotations  of  words  that  make 
it  so  difiicult  to  speak  a  foreign  tongue.  We  may  be  well  trained 
in  grammar  and  command  a  large  vocabulary,  and  yet  use  words 
which,  though  they  express  our  meaning  accurately  enough, 
suggest  ridiculous  or  inopportune  associations  to  a  native. 
"Baboo  Enghsh"  is  proverbial.  The  awkward  and  equivocal 
remarks  into  which  one  frequently  blunders  in  speaking  one's 
own  language,  "the  things  one  would  rather  have  left  unsaid," 
depend  on  a  momentary  forgetfulness  of  some  more  or  less  ob- 
scure connotation  which  the  words  that  we  are  using  may 
bear.^ 

Sign  Argument  Expounded. — Sign  argument  has 
been  regarded  as  confined  to  reasoning  "from  an  effect 
to  a  condition"  of  that  effect,  as,  e.  g.,  ice  is  a  sign  of 

'  "Words  and  Their  Ways  in  English  Speech,"  by  James  B.  Greenoiigh 
and  George  Lyman  Kittredge. 


46  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

cold  weather.  It  has  also  been  regarded  as  having  its 
basis  in  a  partial  resemblance;  that  is,  in  a  resemblance 
in  one  respect  to  something  in  past  experience.  But 
since  the  whole  process  of  thinking  is  inherently  a  process 
of  association,  the  term  argument  from  sign  is  com- 
monly used  to  denote  reasoning  based  on  any  principle 
of  association.  It  is  immaterial  whether  the  process 
is  from  fact  to  principle  or  from  principle  to  fact;  from 
one  case  to  another  case  like  it;  from  effect  to  condition, 
from  effect  to  cause,  from  one  effect  to  another  effect 
of  the  same  cause;  or  even  from  cause  to  effect.  One 
thing  is  connected  with  another;  where  one  is  the  other 
is.  Such  are  arguments  from  sign.  As  we  analyze  and 
develop  them,  however,  we  are  apt  to  call  them  by  the 
name  of  the  specific  relation  employed.  Thus  an  ar- 
gument based  on  indications  that  a  thing  happened  or 
was  so  elsewhere  or  in  other  cases  may  later  be  called 
example,  and  one  based  on  indications  showing  why 
it  may  be  expected  to  happen  or  is  likely  to  be  true  may 
later  be  recognized  as  antecedent  probability  and  so 
called. 

After  all,  the  name  is  less  important  than  that  we 
should  use  the  processes  correctly,  and  that  we  should 
recognize  the  fact  that  the  full  course  of  the  processes 
of  sign  will  show  that  a  proposition  is  true  because  (i) 
of  signs  bearing  upon  it  directly;  because  (2)  of  signs 
showing  its  truth  in  other  cases,  and  because  (3)  of  signs 
telling  why  it  is  likely  to  be  true. 

For  example,  there  are  indications  that  the  public 
ownership  and  operation  of  telegraph-lines  will  result 
in  lower  rates.  As  shown  by  testimonies  in  the  man- 
agement of  the  telegraph  system;  by  testimonies  illus- 
trating lower  rates  in  publicly  owned  lighting  plants 


ARGUMENT  47 

as  compared  with  those  privately  owned;  and  by  state- 
ments tending  to  show  that  the  absence  of  the  need  for 
profit  is  Hkely  to  produce  lower  rates.  Of  course,  there 
may  be  signs  in  the  form  of  testimonies  pointing  to  the 
reverse  conclusion,  testimonies  showing,  for  instance, 
that  the  telegraph  management  is  efficient;  that  in 
publicly  owned  railroads  the  rates  have  not  been  lowered; 
and  that  the  loss  of  initiative  and  energy  in  pubhcly 
owned  works  may  explain  the  reason  why  lower  rates 
will  not  follow.    There  are  usually  signs  on  both  sides. 

The  force  of  sign  arguments  will  vary  from  slight 
probability  to  a  definiteness  amounting  to  certainty. 

Frequently  the  mere  suggestions  of  an  easily  recog- 
nized association  may  secure  its  acceptance  and  belief, 
as,  e.  g.,  a  flag  at  half-mast  means  the  death  of  a  prom- 
inent person;  the  ringing  of  the  college  bell  at  a  certain 
hour  is  a  call  to  chapel;  geese  flying  southward  in  the 
autumn  is  an  indication  of  cold  weather;  and  so  on. 
There  is  a  distinct  force  as  an  impression  in  the  sugges- 
tions of  an  accmnulated  number  of  instances  pointing 
in  a  certain  direction.  This  is  greatest  when  there  is 
a  uniform  experience  behind  it  or  when  the  spirit  or 
emotional  tone  of  the  argument  accords  with  the  feel- 
ing of  the  audience.  ''Trifles  light  as  air  are  to  the 
jealous  confirmation  strong  as  proofs  of  Holy  Writ." 

Carefully  stated  probable  conclusions  based  on  a 
series  of  signs  are  made  by  scientists  and  scholars  in 
every  field  of  investigation  or  research.  Internal  docu- 
mentary evidence  is  usually  regarded  as  suppl>dng  in- 
ferences from  sign.  While  such  inferences  do  not  often 
clearly  establish  a  cause,  the  resemblances  noted  may 
warrant  a  conclusion  of  value.  For  example,  it  is  only 
in  this  way  that  we  can  assign  probable  dates  to  some 


48  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

of  Shakespeare's  plays.  After  noting,  at  length,  points 
of  resemblance  in  the  Old  English  story  Beowulf  and 
in  the  Grettis  Saga,  Stopford  A.  Brooke  states  his  con- 
clusion as  follows: 

The  parallel  is  very  close,  and  three  suggestions  may  be  made 
concerning  it.  Either  the  Beowulf  Saga  was  known  over  Sweden 
and  Norway,  and  its  lays  came  from  Norway  or  the  Western 
Isles  to  Iceland  with  the  first  settlers;  or  some  of  the  roving 
Icelanders  had  heard  of  the  tale  in  England,  and  brought  it 
back  to  Iceland  in  a  broken  fashion;  or  there  was  a  tale  older 
than  Beowulf  itself — a  combination  of  a  nature-myth  and  a 
folk-tale — which  was  common  property  of  the  Northmen,  and 
out  of  which  the  Grendel  story  in  Beowulf,  and  the  Glam  and 
Troll  story  both  grew  independently  of  each  other.^ 

While  it  is  true  that  the  greater  the  number  of  signs 
noted,  the  greater  the  force,  complete  identity  is  rarely 
possible.  Indeed  few  arguments  from  sign  are  con- 
clusive, unless  they  estabhsh  a  cause — as,  e.  g.,  smoke  is 
a  sign  of  fire;  where  there  is  a  chick,  there  has  been 
an  egg.  Junius  argues  in  his  first  Letter  that  the  char- 
acter of  the  government  is  a  sign  of  the  deplorable  state 
of  the  people,  because  only  such  depravity  and  inef- 
ficiency could  have  produced  it.  Illustrations  may  be 
found,  in  abundance,  in  the  courts  in  connection  with 
circumstantial  evidence;  as,  e.  g.,  signs  showing  the  mo- 
tive for  an  act — as  those  pointing  to  revenge,  or  hatred, 
in  the  case  of  an  act  of  violence  charged,  or  of  hungei 
in  a  charge  of  theft. 

Theoretically,  the  force  of  the  argument  from  sign 
will  increase  as  the  number  of  resemblances  noted  tend 
to  estabhsh  identity  with  a  known  circumstance  or 
fact;    tend   to   estabhsh  a  principle  known  or  easily 

'"Hist,  of  Early  Eng.  Lit.,"  p.  92. 


ARGUMENT  49 

recognized  as  true;    and  tend  to  establish  a  relation 
which  is  causal  in  character. 

Observation  and  Inference. — Reasoning  from  sign  is 
the  basis  of  solution  of  the  many  complex  problems  set 
up  in  the  detective  story,  originated  by  Edgar  Allan 
Poe.  Before  facts  can  be  interpreted  and  combined  so 
as  to  establish  or  overthrow  an  hypothesis,  they  must 
of  course  be  observed.  In  making  an  analysis  of  the 
mental  processes  employed  in  playing  successfully  a 
game  of  whist,  Poe  dwells  upon  the  importance  of  ob- 
servation, as  follows:  ^ 

But  it  is  in  matters  beyond  the  limits  of  mere  rule  that  the 
skill  of  the  analyst  is  evinced.  He  makes,  in  silence,  a  host  of 
observations  and  inferences.  So,  perhaps,  do  his  companions; 
and  the  difference  in  the  extent  of  the  information  obtained 
lies,  not  so  much  in  the  validity  of  the  inference,  as  in  the  quality 
of  the  observation.  The  necessary  knowledge  is  that  of  what 
to  observe.  Our  player  confines  himself  not  at  all;  nor,  be- 
cause the  game  is  the  object,  does  he  reject  deductions  from 
things  external  to  the  game.  He  examines  the  countenance 
of  his  partner,  comparing  it  carefully  with  that  of  each  of  his 
opponents.  He  considers  the  mode  of  assorting  the  cards  in 
each  hand;  often  counting  trump  by  trump,  and  honor  by  honor, 
through  the  glances  bestowed  by  their  holders  upon  each.  He 
notes  every  variation  of  face  as  the  play  progresses,  gathering 
a  fund  of  thought  from  the  differences  in  the  expression  of  cer- 
tainty, of  surprise,  of  triumph,  or  chagrin.  From  the  manner 
of  gathering  up  a  trick  he  judges  whether  the  person  taking  it 
can  make  another  in  the  suit.  He  recognizes  what  is  played 
through  feint,  by  the  air  with  which  it  is  thrown  upon  the  table. 
A  casual  or  inadvertent  word;  the  accidental  dropping  or  turn- 
ing of  a  card,  with  the  accompanying  anxiety  or  carelessness 
in  regard  to  its  concealment;  the  counting  of  the  tricks,  with 
the  order  of  their  arrangement;  embarrassment,  hesitation, 
eagerness,  or  trepidation — all  afford,  to  his  apparently  intuitive 

*  "The  Murders  in  the  Rue  Morgue,"   E.  A.  Poe. 


50  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

perception,  indications  of  the  true  state  of  affairs.  The  first 
two  or  three  rounds  having  been  played,  he  is  in  full  pos- 
session of  the  contents  of  each  hand,  and  thenceforward  puts 
down  his  cards  with  as  absolute  a  precision  of  purpose  as  if 
the  rest  of  the  party  had  turned  outward  the  faces  of  their 
own. 

Common  Sources  of  Error  in  inferences  from  sign  are 
the  ignoring  of  contrary  signs,  misinterpreting  facts, 
combining  them  improperly,  and  overdrawing  the  con- 
clusion, that  is,  stating  it  without  sufficient  qualifica- 
tion. Especially,  a  slight  indication  must  not  be  used 
as  a  sufficient  cause.  It  is  true,  e.  g.,  that  clouds  are  a 
sign  of  rain,  but  we  are  hardly  warranted  in  asserting 
that  it  will  rain  to-day  merely  because  the  sky  is  over- 
cast. 

11.     Argument  from  Example 

If  the  relation  from  which  the  conclusion  is  drawn 
is  regarded  as  one  of  resemblance,  or  its  opposite  con- 
trast, the  argument  may  be  called  argument  from  ex- 
ample. 

A.      RESEMBLANCE 

There  are  two  classes  of  resemblance:  (i)  By  general- 
ization and  (2)  by  analogy. 

I.  Example  by  Generalization. — Any  of  the  facts  of 
observation  and  experience  may  be  used  as  examples. 
There  are  examples  of  war  and  peace,  of  heroism  and 
cowardice,  of  the  blessings  and  sorrows  of  preparedness 
as  well  as  of  pacificism.  From  the  success  or  failure  of 
woman  sufi'rage  in  Colorado  we  may  argue  to  the  wis- 
dom or  folly  of  adopting  it  in  New  Jersey;  from  a 
government  ownership  and  operation  of  the  mails^  we 


ARGUMENT  51 

may  argue  to  a  government  ownership  and  operation 
of  the  telephone,  or  municipal  ownership  and  operation 
of  car- lines;  from  the  budget  system  of  Parliament  to 
the  budget  system  of  Congress  or  the  State  Legislatures. 
Its  field  is  practically  unlimited.  "I  have  but  one 
lamp,"  says  Patrick  Henry,  "by  which  my  feet  are 
guided,  and  that  is  the  lamp  of  experience."  Again, 
"History,"  says  Dionysius,  "is  philosophy  teaching  by 
example." 

It  is  essentially,  however,  an  argument  from  resem- 
blance. It  proceeds  from  case  to  case,  from  likeness  to 
likeness.  What  is  true  in  one  place  under  one  set  of 
circumstances  and  conditions  is  equally  true  in  another 
place  under  similar  circumstances  and  conditions;  things 
happening  in  a  certain  way  at  one  time  under  one  set 
of  circumstances  and  conditions  will  happen  again  in 
a  similar  way  at  another  time  under  parallel  circum- 
stances and  conditions;  whatever  is  alike  in  essential 
parts  is  alike  in  whole.  It  cannot  be  confused  with 
sign,  which  is  an  argument  of  unanalyzed  or  unspecified 
association;  or  with  antecedent  probability  or  causal 
argument  which  tells  why  a  thing  is  or  must  be  so.  Ex- 
ample proves  that  it  is  so,  or  cUd  happen. 

The  fact  is  so,  and  these  people  of  the  Southern  Colonies  are 
much  more  strongly  attached  to  liberty  than  those  to  the  North- 
ward. Such  were  all  the  ancient  commonwealths;  such  were 
our  fathers — ancestors;  such  in  our  days  were  the  Poles;  and 
such  will  be  all  masters  of  slaves  who  are  not  slaves  themselves. 
— Burke,  "Conciliation." 

Burke  reinforces  this  argument  from  example,  by  an 
argument  from  causal  relation,  when  he  adds:  "In 
such    a   people    the   haughtiness   of   domination   com- 


52  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

bines  with  the  spirit  of  freedom,  fortifies  it,  and  renders 
it  invincible " 

Cavour  whose  monument  is  united  Italy;  Bismarck  who  has 
raised  the  German  Empire  from  a  name  to  a  fact;  Gladstone  to- 
day the  incarnate  heart  and  conscience  of  England — they  are  the 
perpetual  refutation  of  the  sneer  that  high  education  weakens 
men  for  practical  aEsLiTs.—CurHs,  "  The  PubHc  Duty  of  Educated 
Men." 

The  argument  from  example  always  involves  a  prin- 
ciple, stated  or  implied,  a  principle  of  classification  or  of 
causation,  a  principle  supported  by  authority  or  re- 
garded as  true.  In  the  preceding  illustration,  Cavour  in 
Italy,  Bismarck  in  Germany,  Gladstone  in  England- 
all  come  within  the  class  of  educated  men  who  are  prac- 
tical and  unvisionary.  In  the  quotation  from  Burke, 
a  causal  principle  was  stated  at  the  end.  In  neither, 
however,  was  there  authoritative  support  of  the  prin- 
ciple involved. 

In  law,  it  is  often  argued  that  the  case  at  bar  is  suf- 
ficiently like  a  case  previously  decided  to  bring  it  under 
some  well-estabhshed  principle.  In  the  famous  Dart- 
mouth College  Case,  Justice  Story  endeavored  to  show 
that  a  charter  is  like  a  grant,  through  the  definition  of 
a  contract.  The  Federal  Constitution  denies  to  the 
States  the  right  to  pass  any  law  impairing  the  obliga- 
tions of  contract.  Moreover,  in  Fletcher  vs.  Peck,  it 
was  decided  that  a  grant  of  land,  from  the  State  of 
Georgia  to  a  citizen,  was  a  contract  between  two  par- 
ties. In  order  then  to  decide  the  question — is  this 
charter  a  contract? — it  becomes  important  to  prove 
that  the  charter  was  like  the  grant  of  land  in  respect 
to  those  essential  things  which  made  it  a  contract. 


ARGUMENT  53 

Many  questions  naturally  arise  in  such  a  comparison, 
some  important  and  some  unimportant.  For  instance, 
both  are  sealed  instruments;  the  charter  was  from  the 
State  to  a  corporation,  while  the  grant  was  from  a  State 
to  a  citizen;  both  involved  mutual  promises,  and  so  on. 
The  resemblances,  however,  outweighed  the  differences 
in  all  essential  points  aflfecting  a  contract,  and  the  court 
decreed  that  the  Dartmouth  College  charter,  being  es- 
sentially like  a  land  grant,  was  therefore  a  contract, 
and  so  could  not  be  impaired  by  the  State.  The  gen- 
eral principles  so  applied  in  the  arguments  of  a  case 
at  law  are  derived  from  the  Federal  Constitution, 
statutes,  decisions  of  courts,  legal  text-books,  etc. 

Thus  the  process  of  example  may  be  little  more  than 
a  matter  of  establishing  the  correctness  or  relevancy  of 
a  definition.  The  lawyer,  for  instance,  seeks  first  to  find 
a  principle  covering  the  case  under  investigation;  then 
to  interpret  it  according  to  the  previous  decisions  of  a 
court;  and  finally  to  apply  the  definition  so  determined 
to  the  case  at  bar.  Another  notable  instance  of  an 
argument  of  this  sort  is  that  made  by  Lord  Erskine 
in  defense  of  Lord  George  Gordon  when  he  was  tried 
for  high  treason;  a  speech  worthy  of  analysis  and  careful 
study  for  logical  method,  use  of  authority,  and  presen- 
tation. 

''What  is  law?"  asks  the  student.  "It  is  a  rule  of 
action,"  says  Blackstone.  Practically,  however,  it  is 
an  interminable  definition. 

The  authority  of  precedents  is  perhaps  more  em- 
phasized in  law  then  elsewhere,  for  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  precedents  must  sometimes  be  followed 
by  a  court  when  its  own  view  is  to  the  contrary.  And 
yet  the  antecedent  idea  that  the  end  of  a  State  is  jus- 


54  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

tice,  is  always  more  or  less  involved  in  the  interpreta- 
tion and  application  of  our  laws,  and  sometimes  a  view 
is  even  taken  of  the  probable  consequences  of  a  partic- 
ular interpretation  or  application.  It  happens  fre- 
quently that,  where  two  opposed  arguments  are  struc- 
turally correct  and  equally  supported  by  authorities, 
one  will  prevail  over  the  other  because  it  is  supported 
by  a  sound  pubHc  policy. 

In  the  debates  in  Parliament  on  the  taxation  of  Amer- 
ica, there  was  much  citation  of  examples  affecting  the 
question  of  representation  —  Lord  Camden,  Lord 
Chatham,  and  Burke  believed  in  a  real  representation 
(such  as  is  at  present  in  vogue  in  the  United  States), 
while  Lord  Mansfield  held  to  the  theory  of  a  virtual 
representation.  We  will  see  more  in  the  latter  view  if 
we  recall  that  to-day  parliamentary  representatives 
often  do  not  reside  in  the  district  which  elects  them. 
They  represent  the  nation. 

Lord  Camden,  speaking  in  the  House  of  Lords  in 
1766,  said:  "My  lords,  I  challenge  any  one  to  point  out 
the  time  when  any  tax  was  laid  upon  any  person  by 
Parliament,  that  person  being  unrepresented  in  Par- 
liament." He  considered  the  cases  of  Chester,  the  clergy, 
Wales,  and  Ireland;  and  averred  that  "from  the  whole 
of  our  history  from  the  earliest  period,  you  will  find 
that  taxation  and  representation  were  united."  The 
principle  underlying  his  contention  he  derives  from 
John  Locke,  "The  supreme  power  cannot  take  from  any 
man  any  part  of  his  property  without  his  own  consent," 
and  B  II,  pp.  136-139,  particularly  140,  drawn  from 
the  heart  of  our  constitution,  which  he  thoroughly  un- 
derstood, and  will  last  as  long  as  that  shall  last — Par- 
liamentary Debates  and  Proceedings,  vol.  IV,  p.  366. 

Lord  Mansfield  answered   "the  noble  Lord   (Cam- 


ARGUMENT  55 

den),  particularly  upon  the  cases  he  has  quoted."  With 
respect  to  the  marches  of  Wales,  he  admits  that  they 
enjoyed  the  privilege  of  taxing  themselves  for  a  brief 
time,  "during  the  Hfe  of  Edward  I  till  the  Prince  of  Wales 
became  King,"  but  says  that  they  were  then  annexed 
to  the  crown  and  became  subject  to  taxes,  like  the  rest 
of  the  dominions,  until  Henry  VIII.  The  latter  issued 
writs  for  it  to  return  two  members  of  Parliament,  and 
issued  a  writ  also  to  Calais  to  send  one  Burgess.  Be- 
sides, one  of  the  counties  palatine  (Durham)  was  taxed 
fifty  years  before  he  sent  members  to  Parliament,  while 
the  clergy  were,  at  no  time,  unrepresented  in  Parliament. 

All  parallels  drawn  from  the  colonies  of  antiquity 
to  the  present  case  are  then  excluded  as  irrelevant  and 
immaterial.  The  Tyrians  in  Africa  and  the  Greeks  in 
Asia,  for  instance,  were  totally  different  from  ours.  No 
nation  before  ourselves  had  any  regular  system  of  colo- 
nization except  the  Romans,  whose  system  was  a  mili- 
tary one.  Expounding  next  the  theory  and  history 
of  the  British  colonial  system,  he  argues  that  if  there 
was  no  express  law,  usage  alone  would  be  sufficient, 
and  concluded  by  drawing  the  distinction  between  vir- 
tual and  real  representation — the  true  source  of  differ- 
ence— asserting  that  the  colonies  are  as  much  repre- 
sented in  Parliament  as  are  the  greatest  part  of  the 
people  of  England. 

Burke,  speaking  in  1774,  argued  from  example  to 
show  that  "rebellion  and  loss  to  yourselves"  would 
surely  follow  the  narrow  pohcy  of  the  crown,  as  they 
had  done  in  the  case  of  Wales  and  of  Lancaster. 

You  tried  in  Wales  to  raise  a  revenue  which  the  people  thought 
excessive  and  unjust:  the  attempt  ended  in  oppression,  resis- 
tance, rebellion,  and  loss  to  yourselves.  You  tried  in  the  duchy 
of  Lancaster  to  raise  a  revenue  which  the  people  believed  un- 


56  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

just:  this  effort  ended  in  oppression,  rebellion,  vexation,  and 
loss  to  yourselves.  You  are  now  trying  to  raise  in  America,  a 
revenue  which  the  colonists  disapprove.  What  must  be  the 
result? — American  Taxatioji. 

Thus,  Lord  Camden  argued  from  the  principle  that 
taxation  and  representation  had  always  been  united, 
and  quoted  from  John  Locke  to  prove  that  a  person 
could  not  be  deprived  of  his  property  without  his  con- 
sent. The  argument  in  the  Dartmouth  College  case 
rested  on  the  principle  that  no  State  had  the  right  to 
deny  or  impair  the  obligation  of  a  contract,  as  affirmed 
in  the  Federal  Constitution.  Here  cases  were  examined 
for  the  purpose  of  establishing  sufficient  resemblances 
to  the  case  in  question  to  bring  the  latter  under  a  prin- 
ciple estabHshed  by  authority. 

Lord  Mansfield  based  his  argument  on  the  principle 
of  virtual  rather  than  real  representation  as  the  his- 
toric British  policy — a  principle  grounded  in  tradition 
and  reason.  Burke,  in  the  last  quoted  passage  on  the 
British  attitude  toward  America,  reasoned  (as  he  did 
later  in  his  speech  on  conciliation)  from  the  idea  that 
any  colonial  policy  will  fail  which  the  people  believe 
to  be  unjust;  or,  in  other  words,  that  the  feeling  of  in- 
justice or  oppression  resulting  from  a  policy  will  tend 
to  produce  its  failure.  The  process  here  too  is  one  of 
classification  (for  he  brings  America  into  the  category 
of  colonies  which  have  suffered  through  British  policy) ; 
but  it  is  more.  The  resemblances  are  of  things  viewed 
as  results;  results  imply  causes  or  antecedents;  and 
the  antecedent  here  is  British  colonial  policy  acting  as 
an  agency  or  law  sufficient  to  produce  the  phenomenon 
of  rebellion,  a  principle  of  causation. 

Unless  the  principle  is  easily  accepted  behind  the  argu- 


ARGUMENT  57 

ment  from  example,  there  must  be  some  warranting 
process  such  as  an  authority  or  a  cause.  If,  however, 
an  issue  should  arise  as  to  the  validity  of  any  particular 
causal  principle  asserted,  so  that  we  are  obliged  to  con- 
sider causal  relationships  instead  of  resemblances  in 
results,  the  argument  becomes  causal  relation.  But 
even  the  use  of  authority,  it  should  be  remembered, 
involves  the  idea  that  like  follows  like,  like  causes  must 
produce  like  results. 

Further  Analysis  of  the  Process. — Any  argument  from 
example  will  be  vaHd,  if  the  resemblances  between  the 
case  or  cases  cited  and  the  case  in  question  are  sufficient 
to  bring  them,  in  essential  particulars,  within  the  scope 
of  a  recognized  principle  or  law.  This  presupposes, 
however,  that  the  facts  and  circumstances  relating  to 
the  cases  are  truly  and  fully  stated,  and  that  other  things 
have  not  been  overlooked.  It  will  be  clearly  invahd, 
for  instance,  if  other  cases  are  found  which  establish 
another  principle  stronger  and  equally  well  recognized. 

The  following  table  or  rules  will  show  the  process 
as  a  whole,  including  its  more  important  steps: 

1.  Find  the  principle  covering  the  cases  cited  and  the 
case  in  question. 

2.  Are  the  facts  and  circumstances  concerning  these 
cases  fully  stated,  and  true  as  alleged? 

3.  Are  they  relevant  and  material  to  the  principle 
under  which  they  are  now  included? 

a.  What  of  the  number  and  points  of  resemblance? 
h.  What  of  the  number  and  points  of  difference? 

4.  Are  there  contrary  cases  which  weaken  or  invali- 
date the  conclusion? 

5.  If  the  contrary  cases  tend  to  estabhsh  a  new  and 
different  principle,  what  is   the  value,  comparatively, 


58  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

of  these  two  principles  with  respect  to  such  things  as 
authoritative  support,  general  acceptance,  causal  rela- 
tion, or  sound  public  policy? 

A  complete  analysis  of  the  process  of  example  as  an 
argument  may  involve,  therefore,  the  consideration 
of  such  things  as  a  general  principle,  truth  and  com- 
pleteness of  circumstantial  details,  relevancy,  and  ma- 
teriality of  cases  cited  both  as  to  the  case  in  question 
and  to  a  principle  affirmed,  contrary  cases  with  their 
circumstantial  detail,  and  finally  the  comparative  value 
of  opposed  principles. 

Next  in  importance  to  establishing  the  principle  or 
ground  of  reasoning  is  the  rule  of  relevancy. 

Definition  of  Relevancy  and  Rules. — Any  case  may  be 
said  to  be  relevant  to  a  case  under  inquiry  if  it  re- 
sembles the  latter  in  such  a  way  as  to  permit  its  use  as 
a  premise  in  drawing  a  conclusion  about  a  doubtful  or 
unknown  X. 

The  logical  form  of  the  process  of  reasoning  from 
example  may  be  stated  thus: 

Whatever  is  like  B  with  respect  to  M  is  like  it  with 
respect  to  X;  ^  is  like  B  with  respect  to  M\  therefore 
A  is  like  B  with  respect  to  X.  Here  A  represents  a 
cited  case,  B  a  case  in  question,  and  M  is,  3.  known  char- 
acteristic of  both  A  and  B\  while  X  is  the  uncertain 
or  disputed  point  about  A.  Concretely,  this  may  be 
expressed  as  follows:  Whatever  British  policy  is  like 
the  policy  toward  Wales  in  that  it  is  felt  to  be  unjust 
is  like  it  in  being  followed  by  rebellion  and  loss.  The 
British  policy  toward  America  is  like  that  toward  Wales 
in  that  it  is  felt  to  be  unjust.  Therefore,  the  British 
policy  toward  America  will  be  like  it  in  bringing  rebel- 
lion and  loss. 


ARGUMENT  59 

The  major  premise  of  this  syllogism — "Whatever  is 
like  B  with  respect  to  M  (or  M,  N,  etc.)  is  like  it  with 
respect  to  X" — is  sometimes  called  the  basis  of  com- 
parison. 

The  process  in  arguing  thus  from  example  may  be 
regarded  as  jointly  inductive  and  deductive:  in  the 
sense  that  we  first  find  cases  covering  the  case  under 
inquiry,  including  of  course  the  doubtful  point  X,  in 
order  to  establish  a  general  principle;  and  that  we  then 
apply  this  general  principle  to  the  present  case,  and 
conclude  that  X  should  be  accordingly. 

Where  conditions  are  undeniably  similar,  and  the 
point  to  be  proved  is  carefully  stated  so  that  the 
parallehsm  cannot  be  pushed  too  far,  a  single  example 
may  sometimes  be  convincing.  Thus  President  Hibben 
— when  arguing  that  the  United  States  Government 
should  prepare  against  war  rather  than  for  war,  and 
could  do  so  without  becoming  mihtaristic — cited  the 
example  of  the  invisible  army  of  Switzerland: 

This  is  not  an  impracticable  theory,  incapable  of  being  realized 
in  the  actual  experience  of  a  nation.  Switzerland  proves  the 
possibility  of  a  nation  in  arms  challenging  the  world  as  the  de- 
fenders of  peace. 

It  happened  that  I  crossed  the  western  frontier  of  Switzer- 
land on  the  first  day  of  August,  19 14,  and  was  compelled  to 
travel  toward  the  eastern  frontier  in  the  Engadine  Valley  during 
the  time  of  mobilization  of  the  troops.  The  invisible  army  of 
Switzerland  came  into  being  within  forty-eight  hours.  On  the 
first  day  of  August  there  was  no  evidence  of  any  military  or- 
ganization in  the  country;  then  within  four  days,  between 
400,000  and  500,000  troops  were  on  the  borders;  guides  from 
the  mountains,  men  from  the  shops  and  stores  and  fields,  from 
all  the  industrial  pursuits  of  the  country,  and  they  remain  there 
to  this  day,  defending  their  land  from  the  incursions  of  any 
foreign  foe.     There  is  no  country  in  Europe  that  gives  as  little 


60  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

impression  of  military  display  as  Switzerland,  and  no  country 
better  prepared  to  defend  its  borders  against  the  devastation 
and  disaster  of  war. 

For  our  own  country  it  is  possible  for  us  to  follow  a  similar 
policy.  We  too  can  have  within  our  midst  if  we  choose  an  in- 
visible army,  men  having  some  training  in  military  affairs  and 
yet  not  withdrawn  from  their  daily  activities  and  pursuits.  In 
this  way  our  military  strength  may  be  conserved  at  a  minimum 
expense  and  minimum  industrial  disturbance.  If  we  are  con- 
fident, and  I  think  justly  so,  that  in  the  event  of  war  the  young 
men  of  our  country  would  be  ready  and  eager  to  volunteer  their 
services,  why  should  we  not  issue  a  call  to  volunteer  for  the 
military  training-camps  which  the  government  has  already 
instituted  with  such  marked  success?  Every  thoughtful  person 
is  naturally  opposed  to  military  ostentation  and  display  and 
the  whole  spirit  of  insolent  militarism.  That  which  is  essen- 
tially the  American  way  of  doing  things  is  to  have  our  military 
strength  in  potential  form  rather  than  actually  existent  in  a 
large  standing  army. 

The  important  rules  of  relevancy  when  using  the  argu- 
ment from  example  may  now  be  summed  up  thus: 

1.  Find  the  doubtful  X  in  the  present  case  or  situation.    In 

the  preceding  illustration  the  doubtful  X  was  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  nation  being  prepared  against  war  without 
militarism. 

2.  Find  a  case  essentially  similar  (which  contains  the  doubt- 

ful X)  after  comparing  resemblances  and  differences  with 
all  attendant  conditions.  Such  was  the  selection  of  the 
example  of  Switzerland. 

3.  Make  its  relevancy  apparent.    On  the  first  day  of  August 

there  was  no  evidence  of  a  military  organization  in 
Switzerland;  but  within  four  days  about  four  hundred 
thousand  troops  were  on  the  borders,  assembled  from 
the  activities  of  peace,  to  defend  their  lands.  No  coun- 
try in  Europe  makes  so  little  display  as  Switzerland, 
jione  is  better  prepared  for  defense.    Then  follows  the 


ARGUMENT  61 

comparison.  We  too  can  have  an  invisible  army.  Our 
young  men  are  eager  to  volunteer  for  military  training- 
camps;  it  is  essentially  the  American  way,  and  so  on. 

Indeed,  the  perpetual  and  insistent  problem  of  all 
argument  is  vv^hat  is  to  be  proved — what  proves  it — 
and  how  to  make  the  proof  manifest. 

4.  Establish  the  fundamental  basis  of  the  argument  either 
by  reason  or  by  authority.  The  training-camps  already 
existing  in  the  United  States,  for  instance,  make  pos- 
sible, through  natural  growth,  the  development  of  an 
invisible  army. 

If  illustration  of  authoritative  support  be  needed  fur- 
ther, let  us  take  it  from  Lord  Erskine.  He  is  defining 
the  law  of  treason  as  it  applies  to  the  circumstances  of 
the  Gordon  case,  and  has  just  examined  the  case  of  Dem- 
aree  for  essential  resemblances  to  the  case  at  bar.  He 
remarks  that  all  men  "agree  that  it  is  the  intention  of 
assembhng"  the  mob  which  forms  the  guilt  of  treason, 
and  adds,  "I  will  give  you  the  words  of  high  authority, 
the  learned  Foster"  .  .  .  who  says,  in  a  similar  case: 
"The  true  criterion  seems  to  be  quo  animo  did  the  par- 
ties assemble  ?     With  what  intention  did  they  meet  ?  " 

Arguments  from  example  often  need  thus  to  be  sup- 
ported by  further  arguments.  We  may  accumulate 
resemblances,  select  the  most  striking,  or  summon  our 
greatest  rhetorical  skill;  and  yet  not  escape  the  in- 
evitable why  or  suppress  the  feeling  that  authoritative 
support  should  have  been  given.  Even  when  this  is 
done,  and  when  the  resemblances  are  great  in  number 
and  striking,  it  should  always  be  remembered  that  the 
argument  from  example  can  never  reach  absolute  cer- 
tainty. Practically  no  two  things  are  exactly  alike, 
and  the  conditions  under  which  they  exist  or  operate 


62  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

are  never  exactly  the  same.  It  can,  at  best,  only  estab- 
lish a  very  high  degree  of  probability. 

The  Fallacy,  Begging  the  Question. — A  cited  case  will 
not  be  relevant  to  a  case  under  inquiry,  unless  it  con- 
tains the  doubtful  X.  It  will  not  be  relevant  unless 
the  resemblances  noted  are  in  essential,  rather  than 
accidental  or  superficial,  respects.  We  cannot  know 
that  the  resemblances  are  essential  unless  we  compare 
the  cases  not  only  theoretically,  but  in  the  full  and  exact 
setting  in  which  they  actually  existed,  or  with  all  the 
attendant  circumstances  or  conditions  under  which 
they  actually  took  place.  It  will  be  plainly  irrelevant, 
if  the  differences  are  found  to  be  sufficient  to  overcome 
the  resemblances. 

If  in  an  argument  we  assume  resemblances  or  ignore 
differences,  we  assume  the  very  basis  of  comparison, 
the  very  premise  needed  to  be  proved,  and  so  beg  the 
question.  Indeed,  arguments  from  example  are  com- 
monly ineffective  and  regarded  as  irrelevant,  simply 
because  the  basis  of  comparison  is  not  indicated  by 
pointing  out  and  making  clear  the  exact  points  or  re- 
semblance. Observe  how  carefully  Shylock,  when  at- 
tempting to  show  that  he  was  entitled  to  human  treat- 
ment, indicated  in  detail  his  resemblance  to  a  human 
being  and  a  Christian: 

Hath  not  a  Jew  eyes?  hath  not  a  Jew  hands,  organs,  dimen- 
sions, senses,  affections,  passions?  fed  with  the  same  food,  hurt 
with  the  same  weapons,  subject  to  the  same  diseases,  healed 
by  the  same  means,  warmed  and  cooled  by  the  same  winter  and 
summer,  as  a  Christian  is?  If  you  prick  us,  do  we  not  bleed? 
If  you  tickle  us,  do  we  not  laugh  ?  If  you  poison  us,  do  we  not 
die  ?  and  if  you  wrong  us,  shall  we  not  revenge  ?  If  we  are  lik^ 
in  the  rest,  we  will  resemble  you  in  that, 


ARGUMENT  63 

You  are  doubtless  familiar  with  the  ancient  fable 
relating  to  the  donkeys.  One  donkey,  carrying  on  its 
back  a  bag  of  salt,  plunged  into  a  stream,  with  the  re- 
sult that  the  salt  melted,  and  he  disported  himself  with 
glee  on  the  opposite  meadow.  The  other  donkey  which 
was  laden  with  sponges  instantly  followed  the  example 
of  the  salt-burdened  leader,  and,  leaping  into  the  stream, 
almost  came  to  grief. ^ 

Indeed,  the  most  common  form  of  fallacy  in  arguing 
from  example  arises  from  assuming  a  resemblance  be- 
tween cases  and  ignoring  the  differences  in  attendant 
circumstances  and  conditions.  Let  us  examine  an  il- 
lustration or  two  of  a  causal  example,  involving  the 
prediction  that  what  happened  from  a  certain  cause 
in  another  place  will  ine\dtably  happen  in  the  same 
way  from  the  same  cause  here. 

Ringwalt  in  "Briefs  on  PubHc  Questions"  frequently 
uses  the  argument  from  example  as  one  of  the  main 
divisions  of  a  brief.  These  briefs,  it  should  be  said,  are 
meant  to  be  suggestive;  and  a  good  deal  is  purposely 
omitted  for  the  student  to  supply.  In  one  of  them  the 
doubtful  X  is  the  question  whether  or  not  ownership 
of  the  railways  by  the  United  States  Government  should 
be  adopted,  and  the  example  of  other  nations  is  made 
the  closing  argument,  thus: 

V.  The  experience  of  foreign  nations  is  favorable  to  govern- 
ment ownership  and  operation.  A.  The  experience  of  Prussia 
is  favorable,  i.  In  Prussia  a  large  annual  surplus  has  been 
earned.  2.  Uniform,  stable,  and  lower  rates  have  been  secured. 
3.  Facilities  and  accommodations  have  been  improved.  4. 
Natural  resources  have  been  developed  and  the  commercial 

» "The  Fables  of  La  Fontaine."  Trans,  by  Robt.  Thomson,  bk.  II, 
Fable  10, 


64  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

prosperity  of  the  nation  enhanced.  B.  The  experience  of  Bel- 
gium is  favorable,  i.  A  profit  has  been  earned.  2.  The  total 
of  ton  mileage  has  increased.  3.  Improvements  have  been  in- 
troduced. 4.  Rates  have  been  lowered.  5.  Accidents  are  fewer. 
C  The  experience  of  Australia  and  New  Zealand  is  favorable. 
I.  Great  social  advantages  have  been  secured,  x.  The  better 
distribution  of  labor,  y.  An  increase  in  suburban  dwelling. 
z.  Increased  educational  advantages.  2.  Agricultural  interests 
have  been  fostered.  D.  The  experience  of  other  nations  is 
favorable,  i.  That  of  Austria-Hungary.  2.  Of  Switzerland.  3. 
Of  France. 

This  argument  is  not  shown  to  be  relevant  to  X  ; 
but  to  government  ownership  in  general.  If  it  is  meant 
to  imply  that,  because  government  ownership  has  been 
successful  in  certain  respects  in  other  countries,  it  will 
be  so  in  these  same  respects  in  this  country,  the  con- 
clusion does  not  follow.  By  ignoring  the  conditions 
under  which  the  railroads  are  owned  in  the  countries 
mentioned,  as  well  as  conditions  in  the  United  States, 
the  argument  assumes  so  much  that  there  is  no  vaHd 
basis  of  comparison.  In  fine,  the  conclusion  is  too  broad 
and  the  premises  are  not  proved. 

We  have  seen  that  a  case  cited  should  have  not  only 
a  bearing  on  the  general  subject,  but  a  relevancy  to 
the  doubtful  X  in  the  case  in  controversy.  Very  rarely 
do  the  many  cases  thought  to  be  pertinent  to  a  sub- 
ject turn  out  on  examination  to  resemble  one  another 
completely.  Indeed,  so  frequently  and  in  so  many  ways 
do  differences  appear,  that  the  successful  use  of  example 
as  an  argument  requires  exhaustive  study:  involving 
the  exercise  of  memory  to  carry  in  mind  all  the  circum- 
stantial details;  a  power  of  discrimination  and  analysis 
to  discard  the  irrelevant,  seize  upon  the  vital  points, 
and  determine  the  relationships  of  the  cases  to  one  an- 


ARGUMENT  65 

other  and  to  the  various  principles,  as  well  as  the  ability 
to  grasp  firmly  the  soundest  principle  involved  and  hold 
it  distinct,  so  that  in  the  most  intricate  circumstances 
its  relation  to  the  doubtful  X  will  be  clear  and  luminous. 
Answering  a  Causal  Example  by  Alleging  a  Different 
Cause. — An  argument  from  example  may  be  refuted 
(i)  by  proving  that  the  facts  are  not  true  as  alleged, 
or  (2)  by  admitting  or  assuming  the  alleged  facts  to 
be  true  and  then  pro\ing  that  conditions  are  not  parallel, 
and  that  hence  there  is  no  valid  basis  of  comparison. 
The  latter  refutation  will  be  even  stronger  if  the  alleged 
results  can  be  ascribed  to  another  and  different  cause. 
Thus,  General  Hugh  L.  Scott  refutes  the  argument  that 
the  cost  of  the  United  States  army  is  too  high  as  com- 
pared wdth  the  cost  of  the  German  army.  He  shows 
that  there  is  no  valid  basis  of  comparison,  and  then 
attributes  the  relatively  higher  cost  of  our  miUtary  estab- 
lishment to  the  voluntary  as  opposed  to  the  compul- 
sory principle: 

From  time  to  time  statements  have  appeared  in  current  pub- 
lications showing  the  large  appropriation  necessary  for  the  sup- 
port of  the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States  and  the 
relatively  small  cost  of  the  German  army.  By  dividing  each  of 
these  amounts  by  the  total  strength  of  each  military  establish- 
ment an  effort  is  made  to  compare  the  high  cost  of  one  of  our 
soldiers  with  the  cost  of  a  German  soldier,  which  is  very  much 
lower  than  ours.  No  intelligent  comparison  can  be  made  be- 
tween the  cost  of  the  German  and  American  military  estab- 
lishments without  having  first  a  clear  understanding  of  the  dif- 
ferences in  the  military  system  of  these  two  countries. 

The  German  pays  his  military  obligations  to  the  state  in 
personal  service,  while  we  go  into  the  labor  markets,  where  we 
are  forced  to  compete  with  other  employers  of  labor  in  order 
to  secure  our  soldiers.  In  addition,  there  is  a  small  class  of  volun- 
teers in  the  German  army  who,  in  exchange  for  certain  privileges 


66  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

as  to  service,  maintain  themselves  and  supply  their  own  uni- 
forms and  equipment.  Again,  the  normal  wages  of  our  labor 
markets,  where  we  obtain  our  recruits,  are  much  higher  than  in 
Germany.  The  comparative  cost  of  these  two  soldiers  in  dollars 
and  cents,  therefore,  means  little  except  to  emphasize  the  cost 
of  maintaining  a  military  establishment  on  the  voluntary  prin- 
ciple. If  we  wish,  then,  to  compare  the  cost  of  our  army  with 
the  cost  of  those  of  other  nations,  we  must  limit  our  comparison 
to  those  nations  which  employ  the  same  general  system  as  our- 
selves. We  will  find  that  only  one  other  nation  in  the  world 
does  so — Great  Britain. 

2,  Example  by  Analogy. — Analogy  is  another  term 
used  to  describe  arguments  from  resemblance.  Here 
the  objects  compared  are  regarded  as  vddely  different 
and  lying  in  totally  different  fields;  and  though  the 
implication  of  a  common  cause  is  present,  the  specific 
cause  is  more  remote  and  vague;  so  that  the  probability 
established  is  regarded  as  less  strong  than  if  the  cases 
compared  were  known  to  be  in  the  same  class.  Hence, 
analogy  has  sometimes  been  defined  as  "a  resemblance 
of  ratios"  or  a  ''resemblance  of  relations  rather  than  of 
objects"  or  a  "parity  of  reasoning."  It  is  of  much  value 
to  the  scientist  in  offering  hints  or  ideas  for  experiment 
and  investigation.  There  is,  for  instance,  a  relation 
between  the  falHng  of  an  apple  to  the  ground  and  the 
motion  of  the  heavenly  bodies;  the  lifting  of  the  lid  of 
a  teakettle,  through  the  idea  of  the  expansion  of  steam, 
and  the  piston  in  a  locomotive;  the  structure  of  the 
human  ear  and  the  receiver  of  a  telephone. 

Analogy  is  also  used  by  the  great  orators,  and  often 
with  telhng  effect.  When  so  used  as  an  argument  the 
resemblances  should  be  essentially  alike  in  all  partic- 
ulars which  affect  the  proposition  and  they  should  be 
true  as  stated.    Besides,  the  proposition  should,  if  im- 


ARGUMENT  67 

portant  enough,  be  supported  by  further  evidence. 
Analogy  offers  only  parallel  or  collateral  evidence.  It 
has  place  also  in  the  clarifying  processes  of  exposition; 
is  the  essence  of  much  of  the  description  and  narration 
used  as  argumentative  adjuncts,  and  is  of  great  value 
wherever  the  purpose  is  to  engage  attention,  enHst  in- 
terest, appeal  to  desire,  or  to  "suggest"  to  the  imagina- 
tion, as  well  as  to  prove.  Lincoln's  analogies  are  widely 
known: 

Gentlemen,  I  want  you  to  suppose  a  case  for  a  moment.  Sup- 
pose that  all  the  property  you  were  worth  was  in  gold,  and  you 
had  put  it  in  the  hands  of  Blondin,  the  famous  rope-walker,  to 
carry  across  the  Niagara  Falls  on  a  tight  rope.  Would  you 
shake  the  rope  while  he  was  passing  over  it,  or  keep  shouting  to 
him:  "Blondin,  stoop  a  little  morel  Go  a  little  faster"?  No, 
I  am  sure  you  would  not.  You  would  hold  your  breath  as  well 
as  your  tongue,  and  keep  your  hands  off  until  he  was  safely 
over.  Now  the  government  is  in  the  same  situation.  It  is  carry- 
ing an  immense  weight  across  a  stormy  ocean.  Untold  treasures 
are  in  its  hands.  It  is  doing  the  best  it  can.  Don't  badger  it ! 
Just  keep  still  and  it  will  get  you  safely  over. 

The  use  of  the  several  arguments  previously  men- 
tioned as  well  as  a  clear  mode  of  procedure  may  be 
illustrated  from  the  following  quotation  from  Whately 
on  indirect  description.  He  begins  by  telling  what  his 
thesis  is  like,  and  then  states  it;  after  which  he  tells 
why  a  description  using  carefully  selected  details  will 
produce  a  more  striking  impression  than  one  based  on 
a  catalogue  method,  and  then  cites  two  examples  to 
prove  that  this  is  so: 

It  is  observed  by  opticians  and  astronomers  that  a  side  view 
of  a  faint  star,  or,  especially,  of  a  comet,  presents  it  in  much 
greater  brilliancy  than  a  direct  view.    To  see  a  comet  in  its  full 


68  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

splendor,  you  should  look  not  straight  at  it,  but  at  some  star 
a  little  beside  it.  Something  analogous  to  this  often  takes  place 
in  mental  perceptions.  It  will  often,  therefore,  have  a  better 
effect  to  describe  obliquely,  if  I  may  so  speak,  by  introducing 
circumstances  connected  with  the  main  object  or  event,  and 
affected  by  it,  but  not  absolutely  forming  a  part  of  it.  And 
circumstances  of  this  kind  may  not  infrequently  be  so  selected 
as  to  produce  a  more  striking  impression  of  anything  that  is  in 
itself  great  and  remarkable  than  could  be  produced  by  a  minute 
and  direct  description,  because  in  this  way  the  general  and  col- 
lective result  of  a  whole,  and  the  effects  produced  by  it  on  other 
objects,  may  be  vividly  impressed  on  the  hearer's  mind,  the 
circumstantial  detail  of  collateral  matters  not  drawing  off  the 
mind  from  the  contemplation  of  the  principle  matter  as  one 
and  complete.  Thus,  the  woman's  application  to  the  King  of 
Samaria,  to  compel  her  neighbor  to  fulfil  the  agreement  of  shar- 
ing with  her  the  infant's  flesh,  gives  a  more  frightful  impression 
of  the  horrors  of  the  famine  than  any  more  direct  description 
could  have  done,  since  it  presents  to  us  the  picture  of  that  hard- 
ening of  the  heart  to  every  kind  of  horror,  and  that  destruc- 
tion of  the  ordinary  state  of  human  sentiment  which  is  the  re- 
sult of  long-continued  and  extreme  misery.  Nor  coiild  any 
detail  of  the  particular  vexations  to  be  suffered  by  the  exiled 
Jews  for  their  disobedience  convey  so  lively  an  idea  of  them  as 
that  description  of  their  result  contained  in  the  denunciation  of 
Moses:  "In  the  evening  thou  shalt  say,  Would  God  it  were 
morning !  and  in  the  morning  thou  shalt  say,  Would  God  it  were 
evening!" — Whately,  "Elements  of  Rhetoric,"  p.  125. 

Knowledge  grows  slowly  by  ever-widening  generaliza- 
tions. What  in  one  age  may  seem  to  be  a  weak  analogy 
may  later  become  an  example  of  a  truth.  All  men  may 
reason  to-day,  for  instance,  from  the  analogy  of  biolog- 
ical growth  in  certain  particulars  in  all  living  things 
and  their  products,  but  once  we  find  warrant  for  a  be- 
lief in  some  such  generalization  as  that  asserted  by 
Herbert  Spencer  as  law,  we  would  not  hesitate  to  cite 
as  examples  what  hitherto  we  had  regarded  as  analogies. 


ARGUMENT  69 

WTioever,   indeed,   could   accept   the   following   should 
find  small  difficulty  in  so  doing:  -, 

Now,  we  propose  in  the  first  place  to  show  that  this  law  of 
organic  progress  is  the  law  of  all  progress.  Whether  it  be  in 
the  development  of  the  earth,  in  the  development  of  life  upon 
its  surface,  in  the  development  of  society,  of  government,  of 
manufactures,  of  commerce,  of  language,  literature,  science,  art, 
this  same  evolution  of  the  simple  into  the  complex,  through 
successive  differentiations,  holds  throughout.  From  the  earliest 
traceable  cosmical  changes  down  to  the  latest  results  of  civiliza- 
tion we  shall  find  that  the  transformation  of  the  homogeneous 
into  the  heterogeneous  is  that  in  which  progress  essentially 
consists. 

B.      CONTRAST 

A  Principle  of  Association. — Conventional  treatises 
on  argumentation  make  insufficient  mention  of  the  ar- 
gument from  contrast.  Aristotle  included  contrast  as 
well  as  resemblance  among  the  fundamental  categories 
of  association.  Moreover,  simple  association-tests  show 
that  there  are  certain  t>pes  of  words  which  suggest 
their  opposites,  as,  e.  g.,  head — foot;  right — left  or  wrong, 
etc.  While  there  is  a  tendency  among  modern  psy- 
chologists to  regard  contrast  as  a  secondary  principle 
rather  than  a  primary,  they  are  continually  recognizing 
a  variation  of  method  among  individuals  and  a  char- 
acteristic individual  method  of  reasoning.  Indeed, 
just  as  there  are  types  of  orators  and  debaters  whose 
method  seems  to  be  governed  largely  by  the  principles 
of  resemblance,  as,  for  instance,  Burke,  so  there  are 
others  equally  eminent — notably  Lincoln — in  whom  the 
principle  of  contrast  seems  also  to  be  particularly  strong. 

Uses  in  Debating. — The  method  of  contrast  is  per- 
haps more  essential  in  debating  than  in  any  other  form 


70  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

of  speech,  for  the  debater  must  continually  keep  his 
case  before  an  audience  in  opposition  to  that  of  his  op- 
ponent. He  does  this  in  his  definition  of  the  main  issues, 
in  the  development  of  his  argument,  and  in  his  recapit- 
ulation. Refutation,  too,  may  be  not  only  a  matter  of 
drawing  distinctions  in  a  counter-proof  but  of  contrast- 
ing premise  with  premise,  proof  with  proof,  conclusion 
with  conclusion;  and  so,  in  ordering  his  materials,  when 
the  debater  wishes  to  grapple  with  his  opponent  closely 
and  impress  his  audience  strongly,  he  brings  strength 
into  sharp  contrast  with  weakness,  or  assumption  and 
assertion  into  bold  opposition  to  his  own  evidence, 
with  their  inevitable  conclusions  to  his  own  advan- 
tage. 

In  the  remarks  of  Lincoln  on  the  Dred  Scott  Decision^ 
delivered  June  26,  1857,  observe  how  naturally  and  ef- 
fectively Lincoln  contrasted  (i)  the  dissenting  opinions 
of  Judge  Curtis  with  the  opinions  of  Justice  Taney, 
(2)  the  pubhc  estimate  of  the  black  men  in  the  days  of 
the  Revolution  with  that  at  the  present  time,  and  (3) 
Judge  Douglas's  action  "three  and  a  half  years  ago" 
in  forcing  the  Nebraska  bill  upon  the  country  with  its 
consequences  "now."  We  have  here  a  contrast  in  au- 
thoritative opinion,  a  contrast  in  time,  and  a  contrast 
involving  the  additional  relation  of  antecedent  to  con- 
sequent. 

Uses  in  Refutation:  Types  of  Argument  by  Con- 
trast.— There  are  three  special  types  of  the  argument 
by  contrast  in  which  Lincoln,  the  great  American  de- 
bater, was  especially  proficient,  i.  e.,  redudio  ad  absur- 
dum,  the  dilemma,  and  the  method  of  the  residue.  They 
are  so  effective  in  debating  and  so  common  in  practice 
^  "Little  Masterpieces,"  "  Lincoln,"  by  Bliss  Perry,  p.  13. 


ARGUMENT  71 

that  we  vdW  consider  them  with  some  detail  and  with 
a  variety  of  illustration, 

I.  Reductio  ad  Absurdum. — In  rediidio  ad  absurdiim, 
the  debater  contrasts  the  conclusion  reached  by  his  op- 
ponent with  an  utterly  ridiculous  conclusion  derived 
from  the  citation  of  other  cases  involving  the  same 
process  of  reasoning. 

Any  argument  that  can  be  reduced  to  an  absurdity 
is  said  to  "prove  too  much";  for  instance,  the  argu- 
ment that  "the  liquor  traffic  is  liable  to  abuse  and  there- 
fore should  be  abolished"  proves  too  much.  Its 
absurdity  will  appear  if  one  should  answer:  "Rehgion 
and  learning  also  are  liable  to  abuse;  therefore,  they 
should  be  abohshed."  The  implied  premise  in  the  argu- 
ment is  "whatever  is  hable  to  abuse  should  be  abohshed." 
The  reductio  ad  absurdum  connects  this  impHed  premise 
not  only  with  the  expressed  premise  "the  Hquor  traffic 
is  Hable  to  abuse,"  thereby  showing  that  the  argument 
leads  correctly  to  the  conclusion  drawn,  but  also  con- 
trasts it  with  another  premise,  namely,  "Rehgion  and 
learning  are  hable  to  abuse,"  showing  that  the  argu- 
ment here  leads  to  the  absurd  conclusion,  "Rehgion  and 
learning  should  be  abolished." 

Every  argument  which  proves  too  much  does  not 
require  a  reductio  ad  absurdum  to  overthrow  it.  Webster 
meets  the  objection  that  bank  credit  may  be  abused,  thus: 

I  am  well  aware  that  bank  credit  may  be  abused.  I  know 
that  bank  paper  may  become  excessive;  that  depreciation  will 
then  follow;  and  that  the  evils,  the  losses,  and  the  frauds  con- 
sequent on  a  disordered  currency  fall  on  the  rich  and  the  poor 
together,  but  with  especial  weight  of  ruin  on  the  poor.  I  know 
that  the  system  of  bank  credit  must  always  rest  on  a  specie 
basis,  and  that  it  constantly  needs  to  be  Strictly  guarded  and 


72  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

properly  restrained;  and  it  may  be  so  guarded  and  restrained. 
We  need  not  give  up  the  good  which  belongs  to  it  through  fear 
of  the  evil  which  may  follow  from  its  abuse.  We  have  a  power 
to  take  security  against  these  evils.  It  is  our  business  as  states- 
men to  adopt  that  security;  it  is  our  business  not  to  prostrate 
or  attempt  to  prostrate  the  system,  but  to  use  those  means  of 
precaution,  restraint,  and  correction  which  experience  has  sanc- 
tioned, and  which  are  ready  at  our  hands. 

Macaulay  detects  in  an  argument  of  Mr.  Gladstone 
an  instance  of  proving  too  much  and  exposes  its  premises, 
indicating  at  the  same  time  the  unscientific  mode  of 
deriving  them: 

He  (Mr.  Gladstone)  lays  down  broad  general  doctrines  about 
power,  when  the  only  power  of  which  he  is  thinking  is  the  power 
of  governments — about  conjoint  action,  when  the  only  con- 
joint action  of  which  he  is  thinking  is  the  conjoint  action  of 
citizens  in  a  state.  He  first  resolves  on  his  conclusion.  He  then 
makes  a  major  of  most  comprehensive  dimensions;  and  having 
satisfied  himself  that  it  contains  his  conclusion,  never  troubles 
himself  about  what  else  it  may  contain.  And  as  soon  as  we  ex- 
amine it,  we  find  that  it  contains  an  infinite  number  of  con- 
clusions, every  one  of  which  is  a  monstrous  absurdity.^ 

In  reductio  ad  absurdum,  speaking  exactly,  the  in- 
correct premises  and  conclusion  are  not  pointed  out; 
but  the  argument  is  assumed  to  be  sound  and  contrasted 
with  other  cases  which  prove  it  unsound. 

The  debater  must  not  expect  always  to  find  actually 
expressed  the  argument  proving  too  much;  it  is  fre- 
quently derived  by  implication  either  from  an  opponent's 
argumentation  or  from  the  usual  or  possible  logic  of 
his  side.  In  any  event  he  seeks  to  fasten  upon  his  op- 
ponent a  behef  in  its  soundness. 

In  his  Liverpool  address  Beecher  charged  upon  a 
^Macaulay's  Essay  on  "Gladstone  on  Church  and  State." 


ARGUMENT  73 

hostile  audience  a  belief  in  an  argument  which  proved 
too  much  and  revealed  its  absurdity.  He  had  Just  been 
interrupted  and  considerable  tact  was  required  in  re- 
suming. He  caught  the  ear  of  the  audience  at  once, 
however,  by  attributing  to  them  a  very  natural  sym- 
pathy for  "the  weaker  party,"  and  then  altering  his 
position  slightly  and  without  stating  the  proposition 
he  intended  to  discuss,  he  applied  the  redudio  ad  ah- 
surdum  to  the  proposition  that  *'  the  minority  is  always 
right." 

But  I  know  that  you  say  you  cannot  help  sympathizing  with 
a  gallant  people.  ("Hear,  hear!")  They  are  the  weaker  people, 
the  minority;  and  you  cannot  help  going  with  the  minority  who 
are  struggling  for  their  rights  against  the  majority.  Nothing 
could  be  more  generous,  when  a  weak  party  stands  for  its  own 
legitimate  rights  against  imperious  pride  and  power  than  to 
sympathize  with  the  weak.  But  whoever  sympathized  with 
a  weak  thief  because  three  constables  had  got  hold  of  him? 
("  Hear,  hear ! ")  And  yet  the  one  thief  in  the  policemen's  hands 
is  the  weaker  party.  I  suppose  you  would  sympathize  with  him. 
("Hear,  hear!"  Laughter  and  applause.)  Why,  when  that  in- 
famous King  of  Naples — Bomba — was  driven  into  Gaeta  by 
Garibaldi  with  his  immortal  band  of  patriots,  and  Cavour  sent 
against  him  the  army  of  northern  Italy,  who  was  the  weaker 
party  then?  The  tyrant  and  his  minions;  and  the  majority  was 
the  noble  Itahan  patriots  struggling  for  liberty.  I  never  heard 
that  Old  England  sent  deputations  to  King  Bomba,  and  yet  his 
troops  resisted  bravely  there.  (Laughter  and  interruption.)  To- 
day the  majority  of  the  people  of  Rome  is  with  Italy.  Nothing 
but  French  bayonets  keeps  her  from  going  back  to  the  kingdom 
of  Italy,  to  which  she  belongs.  Do  you  sympathize  with  the 
minority  in  Rome  or  the  majority  in  Italy?  (A  voice:  "With 
Italy."). 

The   manner  of  treatment  may  be  either  direct  or 
indirect.     The  debater,  that  is,  may  proceed  frankly, 


74  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

seriously,  to  show  by  a  wider  application  that  the  argu- 
ment is  unsound;  or  he  may  pretend  to  agree  with  his 
opponent,  admit  the  soundness  of  his  argument  and 
defend  the  truth  of  its  absurdest  conclusions — the  op- 
posite of  what  he  really  believes.  Whately  in  "His- 
toric Doubts"  employs,  in  an  ironical  manner,  Hume's 
arguments  against  Christianity  to  prove  the  non-exist- 
ence of  Napoleon.  Burke  in  ''Vindication  of  Natural 
Society"  applies  ironically  BoHngbroke's  arguments 
against  religious  institutions  to  civil  society.  Swift's 
"Modest  Proposal"  defends  the  cooking  and  eating  of 
the  children  as  the  proper  mode  of  relief  from  famine 
in  Ireland. 

A  good  instance  of  the  direct  way  of  treatment  occurs 
in  a  letter  written  to  Junius  by  Sir  William  Draper. 
Now,  Junius  had  not  only  ridiculed  the  King  in  his  first 
letter  to  the  printer  of  the  Public  Advertiser  but  had 
handled  unsparingly  the  Ministry.  Sir  WilKam  then 
came  forward  over  his  own  signature  to  remove  the 
suspicions  cast  upon  his  friend  the  Marquis  of  Granby 
as  commander  of  the  army.  Draper  was  a  man  of 
scholarly  attainments,  but  alas!  he  was  open-hearted 
and  highly  sensitive  to  ironical  criticism,  the  chief  weapon 
of  his  powerful  antagonist.  Junius  accepted  the  chal- 
lenge and  instantly  put  the  indiscreet  Draper  upon  the 
defensive.  The  latter  managed  to  clear  himself  from 
the  charges  affecting  his  personal  honesty  and  with- 
drew from  the  unequal  contest.  In  the  quotation  given 
below,  referring  to  the  Manila  ransom.  Draper  showed 
that  if  silence  meant  guilt,  then  Junius  had  convicted 
himself  of  several  charges. 

Spain  having  taken  sides  with  France  during  the 
French  and  Indian  War,  an  English  expedition  appeared 


ARGUMENT  75 

(September  25,  1752)  off  Manila,  capital  of  Luzon,  an 
island  of  the  Philippine  group,  and  at  length  carried  the 
place  by  assault  (October  6).  The  victors  accepted 
"bills  on  INIadrid  for  a  milUon  sterhng  in  heu  of  pil- 
lage," and  departed;  but  Madrid  repudiated  tlie  treaty. 
Colonel  Draper,  who  with  Admiral  Cornish  commanded 
the  expedition,  urged  the  government  to  insist  upon  pay- 
ment of  the  ransom,  but  dropped  the  matter,  as  he  tells 
us,  on  grounds  of  "national  convenience."  Junius  in- 
sinuated that  Draper's  silence  had  been  bought  by  sub- 
sequent mihtary  honors  from  the  English  Government, 
and  that  he  had  sold  out  his  companions  who  would 
have  shared  in  the  prize.  The  charge  must  have  ap- 
pealed to  a  very  strong  popular  sentiment,  for,  as  Lecky 
says,  "the  tame  acquiescence  of  the  goverimient  in  the 
Spanish  refusal  bitterly  offended  the  national  pride." 

To  support  your  story  you  have  recourse  to  the  following  ir- 
resistible argument:  "You  sold  the  companions  of  your  vic- 
tory, because  when  the  16th  Regiment  was  given  to  you,  you 
were  silent.  The  conclusion  is  inevitable."  I  believe  that  such 
deep  and  acute  reasoning  could  only  come  from  such  an  extraor- 
dinary writer  as  Junius.  But,  unfortunately  for  you,  the  prem- 
ises as  well  as  the  conclusion  are  absolutely  false.  If  your 
puerile  and  tinsel  logic  could  carry  the  least  weight  or  conviction 
with  it,  how  must  you  stand  affected  by  the  inevitable  conclu- 
sion, as  you  are  pleased  to  term  it  ?  According  to  Junius,  silence 
is  guilt.  In  many  of  the  public  papers  you  have  been  called, 
in  the  most  direct  and  offensive  terms,  a  liar  and  a  coward. 
When  did  you  reply  to  these  foul  accusations?  You  have  been 
quite  silent,  quite  chop-fallen;  therefore,  because  you  were 
silent,  the  nation  has  a  right  to  pronounce  you  to  be  both  a  Har 
and  a  coward,  from  your  own  argument. 

In  his  reply  to  Draper's  argument,  Junius  neither 
mentioned  nor  supported  the  general  proposition  that 


76  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

silence  was  guilt.  He  did  not,  however,  refuse  all  con- 
test; but,  noticing  the  new  and  personal  application, 
was  at  great  pains  to  explain  why  his  name  must  be 
withheld.  It  can  pass  unobserved  largely  from  his  use 
of  interrogatories  and  insinuations  that  in  modifying 
he  has  denied  his  original  and  sweeping  contention. 
His  answer  was  as  follows: 

Your  remarks  upon  a  signature  adopted  merely  for  distinc- 
tion are  unworthy  of  notice;  but  when  you  tell  me  I  have  sub- 
mitted to  be  called  a  liar  and  a  coward,  I  must  ask  you,  in  my 
turn,  whether  you  seriously  think  it  any  way  incumbent  on  me 
to  take  notice  of  the  silly  invectives  of  every  simpleton  who 
writes  in  a  newspaper;  and  what  opinion  you  would  have  con- 
ceived of  my  discretion  if  I  had  suffered  myself  to  be  the  dupe 
of  so  shallow  an  artifice  ?  As  to  me  it  is  by  no  means  necessary 
that  I  should  be  exposed  to  the  resentment  of  the  worst  and  most 
powerful  men  in  this  country,  though  I  may  be  indifferent  about 
yours.  You  assure  me  that  my  logic  is  puerile  and  tinsel;  that 
it  carries  not  the  least  weight  or  conviction;  that  my  premises 
are  false  and  my  conclusions  absurd.  If  this  be  a  just  descrip- 
tion of  me,  how  is  it  possible  for  such  a  writer  to  disturb  your 
peace  of  mind  or  to  injure  a  character  so  well  established  as 
yours?  Take  care.  Sir  William,  how  you  indulge  this  unruly 
temper,  lest  the  world  should  suspect  that  conscience  has  some 
show  in  your  resentments.  You  have  more  to  fear  from  the 
treachery  of  your  own  passions  than  from  my  malevolence. 

How  Answered. — Reductio  ad  absurdum  is  effective 
not  only  because  it  leaves  an  opponent's  proposition 
unproved,  but  because  it  reveals  his  unsound  logic  and 
shakes  confidence  in  his  reliabiHty  as  a  debater.  In 
answering;  the  chief  aim  of  a  debater  may  be  to  show 
that  he  has  not  proved  too  much,  that  his  position  is 
within  reason.  If  he  has  been  misrepresented,  an  em- 
phatic denial   that  he  believes  the  discredited  ideas, 


ARGUMENT  77 

accompanied  by  a  statement  of  his  true  position,  may 
be  all  that  is  necessary.  But  generally  it  is  well  to  show 
something  more  than  the  reasonableness  of  your  posi- 
tion. Possibly  his  argument  was  not  germane  to  the 
point  at  issue.  An  answer  somewhat  more  effective 
is  the  tu  guoque  or  countercharge.  For  instance,  if,  upon 
a  question  involving  an  amendment  to  an  existing  law, 
it  is  held  upon  one  side  that  the  objections  consider 
only  the  abuses  under  the  law,  it  can  be  held  upon  the 
other  that  the  enemies  of  amendment  are  merely  oppos- 
ing innovation.  Circumstances  may  make  it  possible  to 
answer  redudio  ad  ahsurdum  by  any  of  the  chief  modes 
of  attack  suggested.  Examine,  in  illustration,  the  fol- 
lowing inquiries  of  Beecher's  argument  from  the  point 
of  view  of  his  audience: 

Suppose  that  a  Hstener  in  the  audience  refused  to 
believe  that  the  "Minority  is  not  always  right."  In 
answering  would  it  be  effective  to  attempt  to  prove 
the  contradictory  ?  In  this  case,  the  reasoner  would  seek 
to  establish  a  proposition  whose  falsity  seems  obvious. 

Refusing  thus  to  believe  that  "the  minority  is  not 
always  right,"  could  the  objector  employ  in  his  discus- 
sion the  method  of  the  residue?  Beecher's  well-chosen 
examples  were  most  probably  admitted  and,  therefore, 
could  not  be  eliminated. 

Would  it  be  effective  to  answer:  "I  grant  your 
premises  and  conclusion  but  remark  in  your  reasoning 
the  fallacy  ignoratio  elenchi.  I  grant  that  the  majority 
is  sometimes  right  and  is  sometimes  wrong;  that  the 
minority  when  right  should  receive  support  not  because 
it  is  the  weaker  party  but  because  it  is  right,  and  be- 
lieve that  sympathy  may  go  where  it  likes — usually  to 
the  weaker  party;   still  I  fmd  your  argument  irrelevant, 


78  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

for  it  ignores  what,  in  my  mind,  is  the  real  issue, 
namely — Is  the  South  in  the  right  or  in  the  wrong?" 
Again,  would  it  be  effective  to  return  upon  Beecher's 
general  position,  charging  him  with  an  equally  false  as- 
sumption in  the  implied  beHef  that  "the  majority  is  al- 
ways right"  ?  In  the  event  of  a  riot  in  a  lunatic  asylum, 
for  instance,  would  he  always  sympathize  with  the  in- 
mates or  the  superintendent?  The  inmates,  it  will  be 
noticed,  are  in  the  majority. 

From  its  general  nature,  it  is  clear  that  redudio  ad 
ahsurdum  is  of  special  value  in  opening  an  attack.  It 
is  used  to  introduce  in  a  general  way  an  answer  to  a 
particular  issue.  In  debate,  therefore,  it  has  proper 
place  in  the  first  part  of  the  first  speeches  in  rebuttal. 
When  here  employed  it  can  overthrow  an  opponent's 
entire  case;  more  probably,  however,  it  will  remove 
prejudice,  enlist  attention,  and  put  an  opponent  upon 
the  defensive  at  the  outset.  If  a  speaker  has  reason 
to  believe  that  prejudice  exists  against  his  side,  he  may 
employ  the  method  in  his  first  speech.  An  afiirmative 
speaker,  advocating  a  reform  or  amendment,  sometimes 
will  begin  by  applying  the  argument  to  the  conservative 
temper;  or  recommending  to  a  body  of  patriotic  Amer- 
icans the  adoption  of  a  European  scheme  of  govern- 
ment, before  attempting  proof,  will  reduce  to  an 
absurdity  the  assumption  that  "whatever  is  American 
is  right."  A  debater  objecting  to  a  proposition  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  an  "innovation"  employs  a  "question- 
begging  term"  which  can  be  effectively  exposed  by  this 
method.  Henry  Grattan,  speaking  upon  the  "Tithes," 
answers  this  objection  as  follows: 

Yes;  but  will  you  innovate?  Admit  this  argument  and  we 
sit  here  to  consecrate  abuses.    The  statutes  of  mortmain  were 


ARGUMENT  79 

innovations;  for  what  is  the  Protestant  religion  but  the  inter- 
position of  Parliament,  rescuing  Christianity  from  abuses  in- 
troduced by  its  own  priesthood? 

Institutions,  divine  or  human,  corrupt  by  their  nature  or  by 
ours;  the  best  human  institution — the  British  Constitution — 
did  so  corrupt,  that  at  different  periods  it  was  anarchy,  oligarchy, 
despotism,  and  was  restored  by  Parliament. 

The  only  divine  institution  we  know  of — the  Christian  relig- 
ion— did  so  corrupt  as  to  have  become  an  abomination,  and  was 
rescued  by  act  of  Parliament. 

Life,  like  establishments,  declines;  disease  is  the  lot  of  nature; 
we  oppose  its  progress  by  strong  remedies;  we  drink  a  fresh 
life  at  some  medical  fountain,  or  we  find  a  specific  in  some  salu- 
brious herb;  will  _you  call  these  restorations  innovation  on  the 
physical  economy?  Why,  then,  in  the  political  economy,  those 
statutes  which  purge  the  public  weal  and  from  time  to  time  guard 
the  infirm  animal,  man,  against  the  evils  to  which  civil  society 
is  exposed — the  encroachment  of  the  priest  and  the  politician? 

It  is  then  on  a  false  surmise  of  our  nature,  this  objection; 
we  live  by  a  succession  of  amendments;  such  is  the  history  of 
man;  such,  above  all,  is  the  history  of  religion,  where  amend- 
ment was  even  opposed;  and  those  cant  expressions,  the  sup- 
porting church  and  state,  were  ever  advanced  to  continue  the 
abuse  of  both. 

2.  The  Dilemma. — We  may  also  contrast  two  ideas 
in  the  form  of  a  dilemma,  so  as  to  put  an  opponent  at 
a  disadvantage  or  render  his  position,  or  case,  untenable. 
Here  the  contrasted  idea  must  be  contradictory,  and 
each  side  of  the  contradiction — or,  as  we  frequently 
say,  each  "horn  of  the  dilemma" — must  have  the  power 
to  "gore"  or  injure.  In  his  Cooper  Institute  Address, 
Lincoln  said : 

You  charge  that  we  stir  up  insurrections  among  your  slaves. 
We  deny  it,  and  what  is  your  proof?  Harpers  Ferry!  John 
Brown!  John  Brown  was  no  Republican;  and  you  have  failed 
to  implicate  a  single  Republican  in  his  Harpers  Ferry  enterprise. 


80  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

If  any  member  of  our  party  is  guilty  in  that  matter,  you  know 
it,  or  you  do  not  know  it.  If  you  do  know  it,  you  are  inexcusable 
for  not  designating  the  man  and  proving  the  fact.  If  you  do 
not  know  it,  you  are  inexcusable  for  asserting  it,  and  especially 
for  persisting  in  the  assertion  after  you  have  tried  and  failed  to 
make  the  proof.  You  need  not  be  told  that  persisting  in  a  charge 
which  one  does  not  know  to  be  true  is  simply  malicious  slander. 

Two  Kinds. — More  closely,  the  dilemma  is  (i)  simple 
or  (2)  complex  according  as  there  are  one  or  two  sup- 
positions. If  it  should  be  asserted  that  the  United  States 
should  declare  war,  a  person,  believing  in  the  inadequacy 
of  the  present  navy,  might  answer:  "If  we  declare  war, 
we  must  be  able  to  defend  our  coasts  and  to  attack  the 
enemy;  either  we  cannot  defend  our  coasts  or  we  cannot 
attack  the  enemy;  therefore,  we  must  not  declare  war." 
The  simple  dilemma  may  be  formally  expressed  as  fol- 
lows: If  A  is  B,  C  is  D,  and  E  is  F;  either  C  is  not 
D  or  E  is  not  F;  therefore,  A  is  not  B.  Imagine  a 
character,  declared  by  his  eulogist  to  be  wise  and  then 
good;  imagine  also  that  he  is  beHeved  by  a  critic  to  be 
an  irreverent  person.  The  critic  may  resolve  the  argu- 
ment into  a  contradiction,  showing  that  he  cannot  be 
both  wise  and  good,  e.  g.,  "If  he  were  wise,  he  would 
not  be  irreverent  in  jest,  and  if  he  were  good,  he  would 
not  be  irreverent  in  earnest;  but  either  he  is  irreverent 
in  jest  or  in  earnest;  therefore,  either  he  is  not  wise 
or  not  good."  Again,  Calhoun  argued  that  the  doctrine 
of  Nullification  was  a  constitutional  right,  that  it  was 
possible  for  a  State  to  live  within  the  Union  and  without 
it  at  one  and  the  same  time;  Webster,  however,  claimed 
that  the  doctrine  was  rebellious.  The  doctrine  may  be 
assailed  thus:  "If  a  State  is  without  the  Union,  Nul- 
lification is  impossible,  and  if  within,  it  is  rebellious; 


ARGUMENT  81 

but  either  a  State  is  without  the  Union  or  within  it; 
therefore,  either  Nullification  is  impossible  or  rebel- 
Hous."  The  complex  dilemma  may  be  formally  expressed 
as  follows:  If  A  is  B,  C  is  D;  and  if  A'  is  F,  E  is  F; 
but  either  C  is  not  Z)  or  £  is  not  F;  therefore,  either  A 
is  not  B  or  .Y  is  not  Y. 

The  simple  dilemma  has  merely  shown  that  an  op- 
ponent's assertion  is  false.  The  assertion  being  proved 
false,  it  will  follow  that  the  argument  of  which  it  is  a 
premise  must  fall.  The  complex  dilenmia  ended  with 
stating  that  either  of  two  assertions  is  false;  that  the 
argument  fails  will  follow  from  the  fact  that  both  as- 
sertions are  needed  as  premises  to  support  it. 

Hs  Use. — It  is  clear  from  its  twofold  division  that  a 
dilemma  can  attack  either  one  or  two  assertions  in  an 
argumentation.  In  case  two  assertions  are  attacked, 
they  may  be  found  either  in  a  single  argument  or  in  two 
distinct  arguments.  The  critic  will  sometimes  discover 
a  contradiction  in  an  opponent's  proof  of  a  single  main 
proposition  and  expose  it  by  a  complex  dilenmia;  or 
examining  and  criticising  the  proof  of  one  main  proposi- 
tion and  then  of  another,  he  will  note  some  point  of 
contradiction  contained  in  the  proof  of  the  two  proposi- 
tions and  state  it  in  dilemmatic  form.  But  whether  the 
dilemma  be  simple  or  complex,  or  whether  it  be  derived 
from  one  or  from  two  arguments,  it  should  always  be 
remembered  that  unless  the  critic  has  grasped  his  op- 
ponent's argumentation  as  a  whole,  has  found  his  funda- 
mental premises,  his  attack  can  hardly  be  fundamental 
or  essential. 

How  Answered.— In  answering  a  dilemma  you  may 
show  that  the  contradiction  is  more  apparent  than  real 
— that  there  is  a  middle  ground;  or  that  one  side  is  not 


82  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

sound;  or  admitting  that  the  dilemma  will  hold  true, 
that  it  is  irrelevant  to  the  main  argument.  In  any  event, 
your  object  is  to  show  that  your  argument  is  not  "in 
dilemma."  What  I  have  said  here  of  the  destructive 
dilemma  applies,  equally,  to  a  constructive  dilemma. 
That  is,  for  instance,  if  your  opponent  gives  you  a  choice 
between  two  alleged  contradictions  for  the  purpose  of 
eliminating  one  of  your  arguments  (after  which  he  in- 
tends to  disprove  the  remaining  one) ,  you  may  in  answer- 
ing, treat  it  likewise,  by  any  of  the  ways  mentioned. 

Lincoln  was  particularly  clever  in  charging  his  op- 
ponent with  putting  him  in  a  false  dilemma  and  then 
of  showing  that  there  was  a  middle  ground.  This  is 
what  he  did  in  the  following: 

He  finds  the  Republicans  insisting  that  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  includes  all  men,  black  as  well  as  white,  and  forth- 
with he  boldly  denies  that  it  includes  negroes  at  all,  and  pro- 
ceeds to  argue  gravely  that  all  who  contend  it  does,  do  so  only 
because  they  want  to  vote,  and  eat,  and  sleep,  and  marry  with 
negroes.  He  will  have  it  that  they  cannot  be  consistent  else. 
Now  I  protest  against  the  counterfeit  logic  which  concludes  that, 
because  I  do  not  want  a  black  woman  for  a  slave  I  must  neces- 
sarily want  her  for  a  wife.  I  need  not  have  her  for  either.  I 
can  just  leave  her  alone. 

3.  The  Method  of  the  Residue. — The  method  of  the 
residue  may  be  regarded  as  a  method  of  contrast,  for 
it  is  essentially  a  process  of  exclusion.  Specifically, 
the  reasoner  states  a  nimiber  of  cases;  then  eliminates 
all  the  cases  but  one;  and  concludes,  therefore,  that 
the  residuary  case  is  presumably  true — e.  g.,  it  is  not 
this,  it  is  not  that,  therefore  it  must  be  the  other.  If 
a  murder  has  been  assigned  to  deHberate  purpose,  pas- 
sion, or  insanity,  and  the  theories  of  passion  and  of  de- 


ARGUMENT  83 

liberate  purpose  have  been  respectively  exploded,  the 
theory  of  insanity  may  be  presumed  to  be  true.  Several 
hypotheses  are  set  up  to  account  for  a  thing.  Usually, 
the  affirmative  w-ill  advance  one  hypothesis;  the  nega- 
tive another  or  others.  The  affirmative  then  will  en- 
deavor to  support  his  hypothesis  against  its  rivals.  He 
must  overthrow  them.  Enumerating  all  the  hypotheses 
advanced,  excluding  the  opposing  ones  on  specified 
grounds,  he  infers  that  the  remaining  hypothesis,  which 
is,  of  course,  his  own,  is  presumably  the  true  one. 

It  should  be  noted  that  only  in  case  all  possible  hy- 
potheses have  been  considered  and  the  grounds  of  elim- 
ination have  been  sufficient  can  the  speaker  go  further 
and  conclude  that  his  hypothesis  is  undeniably  true; 
but  these  suppositions  do  not  often  exist  in  fact.  The 
force  of  the  method  is  destructive,  but,  as  such,  it  is 
simple  and  convincing.  The  debater  will  therefore 
generally  follow  up  his  advantage  by  supporting  his 
theory  by  other  and  more  positive  proof. 

The  Hon.  Member  for  Taunton  insisted  that  there  ought 
to  be  "some  understanding."  Now,  it  was  a  mighty  easy  thing 
to  assert  that  there  ought  to  be  some  understanding;  but  gen- 
tlemen, however  decided  in  their  opinion,  ought  to  come  forward 
and  say  what  that  understanding  ought  to  be.  There  were 
only  three  courses  which  the  government  of  this  country  had 
to  pursue.  It  might  decline  all  interference  in  the  matter  and 
leave  the  planters,  the  negroes,  and  the  Anti-Slavery  Society 
to  fight  the  battle  out  amongst  themselves.  Would  a  resolution 
like  that  be  acceptable  to  the  Hon.  Member  for  Taunton?  Was 
the  government  not  only  to  decHne  all  interference,  but  to  set 
their  faces,  in  toto,  against  alteration  and  improvement  and  to 
abstain  from  proposing  or  recommending  anything?  Would 
the  Hon.  gentleman  approve  of  such  a  course?  Why,  probably 
not;  because  the  Hon.  gentleman  admitted  that  much  altera- 
tion and  much  gradual  improvement  of  the  condition  of  the 


84  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

slaves  were  desirable.  The  only  question  then  was,  how  could 
that  amelioration  be  effected?  But  there  was  a  third  course 
which  the  government  might  pursue  upon  the  present  question. 
It  might  resolve  to  legislate  altogether  for  the  colonies — to  take 
the  measures  necessarily  into  their  own  hands;  making  no  dis- 
tinction between  these  colonies  which  had  legislatures  of  their 
own  and  those  which  were  immediately  under  the  control  of 
this  country.  Would  that  course  be  acceptable  to  the  Hon. 
Member  for  Taunton?  Why,  again,  probably  not;  for  a  por- 
tion of  his  speech  had  been  occupied  in  showing  the  folly  of  such 
a  line  of  conduct. 

The  only  remaining  course,  then,  was  that  precise  course  which 
government  had  pursued,  and  which  the  Hon.  Member  for  Taun- 
ton had  taken  much  pains  and  time  to  show  was  the  very  wisest 
that  could  possibly  have  been  pursued.  In  those  colonies  as 
to  which  the  crown  had  a  distinct  right  of  legislation,  govern- 
ment had  resolved  to  commence  an  example,  which  it  was  hoped 
would  soon  be  followed  by  those  who  had  a  right  to  legislate 
for  themselves. — {Peel,  Sir  Robert.) 

Or  look  at  it  as  a  class  question.  What  is  it  that  is  interested 
in  the  maintenance  of  these  laws?  It  cannot  be  the  farmer,  be- 
cause the  rent  screw  is  turned  upon  him  for  every  extra  shilling  a 
quarter  he  makes  on  his  corn.  It  cannot  be  the  laboring  classes, 
for  look  at  the  wages  of  eight  a  week  for  a  family  of  seven  or 
eight  persons.  It  cannot  be  the  commercial  class,  for  the  present 
system  keeps  them  out  of  a  foreign  as  well  as  a  home  market. 
It  cannot  be  the  literary  class,  for  who  would  care  to  provide 
food  for  the  mind  when  the  food  for  the  body  is  so  heavily  taxed  ? 
Then  in  fact  it  cannot  be  any  class  but  that  very  small  one 
composed  of  some  10,000  or  20,000  (not  more)  of  nominal  owners 
of  the  soil. — {Fox,  W.  J.) 

In  Plato's  Republic,  Socrates  answered  the  erroneous 
definitions  which  were  held  of  justice,  and  suggested 
that  justice  would  best  be  seen  in  a  perfect  state.  He 
therefore  traced  the  rise  of  a  state;  after  which  he 
ascribed  the  four  virtues,  wisdom,  courage,  temperance, 
and  justice,  to  a  state  that  is  perfectly  good.    The  first 


ARGUMENT  85 

three  ascertained  the  nature  of  the  fourth,  or  justice 
will  be  kno\\Ti  by  the  method  of  residues,  "for  it  is  plain 
that  it  could  only  be  the  remainder,"  and  when  justice 
is  discovered  in  a  perfect  state,  it  may  be  recognized, 
by  analogy,  in  the  individual  man.  Accordingly,  the 
ideal  state  is  constructed.  The  following,  from  an  analy- 
sis^ of  the  Republic,  will  illustrate  his  employment  of 
the  method  of  residues: 

And  now  having  traced  the  rise  of  a  state  from  first  to  last, 
Socrates  returns  to  the  question:  What  is  justice?  And  in  what 
part  of  the  state  are  we  to  look  for  it? 

The  state,  if  it  has  been  rightly  organized,  must  be  perfectly 
good,  it  must  be  wise,  brave,  temperate,  and  just.  Hence,  re- 
garding the  virtue  of  the  state  as  a  given  quantity,  made  up  of 
wisdom,  courage,  temperance,  and  justice,  if  we  can  find  three  of 
these,  we  shall  by  that  very  process  have  discovered  the  nature 
of  the  fourth. 

The  wisdom  of  the  state  obviously  resides  in  the  small  class 
of  guardians  or  magistrates.  The  courage  of  the  state,  as  ob- 
viously, resides  in  the  auxiliaries,  and  consists  essentially  in  ever 
maintaining  a  right  estimate  of  what  is,  or  is  not,  really  formi- 
dable. 

The  essence  of  temperance  is  restraint.  The  essence  of  politi- 
cal temperance  lies  in  recognizing  the  right  of  the  governing  body 
to  the  allegiance  and  obedience  of  the  governed.  It  does  not 
reside  in  one  particular  class,  like  wisdom  and  courage,  but  is 
diffused  throughout  the  entire  state  in  the  form  of  a  common 
consent,  or  harmony,  upon  this  subject.  Thus  we  have  found 
the  three:  where,  then,  is  the  fourth? 

After  eliminating  wisdom,  courage,  and  temperance,  there 
still  remains  a  something  which  enables  the  other  three  to  take 
root  in  the  state,  and  preserves  them  intact  therein.  This  some- 
thing must,  therefore,  be  justice.  It  may  be  defined  as  that 
which  teaches  everybody  to  attend  to  his  own  business  without 
meddling  in  that  of  other  people — which  fuses  together  the  three 

*  "The  Republic  of  Plato."     Davies  and  Vaughan. 


86  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

classes  in  the  state  and  keeps  each  in  its  proper  place.  Con- 
versely, the  essence  of  political  injustice  lies  in  a  meddling,  rest- 
less spirit  pervading  the  three  classes,  and  leading  each  to  med- 
dle with  the  offices,  tools,  and  duties  of  the  other  two. 


CHAPTER  IV 

ARGUMENT 

(continued) 

///.     Argument  from  Causal  Relation 

If  the  source  from  which  the  conclusion  is  drawn  is 
regarded  as  having  its  basis  in  the  relation  which  cause 
bears  to  effect,  antecedent  to  consequent  or  motive  to 
deed,  the  argument  may  be  called  argument  from  causal 
relation. 

We  have  learned  from  experience  that  "nothing 
happens,"  but  that  all  that  exists  is  really  the  result 
of  some  great  antecedent  principle  or  causal  law.  So, 
in  the  field  of  science,  we  are  constantly  seeking  to  in- 
terpret physical  or  biological  phenomena  through  the 
discovery  of  some  general  principle  or  law  governing 
the  universe  which  we  may  apply  in  argument  as  a 
causal  reason  or  explanation  of  a  particular  phenomenon 
or  fact.  Likewise,  in  the  field  of  human  conduct  gen- 
erally, we  are  prone  to  regard  men  as  responsible  agents 
whose  actions  are  guided  by  will,  motive,  desire,  inten- 
tion, modified  of  course  by  such  attending  circumstances 
as  heredity  and  environment. 

Fundamentally,  all  reasoning  assumes  as  its  basis 
the  law  of  causation  which  affirms  that  every  cause  is 
invariably  followed  by  an  effect  and  every  effect  is  in- 
variably preceded  by  a  cause.  The  beUef  in  this  law 
is  too  generally  recognized   to  need  elaboration  here, 

87 


88  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF   DEBATE 

but  the  practical  difficulties  of  applying  it  to  a  concrete 
case  are  so  great  as  to  be  worthy  of  specific  mention. 
Obviously,  causal  reasoning  may  proceed  from  effect 
to  cause,  from  cause  to  effect,  or  from  effect  to  effect. 

The  Rule  of  Adequacy. — The  cause  assigned  must 
be  adequate  to  produce  the  known  effect. 

In  discussing  public  questions  as  in  government, 
poKtics,  economics,  etc.,  when  we  assign  a  cause  for  a 
known  effect,  we  must  take  into  account: 

1.  The  parallelism  or  difference  in  conditions  in  past  experi- 

ence under  which  the  assigned  cause  is  said  to  operate. 
It  is  here  that  reasoning  from  resemblance  and  differ- 
ence or  contrast  performs  its  essential  function  in  causal 
reasoning. 

2.  The  possibility  of  the  existence  of  other  causes  operating 

in  conjunction  wdth  or  in  opposition  to  the  assigned 
cause  in  a  cited  case  or  in  general,  and  also  in  the  case 
in  question.  Hunger,  for  instance,  may  in  certain  cir- 
cumstances prompt  to  theft;  but  fear  of  detection  may 
prevent  the  act. 

3.  We  must  always  allow  for  the  evolution,  change,  and  growth 

of  society  as  tending  to  modify,  by  progressive  experi- 
ences, the  safe  generalizations,  abstractions,  or  opinions 
of  a  former  time. 

That  is  to  say,  the  adequacy  of  any  cause  assigned 
for  a  known  effect  may  depend  on  whether  or  not  the 
conditions  we  have  in  mind  are  really  parallel,  on  the 
absence  of  other  co-operating  or  competing  causes,  and 
on  the  law  of  progress.  This  same  rule  of  adequacy  is 
equally  true  in  using  the  reverse  process,  namely,  that 
of  predicting  the  effects  which  will  probably  foUow  from 
a  known  fact  or  principle  asserted  as  a  cause. 

When  we  state  some  principle  or  fact  and  argue  as 
to  the  consequence  or  results  which  are  likely  to  flow 
from  it,  in  general  or  in  a  particular  case,  we  are  arguing 


ARGUMENT  89 

from  cause  to  effect.  In  debating,  the  advantages  of 
adopting  or  rejecting  a  proposed  plan,  with  its  complex 
of  benefits  and  evils,  is  a  causal  process  of  this  kind.  So 
Washington  argued  against  foreign  alliances  because 
they  would  lead  to  international  conflict,  and  Webster 
opposed  the  South  CaroHna  Doctrine  because  it  would 
result  in  Civil  War.  As  a  rule,  we  first  either  affirm 
or  seek  to  establish  some  principle  to  guide  our  judg- 
ment in  the  case  in  question,  and  then  show  also  the 
consequences  which  will  result  from  its  acceptance  in 
the  present  matter.  The  perorations  of  oratory  are 
replete  with  prophecies  setting  forth  the  effects  result- 
ing from  the  adoption  of  policies  or  courses  of  action, 
with  the  added  devices  of  imagery,  important  in  em- 
phasis and  persuasion. 

Further,  we  may  argue  directly  from  effect  to  effect. 
If,  for  example,  the  process  is  from  one  effect  to  another 
effect  of  the  same  probable  cause,  the  argument  may 
be  regarded  simply  as  another  name  for  argument  from 
sign.  In  the  illustration,  ''the  clouds  indicate  rain," 
it  is  hardly  reasonable  to  regard  the  clouds  as  a  cause 
of  rain,  but  rather  to  think  of  both  clouds  and  rain  as 
effects  of  some  such  cause — as  the  weather  bureau  might 
say — as  ''changes  in  the  barometric  pressure."  If, 
however,  the  process  is  from  one  effect  to  an  allied  effect 
of  a  parallel  cause,  the  argument  may  be  simply  re- 
garded as  argument  from  analogy. 

Illustration  of  Causal  Reasoning. — In  seeking  an  an- 
swer to  the  question  "what  is  a  nationahty?"  Theodore 
Ruyssen,^  after  examining  six  possible  causes  of  nation- 
ality, namely,  the  country,  common  interests,  race, 
language,  rehgion,  and  spiritual  unity,  reaches  the  con- 
•  American  Association  for  International  Conciliation,  No.  112. 


90  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

elusion  that  "  the  ideal  nation  appears  to  us  as  the  close 
synthesis  of  the  social  soul  or  collective  will,  with  a  sys- 
tem of  political  institutions."  To  make  clear  further 
the  minute  care  needed  in  assigning  causes  for  complex 
facts  or  circumstances  in  human  affairs,  and  also  to 
point  out  the  difficulties  of  causal  arguments,  the  follow- 
ing points  in  Ruyssen's  analysis  should  be  of  interest: 
I.  The  interaction  of  cause  and  effect. 

Does  it  not  seem,  after  all,  that  the  "natural  boundary" 
theorists  by  an  unconscious  sophism  mistake  for  a  cause  what 
is  but  an  effect?  In  interpreting  experience  we  naturally  tend 
to  explain  what  is  changeable  by  what  is  immutable,  what  is 
variable  by  essential  and  permanent  characteristics.  Nothing 
is  more  misleading  than  to  account  for  the  life  of  a  people  by 
the  form  of  their  country  in  our  atlases  of  historical  geography. 
The  natural  features  of  the  great  historic  countries,  Spain,  Great 
Britain,  France,  are  so  familiar  to  us,  they  have  so  completely 
become  for  us  the  image  of  these  nations,  that  there  would  seem 
to  be  a  necessary  connection  between  their  topography  and 
their  history;  and  surely  no  one  would  deny  that  there  is  much 
truth  in  this  view.  But  it  should  be  remembered  that  the  geog- 
raphy of  a  nation  is  itself  the  product  of  its  history;  we  need 
only  look  at  an  historical  atlas  to  be  assured  of  this.  France 
has  not  always  reached  to  the  Alps  and  the  Pyrenees,  and  her 
northeastern  frontier  has  been  subject  to  constant  alteration. 
Of  what  existing  boundary  may  we  say  that  it  is  fixed  by  the 
nature  of  things  ?  If  any  country  might  be  thought  predestined 
"by  nature"  to  attain  national  unity,  it  is  certainly  Italy,  iso- 
lated from  other  nations  by  the  sea  and  by  the  highest  moun- 
tains in  Europe.  Nevertheless,  she  remained  for  centuries  after 
the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire  but  a  "geographical  expression," 
and  even  to-day  she  must  fight  hard  to  conquer  the  frontiers 
which  nature  seemed  to  have  assigned  to  her.  Doubtless,  it  is 
true  enough  that  in  one  sense  the  country  makes  the  people, 
modifies  their  character  and  imposes  on  them  certain  habits; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  we  may  also  say  that  the  people  fashion 
their  country  by  their  dreams  and  aspirations. 


ARGUMENT  91 

2.  Partial  and  temporary  causes. 

How  explain  by  motives  of  self-interest  the  Polish  insurrec- 
tion of  1863,  a  movement  of  chivalrous  folly  condemned  from 
the  outset  to  a  cruel  defeat?  In  short,  common  interests  may 
unite  for  a  time  even  hostile  forces,  just  as  they  may  bring  into 
opposition  persons  or  groups  otherwise  sympathetic.  But  the 
national  bond  is  of  a  different  sort  than  a  convenient  com- 
promise;  a  nation  is  not  a  syndicate  of  desires. 

3.  Multiplicity  of  causes. 

The  most  important  part  of  Renan's  analysis,  in  my  opinion, 
is  his  masterly  criticism  of  the  theories  which  would  determine 
nationality  by  race.  The  progress  of  ethnography  and  of  an- 
thropology in  the  last  thirty  years  has  not  in  the  least  weak- 
ened Renan's  position.  Can  any  one  use  the  term  race  in  its 
strictest  sense  as  implying  a  number  of  individuals  of  the  same 
species  linked  together  by  a  common  ancestry?  It  is  obvious 
that  to  do  so  we  should  have  to  seek  out  the  very  origins  of  the 
human  race  which  are  lost  in  the  uncertain  distances  of  prehis- 
toric times;  rather  a  question  of  metaphysics  than  of  physiology 
or  of  human  geography.  We  believe  no  longer  in  the  mythical 
division  of  the  human  family  among  the  sons  of  Noah,  and  yet 
we  do  not  know  whether  the  forest  of  humanity  has  sprung 
from  a  single  root  or  from  a  number  of  diverse  stocks.  An- 
thropology knows  no  instance  of  a  pure  race,  nor  a  single  ex- 
ample of  any  race  unable  to  blend  itself  with  another.  We  may, 
it  is  true,  by  comparing  certain  outstanding  human  character- 
istics, such  as  stature,  facial  angle,  cephaHc  index,  and  so  forth, 
determine  the  predominance  of  certain  types  in  a  given  region 
and  explain  the  variations  from  this  by  migrations  or  by  the  re- 
surgence of  very  ancient  homogeneous  races;  but,  apart  from 
the  fact  that  no  one  knows  whether  these  races  are  themselves 
pure  or  composite,  the  indications  of  anthropology  are  confirmed 
neither  by  linguistics  nor  history.  Nowhere  can  the  geograph- 
ical distribution  of  languages  be  traced  back  to  the  division 
of  populations  into  tall,  blond  dolichocephalic  and  dark,  short 
brachycephalic  types. 


92  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

4.  Relative  value  of  causes. 

But  we  readily  perceive  that  in  a  race  so  considered,  the  factor 
which  is  considered  of  first  importance,  physiological  inheritance, 
plays  an  uncertain  but  always  secondary  part,  and  that  the  truly 
determining  factors  are  climate,  costume,  or  habits  of  life.  It  will 
be  found,  for  example,  that  peoples  undoubtedly  akin  may  be- 
come decidedly  different  from  each  other — as  with  the  Alsatians 
and  the  Badenese — whereas  populations  that  grow  by  immigra- 
tion soon  impose  upon  the  newcomers  a  new  type;  for  instance, 
the  Yankee  type  which  asserts  itself  in  so  curious  a  fashion 
after  two  or  three  generations  among  immigrants  of  every  de- 
scent who  have  come  to  the  United  States,  Anglo-Saxons,  Ger- 
mans, Jews,  Italians,  and  all  others.  From  this  it  follows  that 
race,  wherever  it  constitutes  an  effective  social  reality,  is  fully  as 
much  a  product  of  as  a  factor  in  the  national  life.  A  nation  is 
not  determined  by  its  heredity;  it  is  a  living  organism  which 
is  both  adapted  to  its  environment  and  adapts  that  to  itself.  Or 
better  said — ^for  this  mutual  adaptation  might  be  a  wholly  ma- 
terial process — a  nation  bears  the  imprint  of  its  spiritual  vitality 
on  its  brow  and  in  its  sinews.  It  may  degenerate  from  alcohol, 
debauchery,  overstrain,  or  deliberate  surrender;  or  it  may  en- 
hance, rebuild,  and  beautify  its  life  by  good  hygiene,  athletics, 
schooling,  military  training,  games,  the  arts,  and  the  intensive 
development  of  spiritual  life. 

In  a  word,  nationalities  are  populations  that  aspire  to  become 
nations.  Like  nations  they  are  complex  collectivities,  drawing 
their  sentiment  of  unity  from  a  great  number  of  sources,  among 
which  the  moral  factors,  traditions,  religion,  and  a  common 
speech  are  the  most  essential.  But  in  order  to  become  nations 
in  the  full  sense  of  the  term  they  must  gain  that  political  in- 
dependence through  which  means  alone  a  complete  social  life 
can  manifest  itself. 

Causal  Argument,  and  the  Other  Sources  of  Reason- 
ing.— Moreover,  the  reader  will  notice  in  these  quota- 
tions that,  while  the  inquiry  is  obviously  the  solution 
of  a  causal  problem,  there  is  used  much  concrete  ma- 
terial, involving  the  principle  of  resemblance  and  dif- 


ARGUMENT  93 

ference  as  well  as  much  generalization  in  order  to  make 
the  argument  clear  and  intelligible. 

It  has  been  said  that  all  arguments  in  their  final  analy- 
sis, and  when  carried  to  completion,  may  be  shown  to 
involve  an  inference  from  a  complex  of  four  relations. 
The  illustration  previously  used  may  be  stated  for  causal 
argimient  thus:  This  smoke  is  the  result  of  fire,  for  smoke 
usually  means  fire.  In  other  cases  when  I  have  seen 
smoke  I  have  found  fire,  or  where  there  is  smoke  there 
is  (or  has  been)  fire. 

Differences  of  View-Point. — The  points  of  view  of 
men  differ  so  widely,  as,  for  instance,  between  scientist 
and  business  man,  lawyer  and  doctor,  professor  and 
student,  that  we  often  despair  of  agreeing  with  otliers 
on  a  single  cause  for  a  known  effect.  On  tliis  account, 
no  doubt,  we  sometimes  use  exposition  to  show  how  a 
proposed  plan  will  work,  and  also  persuasion  to  create 
a  wish  or  desire  for  its  adoption.  An  attractive  how 
is  more  effective  than  a  disputed  why. 

Much  of  our  causal  reasoning,  indeed,  is  merely  ex- 
planatory and  not  fundamental,  which  suggests  the 
uncertainty  of  all  human  reasoning  about  nature,  life, 
and  conduct. 

IV.    Inductive  and  Deductive  Arguments 

If  the  source  from  which  the  conclusion  is  drawn  is 
regarded  as  having  its  basis  in  the  relation  which  a  par- 
ticular bears  to  a  general  or  a  general  to  a  particular, 
the  argument  may  be  called  inductive  or  deductive. 

If  the  reasoning  moves  from  a  general  to  a  particular, 
from  a  more  to  a  less  general,  the  process  is  deductive. 
Hence,  when  we  say  all  sailors  are  swimmers — Jones 
is  a  sailor;    therefore,  Jones  is  a  swimmer — we  reason 


94  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

deductively.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  reasoning  moves 
from  a  particular  to  a  general,  from  a  less  to  a  more 
general,  the  process  is  inductive.  Hence,  when  we  say- 
that  because  John  who  is  a  sailor  is  a  swimmer,  and 
because  William  who  is  a  sailor  is  a  swimmer,  etc. — there- 
fore, all  sailors  are  swimmers — we  reason  inductively. 
This  classification,  of  course,  is  quite  independent  of  the 
source  of  the  reasoning  employed  as  involving  the  prin- 
ciple of  simple  association,  of  resemblance,  or  of  cause 
to  effect.  Any  such  relations  may  exist  either  in  deduc- 
tion or  in  induction. 

Whatever  may  be  the  sources  of  our  particulars,  facts, 
or  instances,  whether  they  come  from  our  own  experi- 
ence and  observation,  or  are  made  known  to  us  by  read- 
ing, or  by  the  testimony  of  witnesses  given  in  person;  we 
may  draw  inferences  from  them,  as  to  facts  not  yet 
known  or  as  to  general  truths  to  which  the  particulars 
are  related.  If,  when  travelling  through  the  West,  we 
should  happen  to  observe  that  the  faces  of  all  the  In- 
dians we  have  seen  were  invariably  of  a  reddish  color, 
we  should  perhaps  feel  justified  in  concluding,  therefore, 
that  the  faces  of  all  Indians  are  invariably  of  this  color. 
The  reasoning  is  inductive,  for  it  proceeds  obviously 
from  the  hue  of  a  number  of  Indians  separately  observed 
to  a  general  conclusion  about  all  Indians.  Or,  if  upon 
reading  the  lives  of  several  Presidents  of  the  United 
States,  for  instance,  of  Washington,  Jefferson,  and  Lin- 
coln, we  should  be  impressed  by  their  ability  and  char- 
acter, and  should  conclude  consequently  that  "all  Presi- 
dents of  the  United  States  are  men  of  abihty  and 
character,"  the  reasoning  would  be  inductive.  We 
should  draw  a  general  conclusion  about  all  Presidents 
from  what  we  had  read  about  several. 


ARGUMENT  95 

The  Inevitable  Assumption. — The  great  value  of  in- 
ductive reasoning  appears  to  be  in  those  cases  where 
it  is  impossible  to  examine  all  the  particulars  or  facts. 
It  is  reasoning  from  the  known  to  the  unknown.  Be- 
cause the  Indians  whom  we  have  observed  are  red, 
we  infer  that  all  persons  called  Indians  possess  a  like 
appearance;  because  several  Presidents  whose  lives 
we  have  read  appear  to  us  as  men  of  abihty  and 
character,  we  infer  that  all  men  belonging  to  the  class, 
Presidents,  possess  similar  characteristics.  But  the  ques- 
tion arises,  How  can  we  say  anything  accurately  about 
"all  Indians"  or  "all  Presidents,"  since  we  have  only 
seen  a  few  Indians  and  have  read  the  Hves  of  but  three 
Presidents?  The  answer  is  that  the  argvunent  from  in- 
duction is  based  upon  the  law  of  uniformity.  In  other 
words,  there  Ues  at  the  bottom  of  all  inductive  reason- 
ing this  unexpressed  assumption:  that  what  is  true  of 
several  particulars  making 'up  a  general  is  true  of  the 
general,  "what  is  true  of  several  members  of  a  class  is 
true  of  the  class  as  a  whole." 

The  Inductive  Formula. — If  we  attempt  to  put  in- 
ductive reasoning  into  a  formula,  it  is  clear  that  what 
has  been  called  the  law  of  uniformity  must  appear  as 
a  premise,  for  it  has  been  shown  to  be  necessary  to  the 
inductive  conclusion.    The  formula  may  be  stated  thus: 

I.     Assumption.    What  is  true  of  several  members  of  a  class 

is  true  of  the  class  as  a  whole. 
II.     Facts. 

a.  President  Washington  was  a  man  of  character  and 

ability. 

b.  President  Jefferson  was  ditto. 

c.  President  Lincoln  was  ditto. 

III.    Therefore,  all  Presidents  of  the  United  States  have  been 
men  of  character  and  ability. 


96  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

The  previous  illustrations  are  simple  illustrations  of 
the  loose  inductions  which  we  ordinarily  make  in  daily 
affairs. 

Induction,  the  Scientific  Method  of  Investiga- 
tion.— Induction  should  proceed  by  hypothesis  and 
verification.  The  scientist  who  reasons  pre-eminently 
by  induction  is  patient  in  his  investigations  and  cautious 
in  drawing  his  conclusions.  Starting  with  a  few  facts, 
he  will  make  some  inference  provisionally  and  assert 
it  as  an  hypothesis.  This  is  hardly  more  than  a  con- 
jecture made  for  the  purposes  of  the  investigation,  and 
to  be  modified  or  even  abandoned  as  the  subsequent 
discovery  of  facts  may  seem  to  require.  That  hypothesis 
which  will  explain  all  the  facts  in  the  best  possible  way 
is  the  one  finally  to  be  accepted  and  affirmed  as  true. 

Kinds  of  Induction. — Induction  is  of  two  kinds,  im- 
perfect or  perfect.  Imperfect  induction  is  induction 
based  on  the  above  assumption.  It  is  of  three  kinds 
according  as  it  is  regarded  as  involving  the  other  sources 
or  bases  of  reasoning,  e.  g.,  in  the  first  place  there  is  the 
causal  or  scientific  method,  in  which  the  generalization 
resulting  is  a  cause — e.  g.,  the  law  of  gravitation. 
Second,  there  is  the  method  of  resemblance,  in  which 
the  generalization  is  a  conclusion  drawn  from  other 
cases  similar  in  character;  e.  g.,  arsenic  will  prove  fatal 
because  of  cited  cases  in  which  death  resulted.  Third, 
the  method  of  association  in  which  the  generalization 
is  the  result  of  .previous  associations  in  experience,  e.  g., 
clouds  are  a  sign  of  rain.  Here  again  we  may  see  how 
the  name  we  affix  to  any  argument  will  depend  on  the 
point  of  view.  Perfect  induction  does  not  involve  an 
assumption.  It  is  simply  a  method  of  enumeration,  e.  g., 
there  are  fifteen  persons  in  this  room. 


ARGUMENT  97 

Deduction,  a  Ready  Mode  of  Reasoning. — Deduction 
is  a  thoroughly  simple,  natural  process.  In  ordinary 
afifairs  we  constantly  employ  general  ideas  to  aid  us  in 
reaching  a  conclusion  concerning  a  particular  instance. 
On  seeing  clouds  I  infer  that  it  is  likely  to  rain  to- 
morrow, because  clouds  are  usually  followed  by  rain. 
Having  to  reach  a  railroad-station  a  mile  off,  I  allow 
myself  fifteen  minutes,  because  I  have  found  out  from 
experience  that  I  can  walk  a  mile  comfortably  in  that 
time.  I  attend  the  Princeton- Yale  football  game,  feel- 
ing sure  that  it  will  be  worth  seeing,  because  all  these 
contests  in  the  past  have  been  worth  seeing,  and  so  on. 
The  process  is,  in  each  of  these  illustrations,  deductive — 
from  the  general  to  the  particular.  I  have  merely  ap- 
plied what  I  already  know  from  past  general  experi- 
ence to  aid  me  in  drawing  conclusions  in  the  several 
special  instances.  I  have  done  this,  too,  without  specially 
investigating  the  truth  of  the  general  ideas  employed. 
Hence,  it  may  appear  that  deduction  is  a  ready  method 
of  reasoning  and  proof  involving  the  use  of  generaliza- 
tions already  known  or  ascertained. 

Deduction,  Supplemented  by  Induction. — The  generali- 
zations employed  by  deduction  usually  have  their  source 
in  past  experience.  If  we  examine  the  general  proposi- 
tions used  in  the  preceding  illustrations,  we  find  that 
they  rest  upon  previous  inductions.  It  is  from  the  ob- 
servation of  a  number  of  separate  instances  that  I  have 
been  able  to  say  that  clouds  usually  mean  rain;  it  is 
from  the  recollection  of  the  several  Princeton- Yale  games 
that  I  have  witnessed  that  I  have  confidently  asserted 
that  all  Prince  ton- Yale  games  are  worth  seeing;  and  it 
is  because  I  have  walked  a  mile  comfortably  in  fifteen 
minutes  on  this  and  that  occasion  that  I  feel  justified 


98  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

in  assuming  in  general  that  I  can  walk  that  distance 
comfortably  in  that  time.  "Deduction,"  says  President 
Hibben,  "that  reaches  other  than  purely  abstract  and 
formal  conclusions  must  rest  upon  induction  for  the 
material  to  form  its  premises."  Thus,  while  deduction 
is  a  ready  mode  of  reasoning,  and  may  be  sufficient  for 
one's  purposes,  we  may  have  need  to  use  induction  in 
order  to  make  the  conclusion  more  certain  by  estabHsh- 
ing  the  generalization  on  which  the  deduction  is  based. 

The  student  should  beware  of  the  use  of  hastily  as- 
sumed generalizations  in  reasoning.  "The  boasted 
Athenians,"  said  Doctor  Johnson,  "were  barbarians. 
The  mass  of  every  people  must  be  barbarous,  where 
there  is  no  printing."  Macaulay  shows  that  this  rea- 
soning was  based  on  a  generalization  which  was  both 
incorrectly  derived  and  false. 

Deduction,  a  Method  of  Criticism. — We  have  been 
thinking  of  deduction  constructively,  as  a  mode  of 
reasoning  or  proof;  but  it  may  be  equally  important 
for  us  to  be  able  to  criticise  scientifically  the  accuracy 
of  a  reasoning  process.  We  are  sometimes  less  con- 
cerned about  the  truth  of  the  propositions  used  in  reason- 
ing than  about  the  consistency  of  the  reasoning  itself. 
In  such  cases,  we  can  test  the  process  in  question  by 
throwing  it  into  the  form  of  a  syllogism. 

The  syllogism  is  a  group  of  three  propositions;  namely, 
the  conclusion  or  proposition  to  be  proved  and  two 
other  propositions  from  which  the  conclusion  is  drawn. 
If  now  we  say  "the  man  is  intelligent,"  "an  intelligent 
person  is  rare,"  we  can  conclude  therefore  that  "the 
man  is  a  rare  person."  The  reasoning  is  in  accord  with 
the  known  principle  that  things  which  are  equal  to  the 
same  things  are  equal  to  each  other.  This  group  is  called 
a  syllogism^    But  we  cannot  draw  a  conclusion  from 


ARGUMENT  99 

any  two  propositions;  they  must  have  one  term  in 
common,  as,  for  instance,  "intelligent."  There  are  three 
terms  in  a  syllogism,  the  first  and  second  propositions 
having  one  term  alike  and  each  a  particular  term,  which 
reappear  in  the  conclusion.  Not  only  must  there  be 
a  conmion  term  in  the  first  two  propositions  but  in  one 
of  them  this  term  must  be,  as  it  is  called,  distributed. 
A  universal  proposition  distributes  its  subject,  that  is, 
makes  it  include  all  members  of  its  class  taken  sepa- 
rately, while  a  particular  proposition  does  not.  If  we 
say  "John  is  intelligent,"  "William  is  intelligent,"  we 
have  a  common  term,  but  since  it  is  not  distributed  we 
cannot  draw  a  new  conclusion.  In  the  correct  syllogism, 
however,  the  common  or  middle  term,  as  it  is  usually 
called,  was  distributed  in  the  proposition  "an  intel- 
hgent  person  is  rare,"  for  an  assertion  was  made  of  all 
intelhgent  persons.  The  first  two  propositions  in  a 
syllogism  are  called  premises;  the  premise  which  con- 
tains the  middle  term  and  the  predicate  of  the  conclu- 
sion is  called  the  major  premise,  that  which  contains 
the  middle  term  and  the  subject  of  the  conclusion  is 
called  the  minor  premise. 

This  is  but  one  form  of  syllogism  into  which  our 
reasoning  can  be  thrown.  Altogether  there  are  twenty- 
four  varieties  of  valid  syllogisms,  the  variations  depend- 
ing on  the  position  of  the  middle  term  and  on  the 
quantity  and  quality  of  the  first  two  propositions.  The 
quantity  of  a  proposition  refers  to  its  universal  or  par- 
ticular character,  the  quality  to  its  aflarmative  or  nega- 
tive. 

The  Enthymeme.— In  debating,  the  syllogism  does 
not  appear  in  its  complete  form  but  with  one  of  its 
premises  suppressed.  Such  instances  of  the  incomplete 
formula  are  known  as  enthymemes.    The  syllogism  just 


100  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

mentioned  may  be  stated  as  an  enthymeme  thus:  the 
man  is  a  rare  person  because  he  is  intelligent.  Or  dis- 
carding the  major  premise  we  may  say:  the  man  is  a 
rare  person  because  an  intelHgent  person  is  rare.  If 
we  argue  in  the  former  way  we  assume,  as  admitted,  that 
"an  intelHgent  person  is  rare";  if  in  the  latter,  that 
"he  is  intelligent."  We  may  see  again  the  need  of  three 
propositions  in  any  reasoning  that  is  logically  complete. 
We  may  also  see  that,  for  ordinary  purposes,  the  use 
of  two  propositions  may  be  sufficient.  An  enthjoneme, 
however,  can  be  tested  by  referring  it  to  a  syllogism. 

The  Chain  of  Reasoning.— When  we  reason  so  that 
the  conclusion  of  one  argument  is  made  the  premise 
of  the  second  argument  and  so  on  to  a  final  conclusion, 
we  employ  a  chain  of  reasoning.  A  single  argument 
may  indeed  be  sufticient  to  establish  the  conclusion  de- 
sired, but  in  case  a  premise  of  the  argument  employed 
is  questioned  it  may  be  necessary  to  formulate  another 
argument  in  which  the  disputed  premise  is  made  the 
conclusion.  Epictetus  remarked  that  when  "death 
may  appear  to  be  an  evil,  have  ready  the  thought  that 
it  is  right  to  avoid  evils  and  that  death  is  unavoidable." 
What  he  said  was  in  effect  this:  (i)  Nothing  that  it  is 
right  to  avoid  is  unavoidable;  it  is  right  to  avoid  all 
evils;  therefore,  no  evils  are  unavoidable.  (2)  No  evils 
are  unavoidable;  death  is  unavoidable;  therefore,  death 
is  no  evil.  The  reasoning  is  here  thrown  into  two  syl- 
logisms, the  major  premise  of  the  first  being  supplied. 
We  may  put  this  chain  of  reasoning  into  a  series  of  en- 
thymemes  as  follows: 

Death  is  not  an  evil,  because 
A.  All  evils  are  avoidable,  for 

I.  All  that  it  is  right  to  avoid  is  avoidable. 


ARGUMENT  101 

The  reasoning  here  is  perfectly  clear,  both  the  suppressed 
minor  premise  of  A,  that  "death  is  unavoidable,"  and 
the  suppressed  minor  premise  of  ^  i,  that  "it  is  right 
to  avoid  all  evils,"  being  taken  for  granted. 

Two  Classes  of  Fallacies. — Fallacies,  or  errors  in 
reasoning,  have  been  divided  into  two  classes,  formal 
and  material,  according  as  they  occur  in  the  form  of 
the  reasoning  or  in  the  subject-matter.  We  may  men- 
tion several  cases  of  formal  fallacies:  (i)  Equivocation, 
or  the  use  of  a  word  in  more  than  one  sense,  e.  g.,  Eng- 
land has  a  responsible  cabinet  system.  Her  ministers 
are  responsible,  trustworthy  men.  (2)  Amphibology, 
or  ambiguous  grammatical  structure.  This  fallacy 
frequently  arises  from  undue  ellipsis  or  from  an  improper 
arrangement  in  a  sentence — e.  g.,  "the  duke  yet  lives 
that  Henry  shall  depose,"  "and  all  the  air  a  solemn 
stillness  holds,"  Daudet  is  nearer  Trollope  than  Dickens. 
(3)  Composition,  which  afl&rms  something  of  a  class 
separately  in  the  major  premise  and  collectively  in  the 
minor,  e.  g.,  three  and  two  are  two  numbers;  five  is 
two  and  three;  therefore,  five  is  two  numbers.  (4)  Divi- 
sion, which  affirms  something  of  a  class  collectively  in 
the  major  premise  and  separately  in  the  minor,  e.  g., 
all  the  angles  of  a  triangle  (taken  together)  are  equal 
to  two  right  angles;  these  are  angles  of  a  triangle 
(separately);  therefore,  these  angles  are  equal  to  two 
right  angles.  (5)  Accent,  or  a  grammatical  structure 
in  which  the  ambiguity  arises  from  a  misplaced  accent, 
e.  g.,  "  thou  shalt  not  bear  false  witness  against  thy  neigh- 
bor," as  signifying  that  we  can  bear  false  witness  against 
others. 

Several  cases  of  material  fallacies  may  be  mentioned. 
(1)  Petitii  Principii,  begging  the  question,  which  con- 


102  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

sists  in  its  simplest  form  of  attempting  to  prove  a  propo- 
sition by  itself,  e.  g.,  opium  produces  sleep,  because  it 
is  soporific.  Broadly,  it  is  the  fallacy  of  assuming  with- 
out proof.  (2)  Ignoratio  Elenchi,  irrelevant  conclusion, 
e.  g.,  arguing  that  the  sexes  are  mentally  equal  while 
pretending  to  argue  that  the  suffrage  should  be  given 
to  women.  (3)  Non  Sequitur,  or  false  consequent,  e.  g., 
the  ground  is  wet;  therefore,  it  has  rained.  (4)  Non 
causa  pro  causa,  or  the  false  cause,  e.  g.,  one  of  a  party 
of  thirteen  who  sat  at  a  table  died  within  a  year;  there- 
fore, the  unlucky  number  at  the  table  was  the  cause 
of  his  death.  (5)  Plurium  Interrogationum,  or  many 
questions.  "Have  you  left  off  your  bad  habits?"  This 
question  cannot  be  answered  categorically  without  an 
injurious  admission.  The  remedy  is  to  separate  it  thus : 
Have  you  bad  habits?    If  so,  have  you  left  them  off? 

A  Common  Ground  in  Argument. — Valuable  as  is 
the  preceding  classification  of  arguments  for  an  under- 
standing of  the  nature  and  scope  of  the  argumentative 
processes,  it  should  always  be  remembered  that  the  end 
of  argument  is  agreement.  Logically,  unless  there  is 
agreement  in  the  premises,  there  can  be  no  agreement 
in  the  conclusion.  There  must  be  some  common  ground, 
some  basis  of  agreement  in  the  premises  and  reasoning. 

The  practical  debater  simply  applies  portions  of  his 
own  experiences,  with  insight  and  tact,  to  the  needs 
of  a  particular  situation.  But  the  getting  of  another 
to  recognize  one's  point  of  view  sufficiently  to  make  him 
change  his  mind  is  a  very  difficult  matter.  It  will 
usually  demand  the  ability  "to  see  others  as  they  see 
themselves,"  and  will  require  considerable  insight,  a 
process  of  interpretation  which  is  both  perceptual  and 
associative  in  character. 


ARGUMENT  103 

In  general,  an  effective  argument  is  an  argument 
well  imaged;  as,  for  example,  one  whose  major  premise, 
minor  premise,  and  conclusion  are  so  vividly  presented 
that  the  conclusion  is  instinctively  visualized  as  a  real- 
ity by  the  mind  to  which  it  is  addressed.  But  in  imaging 
ideas,  we  shall  have  need  to  consider  not  only  our  own 
views  but  to  find  the  ideas  and  beliefs  in  the  mind  and 
experience  of  our  hearers  with  which  we  may  connect  the 
views  urged  by  us.  We  can  take  care,  for  instance,  that 
the  opinion  or  action  urged  is  in  accord  with  some  class 
conception  or  "principle  of  action  which  is  a,  fixed  and 
stable  part"  of  the  ego  of  the  persons  we  seek  to  con- 
vince. 

''It  may  be  said  in  general,"  says  James,  "that  a 
great  part  of  every  deliberation  consists  in  the  turning 
over  of  all  the  possible  modes  of  conceiving  of  the  doing 
or  not  doing  of  the  act  in  point.  The  moment  we  hit 
upon  a  conception  which  lets  us  apply  some  principle 
of  action  which  is  a  fixed  and  stable  part  of  our  ego,  our 
state  of  doubt  is  at  an  end.  Persons  of  authority,  who 
have  to  make  many  decisions  in  a  day,  carry  with  them 
a  set  of  heads  of  classification,  each  bearing  its  voli- 
tional consequence,  and  under  these  they  seek  as  far 
as  possible  to  arrange  each  new  emergency  as  it  occurs. 
It  is  where  the  species  is  without  precedent,  to  which 
consequently  no  cut-and-dried  maxim  will  apply,  that 
we  feel  at  a  loss,  and  are  distressed  at  tlie  indeterminate- 
ness  of  our  task.  As  soon,  however,  as  we  see  our  way 
to  a  familiar  classification,  we  are  at  ease  again.  In 
action  as  in  reasoning,  then,  the  great  thing  is  the  quest 
of  the  right  conception."  ^ 

There  may  also  be  a  cormnon  ground  of  feeling  as  well 

'"Briefer  Course,"  430. 


104  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

as  of  reasoning.  But  even  when  it  is  necessary  to  arouse 
attention  and  interest  in  order  to  overcome  prejudice 
or  belief,  to  enlist  sympathy,  or  to  stiffen  the  will  before 
we  can  get  our  views  accepted  by  another,  the  image- 
making  process  may  be  said  to  be  the  handmaiden  of 
that  type  of  the  associative  process  which  we  called 
the  logical.    We  shall  see  this  more  fully  later  on. 

V.     The  Refutation 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  rebuttal  is  very  dif- 
ferent in  character  from  the  first  speech.  In  the  open- 
ing address,  for  example,  a  debater  will  avoid  fallacy 
and  assertion,  things  which  he  may  hope  to  detect  in 
the  argument  of  his  opponent.  There  is  no  class  of  ar- 
guments peculiar  to  refutation  which  may  not  be  em- 
ployed directly.  The  same  power  of  analysis,  knowledge 
of  evidence,  skill  in  the  construction  of  a  logical  frame- 
work, tact  in  persuasion  are  to  be  employed  in  both 
speeches.  It  is  to  be  remembered,  too,  that  the  general 
aim  of  debate  is  to  compel  assent  or  to  induce  action. 

As  distinguished  from  the  first  speech,  the  rebuttal 
deals  with  objections.  Its  specific  aim,  therefore,  is  to 
answer  objections  advanced  in  opposition,  and  to  ofifer 
objections  to  opposed  arguments.  Arguments  which 
are  in  form  constructive  belong  to  the  first  speech; 
those  in  form  destructive  to  the  rebuttal.  But  this 
rule  is  not  invariable,  for  it  is  frequently  wise  to  antic- 
ipate objections,  and  answer  them  in  the  first  speech. 
This  is  done  upon  two  grounds :  either  to  remove  prej- 
udice or  to  weaken  the  force  of  the  objections.  Even 
in  rebuttal  if  an  opponent's  objections  are  weak,  very 
little  time  should  be  consumed  in  answering  them.  They 
may,  indeed,  be  ignored;  in  which  case  the  debater  will 


ARGUMENT  105 

employ  his  time  in  presenting  new  arguments,  in  en- 
forcing an  argument  already  advanced,  in  recapitula- 
tion, or  in  an  appeal  to  the  audience.  It  is  important 
to  note  that  a  great  amount  of  attention  devoted  to 
objections  will  give  the  impression  of  a  lack  of  confidence 
on  the  part  of  the  speaker  in  his  own  constructive  argu- 
ments. 

Preparation  for  the  rebuttal  must  include  a  thorough 
and  minute  study  of  the  opposite  side.  Several  sug- 
gestions may  be  made.  In  the  first  place,  the  debater 
should  be  so  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  arguments 
usually  employed  in  support  of  the  opposite  side  and 
the  usual  form  of  stating  them,  that  he  cannot  be  taken 
by  surprise.  Again,  he  should  be  equally  well  acquainted 
with  the  arguments  usually  advanced  to  refute  the  op- 
posite arguments,  including  their  usual  form  of  state- 
ment, so  that  he  will  know  exactly  with  the  least  hesi- 
tation how  each  argument  may  be  answered.  But  a 
study  of  only  the  usual  arguments  will  be  inadequate 
if  an  opponent  is  specially  skilled,  and  impossible  if 
the  question  is  under  discussion  for  the  first  time.  At 
all  events,  the  successful  debater  will  hardly  be  content 
to  quit  work  when  he  has  guarded  his  defenses  and  di- 
rected his  attacks  in  only  the  conventional  ways;  to 
many  a  man  real  work  is  just  begun.  He  will  institute 
new  inquiries,  make  new  researches,  glean  new  facts 
from  distant  quarters,  give  old  ones  new  applications, 
find  new  theories,  unexpected  devices;  in  a  word,  he 
will  seek  to  discover  by  painstaking  effort  the  strongest 
possible  objections  and  the  strongest  possible  ways  of 
overturning  them. 

An  important  limitation  is  imposed  upon  the  discus- 
sion by  the  presentation  of  the  arguments  upon  the  op- 


106  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

posite  side.  The  affirmative's  rebuttal  is  conditioned 
by  the  negative's  answer  or  opening  speech,  the  nega- 
tive's rebuttal  by  the  affirmative's  opening  speech.  The 
practical  rule  is  this:  limit  discussion  to  arguments 
actually  presented  by  your  opponent.  Your  opposi- 
tion is  no  longer  general  and  undeffiied,  it  is  not  now 
merely  supposed  or  anticipated,  but  specific,  real,  and 
present.  Do  not,  for  example,  state  that  "my  opponent 
will  say  such  and  such  a  thing,"  but  answer  arguments 
actually  made.  Do  not  set  things  up  for  the  sake  of 
destroying  them,  fight  windmills,  or  deal  with  possible 
arguments  not  actually  employed.  Your  attack  should 
be  directed  against  your  opponent's  case  as  made  up 
by  him  and  with  the  evidence  which  he  adduced  to  sup- 
port it. 

Selection. — It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  consent  to 
throw  away  unnecessary  ideas.  But,  unfortunately, 
the  things  which  come  into  the  mind  on  first  hearing 
an  argument  are  not  always  the  most  important.  Your 
objection  being  a  weak  one,  it  might  be  omitted  alto- 
gether, and  a  httle  coolness  and  deliberation  might  cause 
you  to  canvass  the  subject  more  thoroughly  and  reveal 
to  you  a  stronger  answer.  Or  perhaps  the  argument 
should  be  ignored.  Equally  important  with  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  way  each  argument  should  be  answered  is 
the  exercise  of  judgment  and  tact  in  the  selection  of 
the  argument  to  be  attacked.  Not  every  main  argu- 
ment of  your  opponent  is  to  be  answered,  for  there  are 
usually  strong  arguments  upon  both  sides.  "There  are 
objections,"  says  Doctor  Johnson,  "against  a  plenum 
and  objections  against  a  vacuum;  but  one  of  them  must 
be  true."  To  attempt,  however,  to  answer  an  argu- 
ment most  probably  true,  will  not  only  fail,  but,  in  ad- 


ARGUMENT  107 

dition,  serve  to  emphasize  the  weakness  of  your  own 
argument.  If,  therefore,  you  believe  an  argument  to 
be  valid,  do  not  attempt  to  refute  it.  If  it  should  seem 
necessary  to  notice  it,  you  can  employ  what  may  be 
called  a  method  of  depreciatory  contrast.  You  can  do 
this,  for  instance,  by  saying:  "Even  supposing  such  or 
such  a  proposition  of  my  opponent  to  be  true,  it  is  of 
much  less  significance,  of  much  inferior  moment,  than 
such  or  such  a  proposition  of  my  own."  Or,  again,  with- 
out denying  the  proposition,  perhaps  you  can  attack  its 
proof.  In  doing  this,  you  will  keep  clearly  in  view  the 
distinction  that  the  question  is  not  whether  the  hearers 
believe  the  proposition  true,  but  whether  its  truth  is 
conclusively  proved. 

A  debater  can  attack  all  the  main  propositions  set 
up  by  his  opponent;  he  can  attack  only  one  main  proposi- 
tion, admitting  or  ignoring  the  others;  or  he  can  admit 
or  ignore  them  all,  attacking  only  the  general  conclusion. 
It  is  here  to  be  said  that  the  arguments  employed  most 
frequently  in  debate  are  not  demonstrative  but  only 
probable  in  their  force;  and,  consequently,  that  the 
debater's  aim  is  to  show  that  the  preponderance  of  prob- 
ability rests  upon  his  side.  If,  then,  this  preponderance 
can  be  shown  as  to  the  general  conclusion,  it  is  not  ma- 
terial that  some  objections  are  passed  by. 

What  objections  are  to  be  selected  for  attack?  What 
ignored?  What  admitted?  These  questions,  in  prac- 
tice, are  not  easy  of  solution.  The  decisions  should  be 
made  with  deliberation  after  accurately  weighing  in 
balance  each  argument  against  its  corresponding  ob- 
jection. The  strongest  arguments  which  can  be  most 
successfully  rebutted  should  be  made  in  every  case  in 
the  contest  the  objects  of  attack. 


108  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

Fundamental  Criticism. — Where  shall  the  argument 
be  attacked?  Manifestly,  at  essential  or  fundamental 
points.  But  these  points  should  be  vital.  A  spear  thrust 
through  the  cuirass  or  gorget  is  more  formidable  than 
one  through  the  joints  of  the  greaves.  Find  the  vital, 
vulnerable  points  in  your  opponent's  main  argument. 
Deal  with  the  argumentation  as  a  whole,  and  not  only 
in  its  minor  divisions.  Construct  for  yourself,  if  pos- 
sible, the  main  syllogism  of  your  opponent's  argumen- 
tation and  notice  minor  syllogisms  only  when  your  criti- 
cism of  them  can  be  shown  to  affect  the  main  syllogism. 
Now,  the  syllogism  of  an  argument  ought  to  be  such 
that  its  premises  can  either  be  granted  or  proved  to  be 
true;  and  its  reasoning  ought  to  be  conclusive.  If, 
however,  the  reasoning  is  inconclusive  or  either  premise 
is  false  absolutely  or  most  probably,  the  fact  should 
be  made  evident. 

Burke's  argument  that  "taxation  without  represen- 
tation is  unjust"  can  be  reduced  to  the  following  syl- 
logism: taxation  without  an  equivalent  is  unjust;  the 
taxation  of  the  American  colonies  is  without  an  equiv- 
alent; therefore,  the  taxation  of  the  American  colonies 
is  unjust.  In  examining  this  syllogism  two  things  will 
appear:  First,  that  the  reasoning  is  conclusive;  second, 
that  the  major  premise  can  perhaps  be  admitted  to  be 
true,  because  taxation  is  of  the  nature  of  a  contract. 
It  will  be  discerned,  however,  that  the  minor  premise 
demands  proof,  which,  indeed,  Burke  did  not  ignore. 
But  if  it  should  be  expedient  to  attack  this  argu- 
ment, the  issue  would  be  raised  upon  the  truth  of  the 
minor  premise.  Such  criticism  would  be  relevant  and 
fimdamental,  its  success  or  effectiveness  depending,  of 
course,  upon  the  relative  force  of  the  arguments  pro 


ARGUMENT  109 

and  con.  A  fundamental  criticism  directed  against 
slight  misstatements,  discrepancies,  or  minor  and  iso- 
lated points  will  be,  of  necessity,  weak  and  superficial. 

Two  General  Methods  of  Refutation. — The  suscepti- 
bility of  any  proposition  to  attack  is  due  either  to  the 
existence  of  an  error  in  the  argument  or  to  the  existence 
of  other  facts  not  taken  into  consideration.  Sometimes 
a  part  of  the  facts  is  suppressed.  This  is  what  happened 
in  the  memorable  trial  of  Bardell  against  Pickwick. 
In  our  amusement  here  at  the  incident  of  the  finding 
of  Mrs.  Bardell  in  the  arms  of  the  defendant,  who  was 
soothing  and  caressing  her,  we  almost  overlook,  with 
Sergeant  Buzfuz,  the  fact  that  Mrs.  Bardell  was  ill  and 
had  just  fainted  away.  Indeed,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  the  verdict  went  to  the  plaintiff.  Now  what  hap- 
pened here  intentionally  can  occur  accidentally  from 
an  ignorance  of  a  part  of  the  facts.  There  are  in  general 
but  two  ways  of  refuting  a  proposition:  overthrowing 
its  supporting  argument  and  proving  the  contradictory. 
They  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  for  a  speaker  can  em- 
ploy both  methods  in  attacking  one  proposition.  The 
opposed  structure  is  destroyed  first,  and  the  new  one 
is  erected  upon  its  ruins.  You  can  find  a  good  instance 
in  Burke's  speech  on  American  taxation.  He  stated 
that  there  are  two  modes  of  discussing  the  subject,  one 
narrow  and  simple,  another  broad  and  historic.  He 
answered  the  arguments  offered  in  the  restrictive  mode, 
and  then  expounded  the  comprehensive  view  which  he 
thought  was  the  proper  one. 

In  overthrowing  an  argument  already  advanced  in 
support  of  a  proposition,  the  reasoner  may  point  out 
errors  in  the  syllogistic  process.  Is  there  an  error  in  dis- 
tribution of  terms?     Are  there  two  negative  premises 


110  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

or  two  particular  premises  or  some  formal  defect  in 
structure?  If  so,  the  argument  will  fall.  Again,  are 
both  premises  true?  In  case  one  is  doubtful,  is  it  sup- 
ported by  evidence?  Is  the  evidence  offered  relevant, 
material,  and  competent?  Failing  here,  it  can  be  con- 
cluded that  the  proof  is  inadequate  and  the  premise 
presumably  false;  for  a  proof  which  does  not  succeed, 
raises,  indeed,  a  strong  presumption  against  the  proposi- 
tion it  seeks  to  defend.  In  refuting  a  proposition  by 
overthrowing  the  argument  it  is  generally  advisable 
to  show  not  only  where  the  faulty  process  lies,  but,  in 
addition,  exactly  how  it  can  be  supposed  to  have 
arisen. 

Suppose  the  point  at  issue — to  illustrate  the  second 
method — is  supported  by  a  syllogism  which  is  logically 
sound,  and  the  premises  of  which  seem  true;  still  it 
may  happen  that  an  opponent  can  find  sufficient  evi- 
dence to  prove  a  proposition  which  will  contradict  the 
one  attacked.  While  the  method  in  such  a  procedure 
is  constructive  in  that  it  proves  a  new  proposition,  it  is 
destructive  in  that  the  proposition  proved  is  incom- 
patible with  that  of  the  opposite  side.  The  proof  of 
an  aUbi,  for  instance,  by  a  man  charged  with  murder 
upon  circumstantial  evidence  is  just  as  complete  a  refu- 
tation as  if  the  evidence  were  shown  to  be  '*  irrelevant, 
immaterial,  and  incompetent."  Perhaps,  usually,  it 
will  appear  that  where  this  method  is  employed  the 
opponent's  argument  is  not  strong  in  probative  force. 
The  chief  value  of  the  method  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  is 
practicable  when  no  other  form  of  proof  can  be  procured. 
Not  only,  however,  may  the  proposition  in  issue  be  re- 
futed by  direct  opposed  argument,  but  also  the  premises 
(of  which  the  proposition  in  issue  is  the  conclusion). 


ARGUMENT  111 

Special  types  of  argument,  useful  in  refutation — 
redudio  ad  absurdum,  the  dilemma,  and  the  method  of 
the  residue — have  been  considered  under  the  argument 
from  example. 


CHAPTER  V 
EVIDENCE 

The  Proof. — The  word  proof,  according  to  Best, 
"seems  properly  to  mean  anything  which  serves  either 
immediately  or  mediately  to  convince  the  mind  of  the 
truth  or  falsehood  of  a  fact  or  proposition." 

Evidence  and  argument  are  parts  of  proof.  Any 
fact  from  which  another  fact  or  proposition  can  be 
inferred  may  be  called  evidence,  may  prove  the  mat- 
ter in  question.  Any  operation  of  reasoning,  by  which 
we  proceed  from  one  fact  to  another  fact,  or  from 
a  number  of  facts  to  a  generalization,  or  by  syllo- 
gism through  two  assumptions  to  a  conclusion  may  be 
called  an  argument,  may  tend  to  prove  the  matter  in 
question.  The  lawyer,  for  example,  customarily  ac- 
quaints the  court  both  with  the  evidence  and  the  logical 
processes  by  which  he  would  estabUsh  or  disestablish 
the  matter  in  issue.  On  an  issue  of  fact  his  brief  con- 
tains generally  not  only  a  statement  of  the  facts  but 
also  an  argument  based  upon  them.  The  sum  total 
thus  presented  is  called  by  the  lawyer  the  proof  of  his 
case.  It  may  appear  also  that  evidence  and  argument 
are  not  only  parts  of  proof  but  the  chief  means  or  in- 
struments employed  in  making  proof. 

The  difference  between  evidence  and  argument,  easy 
enough  to  recognize  in  practice,  is  a  little  more  difficult 
to  express  accurately  in  words.  Argument  is  a  form 
of  expression  of  the  processes  of  the  mind  in  arriving 

112 


EVIDENCE  113 

at  a  conclusion  from  a  given  premise  or  datum;  while 
evidence,  though  it  often  does  furnish  or  provide  this 
premise  or  datum,  is  always  outside  these  mental  proc- 
esses. 

Meaning  of  Term. — Primarily,  the  word  evidence 
signifies  the  state  of  being  "evident,  plain,  apparent, 
or  notorious,"  but  it  also  has  a  causative  force  as  that 
which  renders  evident,  makes  proof.  In  general,  any 
matter  of  fact  or  principle  offered  to  prove  a  doubtful 
matter  is  evidence  as  to  that  matter. 

The  word  is  in  law  used  in  a  restricted  sense.  "Evi- 
dence means,"  says  Stephen,  "(i)  statements  made  by 
mtnesses  in  court  under  a  legal  sanction  in  relation  to 
matters  of  fact  under  inquiry;  (2)  documents  produced 
for  the  inspection  of  the  court  or  judge";  these  two 
forms  of  evidence  being  called,  respectively,  oral  and 
documentary.  Evidence,  says  Greenleaf,  is  "that  which 
is  legally  submitted  to  a  competent  tribunal  as  a  means 
of  ascertaining  the  truth  of  any  alleged  matter  of  fact 
under  inquiry;  means  of  making  proof;  the  latter,  strictly 
speaking,  not  being  synonymous  with  evidence,  but 
ratJier  the  effect  of  it."  According  to  Best,  it  is  "that 
which  generates  proof.  ...  It  is  any  matter  of  fact, 
the  effect,  tendency,  or  design  of  which  is  to  produce  in 
the  mind  a  persuasion  affirmative  or  disaffirmative  of 
the  existence  of  some  other  matter  of  fact."  We  shall 
note  that  the  phrase  "matter  of  fact,"  which  appears 
in  each  of  these  definitions,  serves  to  exclude  the  use 
of  evidence  in  connection  with  a  matter  of  law.  A  prec- 
edent cited  to  estabhsh  a  legal  principle  is  not,  in  the 
legal  sense,  evidence.    It  is  called  an  authority. 

The  Need  of  Evidence. — We  must,  of  course,  reason 
in  making  proof  and  reason  soundly;    this  is  not  the 


114  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

full  requirement.  Now,  in  formal  logic,  it  is  not  re- 
garded as  necessary  that  the  premises  of  an  argument 
should  be  true.  They  are  simply  taken  for  granted. 
The  syllogism  denoted  thus:  All  B  is  C,  All  A  is  B, 
All  A  is  C,  may  be  expanded  so  as  to  read:  Assuming 
that  All  B  is  C,  and  assuming  that  All  A  is  B,  it  will 
follow  that  All  A  is  C.  We  can  entertain,  that  is  to  say, 
the  question  of  the  correctness  of  an  argument  quite 
apart  from  the  matter  of  the  truth  of  its  premises.  The 
assumptions  made  will  enable  us  to  see  more  clearly 
exactly  how  we  can  arrive  at  a  conclusion.  We  make 
such  assumptions  in  debating,  as  we  say  "for  the  sake  of 
the  argument,"  when,  for  instance,  we  wish  to  expose 
a  fallacy  in  our  opponent's  reasoning. 

But  in  constructing  a  proof,  it  is  just  as  important 
that  the  premises  or  steps  of  an  argument  should  possess 
truth  or  reahty  as  that  the  relation  between  the  premises 
should  warrant  the  conclusion.  The  legal  rule  is  that 
nothing,  material  to  the  issue,  shall  be  taken  for  granted 
and  that  whoever  asserts  must  prove.  Every  one  who 
has  had  any  experience  in  debating,  most  likely  has 
witnessed  the  wreck  that  comes  of  an  argument  com- 
posed of  statements  which  are  false  or  unsupported — 
it  amounts  to  the  same  thing.  Very  probably  the  an- 
tagonist upset  the  conclusion  in  a  sentence  by  merely 
denying  the  unwarranted  premise.  His  denial  being 
as  good  as  the  original  assertion,  the  reasoning  founded 
on  the  latter  simply  went  for  nothing.  Recently,  in 
an  intercollegiate  debate  it  was  argued  that  if  the  speaker 
of  the  House  of  Representatives  were  deprived  of  cer- 
tain specified  powers  which  were  said  to  facilitate  legis- 
lation, the  United  States  would  be  rid  of  the  evils  of 
overlegislation.    The  argument  was  refuted  by  a  denial 


EVIDENCE  ^  115 

tliat  the  United  States  are  suffering  from  overlegisla- 
tion,  tlie  evil  being  arbitrarily  assumed  and  not  proved. 
Or,  again,  quite  probably  we  have  seen  an  adversary 
actually  prove  that  the  very  opposite  of  a  statement, 
employed  in  an  argument,  was  the  real  truth  of  the 
matter.  Fully  armed  with  the  facts,  he  constructed  his 
counter-proof.  Then,  the  premise  in  question  being 
false,  it  was  argued  that  the  conclusion  was  false  also, 
and  the  whole  argument  fell  wath  a  crash.  An  argument 
raised  on  such  premises  is  a  house  built  upon  the  sand. 

The  debater  must  be  ever  mindful  of  the  danger  of 
sheer  assertion.  The  result  has  no  value  as  ex-idence, 
no  place  in  any  scheme  which  aims  at  conviction.  For 
observe  that,  when  free  rein  is  given  to  the  practice, 
it  is  not  possible  to  draw  any  conclusion  about  the  truth 
of  the  points  in  dispute.  The  whole  contest  is  reduced 
to  a  question  of  logic,  and — what  is  worse — of  bad  logic 
usually.  For  the  speaker's  effort  to  defend  some  rash 
statement,  not  infrequently  in  the  heat  of  controversy, 
gives  rise  to  personaHties  and  the  various  kinds  of  sophis- 
try— oifenses  against  taste  as  well  as  judgment.  And 
so  the  trouble  deepens. 

The  habit  of  assertion,  like  all  bad  habits,  is  not 
acquired  with  difficulty;  sometunes  it  comes  from  care- 
lessness or  laziness,  somethnes  from  prejudice.  There- 
fore we  may  insist  that  the  debater  should  make  a  thor- 
ough investigation  of  his  case,  distinguishing  the  true 
from  the  false,  and  assessing  ideas  at  proper  values. 
He  should  not  only  know  what  the  real  facts  are,  what 
their  proper  weight  and  force  are,  but  for  every 
doubtful  declaration  be  prepared  to  produce  his  au- 
thority, his  examples,  his  statistics,  that  is,  his  evidence. 
In  making  his  investigations,  moreover,  he  should  main- 


116  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

tain  as  far  as  possible  an  impartial  attitude  so  as  not 
to  prejudge  his  conclusions.  Doctor  Johnson's  failure 
as  a  literary  critic  has  been  ascribed  by  Macaulay  to 
prejudice.  "The  judgments  which  Johnson  passed  on 
books,"  he  says,  "were  in  his  own  time  regarded  with 
superstitious  veneration;  and  in  our  time  are  generally 
treated  with  indiscriminate  contempt.  They  are  the 
judgments  of  a  strong  but  enslaved  understanding. 
The  mind  of  the  critic  was  hedged  round  by  an  unin- 
terrupted fence  of  prejudices  and  superstitions.  Within 
his  narrow  limits  he  displayed  an  activity  which  ought 
to  have  enabled  hun  to  clear  the  barrier  that  confined 
him.  How  it  chanced  that  a  man  who  reasoned  on  his 
premises  so  ably  should  assume  his  premises  so  foolishly, 
is  one  of  the  greatest  mysteries  of  human  nature.  The 
same  inconsistency  may  be  observed  in  the  schoolmen 
of  the  Middle  Ages.  Those  writers  show  so  much  acute- 
ness  and  force  of  mind  in  arguing  on  their  wretched 
data,  that  a  modern  reader  is  perpetually  at  a  loss  to 
comprehend  how  such  minds  came  by  such  data.  Not 
a  flaw  in  the  superstructure  of  the  theory  which  they 
are  rearing  escapes  their  vigilance.  Yet  they  are  blind 
to  the  obvious  unsoundness  of  the  foundation.  It  is 
the  same  with  some  eminent  lawyers." 

The  Need  of  Assumptions. — We  have  been  speaking 
of  assumptions  as  if  they  were  altogether  unwarrantable, 
as  if  assertions  must  always  be  supported  by  evidence. 
We  were  dealing,  however,  only  with  that  class  of  evi- 
dence which  is  derived  from  experience.  You  must 
know  that  experience  suppHes  to  us  not  only  most  of 
the  questions  of  pubHc  debate  but  most  of  the  data 
upon  which  we  rear  our  arguments.  It  is  the  events 
which  go  on  about  us,  that  we  can  see  with  our  eyes 


EVIDENCE  117 

and  touch  vnih  our  hands — the  knowledge  of  the  senses 
— from  which  in  practice  our  reasoning  perhaps  most 
often  starts.  But  there  is  another  way  of  discovering 
truth  and  hence  of  deriving  our  premises.  We  know 
some  things  with  certitude  without  the  presence  of 
external  evidence.  Such  knowledge  as  we  get  through 
our  intuitions  we  do  not  have  to  prove.  They  carry 
their  proofs  in  themselves.  We  know  directly,  for  in- 
stance, such  things  as  that  we  exist,  that  a  straight 
line  is  the  shortest  distance  between  two  points,  or  that 
a  lie  is  morally  bad. 

Argument  is  hardly  possible  without  assumptions, 
for  our  intuitions  offer  a  basis  of  proof  that  is  more 
ultimate  than  experience.  Let  us  take  a  single  instance 
in  illustration  of  this.  A  man  is  accused  of  murder. 
Trustworthy  witnesses  testify  to  his  presence  in  some 
other  place  when  the  deed  occurred,  and  he  is  therefore 
discharged.  Now  it  is  quite  true  that  the  testimony 
was  sufficient  to  estabhsh  the  fact  of  the  alibi;  but  the 
alibi  warranted  the  acquittal  because  we  know  intui- 
tively that  a  person  cannot  be  in  two  places  at  one  and 
the  same  time.  This  assumption  is  necessarily  involved 
in  the  argument. 

Such  assumptions  may  be  expressed  or  merely  im- 
plied. The  beginning  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
was  supposed,  at  the  time,  to  proclaim  self-evident 
truths  concerning  natural  equality.  There  is,  indeed, 
an  advantage  in  setting  out  from  an  a  priori  truth,  for 
it  affords  at  once  a  common  ground,  a  common  point 
of  sight,  for  the  contrast  of  truth  and  error  add  an  il- 
lumination of  differences.  In  the  great  orations,  you 
can  find  illustrations  that  assume  such  premises  as  a 
universal  love  of  liberty,  desire  for  happiness,  and  so 


118  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

on.  Burke  called  himself  a  "philosopher  in  action," 
meaning  the  emphasis  to  fall  upon  the  final  word.  But 
his  well-known  dislike  for  abstract  principles  in  polit- 
ical debates  did  not  prevent  his  use  of  religious  and 
moral  sentiments  when  enforcing  a  maxim  of  civil  pru- 
dence. 

Classes  of  Evidence 

Direct  and  Circumstantial. — According  as  a  fact  of- 
fered to  produce  an  immediate  or  an  ultimate  conviction 
concerning  the  point  at  issue,  the  evidence  is  said  to 
be  direct  or  circumstantial. 

The  statement  of  a  policeman  that  he  saw  the  ac- 
cused do  the  shooting  charged,  the  revolver  taken  from 
him  immediately  after  the  shooting,  and  the  written 
confession  made  by  him  later  in  his  cell  is,  in  each  in- 
stance, direct  evidence  connecting  the  accused  with 
the  commission  of  the  deed.  In  the  suit  of  Shylock  vs. 
Antonio  ("The  Merchant  of  Venice"),  the  plaintiff, 
by  the  terms  of  a  contract,  claims  a  forfeiture  from  the 
defendant  for  non-payment  of  a  loan.  The  bond  on 
which  Shylock's  argument  is  based  is  direct  evidence. 
The  document,  it  will  be  remembered,  becomes  a 
boomerang,  and  makes  the  coveted  forfeiture  altogether 
undesirable  to  Shylock.  Portia,  in  interpreting  the 
contract,  says: 

"This  bond  doth  give  thee  here  no  jot  of  blood; 
The  words  expressly  are  a  pound  of  flesh: 
Take  thou  thy  bond,  take  thou  thy  pound  of  flesh; 
But  in  the  cutting  if  thou  dost  shed 
One  drop  of  Christian  blood  thy  bonds  and  goods 
Are,  by  the  laws  of  Venice,  confiscate 
Unto  the  state  of  Venice." 


EVIDENCE  119 

On  the  other  hand,  when  the  fact  is  such  that  another 
fact  is  to  be  inferred  from  it  before  a  conviction  can  re- 
sult, the  evidence  is  circumstantial.  If  the  policeman, 
in  the  instance  previously  cited,  had  said  that  he  saw 
the  accused  in  the  neighborhood  immediately  after  the 
shooting  and  had  arrested  him  merely  as  a  suspicious 
character,  or  if  the  revolver,  instead  of  being  taken 
from  the  hands  of  the  accused,  had  been  found  in  the 
street  near  by,  we  could  hardly  grant  that  the  ac- 
cused did  the  shooting  without  inferring  in  the  first 
case,  for  instance,  that  he  was  present  at  the  time  and 
place  of  the  occurrence,  and  in  the  second,  that  the 
revolver  was  in  his  possession  when  the  shooting  took 
place.  It  is  expected,  in  circumstantial  evidence,  that 
the  court  or  the  jury  will  go  through  a  process  of  reason- 
ing and  make  inferences  from  the  fact  offered  to  some 
other  fact  in  dispute.  The  character  Eugene  Aram 
("  Eugene  Aram,"  by  Bulwer)  sought  to  free  himself  from 
the  charge  of  murder,  by  arguing  in  his  own  defense 
that  his  past  general  good  conduct  was  inconsistent  with 
the  commission  of  the  crime  of  which  he  was  accused. 

"My  lord,  the  tenor  of  my  life  contradicts  this  in- 
dictment. Who  can  look  back  over  what  is  known  of 
my  former  years  and  charge  me  with  one  vice — one 
offense?  No!  I  concerted  not  schemes  of  fraud — pro- 
jected no  violence — injured  no  man's  property  or  per- 
son. My  days  were  honestly  laborious — my  nights  in- 
tensely studious.  This  egotism  is  not  presumptuous — • 
is  not  unreasonable.  What  man,  after  a  temperate 
use  of  life,  a  series  of  thinking  and  acting  regularly, 
without  one  single  deviation  from  a  sober  and  even  tenor 
of  conduct,  ever  plunged  into  the  depth  of  crime  pre- 
cipitately and  at  once?    Mankind  are  not  instantaneously 


120  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

corrupted.  Villainy  is  always  progressive.  We  decline 
from  right — not  suddenly,  but  step  by  step." 

Direct  and  circumstantial  evidence  may  be  conclu- 
sive or  presumptive  in  force;  yet,  theoretically,  the 
latter  is  the  inferior  mode  of  proof.  This  may  have 
been  supposed  from  the  statement  that  in  the  one  a 
conviction  follows  immediately,  and  in  the  other  ulti- 
mately. Since  the  facts  offered  as  circumstantial  evi- 
dence are  more  remote  from  the  issue,  it  is  clear  that 
a  given  portion  of  circumstantial  evidence  will  have 
less  weight  than  an  equal  portion  of  evidence  that  is 
direct.  Circumstantial  evidence  may  be  regarded  simply 
as  a  substitute  for  direct,  to  be  employed  to  prove  what 
otherwise  it  might  not  be  possible  to  prove.  Its  force 
will  depend  on  the  "number,  weight,  independence, 
and  consistency"  of  the  various  links  making  up  the 
chain. 

Jury  Verdicts  Upon  Circumstantial  Evidence. — There 
are  instances  where  after  a  conviction  on  circumstan- 
tial evidence  the  prisoner  has  confessed  his  guilt.  A 
good  example  is  the  case  of  Courvoiser,  the  valet  and 
murderer  of  Lord  Wm.  Russell  in  1840.  Here  there 
was  no  direct  testimony  whatever  to  connect  the  ac- 
cused with  the  crime,  and  there  were  circumstances 
designed  by  the  accused  to  suggest  that  it  was  the  work 
of  burglars.  It  was  proved,  however,  that  the  accused 
had  an  opportunity  of  committing  the  crime,  that  some 
of  the  abstracted  property  had  been  concealed  in  his 
pantry,  and  that  he  personally  had  disposed  of  other 
portions  of  it.  The  evidence,  besides,  excluded  the 
reasonable  belief  that  any  other  than  the  prisoner  was 
guilty,  and  upon  these  grounds  he  was  convicted  and 
afterward  confessed. 


EVIDENCE  121 

On  the  other  hand,  there  have  been  cases,  exceed- 
ingly rare,  in  which  a  miscarriage  of  justice  and  the  con- 
viction of  the  innocent  instead  of  the  guilty  have  re- 
sulted from  a  reliance  of  the  jury  upon  circumstantial 
evidence.  The  most  remarkable  of  these  that  have  oc- 
curred arose  out  of  a  burglary  committed  at  the  rectory 
of  Edlingham  in  1879.  Two  burglars,  one  of  whom  shot 
at  the  rector,  were  seen  on  the  night  by  the  rector  and 
another  person.  Two  men  were  arrested  and  tried  for 
the  crime  at  Northumberton  Assizes  in  1879.  Neither 
the  rector  nor  the  other  person  who  had  seen  the  burglars 
was  able  to  identify  the  prisoners,  and  the  defense  was 
that  the  case  for  the  prosecution  was  entirely  one  of 
mistaken  identity.  But  a  chisel  found  in  the  room  where 
the  crime  was  committed  was  traced  to  the  possession 
of  the  prisoners;  a  piece  of  newspaper  picked  up  in  the 
same  room  was  found  to  correspond  with  a  piece  in  the 
coat  of  one  of  the  prisoners,  and  footmarks  found  near 
the  scene  of  the  crime  corresponded  with  those  of  the 
prisoners. 

The  jury,  on  this  evidence,  found  them  guilty,  and 
they  were  sentenced  to  penal  servitude  for  life.  They 
served  in  the  con\dct  settlement  at  Portsmouth  for  nine 
years,  when,  in  1888,  the  true  burglars,  two  men  other 
than  those  that  had  been  convicted,  confessed  to  the 
crime.  Inquiries  were  made  by  the  authorities,  with  the 
result  that  the  men  who  had  been  convicted  on  the 
evidence  of  the  chisel,  the  newspaper,  and  the  footmarks 
were  set  at  Hberty. 

Personal,  Real,  and  Documentary. — There  are  three 
sources  of  evidence:  persons,  things,  and  documents. 
On  this  basis.  Best  has  classified  legal  evidence  as  per- 
sonal, real,  and  documentary.     In  judicial  matters  the 


122  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

most  useful  division  of  evidence  is  undoubtedly  that 
into  direct  and  circumstantial;  but  an  examination 
of  the  second  classification  may  serve  to  clear  up  some 
doubtful  matters. 

The  evidence  of  witnesses — persons  who  inform  the 
tribunal  respecting  facts — ^is  (i)  personal  evidence.  Such 
evidence  in  general  must  concern  matters  of  knowledge 
rather  than  opinion  or  hearsay.  Expert  witnesses,  how- 
ever, are  allowed  to  give  their  opinions  upon  facts  of 
which  they  have  no  personal  knowledge.  They  are 
persons  specially  skilled  in  the  matters  upon  which 
they  testify. 

It  is  extremely  difficult  for  the  ordinary  witness  to 
separate  opinion  from  knowledge.  He  is,  indeed,  a  very 
good  witness  who  when  testifying  as  to  what  he  saw 
or  heard  is  able  to  eliminate  his  personal  views  and  in- 
ferences. There  are  tests  for  the  credibility  of  the  ordi- 
nary witness,  such  as  his  veracity,  interest,  physical 
soundness,  and  so  on,  but  nowadays  the  average  person 
is  deemed  competent  to  give  testimony  in  the  courts. 

It  should  not  be  overlooked  that  the  degree  of  skill, 
reputation,  or  experience  possessed  by  expert  witnesses 
is  a  matter  of  considerable  importance;  for  where  ex- 
pert witnesses  are  employed  by  both  sides,  they,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  give  conflicting  testimony,  in  which 
case  their  "expertness"  may  be  called  in  question. 

Expert  testimony  of  an  interesting  scientific  char- 
acter was  brought  out  in  the  trial  of  the  person  accused 
of  poisoning  by  arsenic  a  certain  Mary  Stannard.  Now, 
the  accused  admitted  having  bought  an  ounce  of  arsenic 
from  a  drug-store  on  the  day  the  girl  died,  but  stated 
he  had  deposited  it  in  his  barn,  where  it  could  be  found 
intact.     The  State  claimed  that  this  arsenic  was  pur- 


EVIDENCE  123 

chased  and  placed  in  the  barn  subsequent  to  the  arrest, 
and  hence  could  not  have  been  that  bought  of  the  drug- 
gist by  the  accused  on  the  day  of  the  girl's  death. 
Professor  Edward  S.  Dana,  of  Yale  University,  was 
called  in  as  expert  witness  for  the  State.  He  procured 
a  sample  of  arsenic  from  the  druggist's  jar^  and  also  a 
sample  of  that  found  in  the  barn,  and  endeavored  to 
determine  whether  or  not  they  could  have  come  from  the 
same  source.  By  means  of  a  microscope  he  noticed  (i) 
certain  differences  in  the  constituent  parts  of  the  two 
samples,  e.  g.,  in  the  size  and  lustre  of  crystals,  lumps, 
dust,  etc.  He  then  examined  ninety-two  samples  of 
arsenic  representing  a  number  of  different  sources  and 
found  (2)  that  all  samples  from  the  same  source  showed 
uniformity  in  composition.  Hence  he  inferred  that  (3) 
the  drug-store  and  barn  samples  could  not  have  come 
from  the  same  source,  and  hence  that  the  barn  sample 
could  not  have  been  taken  from  the  druggist's  jar. 

From  this  illustration  it  is  clear  that  expert  testi- 
mony is  quite  different  from  the  testimony  of  the  ordi- 
nary witness.  If  it  had  happened  that  some  one  had 
actually  witnessed  the  purchase  of  the  barn  arsenic  at 
another  place,  this  person  might  have  testified  as  an 
ordinary  witness  to  such  a  fact.  In  the  case  in  question, 
however,  Professor  Dana  merely  expressed  an  opinion 
to  the  effect  that  the  barn  sample  could  not  have  been 
taken  from  the  druggist's  jar.  This  opinion  was  a  con- 
clusion drawn  by  an  expert  after  a  careful  investigation 
of  facts.  To  observe  and  explain  these  facts,  moreover, 
required  skill  of  a  very  special  character. 

The  term  (2)  real  evidence  explains  itself  (from  res, 
a  thing).    This  division  of  evidence  into  personal  and 

'  "Commercial  Arsenic,"  Edward  S.  Dana, 


124  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

real,  it  may  be  observed,  is  analogous  to  the  usual  legal 
classification  of  property  (personal  and  real).  Real 
evidence  means  "all  evidence  of  which  any  object  be- 
longing to  the  class  of  things  is  the  source;  persons  also 
being  included  in  respect  of  such  properties  as  belong 
to  them  in  common  with  things." 

The  use  of  things  in  effecting  proof  is  of  so  common 
an  occurrence  as  to  make  illustration  almost  superfluous. 
The  signals  of  the  weather  bureau  may  be  mentioned 
as  indicating  usually  the  kind  of  weather  predicted  for 
the  day  following,  or  the  sight  of  flags  at  half-mast  the 
death  of  a  prominent  person.  Moreover,  it  is  the  basis 
of  business  transactions,  where  inspection  precedes 
the  purchase  of  goods,  the  goods  being  real  evidence 
as  to  their  character  and  worth.  We  may  refer,  also, 
to  the  daggers  in  "Macbeth,"  the  rent  in  Caesar's  cloak 
in  "Julius  Caesar,"  the  handkerchief  in  "Othello," 
and,  indeed,  if  you  like,  the  thumb-prints  in  "Pudd'n- 
head  Wilson."  In  Caine's  "Shadow  of  a  Crime,"  when 
the  arm  of  the  witness  Lawson  was  examined  in  court 
and  disclosed  "three  clear  marks  of  an  iron-brand," 
the  marks  were  real  evidence  showing  that  he  had  been 
branded. 

In  criminal  practice,  real  evidence  has  usually  only 
a  probable  or  presumptive  force,  and  appears  in  con- 
nection with  circumstantial  evidence.  The  weapon 
with  which  an  alleged  murder  was  committed;  in  a 
case  of  robbery,  the  marks  of  a  key  with  which  the  robber 
struck  the  prosecution  witness,  corresponding  to  the 
key  found  in  the  robber's  possession;  a  part  of  a  knife- 
blade  left  sticking  in  the  window-frame  through  which 
a  burglar  had  entered,  corresponding  to  the  remnant 
found  in  the  burglar's  pocket,  are  instances  of  circum- 


EVIDENCE  125 

stantial  real  evidence.  In  such  cases  the  force  of  the 
e\ddence  will  depend  very  largely  on  the  speaker's  in- 
sight and  powers  of  interpretation.  It  should  be  said, 
however,  that,  in  criminal  cases  of  this  sort,  the  lawyer 
frequently  employs  the  ser\dces  of  a  detective,  whose 
special  duty  is  to  give  assistance  in  the  discovery  and 
explanation  of  details. 

In  connection  with  the  legal  rule  that  only  "the  best 
e\'idence  of  which  the  case  in  its  nature  is  susceptible  " 
is  to  be  admitted  into  a  court  of  law,  (3)  documentary 
evidence  has  been  divided  into  primary  and  secondary. 
Any  document  may  be  said  to  be  "primary  evidence  of 
its  own  contents,"  while  "the  term  secondary  e\'idence 
is  used  to  designate  any  derivative  proof  of  them,  such 
as  memorials,  copies,  abstracts,  recollections  of  persons 
who  have  read  them,  etc."  In  general,  secondary  evi- 
dence is  not  receivable  in  a  court  of  law  until  it  is  shown 
to  be  the  best  evidence  that  can  be  procured  under  the 
circumstances.  Since  the  debater  usually  procures  his 
evidence  from  a  written  or  documentary  source,  he  will 
find  it  worth  while  to  remember  both  the  legal  rule  about 
the  best  evidence  and  the  legal  distinction  between 
primary  and  secondary  e\ddence.  But  this  is  hardly 
as  important  for  the  debater  as  for  the  lawyer;  for 
the  secondary  evidence  of  the  former,  it  is  not  in- 
frequently sufficient.  But  he  will  sometimes  find  it 
of  advantage  to  be  able  to  criticise  an  opponent  for 
failing  to  refer  to  original  evidence  which  it  were  reason- 
ably expected  he  would  cite.  Such  criticism  will  be 
especially  effective  if  he  is  able  to  compare  "the  sub- 
stitutionary evidence"  employed  by  his  opponent  with 
the  more  original  evidence,  and  to  disclose  some  error 
in  the  former.    At  all  events,  the  careful  investigator 


126  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

should  be  ever  ready  to  go  behind  derivative  evidence 
and  study  the  source  or  sources  from  which  it  was  de- 
rived. 

The  Law  of  Evidence. — What  is  known  in  the  legal 
text-books  as  the  law  of  evidence,  consists  of  a  body 
of  rules  more  or  less  arbitrary,  but  as  binding  on  courts, 
juries,  and  witnesses  as  the  rest  of  the  common  and  stat- 
ute law  of  the  land.  These  rules  are  under  the  control  of 
the  legislature  except  in  cases  of  conflict  with  constitu- 
tional law.  They  prescribe  such  things  as,  that  after 
a  seven  years'  absence  without  having  been  heard  from 
a  man  shall  be  presumed  to  be  dead;  that  interest  may 
render  a  witness  incompetent;  certain  fixed  periods  of 
time  when  a  debt  is  presumed  to  have  been  paid  or  satis- 
faction to  have  been  received.  A  great  many  of  these 
rules  arei  so  special,  and  embedded  in  the  subject-matter 
of  the  law,  that  they  are  of  httle  service  outside  of  the 
courts  or  in  connection  with  issues  not  of  a  legal  char- 
acter. 

The  rules  which  prevail  as  to  the  production  of  evi- 
dence in  the  courts  have  been  reduced  to  the  following 
points: 

1.  Certain  matters  may  be  judicially  taken  notice  of  with- 

out proof;  e.  g.,  facts  of  general  knowledge. 

2.  Evidence  must  correspond  with  the  allegations  in  the 

pleadings  and  be  confined  to  the  point  at  issue. 

3.  Only  the  substance  of  the  issue  need  be  proved;   that 

is,  minor  and  unimportant  issues  need  not  be  established 
as  stated;  e.  g.,  the  time  or  place  when  an  event  oc- 
curred. 

4.  The  burden  of  proof  is  with  him  who  holds  the  affirma- 

tive; e.  g.,  he  who  makes  an  allegation  which  is  dis- 
puted so  as  to  be  at  issue  must  establish  it  by  evi- 
dence. 


EVIDENCE  127 

5.  The  best  evidence  must  be  produced  of  which  the  nature 

of  the  case  admits;  e.  g.,  if  primary  evidence  is  acces- 
sible, it  must  be  produced. 

6.  Hearsay  evidence  is  in  general  inadmissible. 

7.  Testimony  should,  in  general,  concern  matters  of  knowl- 

edge as  distinguished  from  opinion.  Exception  is  made 
in  the  case  of  an  expert  or  one  skilled  in  a  particular 
trade,  art,  or  profession;  e.  g.,  superintendent  of  an  in- 
sane asylum  as  to  matters  connected  with  the  subject 
of  insanity. 

8.  Certain   evidence   otherwise   admissible  is   excluded   on 

grounds  of  public  policy;  e.  g.,  confidential  communica- 
tions between  lawyer  and  client. 

9.  In  certain  cases,  principally  by  statute  law,  written  evi- 

dence must  be  resorted  to  rather  than  oral. 
10.  Oral  contemporaneous  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  vary 
or  contradict  the  terms  of  a  written  contract. 

In  a  trial  with  or  without  a  jury,  it  rests  with  the 
judge  to  determine  whether  the  evidence  is  admissible 
under  these  rules. 

Examining  Testimony 

Consistency — the    One    Great   Test    of  Evidence. — 

The  one  great  test  of  evidence  is  its  consistency,  ex- 
ternal and  internal.  The  facts  presented  should  not 
be  self-contradictory.  They  should,  moreover,  be  con- 
sistent with  the  general  knowledge  we  possess,  derived 
from  our  intuitions  and  experience.  They  should  be 
consistent  also  with  the  particular  information  derived 
from  other  testimonies  and  circumstances  in  the  case. 

I,  Internal  Consistency. — Is  the  testimony  consistent 
internally — that  is,  is  it  consistent  within  itself?  Are 
all  the  statements  made  by  the  witness  reconcilable 
with  one  another?  By  means  of  cross-examination  if 
the  witness  is  present,  or  by  close  analysis  of  his  testi- 


128  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

mony  if  written,  errors  may  be  detected  as  follows: 
(i)  Incidental  or  undesigned  testimony  which  a  witness 
gives  without  reaHzing  its  value  in  the  case;  (2)  hostile 
testimony  or  the  frank  admission  of  some  fact  opposed 
to  the  witness's  position,  and  (3)  negative  testimony  or 
"the  failure  of  a  witness  to  mention  a  fact  so  striking 
that  he  must  have  noticed  it,  had  it  occurred,"  ^  or  a 
failure  to  remember  such  fact.  The  latter  is  sometimes 
called  testimony  from  silence. 

Illustrations  of  this  can  be  found  in  Erskine's  speech 
in  behalf  of  Hardy;  for  example,  his  remarks  on  the 
testimony  of  Lynam. 

2.  External  Consistency. — Is  the  testimony  consistent 
with  our  (i)  general  knowledge,  derived  from  our  intui- 
tions and  experience?  Does  it  seem  probable  when  com- 
pared with  what  we  already  know  about  such  things? 
Statements  which  partake  of  the  marvellous  or  are  in- 
compatible with  ordinary  experience  are  received  with 
suspicion.  Robert  Burton  in  his  "Anatomy  of  Melan- 
choly" says:  "The  air  is  not  so  full  of  flies  in  summer 
as  it  is  at  all  times  of  invisible  devils;  this  Paracelsus 
stifHy  affirms."  If  we  should  regard  this  as  testimony 
ofifered  in  good  faith,  we  should  reject  it  on  account  of 
its  external  inconsistency. 

This  principle  is  so  well  recognized  in  all  rules  of 
jurisprudence  that  all  courts  of  law  and  equity  are  said 
to  "take  judicial  notice"  of  certain  facts  the  existence 
or  truth  of  which  is  so  well-known  and  established  as 
to  be  considered  facts  of  general  and  every-day  knowl- 
edge. For  example,  "matters  which  must  have  hap- 
pened according  to  the  ordinary  course  of  nature,"  as 
the  time  of  sunrise  or  sunset  on  a  certain  day  and  the 
^  "Practical  Rhetoric,"  Genung. 


EVIDENCE  129 

succession  of  the  seasons.  Or  again,  "matters  of  such 
general  and  public  notoriety  that  every  one  may  fairly 
be  presumed  to  be  acquainted  with  them,"  as  the  ordi- 
nary duration  of  human  hfe,  the  usual  length  of  time 
for  a  voyage  across  the  Atlantic,  the  usual  time  to  run 
trains  between  large  cities/  etc. 

And  (2)  is  the  testimony  in  question  consistent  with 
our  particidar  information,  derived  from  other  testi- 
monies and  circumstances  in  the  case?  So  far  as  our 
investigation  has  gone,  Richard  Roe — to  be  concrete — 
has  testified,  let  us  say,  in  language  which  is  straight- 
forward and  uncontradictory,  and  his  testimony  seems 
probable  on  the  face  of  it.  But  suppose  there  is  an- 
other witness,  John  Doe,  to  the  same  circumstances. 
The  testimony  of  these  witnesses,  then,  will  have  to 
be  compared.  If  we  should  find  that  their  testimony 
is  in  substantial  accord,  our  belief  in  the  facts  alleged 
by  Roe  would  be  strengthened.  And  it  would  doubtless 
be  strengthened  still  more  if  it  is  apparent  that  there 
had  been  no  collusion  between  the  witnesses.  Hence, 
when  there  is  more  than  one  witness  and  their  testi- 
mony is  substantially  the  same,  the  force  of  the  proof 
will  depend  not  only  on  consistency  (internal  consistency, 
general  external  consistency,  and  the  interconsistency 
of  the  several  testimonies),  but  also  in  the  number  of 
testimonies  and  their  independence.  This  mode  of  proof 
is  sometimes  called  corroborative  testimony. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  should  find  that  Doe's  testi- 
mony contradicted  that  given  by  Roe,  we  should  in  all 
probability  look  for  other  circumstances  in  the  case, 
such  as  the  characters  of  the  two  witnesses  and  the 
conditions  under  which  the  testimonies  were  given.  If 
'  Stephen's  "Digest  of  the  Law  of  Evidence." 


130  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

it  is  established  that  Doe  was  prejudiced  or  incompetent 
through  intellectual,  physical,  or  moral  reasons,  or  that 
his  testimony  is  given  under  compulsion,  we  should  feel 
justified  in  rejecting  his  testimony.  If  the  opposite 
is  shown  of  Roe,  our  belief  in  his  testimony  would  be 
still  further  strengthened. 

When  a  mass  of  conflicting  testimony  is  presented, 
in  determining  the  correct  value  to  be  given  to  any  par- 
ticular source  of  evidence,  all  these  tests  as  to  truth 
and  probabiUty  are  necessary.  The  same  may  be  said 
of  course  in  regard  to  the  final  conclusion  to  be  arrived 
at  after  considering  all  the  testimony  and  attributing 
to  each  its  proper  force  and  weight. 

This  classification,  it  should  be  remembered,  is  only 
a  test  for  arri\dng  at  the  truth  or  probability  of  testi- 
mony. Before,  however,  a  conclusion  can  be  arrived 
at,  the  weight  and  force  of  the  testimony  presented 
must  be  determined.  Any  attempt  to  classify  the  force 
of  testimony  and  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  therefrom 
must  necessarily  fall  short  of  absolute  completeness.  The 
conclusion  arrived  at  from  conflicting  testimony  depends 
so  much  on  that  illusive  factor  which,  for  lack  of  a  better 
name,  we  call  "the  personal  equation,"  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  lay  down  any  general  rule  as  to  the  probable 
force  and  weight  of  evidence;  for  it  can  readily  be  con- 
ceived that  certain  facts  and  circumstances  may  be 
considered  of  great  importance  by  some  persons  exercis- 
ing judicial  functions,  which  by  others  acting  in  the 
same  capacity  would  be  regarded  as  of  little  weight 
and  consequence.  This  field  is  as  varied  as  the  minds 
and  temperaments  of  men. 

Use  of  Evidence  Outside  the  Courts. — From  what 
has  been  said,  it  appears  that  the  law  of  evidence  deals 


EVIDENCE  131 

with  rules  governing  the  production  of  testimony  in 
courts.  These  rules  have  been  established  for  the  sake 
of  "faciUty  in  disposing  of  compHcated  questions  or 
on  grounds  of  public  policy."  In  non- judicial  tribunals, 
however,  there  are,  strictly  speaking,  no  rules  governing 
the  admissibility  of  evidence.  The  judges  or  audience 
have  no  actual  power  to  exclude  or  admit  evidence,  but 
must  base  their  decision  on  the  evidence  produced,  which 
may  fall  within  the  legal  rules  or  without  them.  The 
speakers  must  decide  for  themselves  what  facts  should 
be  proved  and  what  sort  of  evidence  should  be  employed. 
The  rules  which  apply  in  a  debating  contest  are  the 
unformulated  rules  of  universal  evidence,  the  employ- 
ment of  which  in  particular  cases  rests  in  the  judgment 
of  the  debaters  themselves. 

In  regard  to  the  sort  of  evidence  employable  in  non- 
judicial tribunals,  three  important  exceptions  to  the 
legal  rules  should  be  noted:  (i)  Immaterial  collateral 
evidence;  (2)  hearsay  or  second-hand  evidence;  (3) 
opinions  not  emanating  from  experts.  The  ordinary 
debater  employs  such  evidence,  however,  not  upon  the 
ground  that  it  is  strong  but  merely  that  it  may  be  taken 
for  what  it  is  worth.  Such  evidence  is  rarely  conclusive; 
indeed,  the  presumption  which  it  establishes  is  usually 
very  slight. 

In  manner  of  proof,  many  dififerences  between  the 
legal  and  ordinary  procedure  appear.  The  most  striking 
of  these,  perhaps,  arises  in  connection  with  witnesses. 
Witnesses  may  be  compelled  by  law  to  attend  court 
and  give  their  testimonies  in  person.  In  other  tribunals 
(where  such  practice  would  be  inconvenient  and  in- 
capable of  enforcement,  as  before  deliberative  bodies 
generally),  the  speaker  usually  presents  the  evidence. 


132  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

It  is,  perhaps,  much  as  if  the  lawyer  should  declare  the 
facts  to  the  jury  without  the  previous  appearance  of 
witnesses.  In  this  view,  therefore,  the  debater  can  be 
regarded  as  his  own  witness  giving  hearsay  or  second- 
hand testimony — reported  evidence. 

The  Debater's  Chief  Source  of  Evidence — Author- 
ity.— What  is  usually  known  as  the  argument  from  au- 
thority is  "based  upon  the  statements  of  others  con- 
cerning matters  of  opinion  which  they  have  reached 
by  rational  processes  and  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
testimony  which  consists  of  the  statements  of  others 
concerning  matters  of  fact."  This  distinction  between 
authority  and  testimony  does  not  hold  literally  or  with 
any  degree  of  exactness  for  arguments  in  non-judicial 
tribunals.  The  debater  derives  not  only  opinions  but 
facts  from  authorities.  He  can,  of  course,  derive  the 
latter  from  the  testimony  of  witnesses,  but  he  is  much 
more  likely  to  obtain  it  from  scientific  treatises  or  other 
works  of  an  authoritative  character.  The  debater  uses 
the  term  authority  to  apply  both  to  the  author  and  the 
work  itself. 

Two  Classes  of  Authority. — Authorities  may  be  of 
two  kinds:  (i)  That  based  on  our  confidence  in  the 
knowledge  of  the  authority  quoted,  and  (2)  that  based 
on  our  confidence  in  his,  judgment. 

(i)  Any  declaration  as  to  facts  derived  from  books 
or  documents  may,  if  disputed,  need  verification  by  com- 
paring it  with  more  original  sources.  Such  comparison 
may  be  made  either  with  original  written  evidence  or 
with  original  testimonies  given  when  the  deed,  event, 
or  course  of  action  took  place.  If  unnecessary  issues 
of  this  sort  are  to  be  avoided,  the  source  quoted  in  the 
first  place  should  be  trustworthy.     The  question  is 


EVIDENCE  133 

whether  or  not  the  State  of  Wisconsin  has  a  referendum 
in  the  particular  case  of  banks.  Now  if  the  debater 
should  come  across  the  following  in  Bryce's  "American 
Commonwealth"  (Vol.  I,  p.  452) — "Wisconsin  refers 
it  to  the  voters  to  decide  whether  or  no  banks  shall  be 
chartered" — he  would  probably  consider  the  question 
settled.  He  would  hardly  seek  for  original  written  evi- 
dence— the  original  draft  of  Section  5,  Art,  XI,  Consti- 
tution of  1843 — or  for  the  testimonies  of  those  legis- 
lators who  had  the  matter  under  consideration.  He  is 
content  to  decide  the  point  affirmatively  upon  the  au- 
thority of  one  whose  knowledge  in  such  matters  can 
be  trusted.  Thus  we  assert  that  Wordsworth  was  born 
in  1770,  on  the  authority  of  Knight's  "Life  of  Words- 
worth"; that  Burke  died  in  1797,  on  the  authority  of 
Morley's  "Edmund  Burke";  that  Washington  crossed 
the  Delaware,  on  the  authority  of  Bancroft's  "History 
of  the  United  States";  or  that  the  British  were  at  one 
time  in  possession  of  Havana,  on  the  authority  of  John- 
son's "Universal  Cyclopedia."  These  works  are  au- 
thorities in  the  special  matters  upon  which  they  are 
quoted;  and  while  our  acceptance  of  their  statements 
need  not  go  so  far  as  to  imply  confidence  in  the  reason- 
ing or  judgment  of  their  authors,  it  would  necessarily 
express  confidence  in  their  knowledge  of  those  particular 
matters  upon  which  they  were  cited. 

(2)  Authority,  which  has  weight  because  of  our  con- 
fidence in  the  judgment  of  the  person  quoted,  concerns 
matters  of  opinion — conclusions  from  facts,  generahza- 
tions,  truths.  The  issue  of  a  debate  is  a  policy  of  ex- 
pansion versus  a  policy  of  isolation  for  the  United  States. 
Washington's  celebrated  warning  in  the  Farewell  Ad- 
dress and  parts  of  Monroe's  famous  message  to  Con- 


134  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

gress  in  182 1  are  quoted;  such  extracts  would  concern 
''matters  of  opinion"  which  Washington  and  Monroe 
respectively  had  reached  by  rational  processes.  The 
argument  from  authority  is  highly  valuable  in  ascer- 
taining the  causes  of  known  effects.  For  example,  is 
it  advisable  to  amend  our  lawr  of  immigration?  Now 
it  is  admitted  by  the  parties  to  the  dispute  that  there 
has  been  recently  an  increase  of  immigration  from 
southern  Europe  and  a  decrease  from  northern.  Is  this 
admitted  change  due  to  our  immigration  laws  or  to  other 
causes?  Obviously,  the  debater  on  either  side  would  find 
it  to  his  advantage  if  he  could  support  his  position  by 
the  opinion  of  experts  on  immigration. 

The  general  of  an  army,  it  may  be  supposed,  would 
be  more  of  an  authority  on  the  management  of  a  cam- 
paign than  a  private  in  his  service.  A  newspaper  ad- 
vertisement containing  letters  from  unknown  persons 
as  to  the  merits  of  a  cure  for  liver  trouble  would  have 
little  weight  against  the  opinion  of  a  good  physician. 
But  an  authority  in  one  department  may  not  be  an  au- 
thority in  another.  The  President  of  the  United  States 
would  be  competent  to  speak  on  most  questions  of  state- 
craft but  not  necessarily  in  regard  to  theatrical  matters 
as  would  Henry  Irving.  Even  in  such  allied  depart- 
ments as  chemistry  and  medicine  an  eminent  chemist 
might  not  be  an  authority  on  medical  practice.  Nor 
could  an  ocuhst  necessarily  speak  authoritatively  upon 
the  throat. 

Moreover,  when  the  opinion  cited  is  that  of  a  specialist 
in  the  department  within  which  the  subject  Hes,  it  is 
important  to  know  his  standing  and  reputation.  In 
economic  matters  would  you  follow  Henry  George  or 
John  Stuart  Mill?     In  art  would  you  prefer  Ruskin  to 


EVIDENCE  135 

Philip  Gilbert  Hamerton?  In  natural  history  would  you 
follow  Pliny  or  ]^lande^dlle  rather  than  Darwin  or  Hux- 
ley?   There  are  degrees  of  standing  among  specialists. 

Examining  Evidence  from  Authority 

It  has  been  pre\dously  shown  that  the  debater's 
statements  which  come  from  others  are  taken,  as  a  rule, 
not  from  the  testimony  of  eye-witnesses  but  from  the 
testimony  of  authorities.  The  classification  of  tests  to 
be  applied  in  examining  evidence  from  authority  is,  in 
general,  the  same  as  in  examining  ordinary  testimony. 
The  one  great  test  of  evidence  is  consistency:  (i)  Is  the 
evidence  cited  consistent  internally?  That  is  to  say, 
are  there  incidental,  undesigned  admissions — are  there 
frank  admissions,  open  concessions — and  are  there  miss- 
ing statements  of  fact  so  striking  as  to  throw  doubt 
upon  those  made?  (2)  Is  the  evidence  cited  consistent 
externally  with  our  general  knowledge  derived  through 
our  intuitions  and  experience?  Extraordinary  state- 
ments, even  if  they  emanate  from  an  authority,  may  be 
examined  by  this  test.  And  (3)  Is  the  evidence  con- 
sistent externally  with  our  particular  information  ob- 
tainable from  other  authorities  and  circumstances  in 
the  case  ?  When  a  number  of  authorities  agree  in  stating 
substantially  the  same  fact  or  opinion,  we  have  what 
is  called  corroborative  testimony  from  authority.  It 
is  important,  moreover,  that  such  statements  should 
possess  independence;  in  the  case  of  facts,  that  they 
should  not  have  come  originally  from  the  same  source; 
in  the  case  of  opinions,  that  they  should  have  been  sepa- 
rately determined.  Here,  as  in  ordinary  testimony, 
number  and  independence  may  have  to  be  considered 
before  a  final  conclusion  can  be  arrived  at. 


136  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

If,  however,  there  are  several  authorities  and  their 
testimonies  disagree,  we  should  look  for  other  circum- 
stances in  the  case  which  would  throw  hght  on  the  com- 
petence of  the  authorities.  If  the  statements  under 
examination  can  be  considered  as  concerning  a  matter 
of  knowledge  (as,  for  example,  the  exact  time  of  the  de- 
livery of  Webster's  speech  in  reply  to  Hayne),  a  de- 
cision may  be  possible  after  a  determination  of  the  stand- 
ing of  the  authorities  in  question — their  scholarship, 
methods  of  investigation,  and  opportunities  for  research. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  statements  undergoing  ex- 
amination concern  a  matter  of  opinion  (as,  for  example, 
Webster's  usual  habits  of  preparation  for  a  speech), 
it  is  necessary  to  determine  not  only  the  knowledge  of 
the  several  authorities,  but  also  their  relative  compe- 
tence to  draw  conclusions  from  circumstances  ascer- 
tained. Are  the  authorities  cited  competent  through 
intellectual  power,  training,  and  experience  to  ascertain 
circumstances  correctly  and  to  have  trustworthy  opinions 
upon  them?  And  are  they  unprejudiced  by  personal  or 
professional  bias? 

A  comparison  of  the  several  testimonies  and  a  de- 
termination of  the  relative  competence  of  the  authori- 
ties, if  their  statements  were  made  from  personal  ob- 
servation, may  be  sufficient  to  warrant  a  final  decision, 
after  applying  the  other  tests  of  consistency,  number, 
and  independence.  And,  indeed,  in  case  the  conflicting 
statements  are  of  a  secondary  character,  a  decision 
may  be  reached  which  is  practically  sulSicient.  But 
the  scientific  or  scholarly  investigator  will  look  at  once 
at  the  sources  of  the  authorities,  the  primary  evidence 
(if  such  be  available)  upon  which  the  statements  were 
based.     For  example,  Marsh  in  his  "Webster  and  His 


EVIDENCE  137 

Contemporaries"  assumes  that  Webster's  great  speech 
was  deUvered  on  a  single  day,  Tuesday,  January  the 
twenty-sixth,  eighteen  hundred  and  thirty;  while  Everett 
in  his  "Life"  tells  us  that  its  deUvery  occupied  parts  of 
two  days;  namely,  the  twenty-sixth  and  twenty-seventh. 
The  relative  competency  of  these  conflicting  authori- 
ties, if  determined,  would  not  settle  the  matter  abso- 
lutely. At  all  events,  the  historical  investigator  would 
seek  at  once  for  such  evidence  as  Gales  [and  Sea  ton's 
"Reports"  or  Benton's  "Debates  of  Congress."  Such 
an  investigation,  if  made,  will  verify  Everett's  state- 
ment. In  examining  primary  evidence  the  following 
questions  are  of  great  importance:  (i)  Is  the  document 
authenticated?  And  (2)  Was  it  made  by  a  person  ful- 
filling the  requirements  of  an  expert?  The  Gales  and 
Seaton  "Reports,"  just  mentioned,  fulfil  these  tests; 
so,  for  example,  does  Thucydides'  "History  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  War."  The  story  of  WilHam  Tell's  marks- 
manship, on  the  other  hand,  rests  upon  a  documentary 
basis  which  cannot  be  authenticated.  It  is,  of  course, 
neither  a  contradictory  nor  an  impossible  story,  but  is 
externally  inconsistent  with  certain  particular  facts 
estabhshed  in  regard  to  it.  Substantially  the  same  story 
is  related  of  other  heroes;  for  example,  Toko  and  Egill, 
in  manuscripts  equally  trustworthy.^  The  second-hand 
testimony  of  an  authority  need  not,  it  may  be  supposed, 
depend  upon  documents.  It  may  indeed  sometimes 
depend  upon  more  remote  testimonies  given  when  the 
deed,  event,  or  course  of  action  took  place.  When  such 
occurs,  the  test  previously  given  for  examining  testi- 
mony may  need  to  be  applied.  But,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  it  should  not  be  too  strongly  emphasized  that 
•Vide  Paul's  "Grundriss  der  germanischen  Philologie,"  II,  62. 


138  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

documents  fonn  the  almost  exclusive  ^basis  of  historic 
proofs. 

The  historian  works  with  documents.  Documents  are  the 
traces  which  have  been  left  by  the  thoughts  and  actions  of  men 
of  former  times.  Of  these  thoughts  and  actions,  however,  very- 
few  leave  any  visible  traces,  and  these  traces,  when  there  are 
any,  are  seldom  durable;  an  accident  is  enough  to  efface  them. 
Now  every  thought  and  every  action  that  has  left  no  visible 
traces,  or  none  but  what  have  since  disappeared,  is  lost  for  his- 
tory; is  as  though  it  had  never  been.  For  want  of  documents 
the  history  of  immense  periods  in  the  past  of  humanity  is  destined 
to  remain  forever  unknown.  For  there  is  no  substitute  for  docu- 
ments;  no  documents,  no  history.'^ 

In  a  word,  in  determining  the  particular  external 
consistency  of  testimony  from  authority,  the  other  cir- 
cumstances to  be  considered  may  concern  two  things: 
the  competency  of  an  authority  and  the  original  source. 
And  in  determining  the  weight  of  any  particular  testi- 
mony and  circumstance,  all  the  tests  as  to  truth  and 
probability  are  necessary.  This  is  equally  true  of  the 
final  conclusion  arrived  at  after  comparing  all  the  testi- 
monies and  circumstances  in  the  case,  and  attributing 
to  each  portion  of  evidence  its  proper  force  and  weight. 
What  has  been  said,  moreover,  of  the  personal  equation 
as  rendering  impossible  a  complete  general  classification 
of  the  force  of  ordinary  testimony  is  true  of  every  species 
of  e\ddence. 

The  following  classification  of  authorities,  together 
with  the  questions  which  may  be  asked  in  examining  a 
particular  class  of  authority,  should  be  useful. 

I.     Authoritative  statements  of  a  secondary  character  based 
on  documents. 

^"Introduction  to  the  Study  of  History";   Langlois  and  Seignobos. 


EVIDENCE  139 

A.  Competency. 

1.  In  a  matter  of  knowledge:    Is  the  authority  com- 

petent through  general  ability,  training,  and  ex- 
perience to  ascertain  circumstances  and  facts 
correctly? 
In  a  matter  oi  judgment :  Is  he  competent  through 
general  ability,  training,  and  experience  to  ascer- 
tain circumstances  and  facts  correctly,  and  to 
base  trustworthy  opinions  upon  them? 

2.  Is  he  unprejudiced  ? 

B.  Primary  source. 

1.  Is  the  document  authenticated? 

2.  Was  it  made  by  a  person  competent  to  know  and 

to  judge?     Was  he  unprejudiced  ? 
II.    Authoritative   statements   of    a    second-hand    character 
based  on  ordinary  testimony. 

A.  Competency. 

(Same  as  the  preceding.) 

B.  Source. 

Do  the  testimonies  fulfil  the  tests  given  for  ordinary 
testimony  ? 

III.  A  document — primary  evidence. 

1.  Is  the  document  authenticated? 

2.  Was  it  made  by  a  person  competent  to  know  and 

to  judge  ?    Was  he  unprejudiced  ? 

IV.  A  person — authoritative  statements  based  on  personal  ob- 

servation.    (Expert  testimony.) 
In  a  matter  of  knowledge  and  judgment;  is  he  competent? 
(Same  test  of  competency  as  in  I.,  A.) 

Of  these  classes,  I  and  II  are  the  most  usual  sources 
of  evidence  employed  in  debating;  III  and  IV  are  the 
best  evidence  theoretically  considered ;  but,  as  has  been 
shown,  I  and  II  may  under  certain  circumstances  be  as 
good  as  III,  may  be  sufficient  for  practical  purposes. 

Rules  for  the  Interpretation  of  Documents. — i.  The 
presumption  is  always  in  favor  of  the  plain,  obvious 
meaning  of  the  language. 


140  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

2.  In  all  cases  of  uncertainty  and  ambiguity,  that 
interpretation  should  be  adopted  which  other  circum- 
stances indicate  as  the  intention  of  those  who  had  the 
authority  to  fix  the  phraseology. 

3.  A  document  is  its  own  best  interpreter.  Its  ob- 
scure passages  are  to  be  constructed  in  harmony  with 
those  whose  meaning  is  plain. 

!    4.  The  design  the  author  had  in  view  will  aid  in  de- 
termining what  his  intention  was  in  using  his  words. 

5.  The  spirit  and  temper  of  the  author  must  be  con- 
sidered. 

6.  The  daily  language  of  an  author  must  be  under- 
stood to  understand  his  writings. 

7.  Documents  are  to  be  interpreted  in  harmony  with 
the  surroundings  of  their  authors.^ 

Suggestions  for  Reporting  Evidence. — The  debater 
knows  that  his  opponent  or  the  judges  will  generally 
be  aware  of  the  truth  concerning  important  matters 
and  discover  inaccuracies.  Hence,  fear  of  detection  by 
the  judges  and  exposure  by  an  opponent  with  the  con- 
sequent damage  to  the  speaker's  reputation  and  his 
side  are  most  important  checks  upon  error.  The  chief 
check,  of  course,  is  the  debater's  own  responsibility  as 
respects  the  truth. 

If  he  is  to  get  the  most  out  of  his  evidence,  he  must 
possess  such  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  it  and  the 
source  from  which  it  comes  that  he  can  during  a  contest 
recall  his  knowledge  at  a  moment's  notice.  Now  an 
opponent  may  question  either  the  accuracy  of  a  state- 
ment, the  source  from  which  it  was  taken,  or  the  au- 
thoritative character  of  that  source.  Hence,  in  prepar- 
ing for  a  contest,  the  debater  should  remember  exactly 

^  Hay's  "Every-Daj'  Reasoning,"  pp.  155  et  seq. 


EVIDENCE  141 

what  his  authority  said  and  where  it  was  said,  and  why- 
it  or  he  may  be  considered  as  an  authority.  He  should 
be  prepared  (i)  to  quote  verbatim,  (2)  to  cite  the  au- 
thority quoted,  and  (3)  to  describe  its  or  his  character, 
(i)  Verbatim  Quotation. — In  reporting  the  words  of 
others  for  the  purpose  of  evidence,  the  debater  should 
always  quote  substantially  or  word  for  word.  This 
means  practically  that  he  should  always  take  pains  to 
understand  and  to  repeat  exactly  what  was  said.  It 
is  not  to  be  supposed  that  a  speaker  would  intentionally 
misquote,  but,  through  carelessness  in  the  examination 
of  the  authority  or  an  unrestrained  partiaUty  for  his 
own  side,  misrepresentation  may  be  the  result.  Hence 
the  value  of  verbatim  over  substantial  quotation.  Burke, 
laborious  in  everything,  was  exceedingly  particular,  per- 
haps tediously  so,  in  the  matter  of  quotation  whether 
for  ornament  or  evidence.  The  great  orators  and  states- 
men through  this  practice  have  usually  developed  won- 
derful memories.  Such  was  Webster's  habit  in  this 
respect  that  it  has  been  said  of  him:  "Anything  once 
well  taken  into  his  mind  was  never  afterward  absolutely 
forgotten."  William  Pinkney's  memory  was  "a  bed 
of  steel."  And  what  a  triumph  did  the  latter 's  memory 
score  for  him  in  the  supreme  court!  On  one  occasion 
Pinkney  happened  to  remark  that  he  beHeved  such  an 
author  gave  such  an  opinion,  quoting  it  substantially; 
whereupon  the  counsel  on  the  other  side  interrupted 
him  with  a  flat  denial.  "Pinkney  turned  toward  him 
with  the  greatest  apparent  fury.  'Hand  me  the  book,' 
said  he.  'Never  in  my  not  short  juridical  Hfe  have  I 
attempted  to  mislead  the  court,  and  certainly  I  would 
not  attempt  it  with  a  court  of  such  wisdom  and  lore 
as  this;  if  I  did,  I  should  be  sure  of  being  exposed,  and 


142  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

I  hope  I  think  too  much  of  my  reputation  for  such  an 
artifice.'  Then  again  turning  to  the  startled  adversary, 
'Pass  me  the  book,'  he  exclaimed,  'and  now  before  I 
open  it,  I  shall  tell  your  honor  the  page,  and  the  part 
of  the  page  where  this  authority  is  stated,  and  let  me 
begin  by  repeating  it  to  your  honors.'  He  then  opened 
the  book  and  pointed  to  the  very  page  he  had  indicated 
and  the  authority  was  found  to  correspond  word  for  word 
with  what  he  had  stated." 

(2)  Citation  of  Authority. — Of  course  the  debater 
must  be  prepared  to  cite  authorities  upon  disputed 
points.  He  may  be  called  upon  in  actual  debate,  it 
should  be  remembered,  to  do  so  at  any  time  and  at  a 
moment's  notice.  He  may,  like  Pinkney,  moreover, 
have  to  do  it  with  considerable  warmth  and  minuteness. 
Hence,  in  preparing  his  case,  for  every  quoted  statement 
he  should  always  make  a  point  of  remembering  not  only 
what  was  said,  but  the  work  and  the  place  in  the  work 
from  which  the  statement  was  taken.  The  experienced 
debater  knows  that  facts  which  seem  incontrovertible 
when  he  is  making  up  his  case  will  in  some  way  during 
an  argument  occasionally  become  an  issue.  In  connec- 
tion with  apparently  indisputable  facts,  Burke  frequent- 
ly referred  in  his  speech  upon  Conciliation  to  the  jour- 
nals of  the  House,  giving  volume,  month,  and  year.  A 
constant  reference  to  authority,  it  should  be  said,  has 
a  good  efifect  upon  the  judges,  by  increasing  their  con- 
fidence in  the  speaker. 

(3)  Description  of  the  Authority. — When  Burke  was 
discussing  the  commerce  with  America,  in  his  speech 
on  Concihation,  he  stood  with  two  accounts  in  his  hand: 
one,  a  comparative  statement  of  the  export  trade  of 
England  to  its  colonies  as  it  stood  in  the  year  1704  and 


EVIDENCE  143 

as  it  stood  in  the  year  1772;  the  other,  a  statement  of 
the  export  trade  of  this  country  to  its  colonies  alone, 
as  it  stood  in  1772,  compared  with  the  whole  trade  of 
England  to  all  parts  of  the  world  (the  colonies  excluded) 
in  the  year  1704.  He  then  adds:  "They  are  from  good 
vouchers;  the  latter  period  from  the  accounts  on  your 
table,  the  earlier  from  an  original  manuscript  of  Dave- 
nant,  who  first  estabhshed  the  inspector-general's  office, 
which  has  been  ever  since  his  time  so  abundant  a  source 
of  parliamentary  information." 

The  Reasonableness  of  an  Opinion. — It  is  not  to  be 
overlooked  that  in  matters  of  opinion  the  force  or  weight 
of  a  cited  authority  rests  primarily  on  the  reasonableness 
or  convincingness  of  an  opinion,  and  only  secondarily  on 
the  general  character  or  reputation  of  the  one  who  ex- 
pressed it.  The  debater  should  be  especially  cautioned 
against  quoting  a  man  loosely  as  an  authority  on  his 
side  of  a  question  uithout  stating  the  authority  '5  expressed 
reasons  for  the  position  ascribed  to  him.  The  following 
(from  the  "Principles  of  Rhetoric,"  by  A.  S.  Hill,  p.  13) 
will  serve  to  illustrate  the  correct  use  of  another's 
opinion : 

The  real  question  is,  Are  the  United  States — so  far  as  language 
is  concerned — still  provinces  of  England,  or  do  they  constitute 
a  nation? 

The  true  doctrine  appears  to  be  that  expressed  by  the  late 
Edward  A.  Freeman,  whose  opinion  on  this  point  is  valuable 
because  he  was  an  Englishman  of  EngHshmen.  After  discuss- 
ing several  cases  in  which  usage  differs  in  the  two  countries, 
Mr.  Freeman  goes  on  to  say:  "One  way  is  for  the  most  part 
as  good  as  the  other;  let  each  side  of  the  ocean  stick  to  its  own 
way,  if  only  to  keep  up  those  Httle  picturesque  difTerences  which 
are  really  a  gain  when  the  substance  is  essentially  the  same. 
This  same  Une  of  thought  might  be  carried  out  in  a  crowd  of 


144  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

phrases,  old  and  new,  in  which  British  and  American  usage 
differs,  but  in  which  neither  usage  can  be  said  to  be  in  itself 
better  or  worse  than  the  other.  Each  usage  is  the  better  in 
the  land  in  which  it  has  grown  up  of  itself.  A  good  British  writer 
and  a  good  American  writer  will  write  in  the  same  language 
and  the  same  dialect;  but  it  is  well  that  each  should  keep  to 
those  little  peculiarities  of  established  and  reasonable  local  usage 
which  will  show  on  which  side  of  the  ocean  he  writes."  ^ 

But  to  say  that  the  force  of  argument  from  author- 
ity rests  primarily  on  the  reasonableness  or  convincing- 
ness of  an  opinion,  and  secondarily  on  the  character  or 
reputation  of  the  authority  quoted,  is  not  to  state  all 
of  the  truth.  An  ipse  dixit,  for  instance,  will  sometimes 
be  conclusive  through  its  appeal  to  authority  qua  au- 
thority, to  habit,  or  to  imitation. 

The  Danger  of  Partial  Quotation. — In  reporting  evi- 
dence, the  debater  should  be  especially  warned  against 
the  danger  of  partial  quotation.  It  usually  happens, 
for  instance,  that  an  authority  may  be  loosely  "quoted 
on  both  sides,"  as  it  is  called.  This  is  particularly  true 
of  pubUc  questions  which  are  new,  but  there  is  no  excuse 
whatever  for  the  deliberate  attempt  sometimes  made 
by  debating  teams  to  "steal"  an  opponent's  author- 
ities for  one's  own  side.  Thus,  it  is  both  improper  and 
hazardous  for  a  debater  to  use  what  is  really  a  quaUfying 
remark  or  a  remark  made  in  some  special  or  minor  part 
of  the  discussion  as  if  it  really  represented  the  author- 
ity's true  position.  PubUc  men  have  sometunes  been 
flagrantly  misrepresented  in  this  way;  and  the  honest 
debater  must  be  ever  on  his  guard  against  such  trickery 
or  carelessness,  and  be  prepared  to  supply  when  neces- 
sary the  full  and  complete  statements  of  the  authority 

^Longman's  Magazine,  November,  1882,  p.  90. 


EVIDENCE  145 

in  question  and  to  supply  them  so  effectively  as  to  secure 
his  opponent's  downfall.  Whether  the  cause  of  the 
misrepresentation  be  studied  or  accidental,  certainly  a 
debater  in  his  preparation  should  be  so  thorough  and 
exact  that  his  own  authorities  caimot  be  improperly 
appropriated  by  an  opponent  without  his  being  able  to 
expose  by  specific  citation  the  misrepresentation. 

The  Card  System. — ^The  importance  of  system  in 
note-taking  when  gathering  evidence  for  a  debate  can 
hardly  be  overestimated.  In  the  thorough  preparation 
demanded  in  our  intercollegiate  debates,  hundreds  of 
volumes,  magazines,  or  periodicals  must  frequently  be 
examined,  sifted,  and  classified.  With  such  a  mass  of 
material,  debaters  have,  almost  without  exception, 
found  it  necessary  to  adopt  the  use  of  small  cards  which 
can  be  easily  sorted  and  shifted  from  hand  to  hand. 
The  notes  on  them  usually  show  the  subject,  the  state- 
ment of  fact  or  opinion,  name  of  authority,  and  ref- 
erence, thus: 


Subject 

Statement  Authority  Reference 


146  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

Exercises 

The  subject  of  brief-making,  accompanied  by  a  study 
of  evidence  and  of  argument  and  the  dehvery  of  at 
least  one  oration,  may  well  occupy  the  first  term  in  a 
course  in  debating.  It  should  include  the  drawing  of 
three  or  four  briefs  of  arguments,  found  in  a  book  of 
specimens,  so  as  to  develop  in  the  student  the  habit  of 
accurate  and  thorough  thinking,  that  is,  through  co- 
ordination and  subordination.  The  following  ques- 
tions on  argumentative  theory  may  be  suggestive. 

1.  Distinguish  between  the  following:  argument, 
evidence,  proof;  assumption,  presumption;  persuasion, 
conviction. 

2.  What  are  the  two  important  laws  of  structure? 
Give  the  main  syllogism  of  any  two  of  tlie  specimens 
studied  and  show  how  they  conform  to  these  laws. 

3.  Define  the  several  classes  of  evidence.  Mention 
the  chief  tests  used  in  the  examination  of  ordinary  testi- 
mony. 

4.  What  important  differences  can  you  point  out  in 
the  employment  of  evidence  in  a  court  of  law  and  be- 
fore deliberative  bodies? 

5.  Give  the  rules  for  the  interpretation  of  documents. 

6.  Define  argument,  and  (a)  show  how  all  arguments 
in  their  final  analysis  and  when  carried  to  completion 
will  involve  an  inference  from  the  complex  relations  of 
association,  resemblance  or  contrast,  particular  and 
general,  and  cause  and  effect. 

7.  What,  in  your  opinion,  is  the  relative  importance 
of  observation  and  inference  in  reasoning  about  ordinary 
affairs?  (b)  Show  that  sign  argument  may  vary  in  force 
from  slight  probability  to  certainty.    Illustrate. 


EVIDENCE  147 

8.  When  may  a  cited  case  be  said  to  be  relevant  to 
a  matter  under  inquiry?  Illustrate,  (c)  Mention  the 
most  common  fallacies  in  the  use  of  argument  from 
example.    Illustrate. 

9.  Indicate  the  important  steps  which  may  be  em- 
ployed in  the  process  of  arguing  from  example. 

10.  Show  the  use  of  the  reductio  ad  ahsurdum,  made 
by  Mansfield  in  the  "Evans  Case,"  by  Macaulay  on 
"Copyright,"  or  by  Beecher  when  speaking  at  Liver- 
pool. Give  an  effective  way  of  answering  the  reductio 
ad  ahsurdum  cited. 

11.  From  the  specimens  studied,  give  an  illustration 
of  the  development  by  the  speaker  of  a  common  ground 
as  a  basis  for  argument  to  people  hostile  in  their  mental 
attitude. 

12.  Describe,  as  far  as  possible,  the  method  you  would 
naturally  follow  in  getting  a  person  to  change  his  mind. 

After  brief-drawing  and  argumentative  theory  have 
been  sufficiently  stressed,  there  should  be  provided  ample 
opportunity  for  practice  in  actual  debates,  in  which  the 
student  is  permitted  to  draw  his  own  material  from 
varied  sources.  This  practice  accompanied  by  a  study 
of  presentation  may  well  occupy  the  second  term  of  a 
college  year. 

The  questions  may  be  posted  at  the  beginrdng  of 
the  term  and  debaters  assigned  to  them  from  week  to 
week;  a  reading-room  set  apart  in  the  university  library, 
and  the  reference  librarian  requested  to  place  every 
Monday  on  the  shelves  all  material  necessary  for  an 
intelligent  investigation  and  discussion  of  the  question 
under  debate  for  that  week.  In  this  library  room  the 
debaters  may  be  given  an  hour  for  preliminary  con- 
ference in  groups  with  the  instructor  in  charge.     The 


148  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

material  is  then  carefully  examined,  and  the  case  for 
the  affirmative  and  negative  analyzed  and  distributed 
among  the  speakers,  each  speaker  being  given  a  central 
idea,  fundamental  to  the  case,  and  told  to  image  it  ef- 
fectively on  the  minds  of  his  audience.  There  should 
be  no  requirement  of  a  formal  brief  from  the  speakers 
in  this  debate,  but  rather  a  dependence  placed  on  previous 
systematic  training  in  brief-drawing.  Every  encourage- 
ment should  be  given  for  original  and  individual  think- 
ing. 

Obviously,  good  debating  means  the  ability  to  think 
on  one's  feet  and  to  talk  quietly  to  an  audience,  an- 
ticipating objections  and  answering  them,  conciliating 
rather  than  antagonizing,  in  order  to  secure  approval. 
The  debater  must  speak  extemporaneously  in  rebuttal; 
he  should  also  be  required  to  do  so  in  his  first  speech. 
For  this  purpose,  special  supplementary  exercises  in 
extempore  speaking  are  sometimes  found  advantageous. 
In  a  literary  society  or  a  class  of  a  dozen  men,  a  list 
of  topics  on  current  events  may  be  gathered  from  the 
head-lines  of  the  morning  paper,  or  from  a  weekly  or  a 
monthly  magazine,  and  numbered  in  order.  At  the 
meeting,  the  presiding  officer  may  call  upon  a  member 
to  speak,  whereupon  the  clerk  announces  the  topic  after 
the  speaker  has  taken  the  floor.  The  clerk,  of  course, 
announces  each  topic,  in  the  order  in  which  it  appears 
on  the  list.  By  organizing  the  class  into  a  congress  or 
other  deHberative  body  for  the  discussion  of  resolutions, 
familiarity  may  also  be  had  with  the  rules  of  parlia- 
mentary law.  Always  following  a  debate,  a  vote  should 
be  taken  first  on  the  merits  of  the  debate,  and  then  the 
resolution  should  be  thrown  open  for  general  discussion, 
and  finally  voted  up  or  down.    All  members  of  the  class 


EVIDENCE  149 

other  than  the  assigned  debaters,  usually  six,  are  re- 
quired to  hand  in  a  brief  on  the  question  to  be  debated. 
This  adds  interest  to  the  general  discussion  on  the  merits 
of  the  question. 

This  actual  practice  in  speaking  should,  of  course,  be 
accompanied  by  a  study  in  presentation,  stress  being 
laid  on  the  imagination  and  also  on  suggestion,  volun- 
tary and  involuntary,  conscious  and  subconscious,  as 
being  essential  and  logical  elements  in  the  development 
of  the  process  of  effective  thinking.  In  other  words, 
the  aim  is  to  develop,  first,  logical  accuracy  and  sound 
thinking,  and  afterward  the  other  qualities,  imaginative, 
rhetorical,  and  practical,  and  always  in  connection  with 
a  valuable  subject-matter.  Debate  lends  itself  peculiarly 
to  educational  purposes  because  it  demands  of  a  man 
that  in  self-defense  he  think  soundly  and  effectively 
under  fire. 


PART  II 
THE   PRESENTATION 

CHAPTER  VI 
IMAGINATION   IN   ARGUMENT 

Whether  the  means  or  anns  are  those  of  description, 
narration,  exposition,  or  argument,  the  chief  problem 
in  conveying  our  ideas  to  others  is  one  of  imaginative 
suggestion. 

Suggestion  is  the  broadest  term  used  to  describe  the 
act  of  influencing  others,  whether  spontaneous  or  de- 
liberate, by  word  or  by  gesture.  Any  act  mental  or 
physical  used  to  awaken  or  to  direct  in  others  mental  or 
physical  activity  is  suggestion.  This  implies,  of  course, 
that  thinking  always  involves  molecular  or  physical 
changes. 

Imagery,  too,  has  a  peculiar  power  as  an  agent  of 
suggestion  upon  the  attention,  interest,  sympathy,  and 
thinking  of  an  audience,  over  its  mental  activity,  its 
processes,  conclusions,  and  actions. 

I.    Need  of  Imagination  in  Argument 

Great  progress  has  been  made  in  the  development 
of  public  speaking  in  the  last  few  years.  A  more  pleasing 
and  more  durable  edifice  is  being  artistically  built  on 
the  old  logical,  rhetorical,  and  elocutionary  foundations, 
in  accordance  with  newly  recognized  vital  principles; 

150 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  151 

and  we  are,  I  think,  coming  to  see  more  clearly  both 
the  need  of  developing  the  imagination  of  the  speaker 
and  the  way  to  do  it.  There  arise  before  us  new  vistas 
in  investigation,  knowledge,  and  methods.  Important 
explorations  have  already  been  made,  and  good  ore  is 
being  found  and  reduced  to  practical  use.  There  is, 
first  of  all,  need  of  a  new  emphasis  in  the  training  of 
the  imagination  of  the  student  of  argument  and  debate. 
Since  all  language  is,  of  course,  only  suggestive,  and 
since  argument  at  best  is  hnaginatively  suggestive  (since 
it  is  impossible  to  argue  without  assumption),  one  cannot 
but  feel  the  danger,  to  certain  types  of  students,  which 
would  result  from  too  formal  processes  of  reasoning. 
For  instance,  the  model  of  a  brief-form  made  by  older 
men  may  be  held  up  by  us  before  younger  minds  for 
emphasis  of  the  rational  basis  of  conviction,  to  give  an 
idea  of  the  need  of  firmness  of  structure,  to  illustrate 
the  logical  characteristics  of  unity  and  sequence;  but 
shears  and  measuring- tape  are  needed  in  fitting  the  suit 
of  the  older  son  to  his  next  younger  brother.  Indeed, 
the  theory  of  argumentation,  as  laid  down  in  some  of 
our  text-books,  is  at  times  unsuited  to  college  classes,  in 
which  the  students  are  unacquainted  with  inductive 
processes,  unused  to  making  careful  generalizations  and 
comparisons,  and  have  had  no  earlier  courses,  for  ex- 
ample, in  logic  or  philosophy,  or  no  large  background  of 
knowledge  upon  which  to  draw.  And  does  not  the  sepa- 
rate treatment  of  ''persuasion"  smack  of  the  ancient 
teaching  that  the  mind  is  a  series  of  water-tight  com- 
partments? At  all  events,  such  compendiums  of  "prin- 
ciples" or  "elements"  are  of  value  only  in  the  hands 
of  an  experienced  instructor,  who,  in  using  them,  takes 
account  of  the  fact  that  they  are  not  adapted  to  persons 


152  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

of  all  ages,  nor  indeed  to  all  types  of  mind.  Charles 
Lamb  remarked  of  Scotsmen  that  he  had  been  trying 
all  his  life  to  like  them,  but  had  given  it  up  in  despair. 

Principles,  methods,  and  forms  should  be  taught  only 
in  so  far  as  they  are  readily  assimilable  by  the  student, 
and  are  used  with  freedom  and  enthusiasm  in  parallel 
original  work  in  writing  and  speaking.  The  university 
wit,  Nicholas  Udall,  of  Eton,  wrote  a  play,  modelled 
after  Plautus,  called  "  Ralph  Royster  Doyster,"  the  first 
English  comedy.  Two  younger  gentlemen  of  the  Inner 
Temple,  Norton  and  Sackville,  presented  before  Queen 
Elizabeth  a  play  called  "Gorboduc,"  patterned  after 
Seneca,  and  now  venerated  as  the  first  English  tragedy. 
But,  valuable  as  this  classic  influence  was,  no  one  would 
think  of  sa)ang  that  without  the  addition  of  the  more 
original  imaginative  or  romantic  elements  we  could  ever 
have  had  a  consummate  expression  of  life  in  Elizabethan 
drama,  such  as  was  reached  in  Shakespeare's  plays.  It 
is  a  long  time  now  since  Professor  Baker  of  Harvard 
separated  argumentation  from  the  older  rhetorics  and 
performed  a  great  service  by  giving  it  distinct  and  sepa- 
rate prominence  as  a  form  of  composition.  The  older 
rhetorics,  from  which  it  was  taken,  have  long  since  passed 
away,  chiefly  because  they  did  not  allow  for  individuality 
in  men.  Argumentative  formalism  has  survived  the 
longest,  partly  because  the  theory  is  the  hardest  to  per- 
fect, and  partly  because  of  the  desire  to  recognize  the 
supremacy  of  reason  in  influencing  affairs  in  the  world. 

We  should  welcome  to-day  the  serious  efforts  being 
made  by  what  may  be  called  the  new  psychological 
school  of  expression.  It  not  only  opens  a  stimulating 
field  of  thought  and  investigation,  but  bids  fair  to  suc- 
ceed where  the  older  methods  failed,  namely,  in  allow- 


IMAGINATION   IN   ARGUMENT  153 

ing  for  indi\idual  growth  and  development.  I  believe, 
in  particular,  in  the  opportunity  which  this  line  of 
thought  offers  to  the  student  of  argument;  for,  while 
it  recognizes  reason  as  a  stabilizing  force,  it  teaches 
clearly  that  man  is  not  to  be  reached  by  it  alone,  and 
that  in  appl>4ng  the  laws  of  reasoning  for  the  purpose 
of  influencing  the  thoughts  of  others,  there  are  deeper 
considerations  to  be  taken  account  of.  Not  that  we 
have  not  heretofore  paid  some  heed  to  association  and 
inhibition,  nor  recognized  the  importance  in  expression 
of  attention,  imagination,  memory,  and  feeling;  but 
never  before  have  we  reaUzed  so  fully  the  value  of  the 
psychological  elements  and  at  the  same  time  possessed 
sufficient  and  accurate  data  for  their  effective  exploita- 
tion. Or,  again,  recognizing  the  constant  diversification 
of  the  attention  of  indi\dduals  in  modern  fife,  and  the 
ease  with  which  our  consciousness  may  be  flooded  with 
feehngs  on  matters  of  principle  or  of  interest  or  of  no 
consequence  at  all — with  or  against  our  wills— or  re- 
calling the  different  memory  associations  of  different 
men,  we  perceive  at  once  how  valuable  to  the  trained 
student  of  argument  or  debate  is  that  illmiiinating  emi- 
nence of  view-point  which  enables  him  to  see  his  field 
anew  in  the  clear  air  of  imaginative  suggestion.  We 
should  never  forget,  too,  that  the  unagination  is  the 
vanguard,  the  pioneer  of  all  progress  in  the  world,  of 
which  reason  is  only  the  explanation.  It  has,  I  think, 
been  sufiiciently  shown  heretofore  that  reason  does  not 
exist  apart  from,  and  cannot  proceed  independently  of, 
the  imagination;  and  perhaps  I  may  add  that  there  is 
an  abstract  as  well  as  a  concrete  imagery.  Mathematics, 
for  instance,  is  as  much  imaginative  as  it  is  intellectual. 
It  is  a  distinct  gain  for  the  thinking  and  for  the  power 


154  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF   DEBATE 

of  expression  of  the  student  of  argument  when  he  learns, 
for  instance,  to  image  a  concept  in  its  relations;  that  is, 
with  its  implications,  whether  the  purpose  be  coldly  to 
explain  or  warmly  to  impress.  Certainly  he  must  learn 
to  see  the  content  in  the  form  and  the  form  in  the 
content,  the  part  in  the  whole  and  the  whole  in  the  part, 
the  means  in  the  end  and  the  end  in  the  means,  the  prin- 
ciple in  the  fact  and  the  fact  in  the  principle,  cause  in 
effect  and  effect  in  cause,  simihtude  in  example,  and 
the  reverse.  Imagination,  indeed,  is  a  Hght  shining  from 
afar  which  beckons  us  on;  reason  is  the  road  built  by 
an  engineer  to  enable  us  safely  to  reach  it.  It  is  subject 
to  error,  of  course,  may  prove  an  ignis  fatuus;  but  so, 
too,  may  the  intellect.  And,  finally,  inasmuch  as  lan- 
guage is  a  chief  medium  of  expression  employed  in  argu- 
ment, the  words  which  are  used  as  symbols  must  be 
symbolic  of  something,  must  be  suggestive  of  meaning 
to  the  persons  addressed.  The  teacher  of  argument 
should  thus  be,  not  a  mere  mental  undertaker,  but  an 
inspiration  to  original  creative  thinking  and  reveahng*. 
This  is  the  high  meaning  of  the  word  "educo." 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  apparent  that  the 
debater  may  examine  with  profit  the  psychological  point 
of  view  from  which  an  argument  may  be  regarded,  and 
the  processes  through  which  the  imagination  functions 
in  a  well-presented  argument,  as  well  as  the  various 
imagery  types. 

II.    Psychological  View-Point  and  Processes 

The  Logical  and  the  Psychological. — Perhaps  we  may 
see  even  more  clearly  the  dift'erence  between  the  logical 
and  the  psychological  view-points  from  which  an  argu- 
ment may  be  regarded  if  we  examine  such  a  passage 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  155 

as  the  following  from  Hall  Caine  commenting  on  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  "Peace  Without  Victory"  address  to 
the  United  States  Senate: 

President  Wilson  probably  knows  by  this  time  that  the  first 
expression  of  French  and  British  opinion  on  his  speech  to  the 
Senate  has  been  that  of  scarcely  disguised  disdain. 

He  has  no  reason  to  be  seriously  troubled  on  that  account. 
So  bold  a  challenge  could  hardly  have  failed  of  any  other  imme- 
diate effect.  From  the  daj's  of  Joseph  downward  ridicule  has 
been  the  first  heritage  of  all  exalted  dreamers. 

The  dreamer  is  the  marked  victim  of  what  is  called  the  prac- 
tical mind.  The  loftier  the  theme  and  the  more  idealistic  the 
form  the  easier  the  play  of  satire.  The  world  has  never  thought 
it  a  proof  of  genius,  even  in  the  works  of  men  of  genius,  to 
make  sport  of  the  Angel  Gabriel  or  of  yet  the  Blessed  Trinity; 
on  the  contrary,  it  has  often  found  proof  of  subUmity  in  the 
ideas  that  have  excited  derision.  It  was  the  exaltation  as  well 
as  the  excess  of  Euripides  which  created  Aristophanes.  Warmth 
and  glow  of  mind  and  heart  are  a  natural  challenge  to  icy  na- 
tures. When  red-hot  iron  is  plunged  into  freezing  water  it  al- 
ways goes  off  with  a  hiss.  Let  President  Wilson  take  heart 
from  the  first  reception  of  his  remarkable  speech. — {N.  Y.  Times, 
January  24,  1917.) 

Logically,  the  writer  shows  why  the  President  "should 
take  heart  from  the  first  reception  of  his  remarkable 
speech."  He  argues  that  from  the  days  of  Joseph  down- 
ward, ridicule  has  been  the  first  heritage  of  all  exalted 
dreamers,  for,  indeed,  the  dreamer  is  the  marked  victim 
of  the  practical  mind.  He  applies  the  redudio  ad  ab- 
stirdum  to  the  case  of  the  Angel  Gabriel  and  of  that  of 
the  Blessed  Trinity,  and  then  cites  directly  the  fact 
that  Aristophanes  is  due  to  the  exaltation  of  Euripides. 
He  has  made  his  point  by  examples  or,  if  you  like,  in- 
ductively, by  bringing  instances  under  a  class,  and  he 


156  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

has  made  it  causally,  by  showing  that  an  exaltation  of 
mind  creates  exalted  results. 

Psychologically,  however,  the  passage  may  be  re- 
garded as  imaging  the  concept  of  the  world's  view  of 
the  "exalted  dreamer"  by  bringing  forward  a  few 
chosen  portraits  from  the  gallery  of  memory.  True, 
there  is  here  no  fulness  of  descriptive  detail,  no  richness 
of  epithet,  but  in  the  act  of  associating  a  league  of  peace 
with  the  Angel  Gabriel  and  the  Blessed  Trinity,  the 
writer  has  fixed  the  attention  startlingly  on  the  exalta- 
tion of  dreaming  and  set  the  mind  to  thinking  on  the 
inconsistency  and  the  limitations  of  that  type  of  mind 
which  scoffs  at  a  world  league  of  peace.  The  other 
memory  picture,  that  of  Euripides  and  Aristophanes,  is 
not  so  rich  in  ideal  association,  but  it  fixes  attention  on 
a  more  definite  and  a  nearer  conclusion,  namely,  that 
an  exaltation  of  mind  may  produce  fortunate  results. 
In  the  concluding  sentences  we  will  notice,  too,  the  vivid- 
ness and  force  due  to  the  perceptual  and  emotional  ap- 
peals, in  such  phrases  or  words  as  "warmth  and  glow," 
"icy  nature,"  "red-hot  iron,"  "plunged,"  "freezing 
water,"  "goes  off,"  "a  hiss." 

An  argument  viewed  as  a  logical  process  has  been 
said  to  be  one  of  sign,  example,  or  analogy,  causation, 
and  classification.  As  a  psychological  process,  it  is  a 
concept  imaged  on  the  attention  with  its  proper  im- 
pHcations  and  in  its  readily  recognized  relations.  The 
logical  relations  thus  employed  in  the  imagery  of  argu- 
ment, therefore,  may  be  causal;  general  or  abstract  as 
well  as  particular  or  concrete;  exemplative  or  analogical; 
and,  indeed,  sometimes  so  simple  or  minute  as  to  be  un- 
analyzed,  or  so  complex  or  elusive  as  to  be  almost  un- 
9,nal;yzable.     Broadly  speaking,  the  myriads  of  minute 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  157 

elements  which  go  to  make  up  the  background  of  an 
argument  and  give  it  its  general  tone  or  character,  and 
which  are  before  the  mind  of  the  creative  artist  but  an 
instant  in  the  act  of  writing  or  speaking,  are  mere  ac- 
companiments or  associations  and  may  be  regarded  as 
reasonings  from  sign.  They  emphasize  to  us  the  im- 
portance of  little  things,  and  contribute  immeasurably 
to  the  argument  by  imparting  to  it  a  sense  of  complete- 
ness, richness,  and  reality. 

Images  Are  a  Psychological  Inference. — We  may  use 
the  term  psychological  inference  to  apply  to  any  in- 
ference which  depends  for  its  cognizance  upon  other 
states  of  consciousness  than  the  logical  reason.  Thus 
an  imaged  statement  offered  as  a  reason  supphes  a  ground 
of  psychological  inference,  for  it  makes  the  idea  per- 
ceptual. So  Lincoln  argues  against  slavery  that  it 
"closed  the  door  of  hope."  It  may  also  appeal  to 
memory  and  feehng.  So  President  Wilson  speaking  for 
preparedness,  emphasizing  the  spiritual  over  the  com- 
mercial, said:  "We  do  not  hang  a  yardstick  over  the 
mantelpiece,  but  we  do  hang  a  musket,  for  somehow  it 
is  associated  with  the  lad's  sacrifice  and  has  come  to 
be  revered  in  the  family."  When  the  debater  offers  a 
reason  for  a  proposition  phrased  in  vivid  imagery,  it  is 
usually  a  conclusion  which  he  has  previously  reached 
by  careful  methods  of  investigation  and  by  sound  logical 
processes. 

We  are  morally  justified  in  the  use  of  psychological 
inference  for  such  ideas  as  we  may  regard  as  having 
been  previously  proved  or  which  are  profoundly  believed 
to  be  true  and  valuable.  We  rightly  condemn  the 
demagogue  for  his  insincerity,  but  for  any  sound  be- 
hef  sincerely  held,  we  may  unhesitatingly  and  will  al- 


158  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

most  instinctively  seek  support  by  appealing  to  per- 
ception, feeling,  and  memory  to  assist  the  thinking. 

Psychological  inference  is  really  the  process  of  making 
a  logical  inference  psychological.  If  logical  inference 
be  regarded  as  necessarily  involving  the  class  idea,  psy- 
chological inference  is  an  intuitive  perception.  It  differs 
from  logical  inference  in  the  fact  that,  at  the  tune  and 
so  far  as  we  are  then  conscious,  the  process  is  immediate 
rather  than  mediate.  The  syllogism  is  a  mediate  infer- 
ence; that  is,  from  one  proposition  to  another  by  means 
of  a  third.  The  immediate  process,  on  the  other  hand, 
takes  the  character  of  a  mental  flash.  Effective  argument, 
indeed,  may  be  described  as  a  mental  process  of  which 
imagination  is  the  major  premise,  perception  the  minor 
premise,  and  common  sense  the  ground  of  inference. 
By  common  sense  is  meant  the  perception  of  nature  as 
it  is,  by  a  person  of  well-balanced  mind. 

Mental  Processes. — The  debater  will  perhaps  under- 
stand better  the  nature  of  some  of  the  processes  which 
he  employs  if  we  note  a  few  simple  distinctions  made 
by  psychologists  in  elementary  terms:  First,  the  psy- 
chologist distinguishes  between  the  reproductive  and 
the  productive  imagination.  The  reproductive  imag- 
ination is  really  memory,  for  it  actually  repeats  what 
was  formerly  in  consciousness;  while  the  productive 
imagination  contains  images  "not  before  in  our  minds 
in  their  present  order  and  form."  This  makes  possible 
the  artistic  character  of  literary  composition.  The 
imagination  of  poets,  novelists,  and  orators  is  productive, 
or,  as  the  artists  call  it,  creative. 

Second,  the  psychologist  distinguishes  between  an 
image  and  an  idea.  "So  far,"  says  Angell,  "as  we  have 
in  mind  the  sensuous  content  of  a  thought,  as,  for  ex- 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  159 

ample,  its  \asual  or  auditory  character,  we  use  the  term 
image.  So  far  as  weVish  to  emphasize  in  addition  to 
or  in  distinction  from  this  fact  of  sensuous  constitution 
the  purport,  significance,  or  meaning  of  an  image,  we 
use  the  term  idea.  Images  merely  represent  on  the 
cognitive  side  the  more  substantive  moments  in  the 
onward  outflow  of  consciousness."  So  Jaques  images 
his  idea  of  Hfe  in — "All  the  world's  a  stage." 

A  third  distinction  of  the  psychologist  is  that  made 
between  an  unage  and  a  perception;  the  latter  being 
the  "consciousness  of  a  particular  material  thing  pres- 
ent to  sense,"  while  an  image  is  the  consciousness  of  a 
thing  not  present  to  sense.  We  perceive  a  star  or  a  flower 
which  is  actually  before  the  eye:  it  rises  before  the  con- 
sciousness later  as  an  image.  The  poet  perceives  a  sun- 
rise, but,  being  a  creative  artist,  he  images  it  thus: 

"Night's  candles  are  burnt  out,  and  jocund  day 
Stands  tiptoe  on  the  misty  mountain-tops." 

Obviously,  imagery  is  both  conceptual  and  perceptual. 
Either  characteristic  may  be  exaggerated  and  abused 
by  an  orator  or  debater.  If  it  is  too  ideational,  the 
audience  will  miss  the  meaning;  if  too  sensory,  it  will 
possess  no  meaning. 

The  Creative  Imagination. — Ruskin  makes  the  art 
process  in  general  depend  on  the  eye,  the  head,  and  the 
hand,  which  Bhss  Perry  renders  for  poetry  into  vision, 
transforming  imagination,  and  expression.  The  imagery 
of  our  best  prose,  too,  is  the  result  of  real  vision  and  crea- 
tive power  in  the  image-making  process.  Vision,  that 
is,  perception,  whether  conducted  by  external  observa- 
tion and  selection,  or  by  introspection,  supplies  material 


IGO  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

from  an  individual's  own  experiences,  which  the  asso- 
ciative processes  of  his  mind  transmute,  through  imagery 
and  suggestion,  into  forms  of  memorable  beauty. 

Illustration. — Professor  Goodrich  cites  the  following 
as  "one  of  the  finest  amplifications  in  English  oratory, 
justified  by  the  importance  of  the  subject  which  it  em- 
braces and  admirably  suited  to  produce  the  designed 
impression."  The  central  idea  was  probably  suggested 
by  a  remark  of  Burke,  whose  writings  Mr.  Erskine  in- 
cessantly studied:  "It  is  the  nature  of  all  greatness  not 
to  be  exact."  Defending  Stockdale  from  the  charge 
of  libel,  and  seeing  the  evils  of  a  too  great  restriction 
on  the  press,  Erskine  said: 

From  minds  thus  subdued  by  the  terrors  of  punishment  there 
could  issue  no  works  of  genius  to  expand  the  empire  of  human 
reason.  ...  It  is  the  nature  of  everything  that  is  great  and 
useful,  both  in  the  animate  and  inanimate  world,  to  be  wild 
and  irregular,  and  we  must  be  contented  to  take  them  with  the 
alloys  which  belong  to  them,  or  live  without  them.  Genius 
breaks  from  the  fetters  of  criticism,  but  its  wanderings  are  sanc- 
tioned by  its  majesty  and  wisdom  when  it  advances  in  its  path; 
subject  it  to  the  critic  and  you  turn  it  into  dulness.  .  .  .  Tem- 
pests occasionally  shake  our  dwellings  and  dissipate  our  com- 
merce, but  they  scourge  before  them  the  lazy  elements,  which 
without  them  would  stagnate  into  pestilence.  In  like  manner, 
liberty  herself,  the  last  and  best  gift  of  God  to  his  creatures,  must 
be  taken  just  as  she  is;  you  might  pare  her  down  to  bashful 
regularity  and  shape  her  into  a  perfect  model  of  severe  scrupulous 
law,  but  she  would  then  be  liberty  no  longer;  you  must  be  con- 
tent to  die  under  the  lash  of  this  inexorable  justice  which  you 
have  exchanged  for  the  honor  of  freedom. 

The  Poverty  of  Mere  Facts. — "It  would  not  be  a  bad 
conjecture  but  an  obvious  truism,"  says  William  Haz- 
litt,  "  to  say  that  all  the  great  changes  which  have  been 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  161 

brought  about  in  the  moral  world,  either  for  the  better 
or  the  worse,  have  been  introduced  not  by  the  bare  state- 
ment of  facts  which  are  themselves  already  known  and 
which  must  always  operate  nearly  in  the  same  manner, 
but  by  the  development  of  certain  opinions  and  abstract 
principles  of  reasoning  on  Hfe  and  manners,  on  the  origin 
of  society  and  man's  nature  in  general,  which  bemg 
obscure  and  uncertain,  vary  from  time  to  time  and  pro- 
duce correspondent  changes  in  the  hmnan  mind.  They 
are  the  wholesome  dew  and  rain,  or  the  mildew  and 
pestilence  that  silently  destroy.  To  this  principle  of 
generalization  all  rehgious  creeds,  the  institutions  of 
wise  lawgivers,  and  the  systems  of  philosophy  owe  their 
influence." 

There  are  moments  m  the  great  debates  when  the 
orator  feels  impelled  to  go  beyond  the  precise  mechanics 
of  logic  and  express  the  instincts  of  the  race,  or  of  in- 
dividuals, which  will  Hght  the  fires  of  understanding 
and  kindle  the  common  enthusiasm  and  beliefs  of  hu- 
manity. Reduction  of  reasoning  to  mere  genus  and 
species  by  palpable  facts  is  utterly  fruitless  without  a 
manifestation  of  the  insight  of  the  soul  into  the  wider 
spaces  of  the  imagination  which  point,  as  unerringly 
as  the  needle  of  the  compass,  because  guided  by  the 
subconscious,  the  involuntary — by  instinct,  if  you  like — 
by  whatever  goes  to  make  up  truth  and  behef.  The 
mere  logician  would  depreciate  all  this  with  the  phrase, 
"Mere  imagery,"  but  we  must  speak  with  intuition  as 
well  as  with  precision. 

The  Vision  of  New  Ideas. — Perhaps  one  may  indicate 
briefly  how  in  general  new  ideas  come  into  the  mind. 
The  law  of  association  has  been  defined  as  the  tendency 
of  ideas  which  have  been  in  the  mind  together  to  come 


162  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

up  together,  but  we  have  seen  that  the  imagination  is 
more  than  memory  associations;  we  have  the  sugges- 
tions of  new  images.  The  imagination  is  continually- 
offering  to  consciousness  the  sensations,  experiences, 
and  reactions  from  new  stimuli,  or  from  old  stimuli  in 
new  circumstances.  From  the  slightest  subconscious 
hint,  the  mind  may  perceive  an  image  which  will  incline 
it  in  a  new  direction,  and  which  if  followed  intently  and 
with  determination,  may  result  in  discovery,  invention, 
and  progress.  All  such  experiences  have  been  called  by 
psychologists  anticipation  images. 

Anticipation  Images. — Thus,  while  it  is  of  course  true 
that  images  bring  back  past  memory  associations,  it  is 
equally  true  that  presentations  are  constantly  arising 
in  consciousness  as  images,  which  find  their  way  event- 
ually into  new  combinations  of  value  and  interest.  Crea- 
tive art  also  is  the  result  of  the  suggestion  of  new  images. 
New  images  depend  on  the  laws  of  suggestion. 

The  mind  is  constantly  obliged  to  sail  uncharted  seas 
for  an  unknown,  imagined  port.  The  western  voyages 
of  Columbus,  the  Cabots,  and  Verrazzano,  or  the  search 
for  an  earthly  paradise  which  occupied  the  thoughts 
of  the  Middle  Ages,  are  paralleled  daily  in  the  hypoth- 
esis of  the  scientific  investigator,  the  plans  for  new 
enterprises  in  business,  and  the  ambitions,  aims,  hopes, 
and  expectations  of  the  average  man  in  the  smallest 
affairs  of  life.  Rely  upon  past  experience  we  must,  in 
testing  and  perfecting  all  new  ideas;  otherwise,  we  shall 
go  astray  and  be  lost  in  the  quagmires  of  fancy  and  false- 
hood. Columbus,  for  instance,  when  sailing  for  the 
western  world  used  the  sailing  ships  of  his  day  and  all 
the  knowledge  of  navigation  with  which  astrology  and 
superstition  could  provide  him.    But  he  had  a  vision, 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  163 

a  purpose,  a  hope,  which  enabled  him  from  Genoa  to 
see  "land";  a  land,  moreover,  which  he  was  determined 
to  see,  and  which  he  so  ardently  desired  to  see  that  he 
was  willing  to  bear  any  burden  of  sacrifice  that  would 
enable  him  to  experience  the  joy  of  accomplishing  it. 
Perhaps,  indeed,  the  original  suggestion  to  make  the 
voyage  came  to  liim  from  Marco  Polo.  The  world  is 
full  of  such  adventurous  spirits  in  every  field,  to  whom 
the  vision  of  a  new  idea  is  more  real  than  the  known  and 
familiar  objects  of  perception. 

The  debater,  too,  intently  pursues  his  vision  (be  it  the 
reform  of  prisons  or  the  success  of  our  army)  until  he 
moulds  the  fleeting  suggestions  which  come  before  his 
mind  into  the  single  image  of  a  well-defined,  construc- 
tive plan.  He  pursues  his  vision  further,  and  employs 
the  imagery  of  words  to  express  this  plan  so  suggestively 
to  others  that  they  will  perceive  it,  beUeve  in  it,  and 
perhaps  be  willing  to  act  upon  it. 

Perceptual  Aspect  of  Imagery. — The  perceptual  aspect 
of  imagery  may  always  be  pointed  out  with  profit  to 
that  type  of  mind  which  is  accustomed  to  generaliza- 
tions and  to  abstractions,  as,  for  example,  to  students 
of  mathematics  and  philosophy.  Moreover,  an  appre- 
ciation of  this  fundamental  basis  of  imagery  often  needs 
to  be  awakened  anew  in  debaters  who  have  worked  as- 
siduously on  the  logic  and  form  of  a  brief  or  have  spent 
much  time  in  the  Kbrary.  A  boat  in  the  trough  of  the 
sea  may  not  observe  the  stars.  Effectiveness  in  speak- 
ing usually  means  the  bringing  of  our  ideas  within  the 
listener's  experience  or  life.  I  shall  now  show  that  an 
important  part  of  this  imaging  process  involves  psy- 
chologically, the  reduction  of  our  ideas  to  sense-percep- 
tion. 


164  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

We  recognize  the  value  of  the  concrete  or  the  partic- 
ular in  driving  home  an  argument,  but  we  do  not  under- 
stand fully  the  nature  of  the  process.  We  do  not  suf- 
ficiently realize,  for  instance,  that  the  function  of  the 
concrete  or  particular  in  driving  home  an  argument  is 
to  bring  it  before  the  senses  of  the  listener,  and  that  it 
is  this  sensory  appeal  of  imagery  which  gives  it  its  clear- 
ness and  force. 

Language  itself  is  of  course  primarily  a  perception; 
auditory  when  it  greets  the  ear  as  sounds,  visual  when 
it  strikes  the  eye  as  sights,  as,  for  example,  on  the  printed 
page.  But  words  may  produce  other  sensations  than 
the  purely  auditory  or  the  purely  \asual,  for  we  may 
speak  or  write  of  a  hot  day,  Oi  fragrant  rose,  a  luscious 
apple,  and  so  on.  Thus  words  or  phrases  ma}^  suggest 
the  sensations  of  past  tactile,  olfactory,  gustatory,  or 
other  experiences.  The  literary  artist,  in  his  endeavor 
to  create  in  another  a  consciousness  of  things  not  ac- 
tually present  to  sense,  recognizes  this  and  makes  in- 
directly a  varied  sensory  appeal. 

No  image,  however,  should  be  expected  to  bring  to 
mind  the  same  perception  in  all  individuals,  but  the 
perceptual  character  of  imagery  may  be  illustrated  a 
little  further,  at  least  suggestively.  Portia's  appeal  in 
behalf  of  Bassanio  begins:  "The  quality  of  mercy  is 
not  strained."  Take  the  word  "quality";  a  word  in 
my  mind  opposed  to  quantity,  which  I  know  about 
concretely  either  by  observation  or  by  the  feeling  of 
touch,  as  when  I  speak  of  the  quality  of  a  piece  of  cloth. 
The  image  "quality  of  mercy"  may  therefore  be  re- 
garded by  some,  as  visual  and  tactile.  "Is  not  strained" 
suggests  remotely  the  absence  of  muscular  energy.  Its 
falling  "like  the  gentle  rain  from  heaven"  brings  a  pic- 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  165 

ture  to  my  eyes  of  things  in  motion  but  falling  silently. 
The  second  line  is  therefore  to  me  visual  and  auditory 
in  its  suggestions,  ''It  is  twice  blessed"  brings  before 
me  the  picture  of  a  minister  or  bishop  holding  out  his 
hands  in  benediction.  "It  blesses  him  that  gives  and 
him  that  takes"  fills  in  the  picture  by  adding  the  two 
objects  of  tlie  benediction.  "  'Tis  mightiest  in  the 
mighty.  It  becomes  the  throned  monarch  better  than 
his  crown,"  suggests  the  prerogative  of  the  King  in  exer- 
cising the  pardoning  power  as  prominently  illustrated 
later  by  King  James's  pardon  of  Sir  Francis  Bacon.  You 
probably  did  not  recall  the  particular  material  things 
which  this  imagery  suggested  to  me,  you  may  even  have 
assigned  some  of  the  images  to  different  senses;  but  you 
will  admit  the  suggestiveness  of  the  imagery,  and  the 
vividness,  and  force,  of  its  varied  sense-appeal. 

Or  turn  to  another  well-known  illustration  and  ex- 
amine its  sense-suggestions.  "Well,  honor  is  the  sub- 
ject of  my  story" — an  indirect  suggestion  to  give  ear 
to  the  tale.  "I  was  bom  free  as  Caesar.  We  both  have 
fed  as  well,"  brings  a  picture  to  the  eye  with  a  distinct 
gustatory  imphcation.  "For  once  upon  a  raw  and  gusty 
day"  instances  the  comparison  concretely;  but  notice 
that  the  adjectives  "raw  and  gusty,"  used  to  describe 
the  day,  contain  in  the  first  case,  a  tactile  suggestion 
and  in  the  second  case,  auditory  and  visual  suggestions, 
and  perhaps  even  muscular  force.  "  Cassar  cried,  '  Barest 
thou,  Cassius,  now  leap  in  with  me?'" — obviously  audi- 
tory and  visual.  In  such  wise  does  Shakespeare  com- 
monly express  his  thoughts  with  concrete  details  and 
image  them  with  a  varied  and  indirect  suggestiveness 
of  sensory  appeal. 

Obviously,  imagery  rests  on  a  past  sense-perception, 


166  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

and  its  power  is  conditioned  by  its  ability  to  recall  to 
the  eye  or  ear  the  sensations  experienced  when  past 
particular,  material  things  were  in  some  order  or  form 
previously  before  the  senses.  Indeed,  an  artistic  image 
produces  the  illusion  of  a  real  perception,  and  the  artist 
in  his  enthusiasm  may  actually  so  regard  it.  Henry 
Ward  Beecher,  for  instance,  once  spoke  of  a  diamond 
sceptre,  and,  on  being  reminded  later  that  no  diamond 
had  been  found  as  large  as  a  sceptre,  replied:  "I  saw  it." 

Imaging  a  Concept. — We  have  said  that  since  objects 
and  things  to  which  ideas  refer  cannot  always  be  pres- 
ent to  the  senses,  we  are  in  the  habit  of  calling  them  to 
consciousness  by  suggesting  the  image  of  our  ideas  with 
its  natural  associations.  The  image-making  process  is 
therefore  a  process  of  reducing  abstract  or  general  ideas 
to  sense-perception.  It  has  a  basis  in  feeling  as  well  as 
in  memory  and  furnishes  the  true  method  of  gaining 
interest  and  attention  as  well  as  of  producing  convic- 
tion and  belief. 

General  or  abstract  ideas  make  little  impression  on  the 
average  mind  accustomed  to  think  in  particulars  and 
by  means  of  comparisons.  All  such  ideas  need  to  be 
brought  within  the  listener's  experience  and  imaged  con- 
cretely. The  more  conceptual  an  audience  is,  the  more 
abstract  or  general  may  be  the  presentation,  but  even 
with  educated  audiences  we  gain  in  interest  by  the  spe- 
cific, concrete,  detailed,  illustrative  methods  of  imagery. 

The  debater  must  learn,  if  he  does  not  know  it  al- 
ready, that  he  will  be  dry  and  uninteresting  if  he  re- 
stricts himself  when  speaking  to  processes  which  are 
as  purely  formal  as  those  of  his  brief.  He  must  know, 
for  instance,  that  he  may  quite  properly  make  use  of 
exposition,  narration,  or  description  when  appealing  to 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  167 

grounds  of  belief  or  to  motives  of  action.  He  should 
recall  Lincoln's  story-telling  habit,  his  graphic  descrip- 
tive powers,  and  his  lucid  expositions.  How  ineffective, 
indeed,  would  Lincoln  have  been  in  his  debates  with 
Douglas  had  he  presented  his  arguments  in  an  unimag- 
inative or  purely  logical  way!  Webster  was  called  the 
Great  Expounder,  it  being  said  of  him  that  his  very 
exposition  was  argument.  Nothing  is  more  erroneous 
than  the  idea  that  an  argument  must  always  be  in  an 
argumentative  form.  Even  a  talk  may  be  adorned  with 
a  moral.  Woodrow  Wilson,  for  instance,  uses  an  apt 
anecdote  in  a  dignified  Phi  Beta  Kappa  address.  Ob- 
serve also  the  suggestive  power  of  Colonel  Roosevelt's 
analogy  of  ''The  Man  with  a  Muckrake."  The  argu- 
mentative process  should  be  obvdous,  but  not  tiresomely 
obtrusive. 

We  may  regard  any  proposition  (process  or  conclu- 
sion) as  a  concept  for  the  purposes  of  imagery.  We 
may  also  regard  "affection  and  desire"  as  a  concept 
and  image  that.  Let  us,  then,  illustrate  the  imagmg 
(i)  of  an  analogy,  (2)  of  a  cause,  (3)  of  a  conclusion, 
and  (4)  of  affection  and  desire;  (5)  in  a  team  debate 
and  (6)  in  general. 

I.  Imaging  an  Analogy. — The  trained  mind  of  Alex- 
ander Hamilton,  arguing  on  the  adoption  of  the  federal 
constitution  at  the  New  York  convention  of  1788,  per- 
ceived a  likeness  m  the  strong  attachment  of  the  in- 
dividual for  the  State  to  certain  social  and  physical  facts 
which  he  imaged  thus: 

There  are  certain  social  principles  from  which  we  may  draw 
the  most  solid  conclusions  with  respect  to  the  conduct  of  in- 
dividuals and  of  communities.  We  love  our  famiUes  more  than 
our  neighbors;  we  love  our  neighbors  more  than  our  country- 


168  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

men  in  general.  The  human  affections  like  the  solar  heat  lose 
their  intensity  as  they  depart  from  the  centre  and  become  languid 
in  proportion  to  the  expansion  of  the  circle  on  which  they  act. 
On  these  principles,  the  attachment  of  the  individual  will  be 
first  and  forever  secured  by  the  State  governments;  they  will 
be  a  mutual  protection  and  support. 

2.  Imaging  a  Cause. — The  process  of  imaging  the 
relation  of  cause  and  effect  or  of  motive  to  deed  may 
be  illustrated  by  Hugo's  description  of  the  circumstances 
of  poverty  and  struggle  which  made  Jean  Valjean  steal 
the  loaf  of  bread.  The  argument  is,  that  a  hungry  man 
will  steal;  that  Jean  Valjean  was  hungry;  therefore  he 
burglarized  the  baker's  shop. 

Toward  the  middle  of  the  night,  Jean  Valjean  awoke.  He 
belonged  to  a  poor  peasant  family  of  La  Brie.  ...  At  night  he 
came  home  tired,  and  ate  his  soup  without  saying  a  word.  His 
sister,  Mother  Jeanne,  while  he  was  eating,  often  took  out  of 
his  porringer  the  best  part  of  his  meal,  the  piece  of  meat,  the 
slice  of  bacon,  or  the  heart  of  the  cabbage  to  give  to  one  of  her 
children;  he,  still  eating,  bent  over  the  table  with  his  head  al- 
most in  the  soup,  and  his  long  hair  falling  around  his  porringer 
and  hiding  his  eyes,  pretended  not  to  see  it,  and  let  her  do  as 
she  pleased.  .  .  .  One  Sunday  evening,  Maubert  Isabeau,  the 
baker  in  the  church  square  at  FaveroUes,  was  just  going  to  bed 
when  he  heard  a  violent  blow  dealt  the  wired  and  glazed  front 
of  his  shop.  He  arrived  in  time  to  see  an  arm  passed  through 
a  hole  made  by  a  fist  through  the  wires  and  window-pane;  the 
arm  seized  a  loaf  and  carried  it  off.  Isabeau  ran  out  hastily; 
the  thief  ran  away  at  his  hardest,  but  the  baker  caught  him 
up  and  stopped  him.  The  thief  had  thrown  away  the  loaf,  but 
his  arm  was  still  bleeding;  it  was  Jean  Valjean.  .  .  .  Jean 
Valjean  was  sentenced  to  five  years  at  the  galleys. 

In  the  following,  the  writer  is  endeavoring  to  image 
the  evil  efects  of  cigarette  smoking  in  connection  with 
its  cause: 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  1G9 

Have  you  ever  seen  a  white,  puny,  stunted  youngster,  whose 
anaemic  face  has  aroused  the  question  why?  Nicotine  is  Uke 
an  evil,  yellow  god,  which  eats  into  the  system,  destroying  the 
sensitive  nerve-cells  and  life-giving  vitality.  Its  use  is  prev- 
alent in  the  form  of  cigarettes.  Here  to  the  terrible  danger  of  the 
poisonous  nicotine  is  added  the  poison  carbon  monoxide  which 
arises  from  the  incomplete  combustion  of  the  cigarette-paper. 
This  poison  is  taken  into  the  system  by  the  very  effective  process 
of  osmosis.  Now  to  answer  the  question  why?  Before  the 
deUcate  age  of  twenty-one  is  reached,  the  life-giving  white  blood- 
corpuscles  are  not  fully  developed,  and  when  the  strong  nicotine- 
laden  smoke  is  inhaled,  the  growth  of  the  white  blood-corpuscles 
(which  are  essential  to  good  health)  is  stunted,  and  as  a  result 
we  see  the  white,  puny,  anemic  faces  (resembling  prison-walls) 
of  those  most  unfortunate  and  foolish  youths  who  have  started 
the  vitality-sapping  use  of  tobacco  before  physical  full  develop- 
ment has  taken  place.  Thus,  does  the  all-powerful,  grasping 
nicotine  sap  the  weak  vitahty  of  our  whelp. — {Student's  Com- 
position.) 

3.  Imaging  a  Conclusion. — Burke's  imagery  of  his  ad- 
miration of  the  American  character,  as  shown  by  the 
growth  of  the  whaling  industries  of  New  England,  is 
expressed  in  sublime  eloquence: 

As  to  the  wealth  which  the  colonies  have  drawn  from  the  sea  by 
their  fisheries,  you  had  aU  that  matter  fully  opened  at  your  bar. 
You  surely  thought  those  acquisitions  of  value,  for  they  seemed 
even  to  excite  your  envy;  and  yet,  the  spirit  by  which  that  en- 
terprising employment  has  been  exercised,  ought  rather,  in  my 
opinion,  to  have  raised  your  esteem  and  admiration.  And  pray, 
sir,  what  in  the  world  is  equal  to  it?  Pass  by  the  other  parts, 
and  look  at  the  manner  in  which  the  people  of  New  England 
have  of  late  carried  on  the  whale  fishery.  Whilst  we  follow  them 
among  the  tumbhng  mountains  of  ice,  and  behold  them  pene- 
trating into  the  deepest  frozen  recesses  of  Hudson's  Bay  and 
Davis's  Straits,  whilst  we  are  looking  for  them  beneath  the  arctic 
circle,  we  hear  that  they  have  pierced  into  the  opposite  region 
of  polar  cold,  that  they  are  at  the  antipodes,  and  engaged  under 


170  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

the  frozen  serpent  of  the  south.  Falkland  Island,  which  seemed 
too  remote  and  romantic  an  object  for  the  grasp  of  national 
ambition,  is  but  a  stage  and  resting-place  in  the  progress  of 
their  victorious  industry.  Nor  is  the  equinoctial  heat  more 
discouraging  to  them  than  the  accumulated  winter  of  both 
the  poles.  We  know  that  whilst  some  of  them  draw  the  line, 
and  strike  the  harpoon  on  the  coast  of  Africa,  others  run  the 
longitude,  and  pursue  their  gigantic  game  along  the  coast  of 
Brazil.  No  sea  but  what  is  vexed  by  their  fisheries.  No  cUmate 
that  is  not  witness  to  their  toils.  Neither  the  perseverance  of 
Holland,  nor  the  activity  of  France,  nor  the  dexterous  and  firm 
sagacity  of  English  enterprise,  ever  carried  this  most  perilous 
mode  of  hardy  industry  to  the  extent  to  which  it  has  been  pushed 
by  this  recent  people;  a  people  who  are  still,  as  it  were,  but  in 
the  gristle,  and  not  yet  hardened  into  the  bone,  of  manhood. 
When  I  contemplate  these  things;  when  I  know  that  the  colonies 
in  general  owe  little  or  nothing  to  any  care  of  ours,  and  that 
they  are  not  squeezed  into  this  happy  form  by  the  constraints 
of  watchful  and  suspicious  government,  but  that,  through  a 
wise  and  salutary  neglect,  a  generous  nature  has  been  suffered 
to  take  her  own  way  to  perfection;  when  I  reflect  upon  these 
effects,  when  I  see  how  profitable  they  have  been  to  us,  I  feel 
all  the  pride  of  power  sink,  and  all  presumption  in  the  wisdom 
of  human  contrivances  melt,  and  die  away  within  me.  My 
rigor  relents.    I  pardon  something  to  the  spirit  of  liberty. 

Mr.  Charles  Kendall  Adams  points  out  that  this  pas- 
sage is  based  on  substantial  facts.  "Massachusetts  had 
183  vessels  carr)dng  13,820  tons  in  the  North,  and  120 
vessels  carrying  14,025  tons  in  the  South.  It  was  in 
1775,  the  very  year  of  Burke's  speech,  that  English  ships 
were  first  fitted  out  to  follow  the  Americans  into  the 
fisheries  of  the  South  Seas." 

Thus,  our  best  arguments  are  usually  illuminated 
judgments  tempered  with  feeling.  In  debating,  we 
frequently  illustrate  this  process  in  our  first  speeches, 
leaving  it  to  the  rebuttal  speeches  to  supply,  when  nee- 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  171 

essary,  the  statistical  facts  previously  gathered  during 
our  investigations  and  tested  in  practice  debates.  For 
example,  in  a  debate  on  preparedness  according  to  the 
Swiss  plan  subsequently  mentioned,  the  size  of  the  army 
of  11,000,000  men  and  the  small  cost  of  such  an  army 
were  imaged  at  length  in  tlie  first  speeches.  These  con- 
cepts, however,  were  conclusions  which  had  been  pre- 
viously derived  from  painstaking  investigations.  Their 
further  justification,  if  necessary,  was  left  to  the  work 
of  rebuttal.  Debaters  should  learn  that  audiences, 
though  they  expect  accuracy,  do  not  take  kindly  to 
dull  statistics  or  needless  facts.  All  imaged  concepts 
which  are  conclusions  from  previous  investigations  must 
of  course  be  logical  reasons  for  believing  in  the  main 
proposition. 

A  timely  illustration  may  be  found  in  a  passage  from 
Fisher  Ames,  setting  forth  in  sympathetic  language  the 
sanctity  of  treaties: 

What  is  patriotism?  Is  it  a  narrow  affection  for  the  spot 
where  a  man  was  born?  Are  the  very  clods  where  we  tread 
entitled  to  this  ardent  preference  because  they  are  greener? 
No,  sir,  this  is  not  the  character  of  the  virtue,  and  it  soars  higher 
for  its  object.  It  is  an  extended  self-love,  mingling  with  all  the 
enjoyments  of  life,  and  twisting  itself  with  the  minutest  filaments 
of  the  heart.  It  is  thus  we  obey  the  laws  of  society,  because 
they  are  the  laws  of  virtue.  In  their  authority  we  see,  not  the 
array  of  force  and  terror,  but  the  venerable  image  of  our  coun- 
try's honor.  Every  good  citizen  makes  that  honor  his  own,  and 
cherishes  it  not  only  as  precious,  but  as  sacred.  He  is  willing 
to  risk  his  life  in  its  defense,  and  is  conscious  that  he  gains  pro- 
tection while  he  gives  it.  For,  what  rights  of  a  citizen  will  be 
deemed  inviolable  when  a  state  renounces  the  principles  that 
constitute  their  security?  Or  if  his  life  should  not  be  invaded, 
what  would  its  enjoyments  be  in  a  country  odious  in  the  eyes  of 
strangers  and  dishonored  in  his  own?     Could  he  look  with  aflec- 


172  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

tion  and  veneration  to  such  a  country  as  his  parent  ?  The  sense 
of  having  one  would  die  within  him;  he  would  blush  for  his 
patriotism,  if  he  retained  any,  and  justly,  for  it  would  be  a  vice. 
He  would  be  a  banished  man  in  his  native  land.  I  see  no  ex- 
ception to  the  respect  that  is  paid  among  nations  to  the  law  of 
good  faith.  If  there  are  cases  in  this  enlightened  period  when 
it  is  violated,  there  are  none  when  it  is  decried.  It  is  the  phi- 
losophy of  politics,  the  religion  of  governments.  It  is  observed 
by  barbarians — a  whiff  of  tobacco  smoke,  or  a  string  of  beads, 
gives  not  merely  binding  force  but  sanctity  to  treaties.  Even 
in  Algiers,  a  truce  may  be  bought  for  money,  but  when  ratified, 
even  Algiers  is  too  wise,  or  too  just,  to  disown  and  annul  its 
obligation.  Thus  we  see,  neither  the  ignorance  of  savages,  nor 
the  principles  of  an  association  for  piracy  and  rapine,  permit  a 
nation  to  despise  its  engagements.  If,  sir,  there  could  be  a  resur- 
rection from  the  foot  of  the  gallows,  if  the  victims  of  justice 
could  live  again,  collect  together  and  form  a  society,  they  would, 
however  loath,  soon  find  themselves  obhged  to  make  justice, 
that  justice  under  which  they  fell,  the  fundamental  law  of  their 
state.  They  would  perceive,  it  was  their  interest  to  make  others 
respect,  and  they  would  therefore  soon  pay  some  respect  them- 
selves, to  the  obligations  of  good  faith. 

4.  Imaging  Affection  and  Desire. — Just  as  concepts 
may  be  regarded  as  generalized  percepts,  so  the  emo- 
tions may  be  regarded  as  generalized  feelings  or  sen- 
sations. There  are,  of  course,  intuitive  ideas  such  as 
religious  feelings,  but  all  concepts,  whether  emotional 
or  intellectual  and  in  whatever  way  derived,  may  be 
suggestively  imaged.  Concepts  such  as  joy,  sorrow, 
hope,  mercy,  love,  have  so  decided  an  emotional  con- 
notation that  they  are  commonly  regarded  as  emotional 
concepts,  but  even  they  may  be  imaged  intellectually. 

Everything  of  importance  in  experience,  over  which 
men  differ  and  about  which  they  argue,  has  a  basis  in 
human  feelings  and  human  wants.  It  is  almost  impos- 
sible to  eliminate  our  feelings  and  wishes  when  arguing 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  173 

on  matters  of  conduct  or  policy.  For  example,  Webster's 
argument  for  the  Union  was  not  only  a  constitutional 
justification  of  his  position,  but  an  appeal  to  the  grow- 
ing desire  of  the  people  to  become  a  nation.  LikeAvise, 
in  the  debate  on  S^viss  preparedness  for  America  alluded 
to  above,  both  sides  admitted  and  made  incidental 
appeal  to  the  feeling  for  an  adequate  defense  of  America. 
Too  often,  however,  we  image  our  likes  and  dislikes  in 
a  self-deceived  rationalism.  We  are  so  constituted  that 
it  often  seems  that  all  that  is  needed  to  secure  support 
for  a  proposition  is  a  reasoned  groundwork  for  a  de- 
sired action.  A  mere  bauble  dangled  before  the  eyes 
of  a  child  will  prompt  the  desire  to  reach  for  it.  What 
we  feel  an  impulse  to  do,  we  are  apt  to  feel  is  justified 
in  reason;  what  we  like,  we  are  apt  to  approve;  what 
we  dislike,  to  disapprove.  And  so  an  argument  is  pre- 
sented for  approval  and  disapproval.  At  all  events, 
the  coincidence  of  reason  and  desire  may  be  needed  to 
secure  a  fully  satisfied  judgment  and  a  confident  ac- 
tion. Argument  may  exist  without  desire,  it  cannot 
exist  without  reason.  Argument  is  primarily  intellec- 
tual in  aim  and  method. 

Daniel  Webster's  address  to  the  supreme  court  of 
Massachusetts  in  1817,  in  defense  of  the  Kennistons,  is 
noted  for  its  simplicity  and  \ital  directness  of  style. 
The  following  extract  contains  only  a  few  words  of 
slight  emotional  suggestion: 

From  the  time  of  the  robbery  to  the  arrest,  five  or  six  weeks, 
the  defendants  were  engaged  in  their  usual  occupations.  They 
are  not  found  to  have  passed  a  dollar  of  money  to  anybody. 
They  continued  their  ordinary  habits  of  labor.  No  man  saw 
money  about  them,  nor  any  circumstance  that  might  lead  to  a 
suspicion  that  they  had  money.     Nothing  occurred  tending  in 


174  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF   DEBATE 

any  degree  to  excite  suspicion  against  them.  When  arrested,  and 
when  all  this  array  of  evidence  was  brought  against  them,  and 
when  they  could  hope  in  nothing  but  their  innocence,  immunity 
was  offered  them  again  if  they  would  confess.  They  were 
pressed,  and  urged,  and  allured,  by  every  motive  which  could 
be  set  before  them,  to  acknowledge  their  participation  in  the 
offense,  and  to  bring  out  their  accompUces.  They  steadily  pro- 
tested that  they  could  confess  nothing  because  they  knew  noth- 
ing. In  defiance  of  all  the  discoveries  made  in  their  house,  they 
have  trusted  to  their  innocence.  On  that,  and  on  the  candor 
and  discernment  of  an  enlightened  jury,  they  still  rely. 

It  is  in  the  perorations  of  arguments  or  debates,  how- 
ever, that  we  usually  find  emotional  concepts  imaged 
with  undisguised  directness  for  the  purpose  of  awakening 
feeling  and  securing  action— e.  g.,  the  desire  for  hap- 
piness, the  wish  to  avoid  unhappiness,  the  hope  of  suc- 
cess, the  dread  of  failure,  or  the  binding  obUgations  of 
duty — all,  of  course,  as  applicable  to  the  thesis  attacked 
or  defended.  An  illustration  from  a  modern  Jury  ad- 
dress may  perhaps  be  taken  as  typical.  After  analyzing 
the  evidence  and  recapitulating  with  great  clearness, 
Mr.  Henry  L.  CHnton  concluded  thus: 

Gentlemen,  I  have  now  discharged  my  duty— my  duty  to 
my  cHent,  my  duty  to  you,  my  duty  to  my  own  conscience.  The 
responsibility  of  this  case  is  with  you.  Do  your  duty.  There 
is  no  enjoyment  so  great,  no  consolation  so  sweet,  as  the  con- 
sciousness of  duty  performed.  With  entire  confidence  I  commit 
my  client  to  your  hands.  Though  you  obey  the  stern  behests 
of  duty  and  acquit  him  promptly,  you  cannot  undo  the  injury 
done  him  through  the  instrumentahty  of  that  wife  whose  vows 
at  the  holy  altar  to  love  and  honor  him  he  fondly  believed  would 
guide  her,  as  he  determined  that  his  vows  should  guide  him, 
until  death.  Hereafter,  though  he  may  live  a  Ufe  of  spotless 
purity,  though  he  may  practise  every  virtue  known  to  man, 
though  in  all  the  relations  of  life  he  be  without  fault,  or  the 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  175 

semblance  of  fault — in  a  word,  though  his  whole  future  life  be 
the  incarnation  of  every  excellence,  of  even  absolute  moral  per- 
fection, yet  hereafter  his  enemies  will  be  too  ready  to  proclaim 
that  his  wife  charged  him  with  this  crime,  and  that  he  was  tried 
upon  the  charge.  And,  gentlemen,  let  it  be  added  that  a  jury 
of  twelve  upright,  intelligent,  conscientious  citizens  of  West- 
chester County,  mindful  of  their  oaths  to  render  a  true  verdict 
according  to  the  evidence,  pronounced  him  "Not  Guilty!" 


5.  Imaging  in  a  Team  Debate. — In  the  training  of  a 
debating  team,  the  case  may  be  first  separated  into 
several  main  ideas.  And  then  after  the  facts  are  all 
gathered  and  the  argvmients  formulated,  the  real  prob- 
lem of  presentation  is — how  to  image  most  effectively 
these  main  ideas  or  concepts,  with  essential  matters  of 
proof,  on  the  minds  of  the  audience.  With  an  exact 
knowledge  of  the  facts  and  of  the  work  to  be  done  by 
each  debater,  the  latter  must  now  bridge  the  chasm  be- 
tween subjective  library  work  and  adjusted  objective 
presentation.  He  must,  wath  all  the  power  that  imagi- 
nation can  simimon,  conceive  his  audience  and  apply  his 
technic. 

If  he  is  to  present  his  arguments  with  success,  he  must 
take  special  pains  to  image  effectively  his  fundamental 
concepts  or  reasons.  Moreover,  all  imagery  of  such 
fundamental  concepts  must  be  accurate  and  interesting. 
They  wdll  be  accurate  if  they  are  consistent  with  the 
things  to  which  they  refer  in  nature,  history,  conduct, 
or  affairs,  and  are  also  consistent  with  one  another.  The 
student  who  has  carefully  put  his  arguments  into  the 
form  of  a  brief,  it  is  beheved,  will  usually  speak  with 
accuracy.  His  reasons  are  likely  to  be  interesting  if 
they  are  really  suggestive  to  his  Hsteners. 

In  a  debate  on  the  adoption  of  the  Swiss  military 


176  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

system  of  compulsory  service  for  the  United  States, 
the  negative,  speaking  at  Princeton,  imaged  the  absence 
of  any  necessity  for  it  thus : 

Consider  the  position  of  Switzerland,  one  of  the  smallest  of 
sovereign  states,  with  an  area  of  about  fifteen  thousand  square 
miles — just  twice  the  size  of  this  State  of  New  Jersey — with  a 
population  less  than  that  of  our  single  city  of  New  York.  Switzer- 
land's largest  city  is  but  half  again  the  size  of  our  neighboring 
metropolis  of  Trenton.  She  is,  moreover,  surrounded  by  four 
warlike  and  powerful  neighbors,  France,  Germany,  Austria, 
and  Italy,  with  a  combined  war  strength  of  over  eighteen  million. 
We  are  a  powerful  state  with  thirty  times  the  population  of 
Switzerland.  Instead  of  being  surrounded  by  dangerous  rivals, 
we  are  supreme  upon  two  continents.  It  is  absurd  to  suppose 
that  a  people  so  blessed  by  fortune  in  strength  and  location 
should  be  forced  to  make  sacrifices  in  proportion  to  those  neces- 
sary in  a  tiny  state  whose  situation  is  as  unfavorable  as  ours  is 
favorable. 

The  size  of  the  vast  army  was  imaged  thus: 

Under  the  Swiss  system  about  eleven  million  would  be  trained 
and  liable  to  service.  But  the  numbers  are  the  astonishing 
thing — eleven  milUon  trained  men  in  the  United  States.  Do 
you  fully  grasp  the  enormity  of  these  figures  ?  Can  you  conjure 
up  even  in  the  wildest  flight  of  your  imagination  a  situation  in 
which  we  would  need  such  a  force?  Do  we  contemplate  con- 
quering the  world?  A  force  this  size  would  be  larger  than  the 
combined  total  trained  strength  of  both  Germany  and  Russia 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war.  New  York  State  alone  would 
have  a  force  more  than  two-thirds  the  size  of  the  war  strength 
of  Japan.  Illinois,  eight  hundred  miles  from  any  coast,  would 
have  a  force  of  seven  hundred  thousand  trained  men. 

The  affirmative  endeavored  to  offset  this  by  imaging 
the  magnitude  of  our  ideals  and  of  our  country  thus: 

We  are  the  greatest  democracy  in  the  world.  Our  military 
system  must  therefore  be  democratic  in  every  sense  of  the  word. 
It  must  recognize  the  fundamental  duty  of  every  citizen  of  a 
democracy  to  defend  his  nation.    We  are  proud  of  the  fact  that 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  177 

our  system  provides  a  large  reserve  force.  We  are  proud  be- 
cause we  are  proud  of  the  magnitude  of  our  country,  of  her  enor- 
mous wealth  and  resources.  It  is  idle  to  speak  of  our  national 
defense  in  terms  of  thousands  when  we  have  three  millions  of 
square  miles  of  area,  one  hundred  millions  of  population,  and 
two  hundred  billions  of  resources.  CaHfornia  is  three  times  as 
large  as  England;  all  Germany  could  be  put  in  Wyoming  and 
Colorado.  We  have  ten  thousand  miles  of  boundary,  vulnerable 
at  almost  every  point.  Does  the  negative  hope  to  protect  such 
a  country  with  a  few  hundred  thousand  men? 

Modern  wars  are  fought  in  terms  of  millions,  and  nations 
employ  not  only  one  army  but  several  armies;  we  must  face 
these  conditions.  How  does  the  negative  expect  to  defend  both 
Boston  and  San  Francisco  against  invading  armies?  And  yet 
it  is  quite  possible  that  both  shores  will  be  attacked  by  a  power- 
ful alliance.  How  would  they  protect  both  the  Canadian  and 
the  Mexican  borders,  or  either  alone,  with  a  few  hundred  thou- 
sand soldiers?  Your  army  must  be  either  concentrated  or  scat- 
tered; if  concentrated,  what  enemy  would  be  so  foolish  as  to 
attack  at  the  point  of  concentration?  If  scattered,  what  sort 
of  resistance  force  could  it  give  at  the  point  of  attack?  We 
must  face  the  issue  squarely;  half-way  measures  will  not  do. 
Modern  wars  are  fought  on  a  large  scale;  our  protection  must 
also  be  on  a  large  scale.  Such  protection  will  be  much  more 
than  preparedness  for  war:  it  will  be  the  best  possible  prepara- 
tion for  peace. 

Verily,  in  debate,  there  may  be  a  battle  of  imagery 
as  well  as  of  arguments.  Moreover,  the  affirmative  used 
the  preceding  as  a  prelude  to  showing  that  the  cost  of 
such  an  army  of  11,000,000  men  would  not  be  excessive, 
but  would  be  an  insurance  premium  of  less  than  one- 
tenth  of  one  per  cent  on  our  two  hundred  billion  of  re- 
sources.   (Analogy.) 

For  vividness  and  directness,  note  further  the  imagery 
of  the  following  shorter  passages: 

You  ask  what  we  would  think  of  a  fire-engine  which  reached 
a  fire  six  months  after  the  fire  had  started.    That  is  not  the  ques- 


178  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

tion.  I  ask  what  you  would  think  of  a  fire  department  which 
pumped  water  on  a  fire  two  years  after  the  fire  was  out. 

In  fact,  with  conditions  in  the  two  countries  so  diametrically 
reversed,  we  might  just  as  well  advocate  the  American  plan 
for  the  Swiss  navy  as  the  Swiss  plan  for  the  American  army. 

The  average  American  does  not  consider  digging  a  trench 
under  a  blazing  hot  sun  a  recreation  or  a  pleasure. 

A  sudden  blow  at  this  vital  and  exposed  organ  (New  York) 
might  well  prove  fatal. 

The  European  nations  will  not  come  forth  bled  white. 

No  eagle  scream  of  patriotism. 

Would  you  have  American  patriotism  carry  the  millstone  of 
compulsory  service  about  its  neck? 

In  debating,  an  aphorism,  epigram,  paradox,  meta- 
phor— especially  any  vivid  image  of  likeness  or  unlike- 
ness — will  often  make  extended  proof  unnecessary.  It 
may  not  only  arrest  the  attention  and  quicken  the  in- 
terest, but  may  awaken  old  and  familiar  associations, 
give  the  mind  the  challenge  of  a  new  idea,  flood  the 
consciousness  with  feelings,  or  decide  the  will.  Mere 
phrases  are  potent  psychological  instruments  used  by 
a  debater  to  make  clear  and  obvious  the  perception  of 
a  truth  so  that  it  can  be  easily  understood,  identified, 
accepted,  by  a  hearer  and  carried  in  memory. 

6.  Imaging  in  General. — Accuracy  and  interest  are, 
perhaps,  the  chief  characteristics  of  effective  imagery. 
Interest  is  the  cause  of  attention.  Given  an  idea,  there 
is  no  better  way  of  arousing  interest  in  it  than  by  use 
of  vital  illustrations,  no  better  practice  for  the  student 
than  that  of  searching  for  illustrative  material  which 
will  start  the  listener's  mind  to  thinking  in  connection 
with  the  idea  advanced. 

The  moving  scene  which  Lincoln  draws  of  the  grow- 
ing "bondage  of  the  negro"  suggests  to  the  mind  a  situa- 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  179 

tion  which  no  constitutional  argument  could  ever  con- 
fute: 

Mammon  is  after  him,  ambition  follows,  philosophy  follows, 
and  the  theology  of  the  day  is  fast  joining  the  cry.  They  have 
him  in  his  prison-house;  they  have  searched  his  person,  and 
left  no  prying  instrument  with  him.  One  after  another  they 
have  closed  the  heavy  iron  doors  upon  him;  and  now  they  have 
him,  as  it  were,  bolted  in  with  a  lock  of  a  hundred  keys,  which 
can  never  be  unlocked  without  the  concurrence  of  every  key — 
the  keys  in  the  hands  of  a  hundred  different  men  and  they 
scattered  to  a  hundred  different  and  distant  places;  and  they 
stand  musing  as  to  what  invention,  in  all  the  dominions  of  mind 
and  matter,  can  be  produced  to  make  the  impossibility  of  his 
escape  more  complete  than  it  is. 

A  narrative  example  of  the  power  of  imagery  through 
suggestion  is  that  of  the  Master,  in  Saint  Matthew: 

Therefore,  whosoever  heareth  these  sayings  of  mine  and  doeth 
them,  I  will  liken  him  unto  a  wise  man,  which  built  his  house 
upon  a  rock;  and  the  rain  descended  and  the  floods  came  and 
the  winds  blew  and  beat  upon  that  house,  and  it  fell  not;  for 
it  was  founded  upon  a  rock. 

And  every  one  that  heareth  these  sayings  of  mine,  and  doeth 
them  not,  shall  be  likened  unto  a  foolish  man  which  built  his 
house  upon  the  sand;  and  the  rain  descended  and  the  floods 
came,  and  the  winds  blew  and  beat  upon  that  house,  and  it  fell; 
and  great  was  the  fall  of  it. 

The  images  here  are  made  more  vivid  through  the 
use  of  contrast  and  skilful  repetition.  The  assumed 
resemblances  and  contrast,  too,  are  easily  recognized 
and  accepted.  Their  real  force,  of  course,  is  due  to  the 
great  Authority  who  uttered  them. 

"Suppose,  sir,"  says  Burke,  "that  the  angel  of  this  auspicious 
youth  (Lord  Bathurst)  .  .  .  had  appeared  to  him  in  vision,  .  .  . 


ISO  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF   DEBATE 

and  should  tell  him:  'Young  man,  there  is  America  which  at  this 
day  serves  for  little  more  than  to  amuse  you  with  stories  of  savage 
men  and  uncouth  manners;  yet  shall,  before  you  taste  of  death, 
show  itself  equal  to  the  whole  of  that  commerce  which  now  at- 
tracts the  envy  of  the  world.  Whatever  England  has  been  grow- 
ing to  ...  in  a  series  of  1700  years,  you  shall  see  as  much  added 
to  her  in  the  course  of  a  single  life ! '  Fortunate  man,  he  has  lived 
to  see  it." 

This  supposed  case  has  no  argumentative  value.  The 
older  rhetoricians  would  have  called  it  vision,  a  figure 
of  emphasis.  The  final  statement  that  he  had  "Hved 
to  see  it"  brings  it  back  to  reality.  Burke,  you  re- 
member, had  already  cited  comparative  tables  showing 
the  export  trade  of  England  and  of  her  colonies  in  1704 
and  in  1772. 

Individual  or  concrete  instances  are  often  used  to 
make  plain  a  general  statement,  and  have  a  special  in- 
terest when  they  lie  within  the  listener's  experience: 

Political  economy  consists  simply  in  the  production,  preserva- 
tion, and  distribution,  at  fittest  time  and  place,  of  useful, 
pleasurable  things.  The  farmer  who  cuts  his  hay  at  the  right 
time;  the  shipwright  who  drives  his  bolts  well  home  in  sound 
wood;  the  builder  who  lays  good  bricks  in  well-tempered  mortar; 
the  housewife  who  takes  care  of  the  furniture  in  her  parlor,  and 
guards  against  all  waste  in  her  kitchen;  and  the  singer  who 
rightly  disciplines  and  never  overstrains  her  voice  are  all  polit- 
ical economists  in  the  true  and  final  sense;  adding  continually 
to  the  riches  and  well-being  of  the  nation  to  which  they  be- 
long.— {Ruskin.) 

Finally,  observe  the  effect  of  the  linguistic  strokes 
of  Senator  Thurston  in  his  speech  preceding  our  war 
with  Spain.  He  introduces  the  theme — "God's  force" — 
by  a  sorites  or  chain  of  reasoning  in  the  first  three  sen- 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  181 

tences.  Then  notice  how  he  gains  something  more  than 
unity  and  clearness  by  repeating  "force"  as  the  subject 
of  each  clause  in  the  second  paragraph.  And  note  par- 
ticularly, how  from  this  subject  numerous  and  varied 
illustrations  radiate.  No  fatigue  or  loss  of  attention, 
but  kaleidoscopic  change  of  thought  and  a  gradual  in- 
crease of  interest.  When,  at  the  end,  the  music  and 
drum-beat  stop,  we  are  left  with  the  sensation  audibly 
evoked,  that  God  is  marching  on: 

Intervention  means  force.  Force  means  war.  War  means 
blood.  But  it  will  be  God's  force.  When  has  a  battle  for  hu- 
manity and  liberty  ever  been  won  except  by  force?  What  bar- 
ricade of  wrong,  injustice,  and  oppression  has  ever  been  carried 
except  by  force? 

Force  compelled  the  signature  of  unwilling  royalty  to  the 
great  Magna  Charta;  force  put  life  into  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence, and  made  effective  the  Emancipation  Proclama- 
tion; force  beat  with  naked  hands  upon  the  iron  gateway  of 
the  Bastille  and  made  reprisal  in  one  awful  hour  for  centuries 
of  kingly  crime;  force  waved  the  flag  of  revolution  over  Bunker 
Hill  and  marked  the  snows  of  Valley  Forge  with  blood-stained 
feet;  force  held  the  broken  line  at  Shiloh,  climbed  the  flame- 
swept  hill  at  Chattanooga,  and  stormed  the  clouds  on  Lookout 
Heights;  force  marched  with  Sherman  to  the  sea,  rode  with 
Sheridan  in  the  valley  of  Shenandoah,  and  gave  Grant  victory 
at  Appomattox;  force  saved  the  Union,  kept  the  stars  in  the 
flag,  made  "niggers"  men.  The  time  for  God's  force  has  come 
again.  Let  the  impassioned  lips  of  American  patriots  once  more 
take  up  the  song: 

"In  the  beauty  of  the  lilies  Christ  was  born  across  the  sea. 
With  a  glory  in  His  bosom  that  transfigures  you  and  me; 
As  he  died  to  make  men  holy,  let  us  die  to  make  men  free, 
For  God  is  marching  on." 

Logic  makes  clear  only  to  him  who  is  interested  and 
will  follow.     The  trouble  with  logic  is  its  monotone, 


182  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

which,  if  long  continued,  produces  fatigue.  We  need 
variety  to  rest  and  stimulate  the  attention. 

Concrete  suggestions,  such  as  the  imagery  of  speech 
figures,  parables,  fables,  allusive  stories  or  anecdotes 
used  to  point  a  moral — analogies,  drawn  from  history, 
literature,  science,  art,  religion,  or  from  every-day  life — 
may  be  used  to  enrich  and  fertilize  barren  places,  to 
illuminate  dull  themes,  or  when  occasion  arises  to  raise 
the  winds  like  Prospero,  and  if  need  be  to  cause  the 
waters  to  subside  as  they  did  at  the  Red  Sea.  An  en- 
cyclopaedic knowledge  without  the  power  of  association, 
without  the  impelling  desire  to  bring  facts  together  and 
weave  them  into  new  creations  for  the  purpose  of  in- 
fluencing thought  and  action,  is  a  pmnp  that  holds  water 
but  does  not  give  it  out,  a  fourteen-inch-gun  that  will 
not  go  off,  a  football  or  debating  team,  an  army,  that 
goes  down  to  defeat  when  it  might  have  the  power  to 
triumph. 

The  Advantage  of  the  Conceptual  View-Point  to 
the  Debater. — The  debater  may  regard  any  process  or 
proposition  as  a  concept  for  the  purpose  of  imagery, 
and  may  exhibit  all  the  arts  of  rhetoric  when  attempting 
to  suggest  the  image  of  a  concept  to  the  minds  of  his 
audience. 

After  a  thorough  work  in  briefing,  which  involves  a 
careful  analysis,  discrimination,  classification,  and  ar- 
rangement of  his  material,  the  debater  will  often  find 
it  of  advantage  to  sum  up  the  main  proposition  of  his 
speech  in  a  single  abstract  word  or  phrase  significant 
of  meaning  to  himself.  In  a  team  debate,  the  case  as 
a  whole  may  be  summed  up  in  several  such  words,  as, 
e.  g.,  democracy,  security,  permanency;  causes,  examples, 
consequences,   etc.     These  concepts,   of   course,   must 


IIMAGINATION  IN   ARGUMENT  183 

contain  the  fundamental  reasons  for  the  proposition  to 
be  proved,  and  the  imaging  of  them  must  be  the  imaging 
of  fundamental  reasons. 

This  broad  conceptual  view-point,  moreover,  should 
give  the  debater  the  free  hand  needed  for  a  suggestive, 
imaginative,  handling  of  his  material.  Confident  in 
the  logical  structure  of  his  argument,  and  of  his  knowl- 
edge of  facts  and  material,  he  is  less  constrained  in  the 
use  of  his  own  processes.  He  can  also  make  his  processes 
and  conclusions  more  perceptual  to  others.  He  can,  for 
instance,  adjust  his  imagery  to  his  audience,  and  to  re- 
sponses received  while  speaking,  and  can  continue  in 
his  imaginative  suggestions  until  the  responses  noticed 
indicate  that  his  idea  is  understood  and  accepted.  In 
a  word,  the  adoption  of  the  conceptual  view-point  by 
the  logically  trained  student  means  freedom  in  the  imag- 
ing process  and  in  adaptation;  and  this  means  effec- 
tiveness. For  the  debater  is  thus  enabled  to  give  to 
his  logical  formulas  detailed  or  expansive  content,  as 
occasion  may  require,  to  express  his  own  individuahty, 
to  introduce  a  sincere,  natural,  personal  touch,  and  to 
instil  into  his  remarks  atmosphere  and  reality.  Facts 
and  logic  are  made  to  appeal  to  human  interest  in  ex- 
perience and  consciousness. 

HI.    Types  of  Imagery 

We  are  famihar  with  the  fact  that  there  is  a  classifica- 
tion of  imagery  made  on  the  basis  of  the  senses  employed 
(see  Perceptual  Aspect  of  Imagery,  this  chapter).  The 
t>T:>es  of  imagery  so  based  are  considered  further  in 
Appendix  B. 

In  conclusion,  we  should  note  that  there  is  also  a  divi- 
sion of  imagery  based  on  past,  present,   and  future. 


184  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF   DEBATE 

Moreover,  images  of  the  past  are  of  two  kinds :  memory 
images  and  imagination  images.  Memory  images  call 
to  mind  specific,  actual  experiences  in  the  life  of  an  au- 
dience. All  other  images  are  products  of  the  creative 
imagination  and  are  called  imagination  images  of  the 
past,  present,  or  future.  A  twenty-six-year-old  general, 
speaking  in  Italy,  used  Metnory  Images  and  Images  of 
the  Future  as  a  means  of  inspiring  confidence,  courage, 
and  hope  in  his  men  in  the  following  proclamation: 

Soldiers,  you  have,  in  fifteen  days,  gained  six  victories,  taken 
twenty-one  stands  of  colors,  fifty  pieces  of  cannon,  several  forti- 
fied places,  made  fifteen  hundred  prisoners,  and  killed  or  wounded 
over  ten  thousand  men.  You  are  the  equals  of  the  conquerors 
of  Holland  and  of  the  Rhine.  Destitute  of  everything,  you  have 
suppHed  yourselves  with  everything.  You  have  won  battles 
without  cannon,  crossed  rivers  without  bridges,  made  forced 
marches  without  shoes,  bivouacked  without  spirituous  hquor 
and  often  without  bread.  The  republican  phalanxes,  the  sol- 
diers of  liberty,  were  alone  capable  of  enduring  what  you 
have  suffered.  Thanks  to  you,  soldiers !  Your  country  has  a 
right  to  expect  of  you  great  things.  You  have  still  battles  to 
fight,  cities  to  take,  rivers  to  pass.  Is  there  one  amongst  you 
whose  courage  flags?  One,  who  would  prefer  returning  to  the 
sterile  summits  of  the  Apennines  and  the  Alps,  to  undergo  pa- 
tiently the  insults  of  that  slavish  soldiery?  No,  there  is  not 
one  such  among  the  victors  of  Montenotte,  of  Millesimo,  of 
Diego  and  of  Mondovi !  Friends,  I  promise  you  that  glorious 
conquest:  but  be  the  liberators  of  peoples,  be  not  their  scourges.^ 

Not  always,  of  course,  are  the  emotions  and  will  so 
dominant  as  here  with  Napoleon.  Indeed,  a  sweet 
reasonableness  and  a  quiet  library  calm  are  better 
adapted  to  the  average  occasion  and  the  mood  of  the 

^ "  The  Orators  of  France,"  by  Timon,  translated  by  J.  T.  Headley, 
p.  80. 


IMAGINATION  IN  ARGUMENT  185 

average  person.  It  is  a  better  way  to  sell  bonds  or  in- 
surance, or  to  adjust  the  price  when  buying  a  house  and 
lot. 

Or,  we  may  refer  in  illustration  to  the  twenty-third 
Psalm.  The  effect  of  this  beautiful  lyric  is  a  feeling  of 
sympathy  with  David's  confidence: 

1.  As  he  recalls  the  contentment  of  green  pastures  (imagina- 

tion image  of  the  past). 

2.  As  he  suggests  the  spiritual  comfort  which  he  experiences, 

with  God  actually  present  by  his  side.     "For  Thou  art 
with  me"  (immediate  image),  and 

3.  As  he  exclaims  in  Faith  and  Hope,  "I  will  dwell  in  the 

house  of  the  Lord  forever"  (imagination  image  of  the 
future). 

The  ability  to  suggest  to  the  consciousness  of  an  au- 
dience scenes,  events,  and  happenings  of  the  past,  or  to 
prophesy  the  future  consequences  of  a  proposed  plan, 
policy,  or  course  of  action  is  constantly  demanded  of 
the  debater.  In  the  reply  to  Hayne,  Webster's  eulqgy 
of  his  own  State  is  an  imagination  image  of  the  past, 
while  his  description  of  the  consequences  of  disunion 
is  an  imagination  image  of  the  future.  Indeed,  whether 
the  image  used  is  an  image  of  past  or  future,  of  imagina- 
tion or  of  memory,  the  debater  must  manifest  his  logical, 
psychological,  and  artistic  skill.  He  is  more  likely  per- 
haps to  "ride  the  winged  horse"  when  imaging  the 
future,  as,  for  example,  when  he  is  describing  in  his  per- 
oration the  consequences  of  the  organization  of  a  society 
of  nations  to  enforce  peace  after  the  war. 

Since  the  word  "present"  may  mean  an  hour,  a  day, 
a  year,  a  decade,  or  a  century,  the  length  of  time  sug- 
gested by  an  image  of  the  present  will  vary  with  cir- 


186  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

cmnstances.  Images  of  the  present  refer  to  happenings 
in  the  more  or  less  remote  present  as  distinguished  from 
past  or  future. 

In  the  most  limited  sense,  however,  the  present  exists 
only  as  a  nexus  between  past  and  future.  We  no  sooner 
utter  the  word  "now"  than  it  is  gone.  The  present 
in  which  we  live  is  ever  moving;  what  is  thought  to  be 
with  us  is  with  us  only  in  a  world  of  motion.  There  is 
only  a  theoretical  present,  consisting  of  the  moment  of 
time  in  which  we  are  thinking;  and  there  is  always,  of 
course,  the  possibility  of  shutting  out  both  the  past  and 
the  future  for  an  absorbing  contemplation  of  that  which 
is  immediately  before  us  in  time  and  space.  We  may, 
therefore,  in  a  sense  regard  all  effective  images  as  present 
images;  so  that  the  function  both  of  images  of  the  past 
and  of  the  future  is  simply  to  bring  to  the  focus  of  im- 
mediate attention  the  other  experiences  of  other  times. 
Moreover,  the  creative  imagination  through  the  infinite 
suggestions  and  implications  of  imagery  simply  brings, 
with  a  conscious  or  subconscious  logic,  other  experiences 
to  bear  on  a  matter  at  hand. 

Summary. — The  present  chapter  calls  attention,  first, 
to  the  need  of  the  imagination  in  argument.  This  is 
believed  to  be  necessary,  on  account  of  the  dangers  aris- 
ing from  an  overemphasis  of  the  logical,  and  is  believed 
to  be  desirable  because  of  the  opportunity  for  original- 
ity afforded,  and  the  resulting  higher  degree  of  excel- 
lence attainable,  through  the  use  of  the  imaginative 
powers.  It  sets  forth,  second,  the  character  and  function 
of  the  imaging  process  in  argument;  distinguishing  be- 
tween the  logical  and  psychological  view-points  from 
which  an  argument  may  be  regarded;  and  explainuig 
the  processes  other  than  the  logical  which  are  employed. 


IMAGINATION   IN   ARGUMENT  187 

It  appears  that  in  presenting  an  argument  a  debater 
may  exercise  his  creative  imagination,  and  may  use 
the  skill  of  the  real  Uterary  artist,  if  he  wisely  allows 
himself  a  greater  freedom  in  his  mental  point  of  view 
when  speaking  or  writing.  Imagery  is  also  shown  to 
have  both  a  perceptual  and  a  conceptual  aspect,  and 
the  problem  of  communicating  our  ideas  to  others  in 
order  to  image  them  on  their  consciousness  is  declared 
to  be  a  process  of  reducing  concepts  to  sense-percep- 
tion. Assuming,  then,  that  argument  is  the  perceptuali- 
zation  of  a  concept,  the  process  of  imaging  a  concept  is 
illustrated  variously  and  at  length,  logically  and  broadly, 
and  appHed  to  debating  and  general  use.  Third,  the 
last  topic,  types  of  imagery,  suggests  the  wide  scope 
of  the  imaging  power  through  its  ability  to  bring  to 
immediate  perception  images  of  the  past,  present,  and 
future. 


CHAPTER  VII 
SUGGESTION   IN   ARGUMENT 

We  have  defined  the  presentation  as  a  problem  in  im- 
aginative suggestion,  and  have  examined  the  imagina- 
tion from  the  standpoint  of  the  speaker.  We  are  now 
to  examine  the  subject  of  suggestion  (which  is  the  other 
side  of  imagery)  as  the  process  and  means  of  communi- 
cating our  ideas  to  others.  This  carries  us  into  the  dif- 
ficult territory  of  the  hearer,  for  suggestion  is  to  be 
defined  in  terms  of  response,  effect,  or  reaction. 

Argument,  it  may  be  said,  is  an  appeal,  through  the 
imagery  of  words  and  gestures,  for  immediate  and  strong 
response;  and  makes  use  either  of  the  concealed,  indirect 
methods  of  persuasion,  or  the  open  and  consciously  log- 
ical method  of  conviction.  Our  immediate  purpose  is  to 
assist  the  debater  to  an  unders  tanding  of  the  mental  op- 
erations by  which  the  decisions  in  argument  are  consci- 
ously or  subconsciously  reached.  The  present  discus- 
sion, therefore,  is  restricted  to  two  topics:  (i)  The  laws 
of  mental  suggestion  and  their  use  in  debating,  and  (2) 
the  instruments  of  suggestion  as  applied  to  the  delivery 
and  rhetoric  of  argument.  Gestures,  voice,  and  manner 
are  images  of  ideas  used  to  convey  meaning  to  others 
and  are,  therefore,  instruments  of  suggestion.  Words, 
sentences,  paragraphs,  whole  compositions  are  also 
images  of  ideas  used  to  convey  meaning,  and  likewise 
must  be  regarded  as  instruments  of  suggestion. 

18S 


SUGGESTION  IN  ARGUMENT  189 

I.  Laws  of  Suggestion  and  Their  Use  in  Debating 
The  Laws  of  Mental  Suggestion  proclaim  the  dynamic 
power  of  the  image  to  produce  response.  They  assert 
the  tendency  of  the  mind  to  act  in  line  with  a  suggested 
idea  unless  interfered  with  by  a  contrary  or  inhibiting 
idea.  They  have  been  summed  up  in  two  definite  state- 
ments, as  laws,  thus: 

1.  Every  idea  of  an  action  (or  function)  will  result  in  that 
action  unless  hindered  by  a  competing  idea  or  physical  impedi- 
ment. 

2.  Every  idea  that  is  suggested  to  the  mind  is  held  as  truth 
unless  inhibited  by  some  contradictory  idea. 

The  value  of  these  laws  for  the  speaker  depends  chiefly 
on  "limiting  the  consciousness  of  the  minds  of  the  hearers 
to  the  idea  suggested,  and  the  avoidance  of  the  ideas 
in  their  minds  which  invaHdate  or  hinder  the  idea  sug- 
gested." 1 

Let  us,  in  explanation,  start  with  the  simple  fact  that 
when  a  speaker  images  an  idea  so  that  it  can  be  visualized 
by  another,  the  suggested  image  awakens  in  the  hearer 
a  mental  acti\dty  in  a  particular  direction  (i)  of  think- 
ing, e.  g.,  What?  Hark!  If— but;  and  (2)  also  in  a 
particular  direction  of  actmg,  e.  g.,  "Do  you  see  that 
sign?"  prompting  one  to  turn  his  head  in  the  direction 
of  a  spot  indicated. 

The  second  law  is  recognized  in  the  popular  idea  of 
"beheving  what  we  are  told,"  and  of  "accepting  as  true 
what  we  see  in  print." 

On  the  other  hand,  when  a  hearer  does  not  follow 
out  a  suggested  idea  either  in  his  thinking  or  his  acting 

»"  Psychology  of  Public  Speaking,"  W.  D.  Scott,  p.  156. 


190  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

or  does  not  believe  something  that  he  is  told  or  sees  in 
print,  it  is  because  of  obstacles  rising  in  that  mind  in 
the  shape  of  inhibitions  to  compete  with  or  interfere 
with  the  carrying  out  of  the  process. 

In  general,  it  is  apparent  that  any  vivid  image  of  an 
idea  or  action  tends  to  produce  a  quick  and  strong  re- 
sponse in  others.  The  clever  advertiser  endeavors  to 
make  his  suggestions  compelling,  thus: 

1.  Go  to  the  Big  Store. 

2.  Visit  the  store  you  have  always  visited. 

3.  Everybody  goes  to  the  Big  Store. 

4.  Bargains  at  the  Big  Store. 

5.  The  Patriotic  Store. 

If  you  will  examine  these  statements  a  httle  closely, 
you  wiU  notice  that  there  is  an  attempt  to  make  the 
mind  go  forward  in  thinking  about  the  store,  through  the 
responses  given  to  a  command,  and  through  appeals  to 
habit,  imitation,  opportunity  of  advantage,  and  finally, 
I  may  say,  to  ideahsm.  There  was  also  an  expectation 
on  the  part  of  the  advertiser,  that  the  idea  so  vividly 
fixed  in  the  thinking,  will  be  accepted  as  truth  by  the 
reader,  and  that  we  may  become  sufificiently  interested 
in  what  the  store  may  hold  out  for  us  to  incHne  us  to 
find  out  more  about  it.  Vividness,  frequency,  and 
recency  are  psychological  principles,  of  which  those 
who  are  most  successful  make  constant  use. 

It  will  be  noticed,  however,  that  the  first  statement, 
*'Go  to  the  Big  Store,"  is  not  so  much  the  imagmg  of 
an  idea  which  can  be  regarded  as  a  reason,  as  the  imag- 
ing of  a  command  to  action.  All  the  other  sentences 
contain  a  vivid  imagery  of  reasons.  The  orator,  like 
the  advertiser,  may  appeal  openly  for  action,  but  the 


SUGGESTION  IN  ARGUMENT  191 

debater  cannot  do  so  unless  his  appeal  for  action  is  well 
grounded  in  an  imaging  of  reasons. 

The  debater's  problem,  indeed,  is  more  difficult  than 
either  that  of  the  orator  or  the  advertiser.  For  he  no 
sooner  suggests  his  own  case  than  an  opponent  seeks 
to  inhibit  it  and  to  suggest  another  of  his  own.  In  the 
privacy  of  his  study,  he  may  have  placed  his  argument 
in  a  secure,  logical  form  by  which  he  hopes  to  start  and 
give  direction  to  the  thinking — 

Proposition because 

A since 

I for 

a 

But  practically  and  in  action,  he  finds  that  his  sug- 
gested ideas  are  in  constant  conflict  with  others.  They 
may  come,  indeed,  not  only  from  his  visible  opponent 
but  also  from  his  audience  to  block,  retard,  or  change 
the  direction  of  his  ideas,  as  well  as  to  faciHtate  them. 
Such  inhibitions  and  suggestions  may  spring  from  the 
ill-defined  regions  of  the  subconscious,  as  well  as  from 
the  better  known  or  conscious  experiences.  Let  us  illus- 
trate. 

In  an  expressed  argument,  the  debater  at  the  out- 
set suggests  the  proper  mental  attitude  of  his  audience 
toward  the  proposition  as  he  sees  it  by  such  phrases  as 
"I  propose  to  show,"  *'I  commend,"  "I  approve,"  which 
inclines  the  minds  of  his  hearers  in  the  desired  direc- 
tion. Then  an  opponent  takes  the  floor  and  inhibits 
the  thinking  and  leads  it  in  another  direction  with  "I 
object,"  "I  oppose,"  "I  hesitate,"  "I  fear."  And  then, 
one  speaker  will  tell  us,  for  example,  that  the  United 
States  should  not  enter  a  league  to  enforce  peace  after 


192  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF   DEBATE 

the  war  by  a  reminder  of  Washington's  warning  against 
foreign  alliances.  This  is  primarily  an  appeal  to  au- 
thority, but  there  may  be  in  it  also  a  hidden  appeal, 
for  Washington  is  an  authority  whom  we  habitually 
accept  and  whom  we  lilce  to  imitate.  An  opposing 
speaker  then  reminds  us  that  "President  Wilson  and 
former  Presidents  Taf t  and  Roosevelt  are  all  in  favor  of 
our  joining  such  a  league."  We  have  now  raised  a  doubt 
as  to  the  wisdom  of  Washington's  advice,  and  intro- 
duced into  the  mind  a  new  notion  involving  conflicting 
authority  and  incidentally,  and,  perhaps,  subconsciously, 
appeals  to  habit  and  imitation.  And  so  the  problem 
deepens  and  continues.  Indeed,  whether  we  are  de- 
bating with  ourselves  or  with  others,  or  merely  listening 
to  a  debate,  the  mind  is  continually  facilitating  and 
retarding  our  initial  suggestions  by  other  suggestions 
or  inhibitions  of  its  own,  so  that  there  may  be  a  con- 
stant vacillation  between  a  feeling  of  certainty  and 
doubt  until  a  decision  is  definitely  reached. 

This,  then,  is  the  nature  of  the  process  and  the  ma- 
terial on  which  the  debater  must  impress  his  views; 
active,  living  minds,  with  varying  antecedent  experi- 
ences, and  differing  present  capacities,  operations,  atti- 
tudes, and  views.  He  naturally  strives  to  win  the  good- 
will, sympathy,  and  confidence  of  his  hearers  in  order 
to  get  their  co-operation;  he  also  strives  to  find  a 
common  ground,  in  thought  as  well  as  in  feeling — real, 
vital  grounds  of  behef.  But  he  may  fail,  unless  he  is 
able,  through  insight  and  imaginative  power,  to  get 
within  the  inner  circle  of  the  consciousness  of  his  hearers, 
in  order  to  interest  them  and  to  set  them  to  thinking, 
so  that  their  minds  will  naturally  and  of  themselves  go 
forward  in  the  proper  direction. 


SUGGESTION  IN  ARGUMENT  193 

The  debater's  primary  responses  are  in  interest  and 
in  belief.  Indeed,  the  first  law  of  mental  suggestion, 
given  above,  as  apphed  to  debating,  seems  to  assert 
the  need  of  interest;  and  the  second  law,  the  need  of 
proof,  if  the  suggested  idea  is  to  be  held  in  the  mind  as 
a  truth  more  than  temporarily,  and  not  brushed  aside 
by  an  immediate  denial  or  contradiction. 

1.  Interest  is  a  prerequisite  of  all  successful  speaking 
or  writing.  The  factors  of  interestingness  have  been 
variously  described,  and  are  said  to  include  such  things 
as  the  vital,  the  unusual,  the  uncertain,  the  smiilar, 
the  antagonistic,  and  the  animate.^ 

In  general,  anything  which  will  attract  the  Hstener's 
mind  and  incKne  it  to  think  for  itself  about  the  reasons 
given,  is  of  value  in  securing  and  holding  interest  when 
presenting  an  argument.  The  responsive  is  the  interest- 
ing. 

2.  The  nature  of  proof  has  been  considered  under 
logical  organization.  It  was  shown  that  an  effective 
argument  should  be  imaged  within  an  accepted  class 
concept  of  a  hearer,  so  as  to  bring  it  within  his  experi- 
ence. Professor  Phillips  points  out  the  great  value  of 
the  principle  of  reference  to  experience, — 

because  it  enables  the  speaker  to  attain  his  purpose  along  the 
right  psychological  line — that  of  allowing  the  listener  to  use 
his  own  powers.  The  use  of  this  principle  gives  the  Hstener 
or  reader  the  pleasant  feeUng  that  he  is  not  driven  or  cajoled, 
but  that  he  sees,  feels,  accepts,  or  does  the  thing  desired  of  his 
own  free  will  and  through  his  own  processes.  To  illustrate: 
When  my  friend  entered  his  home  the  sky  was  cloudless.  An 
hour  later  I  come  in  and  say  there  will  be  a  storm.  He  contra- 
dicts me.    I  then  tell  him  that  heavy  black  clouds  are  rolling 

1  "Effective  Speaking,"  Phillips,  A.B.,  p.  63. 


194  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

up  from  the  west,  that  flashes  of  lightning  can  be  seen  and  that 
the  wind  is  increasing.  He  now  agrees  with  me.  What  did  I 
do?  I  gave  him  three  facts  that  were  like  his  own  experience 
in  respect  to  the  conditions  generally  preceding  a  storm.  He 
came  to  his  own  conclusion  by  means  of  my  reference  to  his 
experience.  I  simply  called  up  part  of  his  stock  of  knowledge 
applicable  to  the  case,  he  did  the  rest.  I  recalled  to  his  conscious- 
ness some  of  his  subconscious  knowledge.  I  held  up  to  him 
the  mirror  of  his  own  experience,  and  he  himself  came  to  the 
conclusion. 

He  notes  further,  that,  when  the  end  is  belief,  as  in 
argument,  it  is  very  important  to  show  that  the  mat- 
ter in  question  is  like  something  we  already  believe. 
"Behef,  then,  demands  references  to  experience  that 
show  the  thing  for  which  acceptance  is  sought,  is  like 
something  already  accepted  as  truth — reahty.  And 
the  most  powerful  reference  will  be  that  accepted  ac- 
tuality wliich  most  resembles  the  thing  to  be  believed." 
Not  only  likeness,  however,  but  all  the  principles  of 
association,  likeness  and  unlikeness,  cause  and  effect, 
or  the  inclusion  of  the  thing  offered  within  a  more  gen- 
eral principle  or  class  concept  already  known  or  ac- 
cepted. For  there  is  great  variation  among  men  in  their 
modes  of  associating  ideas.  As  Doctor  McCosh  has 
noted:  "One  mind  ever  tends  to  repetition,  another 
rather  to  correlation.  One  man  delights  in  poetical 
images,  another  in  scientific  classes  of  causes.  One  in- 
tellect is  inclined  to  observe  resemblances,  another  ex- 
ceptions and  differences."  We  must,  however,  make  our 
suggestions  along  the  proper  psychological  lines — em- 
ploying so  far  as  we  can  the  processes,  facts,  and  man- 
ner that  a  hearer  would  most  likely  be  able  to  follow. 

Avoiding  and  Removing  Inhibitions. — A  few  specific, 
practical  suggestions  may  be  given,  namely:    (i)  That 


SUGGESTION  IN  ARGUMENT  195 

a  speaker  should  not  inhibit  his  own  case  by  hurtful 
admissions;  (2)  that  in  an  actual  debate  the  inhibitions 
introduced  by  an  opponent  should  be  removed  at  the 
earliest  opportunity;  (3)  that  logical  fallacies  may  act 
as  inhibitions,  and  (4)  that  an  inhibiting  wish,  always 
difficult  to  handle,  may  sometimes  be  removed  by  the 
image  ad  absurdum. 

1.  Hurtful  Admissions  as  Inhibitions. — In  the  nature 
of  things,  the  debater  cannot  keep  inhibiting  ideas  from 
entering  the  mind  of  his  audience,  for  assertion  is  met 
by  denial,  proof  by  counter-proof  or  distinctions. 

He  must,  in  the  first  place,  avoid  introducing  inhibit- 
ing ideas  himself  into  his  own  argument.  Indeed,  if 
they  are  unconsciously  permitted  to  enter,  they  may  be 
regarded  as  hurtful  admissions  and  made  the  basis  of 
attack  as  in  the  following: 

GERMAN  DECEPTIVE  EXPERIENCES 

The  phrase  is  from  the  Berlin  Kreuz-Zeitung.  It  was  report- 
ing the  chancellor's  belief  that  the  submarine  campaign  would 
end  the  war  quickly,  and  said:  "We  must  hasten.  Five  or  six 
months  will  suffice."  But  then  it  added,  perhaps  with  more 
significance  than  it  was  aware  of:  "God  grant  that  we  do  not 
renew  with  our  submarines  our  deceptive  experiences  with  Zep- 
pelins." 

2.  Immediate  Removal  of  Inhibitions  Introduced  by  an 
Opponent. — The  debater  should  also,  in  the  second  place, 
remove  inhibiting  ideas  which  have  been  introduced 
by  an  opponent  the  instant  he  has  the  opportunity.  When 
Patrick  Henry  made  his  famous  remark,  "Caesar  had 
his  Brutus,  Charles  the  First  his  Cromwell,  and  George 
the  Third—"  he  was  interrupted,  it  will  be  remembered, 
by  cries  of  "Treason";   but  equal  to  the  occasion  he 


196  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

defiantly  answered:  "If  that  be  treason  make  the  most 
of  it."  Though  the  inhibited  idea  was  permitted  to 
enter,  it  was  quickly  expelled.  An  objection  raised  by 
an  opponent  is,  of  course,  an  inhibiting  idea  and  will 
hinder  the  acceptance  of  new  arguments  in  the  mind  of 
a  hearer  until  that  objection  is  removed. 

In  a  team  debate,  the  first  speaker  in  the  negative 
should  at  the  outset  remove  the  interfering  ideas  ad- 
vanced by  the  first  afiirmative,  and  then  also  introduce 
inhibiting  ideas  on  his  own  part  concerning  the  affirma- 
tive case  presented.  All  speakers  other  than  the  one 
assigned  to  speak  first  on  the  affirmative  side,  who  begin 
immediately  with  their  constructive  speeches,  by  pay- 
ing no  heed  to  what  has  been  previously  said,  fail  to 
remove  an  inhibition,  and  so  lose  the  attention  of  the 
audience.  Even  if  a  speaker  cannot  answer  or  does 
not  care  to  answer  an  objection  fully  at  the  moment, 
he  should  at  least  parry  or  notice  in  some  way  an  im- 
portant objection  before  presenting  an  entirely  new  or 
different  argument.  Once  a  university  debater,  fear- 
ing surprise  and  wishing  to  gain  time,  wrote  down  a 
sentence  to  be  used  at  the  opening  of  any  speech: 
"Against  the  argument  which  you  have  just  heard,  we 

of  the side  throw  the  whole  force  of  our  position." 

Speakers  in  debating  cannot  be  "ships  that  pass  in  the 
night."  The  side  that  does  not  speak  to  an  opponent 
or  that  continually  ignores  evidence  presented,  deserves 
to  lose.  Its  members  may  be  orators,  they  are  not  de- 
baters or  practical  psychologists.  The  enthusiasm  or 
joy  of  an  audience,  frequently  manifested  during  the 
rebuttal  speeches,  is  largely  due  to  the  clear  perception 
of  the  alternate  processes  of  suggestion  and  inhibition  in 
rapid  succession.     The  intruder  evicted  returns  again 


SUGGESTION  IN  ARGUMENT  197 

and  again  for  admission.  Ejected  by  one  door  he  ap- 
pears at  another,  or  at  a  window.  Lucky  for  hini  if  he 
remains  on  the  inside  when  the  last  bell  rings! 

A  volume  might  be  written  in  illustration  of  the  func- 
tion of  suggestion  and  inhibition  in  the  handling  of  an 
opponent  and  of  an  audience  in  varjdng  moods  and 
circumstances.  Sometimes,  even  logic  and  truth  are 
factors  of  inhibition,  for  there  are  none  so  deaf  as  those 
who  will  not  hear;  and,  of  course,  a  luckless  glance, 
gesture,  or  allusion  may  raise  a  whirlwind  which  a  mere 
nothing  will  cause  to  subside. 

The  debater  plays  upon  the  emotions  less  than  the 
orator,  but  he  touches  an  emotional  chord,  as  through 
the  turn  of  a  phrase  or  a  flash  of  wit,  more  often  per- 
haps than  he  is  aware.  Complex  though  laughter  is, 
it  is  at  least  a  means  of  preventing  fatigue  and  relieving 
tension.  Laughter  hberates  the  energies,  sets  the  soul 
free,  and  refreshes  it.  Irony,  sarcasm,  and  invective 
assist  reasoning  by  turning  the  emotions  against  an- 
other, while  mere  amusement  or  entertainment,  which 
causes  a  spontancotis  expression  of  the  emotion  joy  in 
smiles  and  laughter,  incUnes  one  to  follow  the  sugges- 
tions of  a  speaker  through  the  sheer  pleasure  of  listen- 
ing. 

3.  Logical  Fallacies  as  Inhibitions. — The  discovery  of 
a  logical  fallacy  in  an  argument  may  act  as  an  inhibition. 
It  is  easy  to  show,  for  instance,  that  in  case  the  imagina- 
tive processes  are  dominant  in  the  mind  of  the  speaker 
and  the  logical  in  the  mind  of  the  hearer,  the  acceptance 
of  imaginative  data  is  inhibited  through  the  discovery  of 
an  improper  or  inadequate  logical  organization  of  the 
thought.  Consider,  for  instance,  (i)  an  accidental 
association    of    images    such    as    occurs   in   figures   of 


198  THE   FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

speech.     In  the  following,  Bryan's  association  is  purely 
fatuous: 

Mr.  McKinley  was  the  most  popular  man  among  the  Repub- 
licans, and  three  months  ago  everybody  in  the  Republican 
party  prophesied  his  election.  How  is  it  to-day?  Why,  the 
man  who  was  once  pleased  to  think  that  he  once  looked  like 
Napoleon — that  man  shudders  to-day  when  he  remembers  that 
he  was  nominated  upon  the  anniversary  of  the  Battle  of  Water- 
loo. Not  only  that,  but  as  he  listens  he  can  hear  with  ever- 
increasing  distinctness  the  sound  of  the  waves  as  they  beat  upon 
the  lonely  shores  of  Saint  Helena. 

The  orator  here  simply  used  a  metaphor  to  image  a 
conclusion  which  he  had  reached  on  other  grounds.  But 
as  we  read  it  to-day  apart  from  the  context,  its  power 
of  appeal  is  lost  through  the  absence  of  logical  connec- 
tion. There  is  no  inherent  or  necessary  relation  shown 
between  McKinley  and  Napoleon  in  the  matter  referred 
to.  Or  notice  again  (2)  how  an  emphasis  of  the  con- 
crete without  orientation  may  interfere  with  the  in- 
tended effect  of  an  imaginative  appeal.  The  question 
involved  the  merits  of  the  Canadian  plan  of  a  manda- 
tory investigation  of  labor  difficulties  before  strikes  or 
lockouts  could  take  place.  A  negative  team  had  planned 
a  campaign  of  opposition  through  an  elaboration  of 
the  specific  instances  in  which  the  plan  had  failed.  In- 
stances were  cited  again  and  again  with  full  detail,  in 
which  strikes  actually  occurred  during  the  period  of 
investigation,  and  the  audience  was  duly  impressed 
with  the  futility  of  the  plan.  When,  however,  the  au- 
dience discovered  the  small  proportion  of  failures  to 
successes,  the  greater  number  of  instances  in  which 
there  had  been  no  strikes  during  the  period  of  investi- 
gation, and  the  gradually  diminishing  number  of  strikes 


SUGGESTION  IN  ARGUMENT  199 

in  the  past  few  years,  all  the  intended  eflfect  of  the  ac- 
cumulated images,  with  their  display  of  detailed  knowl- 
edge and  indirect  appeal  to  the  emotions,  failed  at  once, 
for  they  were  logically  inhibited.  In  this  way,  too,  a 
public  executive  who  is  the  recipient  of  propagandist 
literature,  all  emanating  from  one  source,  sometimes 
gets  an  erroneous  unpression  of  pohtical  opinion.  As 
a  logical  fallacy,  the  instances  are  not  typical  and  taken 
at  random,  or  one  is  led  to  mistake  a  part  for  the 
whole. 

4.  Removing  an  Inhibiting  Wish  by  the  Image  ad 
Absurdum. — ''How  shall  I  get  rid  of  the  inhibiting  wish 
in  the  mind  of  the  audience?"  is  often  the  most  trouble- 
some problem  in  debating.  "I  have  a  good  case,  but 
there  is  an  undercurrent  of  feehng  against  it  which  I 
fear  it  will  be  impossible  to  overcome."  Reahzation  of 
the  problem,  however,  is  the  first  step  toward  its  solu- 
tion. When  Edmund  Burke  talked  with  the  wind,  he 
was  hailed  as  the  greatest  orator  of  his  time;  when  he 
spoke  against  it,  he  became  the  dinner-bell  of  ParHa- 
ment.  There  are  tunes  in  the  experience  of  every  orator 
and  debater  when  the  wind  is  dead  ahead.  Argument 
avails  nothing,  for  the  audience  can  hardly  be  induced 
to  follow,  much  less  to  heed;  it  is  mastered  by  its  own 
desires  and  purposes  now  in  conflict  with  that  of  the 
speaker.  Diversion  of  attention,  by  holding  up  for  ap- 
peal a  new  object  of  desire,  has  failed  as  utterly  as  argu- 
ment. The  favorite  recourse  of  most  debaters  in  such 
an  emergency  is  to  image  the  opposed  feehng  with  new 
concrete  examples  which  will  bring  the  audience  to 
laughter  and  ridicule  of  itself.  Beecher  often  used  this 
device  (reduciio  ad  absurdum),  as  at  Liverpool,  when 
he  accused  his  audience  of  sympathizing  with  the  South, 


200  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

because  they  were  in  the  minority,  and  reminded  them 
that  they  should  also  sympathize  with  a  thief  in  the 
hands  of  three  constables.  It  was  a  favorite  method  of 
Lincoln's  when  he  felt  compelled  to  grapple  closely  with 
his  opponent. 

But  you  will  not  abide  the  election  of  a  Republican  Presi- 
dent! In  that  supposed  event  you  say  you  will  destroy  the 
Union!  And  then  you  say  the  crime  of  having  destroyed  it 
will  be  upon  us !  That  is  cruel !  A  highwayman  holds  a  pistol 
to  my  ear  and  mutters  through  his  teeth:  "Stand  and  deliver, 
or  I  shall  kill  you,  and  then  you  will  be  a  murderer." 

You  will  find  in  debating  that  your  opponent  is  not 
averse  to  letting  out  all  his  sail  when  going  with  the 
wind.  You  should,  therefore,  take  time  to  discover 
this  probable  source  of  appeal  and  to  find  out  if  pos- 
sible the  most  effective  way  of  removing  it.  It  is  for- 
tunate if,  like  Lincoln,  you  can  dispose  of  it  quickly  and 
decisively  by  an  analogy  of  the  meteoric  sort.  In  a 
debate  on  ship  subsidies,  the  negative  had  made  a  strong 
case  against  it  on  economic,  political,  and  moral  grounds, 
but  felt  that  the  ajQarmative  had  gained  much  influence 
through  a  covert  appeal  to  the  desire  for  a  larger  mer- 
chant marine.  The  situation  was  serious,  but  how  was 
it  to  be  met?  In  this  case  the  last  speaker,  in  summing 
up,  broke  the  spell  thus:  "We  sympathize  with  the  af- 
firmative in  their  desire  for  a  larger  merchant  marine. 
We  feel  much  pleasure  in  seeing  the  American  flag  flying 
from  the  stem  of  vessels  when  we  are  in  foreign  ports," 
and  then  leaning  forward  gravely,  "but,  ladies  and 
gentlemen,  let  me  warn  you  lest  your  pockets  should 
be  picked  while  the  band  is  playing  the  'Star  Spangled 
Banner,' " 


SUGGESTION  IN  ARGUMENT  201 

Conclusions. — A  debate  may  be  defined  as  a  psy- 
chological process  of  admitting  ideas  properly  associated 
to  secure  interest  and  belief  and  of  avoiding  and  exclud- 
ing all  ideas  of  whatever  character  or  description  which 
tend  to  interfere  with  this  purpose. 

Whoever,  when  speaking,  can  prevent  serious  inhibi- 
tions from  arising  in  the  minds  of  his  hearers,  and  can 
also  secure  quick  and  strong  responses  for  the  funda- 
mental reasons  which  he  suggests,  possesses  the  quali- 
fications of  an  effective  debater.  'i 

The  word  inhibition  is  a  valuable  addition  to  the  de- 
bater's vocabulary.  Anything  which  stands  in  the  way 
of  or  prevents  the  acceptance  of  an  idea  by  another, 
may  be  called  an  inhibition.  There  are  inhibitions  of 
fact  and  of  logic;  of  style,  sentence,  or  word;  of  manner, 
voice,  and  gesture.  Whatever,  indeed,  may  be  sup- 
posed to  be  offensive  or  disagreeable  to  others,  which 
may  be  avoided — in  taste,  sentiment,  feeling,  perceiv- 
ing, thinking,  or  believing — may  act  as  inhibitions,  may 
prevent  the  acceptance  of  our  ideas.  The  debater  must, 
therefore,  possess  and  manifest,  in  no  small  degree,  a 
power  of  consideration  for  others,  a  delicacy  of  feeling, 
a  courtesy,  a  spirit  of  consideration,  fair  play,  tact — 
in  a  word,  the  characteristics  of  the  educated  gentle- 
man. 

II.    Instruments  of  Suggestion 

In  the  process  of  influencing  by  suggestion,  the  de- 
bater uses  the  two  instruments  of  ordinary  intercourse: 
gesture  images  and  word  images.  He  usually  visualizes 
his  ideas  and  touches  them  with  feelings,  at  the  same 
time  co-ordinating  the  muscular  or  motor  functions 
with  the  mental  and  emotional.     Body  and  mind  act 


202  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

together.  "Don't"  is  a  word  of  prohibition,  to  which 
an  even  clearer  and  stronger  meaning  is  attached  if 
its  utterance  is  accompanied  by  a  frown  or  backward 
wave  of  the  hand.  Indeed,  the  mind,  as  we  have  seen, 
tends  to  act  in  hne  with  a  transmitted  suggestion,  so 
that  he  who  argues  must  continually  take  heed  of  the 
psychology  of  the  one  with  whom  he  argues,  and  of  those 
who  listen.  No  expression  can  be  effective  unless  it  is 
impressive;  and  all  reactions  between  giving  and  re- 
ceiving minds — the  minds  of  speaker  and  hearer,  or 
writer  and  reader — which  look  toward  agreement  or 
difference,  are  produced  through  mental  suggestion. 
The  suggestions  of  argument  call  for  an  immediate  and 
direct  response.  As  to  the  long-mooted  question — 
''how  far  an  actor  must  feel  his  part" — ^modern  psy- 
chology tends  toward  a  belief  in  the  existence  of  an  ac- 
tual feeling  on  the  part  of  the  actor.  There  are  words 
like  bubble,  for  instance,  which  we  can  hardly  think  of 
without  a  slight  feeling  in  the  lips  or  a  muscular  impulse 
to  pronounce  the  word.  Speech,  indeed,  is  an  ex-pres- 
sion,  a  pressing  out. 

All  gestures  and  words  used  must  be  images  of  mean- 
ing in  order  to  become  effective  instruments  of  sugges- 
tion. Indeed,  if  they  are  so  chosen  or  so  placed  as  to 
add  nothing  in  cloarness,  force,  or  ease  to  the  presenta- 
tion, they  may  easily  inhibit  meaning  and  prevent  the 
acceptance  of  our  ideas.  Word  images,  moreover,  are 
not  only  suggestive  of  meaning  but  of  old  associations. 

Gesture  Images  as  Instruments  of  Suggestion. — His- 
torically, it  is  deemed  likely  that  gestures  preceded 
speech,  and  that  the  labials  m  and  p  were  the  first  spoken 
utterances.  This  at  least  is  a  fair  inference  from  the 
analogy  of  child  development.     All  movements  of  the 


SUGGESTION  IN  ARGUMENT  203 

human  body — face,  head,  trunk,  and  limbs — have  an 
unage  value  in  suggesting  our  ideas  to  others.  For  ex- 
ample, the  image  of  the  cHnched  fist  suggests  determina- 
tion; the  finger  gesture,  the  idea  of  close  or  logical  dis- 
tinctions; the  open  palm,  the  approval  of  ideas,  and 
the  inverted  palm,  their  rejection  or  disapproval.  A 
movement  of  the  arms  toward  the  speaker  calls  atten- 
tion to  himself;  outwardly,  or  away  from  the  speaker, 
it  attracts  notice  to  others  or  to  objects  in  nature.  Such 
movements,  hke  the  images  of  words,  may  be  personal  or 
impersonal,  but  again,  as  with  words,  the  person  speak- 
ing before  an  audience  is  a  person  feeling  and  wilHng 
through  physical  or  motor  power  as  well  as  one  think- 
ing and  conveying  ideas.  Certainly  all  such  physical 
movements  are  suggestive  of  ideas.  Gestures  appear  to 
be  less  arbitrary  and  more  based  on  reason  than  the 
meaning  assigned  to  many  words,  but  tliere  is  also  a 
recognized  conventional  use  of  gesture,  as  shown  in 
formal  treatises. 

Professor  Houghton,  in  an  excellent  work  on  dehvery, 
uses  the  term  "action"  as  the  foundation  of  all  bodily 
expression  and  defines  it  as  a  muscular  response  to  men- 
tal or  emotional  stunuU.    He  says: 

The  student  of  psychology  is  familiar  with  the  influence  of 
the  mind  over  the  body,  with  the  marked  effect  that  each  mental 
or  emotional  stimulus  has  upon  the  muscular  organisms.  The 
inexperienced  speaker  is  often  astonished  at  the  unexpected 
exhilaration  that  he  feels  as  he  faces  an  audience.  He  finds 
that  the  mind  is  singularly  alert  and  acts  much  more  freely  than 
he  had  expected;  that  the  blood  flows  faster;  that  he  has  a  sense 
of  unusual  physical  vigor;  and  that  there  is  an  insistent  call 
from  the  brain  for  muscular  response  to  the  lively  activities  of 
the  mind.  This  is  the  true  foundation  for  all  bodily  expression. 
Any  voluntary  action  that  is  not  a  direct  response  to   such 


204  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF   DEBATE 

prompting  is  necessarily  false  and  purely  mechanical.  To  be 
sure,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  action  that  is  not  the  result  of  volun- 
tary prompting.  Various  emotions  such  as  timidity,  fear,  im- 
patience, or  anger  express  themselves  through  the  muscles  in- 
voluntarily in  a  way  no  less  mistakable  to  an  audience  than 
voluntary  action.  But,  whether  voluntary  or  involuntary,  the 
fundamental  cause  is  the  same — the  telegraphic  message  sent 
out  to  the  muscles  from  the  brain.  The  entire  problem  of  plat- 
form deportment,  therefore,  resolves  itself  into  two  fundamental 
considerations: 

I.  Is  the  bodily  action  of  the  speaker  the  result  of  mental 
or  emotional  stimuli? 

II.  Does  the  bodily  action  resulting  from  these  stimuli  look 
well  and  contribute  to  the  general  effectiveness  of  the  speech  ?  ^ 

It  is  here  implied,  of  course,  that  the  kind,  degree, 
and  quality  of  the  reactions  v^hich  are  awakened  in 
others  are  dependent  upon  the  kind,  degree,  and  quality 
of  the  stimuH  employed  by  a  speaker. 

Word  Images  as  Instruments  of  Suggestion.— As  it 
is  natural  to  suppose  that  gesture  preceded  speech,  it 
is  also  likely  that  speech  came  before  v^riting;  but  why, 
in  the  beginning,  a  chair  was  called  a  chair  rather  than  a 
table,  we  do  not  know.  All  speech  utterances,  of  course, 
have  a  physiological  basis,  and  speech  organs  and  de- 
velopment must  have  been  greatly  influenced  by  such 
elementary  muscular  actions  as  eating,  swallowing,  and 
ejecting. 

Verbal  nouns  seem  to  have  been  assigned  to  things 
at  first  more  or  less  arbitrarily,  until  certain  names  be- 
came associated  with  certain  meanings.  These  names 
with  their  meanings,  through  constant  changes  and 
variations,  have  gradually  obtained  a  customary,  con- 

i"The  Elements  of  Public  Speaking,"  Harry  Garfield  Houghton, 
p.  S8. 


SUGGESTION  IN   ARGUMENT  205 

ventional,  and  estabKshed  use.  Indeed,  words  are  so 
largely  records  of  past  experiences  that  for  scientific 
purposes  the  great  German  scholar  Ebbinghaus^  has 
invented  a  series  of  nonsense-words  in  an  effort  to  get 
rid  of  the  uncertain  and  variable  elements  of  memory. 
The  arbitrar}^  character  of  many  conventional  names 
which  have  become  attached  to  things,  and  so  have 
acquired  definite  associations  almost  startles  us  when 
we  read,  for  instance,  sentences  like  the  following: 

"The  ghost  is  willing,  but  the  meat  is  weak." 
"  As  harmless  as  pigeons  and  as  wise  as  snakes." 

It  is  the  function  of  linguistics  and  of  lexicography 
to  record  the  correct  and  estabhshed  uses  of  words.  The 
best  key  to  the  meaning  of  words  is  in  a  study  of  lan- 
guages, classic  and  foreign.  Doctor  Austin  Phelps  thus 
emphasizes  the  importance  of  a  patient  groping  after 
the  right  word : 

"Do  we  not,"  he  asks,  "often  fret  for  the  right  word,  which 
is  just  outside  the  closed  door  of  memory?  We  know  that  there 
is  such  a  word;  we  know  that  it  is  precisely  the  word  we  want; 
no  other  can  fill  its  place;  we  saw  it  mentally  a  short  half -hour 
ago;  but  we  beat  the  air  for  it  now.  The  power  we  crave  is 
the  power  to  store  words  within  reach,  and  hold  them  in  mental 
reserve  till  they  are  wanted,  and  then  restore  them  by  the  mental 
vibration  of  a  thought.  Nothing  can  give  it  to  us  but  study  and 
use  of  the  language  in  long-continued  and  critical  practice."  Again 
he  says:  "By  such  studies,  when  combined  with  scholarly  use 
of  language  of  a  laborious  profession,  a  man  masters  words  singly, 
words  in  combinations,  words  in  varieties  of  sense,  words  in 
figurative  uses,  and  those  forms  of  expression  which  always  lie 
latent  in  original  uses  of  one's  mother  tongue."  * 

•  "  Memory,"  by  Hermann  Ebbinghaus,  translated  by  Henry  A.  Ruger. 
'"The  Making  of  an  Oration/'  C.  M.  Brink,  p.  109.     (McClurg.) 


206  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

There  are  few  neutral  words  in  our  language,  that  Is, 
words  without  the  experiences  of  past  associations.  In- 
deed, neutrality  in  words  is  almost  as  rare  as  neutrality 
in  patriotism.  Professor  L.  W.  Smith  gives  the  usual 
division  of  words  into  impersonal  words  and  personal 
words,  and  shows  that  the  words  which  give  a  writing 
its  literary  character  are  personal.  Impersonal  words 
are  used  for  clarity,  simplicity,  and  precision;  but  per- 
sonal words  are  used  for  strength  (orientation,  energy, 
dignity,  weight) ,  for  emphasis,  and  for  beauty  (harmony, 
euphony,  speech  figures).    He  continues: 

We  should  always  strive  to  write  clearly,  and  we  should  also 
strive  to  write  as  simply  as  is  consistent  with  writing  concisely. 
If  a  subject  is  difficult,  it  may  not  be  possible  to  deal  with  it 
in  a  simple  manner  and  yet  achieve  accuracy.  In  the  degree 
in  which  the  subject  and  our  interest  in  it  permit,  however,  we 
should  be  clear,  simple,  and  precise  in  everything  we  write.  Evi- 
dently, then,  the  qualities  that  make  a  writing  personal,  that 
give  it  literary  character,  are  additions  to  the  simple  qualities 
when  purpose  does  not  go  beyond  that  of  establishing  under- 
standing of  the  author's  meaning.^ 

Likewise,  in  the  speech  of  the  normal  man,  personal 
words  are  as  natural  as  the  light  in  the  eye,  the  smile 
on  his  countenance,  or  his  gesture  of  hand  or  body. 

Words  are  as  temperamental  as  the  individuals  who 
employ  them.  They  may  be  regarded,  theoretically, 
as  counters  in  a  process  of  intellectual  exchange;  but 
practically,  such  symbols  of  thought  usually  manifest 
personality  and  feehng,  and  appeal  to  old  experiences. 
Even  general  or  abstract  words,  such  as  faith,  power, 
duty,   enemy,   soldier,   have   emotional  associations,   as 

i"The  Mechanism  of  English  Speech,"  Lewis  Worthington  Smith, 
p.  12.     (Oxford.) 


SUGGESTION  IX   ARGUMENT  207 

well  as  simple  or  concrete  words,  like  father,  mother,  or 
home.  Indeed,  impersonal  terms  hardly  exist  outside 
the  sciences;  and  in  public  speaking,  they  do  so  only 
in  those  occasional  instances  where  clearness  only  is 
needed,  as  in  addresses  before  purely  technical  bodies. 
There  is  no  feeling,  for  instance,  in  the  abstract  state- 
ment that  the  sum  of  the  angles  of  a  triangle  is  equal 
to  two  right  angles.  On  the  other  hand,  take  such  a 
random  list  of  words  as  the  following: 

Tartar,  Hun,  Vallombrosa,  Mesopotamia,  Tophet,  Paradise, 
Eden;  copperhead,  jingo,  protectionism,  pension,  free  trade, 
civil  service,  Monroe  Doctrine;  rose,  alcohol,  cabbage,  turkey, 
tobacco,  apple,  roast  pig;  reeking,  rollicking,  working,  playing, 
hunting,  fishing,  crying;  eat,  swim,  dive,  run,  blow,  rest,  sleep. 

Such  words  produce  overtones  of  suggestion  which 
cause  emotional  judgments,  and  the  bare  mention  of 
their  names  may  awaken  in  others  in  varying  degrees 
the  experiences  of  earlier  associations.  Thus,  Hterature, 
art,  business,  and  all  forms  of  public  speech  are  largely, 
though  often  unconsciously,  dependent  for  effectiveness 
on  the  hidden  emotional  associations  which  lurk  in  our 
common  speech. 

Variability  of  Meanings. — The  ever-changing  char- 
acter of  the  meanings  of  words  is  sometimes  due  to  the 
speaker  himself,  and  sometimes  to  the  listener. 

I.     Due  to  the  speaker. 

Vocal  Shadings. — Obviously,  a  different  color  of  mean- 
ing may  be  imparted  to  words  through  the  manner  of 
their  utterance.  You  have  probably  heard  an  Irish- 
man say,  "Good  morning,"  in  such  a  manner  as  to  re- 
member it  all  day.  You  have  also  no  doubt  occasionally 
heard  a  speaker  who,  through  egotism  or  vanity,  through 


208  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

ignorance  or  spurious  art,  has  displeased  or  disgusted 
you.  I  shall  do  no  more  here  than  to  mention  the  great 
possibilities  for  shading  in  the  use  of  that  marvellous 
musical  instrument — the  voice — and  the  equally  marvel- 
lous capacity  of  the  brain  to  analyze  and  interpret  au- 
ditory impressions. 

Negatively,  the  most  common  faults  in  speech  utter- 
ance which  may  inhibit  meaning  are,  perhaps,  poor 
articulation  and  enunciation,  throaty  constringency, 
nasaUty,  and  monotony  of  tone.  The  most  pleasing 
voice,  therefore,  and  the  voice  most  likely  to  convey 
the  intended  meaning,  possesses  freedom,  flexibility,  and 
variety;  and  in  quality  is  pure,  clear,  round,  fairly  mu- 
sical and  fairly  deep  and  rich. 

II.     Due  to  the  listener. 

a.  The  mental  level. 

h.  The  psychological  moment. 

There  is  also  a  variation  of  meaning  due  to  the  lis- 
tener. Since  word  meanings  are  so  dependent  upon 
experience,  it  remains  to  be  pointed  out  how  word  mean- 
ings will  vary  on  this  account  with  different  listeners. 
Meanings  are  not  constant  either  among  individuals  at 
the  same  time  or  among  the  same  individuals  at  dif- 
ferent times.  Thus,  there  is  the  law  of  the  mental  level 
as  applied  to  words.  Illustrations :  The  Indo-European 
family  of  languages  includes  eight  branches,  as  follows: 
The  Aryan,  the  Armenian,  the  Hellenic,  the  Albanian, 
the  Italic,  the  Celtic,  the  Balto-Slavic,  the  Teutonic.^ 
A  mention  of  these  names  opens  trains  of  associations 
to  the  linguistic  scholar  which  floods  them  with  signif- 
icance;  while  to  the  uninformed  reader  they  are  as  de- 

1  "The  History  of  the  English  Language,"  O.  F.  Emerson.  (Macmil- 
lan.) 


SUGGESTION  IN  ARGUMENT  209 

void  of  meaning  as  if  they  were  written  in  Choctaw. 
Again,  this  may  be  illustrated  by  the  use  of  learned  or 
technical  terms.  In  speaking  of  the  vagueness  and  un- 
intelligibihty  of  some  German  writers,  Boris  Sidis  ridi- 
cules Hegelian  philosophical  speculation  by  quoting 
from  Hegel's  chapter  on  perception: 

"The  this  is  thus  given  as  not  this,  or  as  sublimated,  and  there- 
with not  nothing,  but  a  definite  nothing,  or  a  nothing  having  a 
content,  namely  the  this.^^  The  itahcs  are  Hegel's.  The  sense 
is  chiefly  in  the  suggestive  power  of  the  itahcs.  Such  meta- 
physical speculations  are  recommended  by  some  Hegelians  as 
the  profoundest  wisdom  of  idealistic  philosophy.  One  is  re- 
minded of  the  semi-Platonic,  semi-Hegelian  definition  of  love: 
"  Love  is  the  ideality  of  the  relativity  of  reality  of  an  infinitesimal 
part  of  the  infinite  totality  of  the  Absolute  Being."  ^ 

Another  important  consideration  is  the  verbal  law 
of  the  psychological  moment,  for  words,  like  fashions  in 
dress,  have  their  seasons.  I  feel  sure  that  ice  and  coal 
bear  a  different  significance  in  summer  than  in  winter. 
Football  terms,  which  are  readily  bandied  about  in  the 
autumn,  become  almost  obsolete  during  the  athletic 
periods  of  baseball,  rowing,  and  tennis.  There  are,  in- 
deed, words  of  the  hour,  which  for  some  special  reason 
are  suddenly  lifted  bodily  out  of  the  dictionary  and 
translated  as  if  by  magic  into  meanings  of  transcendent 
power.  In  this  class  was  the  word  peace,  when  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  in  February,  191 7,  proposed  to  all  the  Eu- 
ropean belHgerents  the  formation  of  a  league  to  enforce 
peace  after  the  war.  By  April,  however,  of  the  same 
year,  it  was  war,  which  had  become  capitalized  in  the 
public  mind,  and  peace  was  being  written  with  a  small 
letter.    I  doubt  if  the  word  coincidence  was  ever  more 

•  "The  Psychology  of  Laughter,"  Boris  Sidis,  p.  22.    (.^pplcton.) 


210  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

fraught  with  meaning  than  on  July  4,  1824.  On  this 
day,  which  was  the  semicentennial  anniversary  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  Jefferson  and  Adams  both 
passed  away.  The  name  of  the  hero  of  the  hour  is  usually 
expected  to  elicit  a  demonstration. 

Thus,  the  meaning  values  of  images  suggested  will 
vary  with  speakers,  and  will  vary  with  the  experience 
of  listeners;  which,  in  turn,  vary  from  time  to  time,  as 
does  the  bullion  which  goes  to  make  up  the  silver  dollar. 
Moreover,  the  shadings  and  adjustments  given  to  ges- 
ture images  and  to  word  images  demand  for  their  effec- 
tiveness the  consideration  of  such  factors  as  the  mental 
receptivity  of  the  particular  Hstener  and  the  inevitable 
emotion-bearing  element  hidden  in  words  of  the  partic- 
ular moment.  Some  plants  grow  only  in  certain  soils, 
while  some  blossom  best  in  particular  seasons  of  the 
year. 

Imagery  an  Imperfect  Means. — The  best  we  can  ever 
do  with  such  an  imperfect  means  as  word  imagery  is 
to  arrive  at  approximate  truth.  Moreover,  in  our  theory 
of  reasoning,  it  seems  we  must  strike  an  average  between 
the  logic  of  categories  and  pure  empiricism.  We  must 
admit  the  inherent  capacity  of  the  mind  to  reason,  but 
then  we  must  admit,  also,  the  necessity  of  explaining 
this  process  by  an  objective  reference.  Even  Aristotle's 
association  laws  are  merely  an  explanation  of  the  sort 
of  "hunt"  he  would  go  on  in  order  to  call  to  mind  some- 
thing which  he  had  forgotten.  He  asks  what  is  its  like, 
what  is  its  contrary,  or  what  it  was  next  to  in  space  or 
time. 

Fundamentally,  we  start  with  an  idea,  we  give  it  an 
objective  reference  or  test;  but  the  words  used  to  image 
the  idea  will  remain  an  indefinite  variable,  ever  open 


SUGGESTION   IN   ARGUMENT  211 

to  error  and  correction.  Fortunately,  in  argument  it  is 
sufficient  if  we  employ  sincerely  such  means  as  we  are 
provided  with,  and  so  are  enabled  to  resolve  differences 
of  opinion  by  overcoming  probable  error  or  by  estab- 
lishing probable  truth.  The  end  of  education  indeed 
is  not  only  to  know  the  truth,  but  to  make  it  known. 
Learning  is  not  a  light  hidden  under  a  bushel,  but  a 
torch  to  be  held  aloft.  These  limitations  of  imagery, 
moreover,  hold  to  a  certain  extent  for  the  finding  and 
statement  of  knowledge,  as  well  as  for  its  dissemination. 
Two  further  remarks  may  be  made.  First,  that  it  is 
precisely  this  plasticity  of  imagery  which  gives  to  the 
speaker  or  writer  his  opportunity  for  freedom  and  in- 
dividuality, and  enables  us  to  dignify  his  best  products 
by  the  name  of  art  in  the  higher  sense  at  once  difificult 
and  interesting  to  create.  Second,  that  the  attainment 
of  success  in  debating  demands  sterHng  honesty  and 
sincerity — in  a  word,  character. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
INSTRUMENTS   OF   SUGGESTION 

The  debater  should  acquire  a  discriminating  use  of 
words.  He  needs  not  only  accurate  or  precise  words 
but  suggestive  words,  words  rich  in  associations,  emo- 
tion-arousing words,  and,  of  course,  a  copious  vocabulary. 
For  this  purpose,  he  may  pursue  any  line  of  reading  or 
study  which  will  lead  him  to  consider  for  himself  such 
things  as  the  connotations  of  words,  the  synonyms  and 
antonyms  of  words  used  by  great  writers  and  speakers, 
and  the  history  and  etymology  of  words.  He  should 
know  the  primal  or  root  meanings  of  words,  and  be  able 
to  compare  them  with  their  customary  meanings,  so 
as  to  keep  as  close  as  possible  to  these  primal  or  root 
meanings.  In  accomplishing  this,  Latin  of  course  is  the 
great  linguistic  study,  but  translating  from  the  Greek 
and  modern  languages  is  of  great  assistance.  Indirectly, 
good  reading  and  the  study  of  languages;  directly,  a 
study  of  the  dictionary;  books  of  synon3ans  are  espe- 
cially commended. 

Verbal  meanings  and  tonal  meanings,  which  are  de- 
rived from  antecedent  experiences,  will  generally  do 
more  in  getting  attention,  and  in  impressing  others  with 
the  interesting  and  solid  character  of  one's  ideas,  than 
verbal  commonplaces  which  are  only  precise.  A  man's 
speech,  however,  is  the  mirror  of  himself.    Indeed,  it  is 

212 


INSTRUMENTS   OF   SUGGESTION  213 

so  largely  a  product  of  his  education,  environment,  and 
natural  ability,  so  individual  and  personal,  that  any 
advice  given  must  recognize  as  fundamental  the  in- 
alienable right  of  an  individual  to  choose  his  words  as 
he  chooses  his  friends. 

Let  us,  then,  return  to  the  elementary  notion  of  re- 
garding words  as  images  of  ideas,  not  only  that  we  may 
present  them  effectively,  but  in  order  to  keep  our  vo- 
cabulary from  '  becoming  impoverished.  The  business 
man  who  writes,  "Yours  of  even  date  received.  In 
reply,  I  would  state  .  .  .  Yours  very  truly,"  is  likely 
always  to  be  a  man  of  limited  vocabulary.  The  words 
of  a  speaker,  however,  are  not  mere  automata,  but  vital 
energies  of  human  thought  and  life,  possessing  an  in- 
finite variety  of  meanings  in  their  nuances  of  etymo- 
logical significance,  customary  or  special  usages,  and 
practical  applications.  The  speaker  must  know  his 
words  as  the  engineer  the  strength  of  his  materials  and 
the  stability  of  his  structures;  he  must  also  know  them 
as  the  harpist  knows  his  strings  and  the  painter  his  colors. 
He  is  both  scientist  and  artist.  Words,  in  fine,  are  the 
most  important  elements  in  the  instrumentation  of 
ideas  by  civilized  man.  Word  imagery,  tonal  and  illus- 
trative, always  essential  to  effective  presentation,  is 
equally  important  to  personal  growth  in  the  use  of  these 
instruments,  in  imparting,  in  receiving,  and  in  inter- 
preting the  meanings  intended  to  be  transmitted.  They 
express  the  finesse  as  well  as  the  soHdity  of  thinking. 

I.  Tonal  Imagery. — This  term  is  used  (in  contra- 
distinction to  illustrative  imagery,  or  imagery  of  the 
content)  to  describe  all  those  subconscious  influences 
upon  the  thinking  which  are  due  to  sounds,  and  includes 
onomatopoeia  and  rhythm.     Their  primary    function  is 


214  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

aesthetic  or  emotional,  so  that  they  are  more  important 
to  music,  the  dance,  poetry,  and  certain  forms  of  oratory, 
than  to  argumentative  discourse. 

Onomatopoeia  is  only  an  auxihary  of  argument.  A 
word  or  phrase  used  to  illustrate  the  content  of  an  idea 
is  more  striking  if  the  vowel  or  consonant  combinations 
which  go  to  make  it  up  imitate  or  tonally  suggest  the 
object  or  action  referred  to.  It  intensifies  an  auditory 
suggestion.  Ordinarily,  moreover,  we  prefer  euphonious 
to  cacophonous  words.  Ex-President  Roosevelt's  mes- 
sage in  the  spring  of  191 7  was  summed  up  in  the  strik- 
ing phrase:  "Arm  and  Farm." 

Rhythm  is  the  recurrence  of  accented  and  unaccented, 
of  emphasized  and  unemphasized,  words  or  syllables. 
In  poetry,  there  is  a  definite  unit  of  measure  called  a 
foot,  but  the  rhythm  of  prose  possesses  much  greater 
freedom,  and  is  more  noticeable  in  spoken  than  in  written 
forms.  , 

Prose  passages  which  are  most  regularly  rhythmical 
are  usually  those  which  are  most  emotional;  e.  g.,  Dick- 
ens's description  of  the  death  of  Paul  Dombey.  In  his 
classical  collection,  "British  Eloquence,"  Professor  Good- 
rich twice  makes  note  of  the  rhythmus:  once  in  the 
speech  by  Plenry  Grattan  on  "Irish  Rights,"  and  again 
in  Lord  Erskine's  "Defence  of  Stockdale."  The  former 
is  slow  and  dignified,  while  the  latter  possesses  a  more 
rapid,  iambic  movement: 

(i)  "Hereafter,  when  these  things  shall  be  history,  your  age 
of  thraldom,  your  sudden  resurrection,  commercial  redress,  and 
miraculous  armament,  shall  the  historian  stop  at  liberty,  and 
observe  that  here  the  principal  men  among  us  were  found  want- 
ing, were  awed  by  a  weak  ministry,  bribed  by  an  empty  treasury; 
and  when  liberty  was  within  their  grasp,  and  her  temple  opened 


INSTRUMENTS   OF   SUGGESTION  215 

its  folding  doors,  fell  down  and  were  prostituted  at  the  thresh- 
old?" 

"I  might,  as  a  constituent,  come  to  your  bar  and  demand  my 
liberty.  I  do  call  upon  you  by  the  laws  of  the  land,  and  their 
violation;  by  the  instructions  of  eighteen  counties;  by  the  arms, 
inspiration,  and  providence  of  the  present  moment — tell  us 
the  rule  by  which  we  shall  go;  assert  the  law  of  Ireland;  declare 
the  liberty  of  the  land !  I  will  not  be  answered  by  a  public  lie, 
in  the  shape  of  an  amendment;  nor,  speaking  for  the  subjects' 
freedom,  am  I  to  hear  of  faction.  I  -wish  for  nothing  but  to 
breathe  in  this  our  island,  in  common  with  my  fellow  subjects, 
the  air  of  liberty.  I  have  no  ambition,  unless  it  be  to  break  your 
chain  and  contemplate  your  glory.  I  never  will  be  satisfied  so 
long  as  the  meanest  cottager  in  Ireland  has  a  link  of  the  British 
chain  clanking  to  his  rags.  He  may  be  naked,  he  shall  not  be 
in  irons.  And  I  do  see  the  time  at  hand;  the  spirit  is  gone  forth; 
the  Declaration  of  Right  is  planted,  and  though  great  men  should 
fall  off,  yet  the  cause  shall  live;  and  though  he  who  utters  this 
should  die,  yet  the  immortal  fire  shall  outlast  the  humble  organ 
who  conveys  it,  and  the  breath  of  liberty.  Like  the  word  of  the 
holy  man,  will  not  die  with  the  prophet,  but  survive  him." 

(2)  ''Gentlemen,  I  think  I  can  observe  that  you  are  touched 
with  this  way  of  considering  the  subject,  and  I  can  account  for  it. 
I  have  not  been  considering  it  through  the  cold  medium  of  books, 
but  have  been  speaking  of  man  and  his  nature,  and  of  human 
dominion,  from  what  I  have  seen  of  them  myself  among  reluc- 
tant nations  submitting  to  our  authority.  I  know  what  they 
feel,  and  how  such  feelings  can  alone  be  repressed.  I  have  heard 
them  in  my  youth  from  a  naked  savage,  in  the  indignant  char- 
acter of  a  prince  surrounded  by  his  subjects,  addressing  the 
governor  of  a  British  colony,  holding  a  bundle  of  sticks  in  his 
hand,  as  the  notes  of  his  unlettered  eloquence.  'Who  is  it,' 
said  the  jealous  ruler  over  the  desert,  encroached  upon  by  the 
restless  foot  of  English  adventure,  'who  is  it  that  causes  this 
river  to  rise  in  the  high  mountains,  and  to  empty  itself  into  the 
ocean  ?  Who  is  it  that  causes  to  blow  the  loud  winds  of  winter, 
and  that  calms  them  again  in  summer?    Who  is  it  that  rears 


216  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

up  the  shade  of  those  lofty  forests,  and  blasts  them  with  the 
quick  hghtning  at  his  pleasure?  The  same  Being  who  gave 
to  you  a  country  on  the  other  side  of  the  waters,  and  gave  ours 
to  us;  and  by  this  title  we  will  defend  it,'  said  the  warrior,  throw- 
ing down  his  tomahawk  upon  the  ground,  and  raising  the  war- 
sound  of  his  nation.  These  are  the  feelings  of  subjugated  man 
all  round  the  globe;  and  depend  upon  it,  nothing  but  fear  will 
control  where  it  is  vain  to  look  for  affection." 

It  has  recently  been  asserted,  that  while  rhythm  is 
primarily  aesthetic  in  aim  and  function,  secondarily  it 
"assists  the  thinking."  This  is  true  only  if  the  emphasis 
in  speaking  is  properly  made  dependent  on  the  sense 
of  the  passage,  on  the  thought  groups  rather  than  on 
sound  groups. 

In  keeping  time  with  rhythm  our  muscles  contract  with  the 
accented  and  relax  with  the  unaccented  part  of  the  foot  or  line. 
This  contraction  of  the  muscles  is  an  influence  beneficial  in  pro- 
ducing a  rise  of  the  attention.  Our  attention  is  best  employed 
when  periods  of  activity  are  followed  by  periods  of  rest.^ 

Similarly,  while  writing  in  another  connection,  an- 
other psychologist  refers  to  "expectancy"  as  resulting 
from  our  "flow"  of  speech: 

The  articulate  voice  per  se  seems,  then,  to  have  a  function  of 
pointing,  i.  e.,  of  leaving  us  expectant  and  ready,  even  when 
there  is  no  content  pointed  to.  Every  one  has  the  experience 
of  listening  to  others  conversing  in  an  unknown  tongue  (Chinese 
laundrymen,  for  instance),  where  there  is  not  the  remotest  con- 
ception of  the  subject  in  hand,  yet  a  feeling  of  significance  ac- 
companies the  floiv  of  uncomprehended  talk.  Those  who  do  not 
understand  French  or  Italian  well  enough  to  follow  the  connec- 
tion in  a  play,  will  leave  the  theatre  with  the  impression  of  hav- 
ing understood  every  word  said.    In  these  cases  the  expectancy, 

J  "Psychology  of  Public  Speaking,"  W.  D.  Scott,  loi. 


INSTRUMENTS  OF  SUGGESTION  217 

the  pointing  consciousness  has  been  there,  the  feeling  of  other- 
ness or  of  significance,  although  there  was  no  subsequent  content 
to  fill  it  up.i 

When  the  emphasis  is  placed  on  sound  groups  rather 
than  on  thought  groups,  the  effect  is  likely  to  lull  rather 
than  to  arouse. 

2.  Illustrative  imagery  or  imagery  of  the  content  may 
be  classified  as  objective  or  subjective,  according  as  it 
omits  or  expresses  the  emotions  of  the  speaker.  ^ 

Classical  illustrations  of  the  impersonal  objective  image 
which  are  formed  by  analogy  are  Gibbon's  description 
of  Byzantium  in  the  form  of  an  unequal  triangle  ("De- 
cline and  FaU  of  the  Roman  Empire,  XVII"),  Victor 
Hugo's  battle-field  of  Waterloo  presented  in  the  form  of 
the  letter  A  ("Les  Miserables"),  and  Stevenson's  like- 
ness of  the  Bay  of  Monterey  to  a  bent  fishing-hook 
("Across  the  Plains"). 

Every  pubhc  speaker  soon  learns  the  value  of  a 
mental  sketch-map  as  an  aid  to  the  understanding  of 
an  audience.  Webster  presents  a  vivid  picture  of  the 
opening  situation  in  the  Hayne- Webster  debate  by  re- 
ferring to  the  fact  that  when  the  mariner,  after  being 
tossed  at  sea  for  many  days,  attains  a  glance  of  the  sun, 
he  immediately  takes  his  latitude,  and  learns  his  true 
position.  So  Webster  argues  that  before  we  float  farther 
on  the  waves  of  this  debate  we  should  ascertain  where 
we  now  are,  and  concludes  by  calling  for  a  reading  of 
the  resolution  before  the  Senate.  In  debating,  the  func- 
tion of  an  image  is  just  as  properly  to  convey  informa- 
tion which  impHes  a  conclusion  as  it  is  to  secure  atten- 

'  The  Psychological  Review,  Monograph  Supplement  No.  30,  by  Eleanor 
H.  Rowland,  p.  7. 


218  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

tion  and  interest  through  an  emotional  reaction.  Unless 
reliance  is  placed  upon  reason,  in  controversial  matters 
the  process,  indeed,  becomes  one  of  persuasion,  and  is 
not  argument  at  all.  The  debater,  therefore,  should 
acquire  skill  in  the  use  of  the  objective  image.  He  may- 
use  this  skill  in  the  introduction,  where  impartiality  is 
requisite  without  implying  a  conclusion,  as  in  imaging 
the  terms  of  the  proposition  under  discussion,  or  in  ex- 
cluding irrelevant  matter,  or  in  explaining  by  analogy 
what  the  issue  is  like.  Moreover,  during  the  debate, 
whenever  the  reasoning  is  to  be  set  forth  impressively, 
such  objective  images  have  place.  But  there  is  also 
an  effective  expository  type  of  argument,  where  con- 
clusions are  not  fonnally  drawn  but  implied  through  the 
association  of  ideas  well  imaged.  Thus,  signs  and  ex- 
amples have  force  and  convey  meaning  in  the  presenta- 
tion of  those  ideas  which  we  know  rest  ultimately  upon 
unstated  but  remotely  suggested  inductions  or  causal  re- 
lationships. That  which  we  perceive,  we  know;  seeing 
is  believing.  Such  images  used  with  argumentative 
effect  express  the  relation  of  simple  association  and 
resemblance,  and  imply  those  of  particular  with  general 
or  of  antecedent  with  consequent. 

Avoiding  Personalities. — Argument,  moreover,  pre- 
supposes sufficient  emotional  color  to  enable  a  listener 
to  reach  a  sound  judgment.  The  tendency,  however, 
to  personalities  which  lower  the  intellectual  tone  of  an 
argument  is  always  to  be  avoided.  If,  at  length,  per- 
sonal charges  are  found  to  be  necessary,  they  should, 
of  course,  be  made  as  free  from  feeling  as  possible  and 
always  with  a  full  consideration  of  an  opponent's  point 
of  view.  In  the  passage  beginning  "Matches  and  Over- 
matches," Webster  met  the  personal  taunts  of  Hayne 


INSTRUMENTS  OF  SUGGESTION  219 

with  a  reserve  of  feeling,  a  dignity,  and  exaggerated 
courtesy  which  intensified  the  power  of  his  sarcasm. 
In  the  heat  of  debate,  even  Lincoln,  who  was  calmness 
itself  in  his  second  inaugural,  sometimes  went  too  far 
in  his  earlier  days,  as  in  his  personal  attacks  on  Presi- 
dent Polk.  Certainly  his  Framed  Timber  Analogy  in 
the  House-Divided-Against-Itself  speech  possesses  more 
argumentative  merit  than  such  a  passage  as  the  fol- 
lowing: 

But  if  he  cannot  or  will  not  do  this — if  on  any  pretense  or 
no  pretense  he  shall  refuse  or  omit  it — then  I  shall  be  fully  con- 
vinced of  what  I  more  than  suspect  already — that  he  is  deeply 
conscious  of  being  in  the  wrong;  that  he  feels  the  blood  of  this 
war,  like  the  blood  of  Abel,  is  crying  to  Heaven  against  him; 
that  originally  having  some  strong  motive — what,  I  will  not 
stop  now  to  give  my  opinion  concerning — to  involve  the  two 
countries  in  a  war,  and  trusting  to  escape  scrutiny  by  fixing 
the  pubhc  gaze  upon  the  exceeding  brightness  of  military  glory- 
that  attractive  rainbow  that  rises  in  showers  of  blood — that 
serpent's  eye  that  charms  to  destroy — he  plunged  into  it,  and 
has  swept  on  and  on  till,  disappointed  in  his  calculation  of  the 
ease  with  which  Mexico  might  be  subdued,  he  now  finds  himself 
he  knows  not  where.  How  like  the  half-insane  mumbling  of  a 
fever  dream  is  the  whole  war  part  of  his  late  message ! 

Something,  however,  may  perhaps  be  here  pardoned 
to  the  temper  of  the  times. 

Subjective  images  are  the  commonest  type,  even  in 
debating.  They  tend  to  awaken  in  the  hearer  personal 
feelings,  either  favorable  or  unfavorable.  Feeling  begets 
feeling.  It  is  very  difficult  to  describe  a  thing,  let  us 
say,  as  beautiful  or  as  just,  without  manifesting  quite 
unconsciously  some  pleasure  concerning  it,  or  as  ugly 
or  unjust,  without  evincing  some  feeling  of  dislike,  aver- 
sion, or  even  contempt.    With  some  persons  a  beautiful 


220  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF   DEBATE 

view  is  always  a  "charming"  one,  and  a  thing  ugly  in 
appearance  may  quickly  become  hideous  and  hateful. 
Thus,  there  is  value  in  learning,  through  a  study  of 
synonyms,  the  temperaments  of  words. 

In  the  following,  the  itaHcized  words  give  it  an  emo- 
tional quality: 

We  can  organize  an  army  on  either  the  plan  submitted  by 
the  majority  of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  or  that  of 
the  minority.  Both  provide  conscription,  but  that  of  the  ma- 
jority makes  the  stronger  appeal  to  me.  It  does  not  insult  the 
young  men  of  the  country  by  assuming  that  they  will  not  do 
as  the  young  men  of  England  did,  come  voluntarily  to  their 
country's  assistance.  My  contention  is  that  the  drastic  method, 
the  odious  conscription  plan,  should  not  be  resorted  to  until 
a  chance  has  been  given  for  getting  men  into  the  army  on  a  basis 
that  is  generally  regarded  as  honorable.  Even  advocates  of  the 
conscription  system  say  that  it  is  inadvisable  to  have  volun- 
teers and  conscripts  in  the  same  army,  because  the  former  are 
thought  to  have  a  more  honorable  status.  I  fancy  this  must 
be  true,  for  certainly  they  will  be  the  men  of  spirit,  who  do  not 
require  compulsion  to  bring  them  to  the  defense  of  their  coun- 
try. 

In  a  recent  debate  on  the  compulsory  investigation 
of  labor  troubles  before  strikes  and  lockouts  should  take 
place,  an  affirmative  speaker  imaged  his  main  conten- 
tion vividly  as  follows:  "The  economic  forces  of  our 
country  may  be  likened  unto  a  sword,  one  edge  of  which 
is  capital,  the  other  labor.  Periodically,  the  pubHc 
is  asked  to  take  hold  of  this  sword,  with  the  result 
that  it  gashes  its  hand.  We  of  the  affirmative  have 
provided  a  hilt  for  that  sword.  The  hilt  is  ready — 
compulsory  investigation.  Will  you  reach  for  it  and 
grasp  it?" 

As  emotions  have  been  classified  broadly  into  ap- 


INSTRUMENTS   OF  SUGGESTION  221 

proving  and  disapproving,  so  subjective  images  may  be 
classified  as  appro\dng  and  disapproving  images.  So  we 
have  the  imagery  of  the  eulogy  and  that  of  the  phiUppic. 
It  should  be  remembered,  however,  that  we  will  some- 
times seek  approval  for  a  cause,  object,  or  person,  by 
awakening  a  dislike  or  disapproval  of  the  opposite.  Some 
political  campaigns  seem  to  be  conducted  on  this  prin- 
ciple. Ob\4ously,  the  suggestions  offered  on  the  affirma- 
tive and  negative  sides  in  a  debate  need  not  always 
be,  for  the  affirmative  one  of  approval,  or  for  the  nega- 
tive one  of  disapproval.  Neither  side  need  confine  it- 
self to  one  set  of  emotions  or  harp  too  continually  on 
one  string.  The  affirmative,  for  instance,  will  image 
evils  in  an  existing  system  to  be  remedied,  or  will  sug- 
gest objections  to  the  negative  case;  while  the  negative 
side  may  seek  not  merely  to  estabHsh  a  negation  but 
to  secure  approval  for  a  substitute  plan. 

Personal  Adjectives. — The  excessive  use  of  personal 
adjectives  is  especially  to  be  avoided  in  argument,  for, 
of  all  the  parts  of  speech,  adjectives  seem  most  commonly 
to  possess  "an  affective  coloring."  No  words  expressive 
of  feeling  are  really  justified  in  argument  unless  that 
feeling  is  also  justified  by  evidence  and  reasoning.  The 
word  odious,  for  instance,  in  the  phrase  "the  odious 
plan"  above,  really  begs  the  question  at  issue.  The 
characterization  of  an  argument  by  an  adjective  of  feel- 
ing (after  the  argument  has  been  clearly  established) 
is  another  matter,  provided  it  expresses  the  reaction 
also  clearly  experienced  by  others. 

In  studying  synonyms,  therefore,  to  enrich  one's  vo- 
cabulary, attention  should  always  be  paid  to  this  dis- 
tinction between  subjective  and  objective  adjectives. 
A  synonym,  it  may  be  said,  is  not  a  word  whose  mean- 


222  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

ing  is  identical  with  that  of  another,  but  similar.  It 
possesses  a  family  rather  than  an  individual  likeness, 
the  points  of  difference  at  the  moment  being  regarded 
as  unimportant. 

Many  speakers  have  their  characteristic  adjectives. 
Referring  to  Rufus  Choate's  use  of  adjectives,  it  was 
once  said  that  he  "drove  a  coach  and  six,"  each  new 
adjective  applied  adding  something  new  to  the  picture, 
giving  it  an  increased  vividness  and  the  hearer  a  new 
delight.  On  the  other  hand,  William  Pinkney,  for  many 
years  his  rival  for  legal  supremacy  during  the  adjudica- 
tion of  marine  cases  arising  out  of  the  War  of  1812,  was 
at  times  as  sparse  in  adjectival  imagery  as  Choate  was 
copious. 

The  student  might  profitably  read  some  argum-ent 
and  make  a  report  of  it  on  the  following  plan:  First, 
write  down  in  one  column  a  list  of  the  adjectives  used. 
Second,  record  in  another  column,  opposite  each  word, 
a  Hst  of  its  synonyms.  Then  he  should  consider  the 
relative  appropriateness  of  the  several  words  to  the 
context,  and  also  their  intellectual  or  emotional  quahty. 
Similar  investigations  may  be  made  as  to  the  other  parts 
of  speech,  particularly  concrete  nouns,  verbs,  and  ad- 
verbs. 

All  the  parts  of  speech,  it  would  seem,  may  be  con- 
sidered as  imagery,  expressing  a  state  of  mind  having 
an  objective  reference.  We  should  cultivate  the  habit 
of  imaging  nouns  as  concrete  objects,  and  verbs  as  ac- 
tions. Adjectives  and  verbs  are  imaged  as  modifiers, 
respectively,  of  things  and  actions;  the  preposition 
with  suggests  the  accompaniment  of  things;  over  and 
under  the  position  of  things;  the  conjunction  and  the 
connection,  and  or  the  alternative  of  things,  etc. 


INSTRUMENTS   OF  SUGGESTION  223 

The  very  experience  of  a  concrete  noun  involves  associated 
images.  It  is  the  part  of  speech  devoted  to  that  unusual  habit 
of  mental  imagery,  especially  visual.  As  soon  as  we  ignore  our 
images,  or  for  some  reason  have  but  few,  our  vocabulary  is  im- 
poverished of  concrete  nouns. 

Observe  the  concrete  nouns  and  adjectives  by  which 
the  chief  justice  proves  to  Falstaff  that  he  is  an  old 
man: 

Do  you  set  down  your  name  in  the  scroll  of  youth,  that  are 
written  down  old  with  all  the  characters  of  age?  Have  you 
not  a  moist  eye ?  a  dry  hand?  a  yellow  cheek ?  a  white  beard? 
a  decreasing  leg ?  an  increasing  belly?  is  not  your  voice  broken? 
your  wind  short?  your  chin  double?  your  wit  simple?  and 
every  part  about  you  blasted  with  antiquity?  and  will  you  yet 
call  yourself  young?     Fie,  fie,  fie,  Sir  John! 

The  motor  response  to  verbs,  especially  in  the  im- 
perative form,  is  too  well  recognized  to  be  dwelt  upon. 
Doubtless  it  is  often  because  of  this  that,  when  we  wish 
to  avoid  bluntness  of  speech  invoking  action,  we  give 
the  verb  adverbial  or  other  modifiers. 

The  Apostle  Paul's  remarks  to  the  Corinthians,  upon 
the  abstract  virtue  charity  or  love,  illustrates  concrete 
suggestion  through  verbs: 

Charity  suffereth  long  and  is  kind;  charity  envieth  not; 
charity  vaunteth  not  itself,  is  not  puffed  up,  doth  not  behave 
itself  unseemly,  seeketh  not  her  own,  is  not  easily  provoked, 
thinketh  no  evil;  rejoiceth  not  in  iniquity  but  rejoiceth  in  the 
truth;  beareth  all  things,  believeth  ail  things,  hopeth  all  things, 
endureth  all  things. 

The  verbs  of  the  man  of  science  grow  in  significance 
when  they  are  imaged  concretely: 

From  the  time  that  the  first  suggestion  to  introduce  physical 
science  into  ordinary   education   was  timidly  whispered,   until 


224  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

now,  the  advocates  of  scientific  education  have  met  with  opposi- 
tion of  two  kinds.  On  the  one  hand,  they  have  been  pooh-poohed 
by  the  men  of  business  who  pride  themselves  in  being  the  represen- 
tatives of  practicaHty;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  they  have  been 
excommunicated  by  the  classical  scholars,  in  their  capacity  of 
Levites  in  charge  of  the  ark  of  culture  and  monopolists  of  liberal 
education. — {Thomas  H.  Huxley.) 

But  most  of  all,  perhaps,  the  debater  should  pay  at- 
tention to  his  use  of  adjectives,  for  they  express  the 
mental  attitude  and  the  emotion  of  the  speaker. 
Characterization,  however,  is  not  argument,  though 
often  an  important  aid  to  it.  Excessive  characteriza- 
tion is  quickly  detected,  and  defeats  its  own  ends. 

Adjectives  seem  to  be  more  intimate,  more  personal  words 
than  any  yet  given.  .  .  .  We  find  that  the  adjective  function 
in  general  is  that  of  expressing  the  intimate  effect  of  stimuli 
on  organism  and  at  the  same  time  of  pointing  to  an  object  as 
possessing  these  qualities,  and  it  is  more  likely  than  the  other 
parts  of  speech  to  have  an  afifective  coloring.^ 

The  following  passage  from  Sidney  Smith  may  illus- 
trate imaginative  suggestion  in  general,  marked  by  a 
peculiar  richness  of  diction: 

Take  some  quiet,  sober  moment  of  life,  and  add  together 
the  two  ideas  of  pride  and  man;  behold  him,  a  creature  of  a 
sphere  high,  stalking  through  infinite  space  in  all  the  grandeur 
of  littleness.  Perched  on  a  speck  of  the  universe,  every  wind 
of  heaven  strikes  into  his  blood  the  coldness  of  death;  his  soul 
floats  from  his  body  like  melody  from  the  string;  day  and  night, 
as  dust  on  the  wheel,  he  is  rolled  along  the  heavens,  through  a 
labyrinth  of  worlds,  and  all  the  creations  of  God  are  flaming 
above  and  beneath. 

^  Ths  Psychological  Review,  Monograph  Supplements,  No.  30,  by 
Eleanor  H.  Rowland,  pp.  19,  23. 


INSTRUMENTS  OF  SUGGESTION  225 

It  has  been  well  said  that ''  there  are  three  great  words 
in  expression — imagination,  sympathy,  and  suggestion." 
To  the  literary  artist,  the  greatest  of  these  is  imagi- 
nation, for  the  imagination  is  the  mental  source  of 
suggestion.  It  suggests  feehng,  it  suggests  thought. 
Through  its  dynamic  power  it  awakens  the  mental  ac- 
tivity of  others,  which  under  guidance  and  control  seems 
of  itself  to  reach  the  anticipated  goal — whether  that 
goal  be  the  perception  of  a  truth  or  the  performance  of 
an  action  desired.  Thus  the  verbal  image  is  the  natural 
agency  of  the  mind  in  conveying  its  ideas.  Nothing  is 
simpler,  except  gesture  and  facial  expression. 

"The  eye  it  cannot  choose  but  see, 
We  cannot  bid  the  ear  be  still, 
Our  bodies  feel  where'er  they  be 
Against  or  with  our  will." 

The  Phrase. — Fortunate,  indeed,  is  the  debater  who 
is  able  to  image  such  concepts  as  necessity,  advantage, 
and  danger,  when  they  are  fundamental  to  his  case, 
in  interest-arousing,  memorable  phrases.  Failing  in 
tliis,  like  most  pohtical  orators,  he  lays  stress  on  the 
power  of  the  quoted  phrase  or  epigram  which  appeals 
to  a  cherished  attitude  or  a  familiar  ideal.  Indeed,  even 
the  main  issues  of  a  debate  have  sometimes  been  so 
stated  as  almost  to  beg  the  main  question  at  issue.  This 
happened  quite  unconsciously,  for  example,  when  a 
negative  team,  opposing  the  participation  by  the  United 
States  in  a  league  of  peace  to  be  formed  after  the  war, 
defined  the  issue  as  freedom  and  independence  of  action 
versus  a  formal  alHance.  All  such  phrases  appeal  to 
emotional  judgments. 


226  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

The  power  of  the  phrase  has  been  emphasized  by 
Emerson  in  his  "Essay  on  Eloquence"  as  follows: 

The  orator  must  be,  to  a  certain  extent,  a  poet.  Condense 
some  daily  experience  into  a  glowing  symbol,  and  an  audience 
is  electrified.  ...  It  is  a  wonderful  aid  to  memory,  which  carries 
away  the  image,  and  never  loses  it.  A  popular  assembly,  like 
the  House  of  Commons,  or  the  French  Chamber,  or  the  Amer- 
ican Congress,  is  commanded  by  these  two  powers — first  by  a 
fact,  then  by  skill  of  statement.  Put  the  argument  into  a  con- 
crete shape,  into  an  image — some  hard  phrase,  round  and  solid 
as  a  ball,  which  they  can  see  and  handle  and  carry  home  with 
them — and  the  cause  is  half  won. 

An  effective  artistic  image  must  appeal  as  an  actuality 
or  truth  and  give  tlie  impression  of  spontaneity,  ob- 
taining its  effects  instantly  or  not  at  all.  It  is  simple, 
not  stilted  or  overwrought,  is  drawn  with  a  free  but 
sure  hand.  It  has  the  force  of  an  intuitive  perception 
whose  implications  and  suggestions  are  so  obvious  and 
compelling  as  to  be  inescapable.  It  is  a  psychological 
bow-shot  at  the  bull's-eye. 

Great  truths  which  have  influenced  the  policies  of 
this  nation  have,  on  great  occasions,  been  imaged  vividly 
as  a  mental  flash.  Washington  fixed  the  foreign  policy 
of  the  United  States  for  over  a  hundred  years  in  his 
Second  Inaugural  through  his  use  of  the  term  ''En- 
tangling AlUances."  Lincoln  defined  the  issues  which 
saved  the  Union  through  his  application  to  slavery  of 
the  Biblical  quotation  that  a  "house  divided  against 
itself  cannot  stand."  And  more  recently,  President 
Wilson  justified  America's  entrance  into  the  great  Eu- 
ropean War  by  a  phrase  whose  truth  was  instantly  per- 
ceived, recognized,  and  accepted,  namely,  that  we  must 
"make  the  world  safe  for  democracy."     Throughout 


INSTRUMENTS  OF  SUGGESTION  227 

the  century,  indeed,  slogans  of  parties  in  succeeding 
campaigns  have  figured  prominently  in  their  triumphs 
or  defeats.  The  mottoes  of  our  States,  and  in  ancient 
times  those  on  the  coats  of  arms  of  families,  served  as 
the  rallying  cries  for  loyalty,  devotion,  and  sacrifice. 

Sentence  Forms. — In  making  argument  effective, 
there  is  much  to  enhghten  us  in  the  psychology  of 
grammar  and  rhetoric.  Chief,  among  the  sentence  forms 
used  to  awaken  and  intensify  interest,  is  the  interroga- 
tory. 

(i)  Our  best  oratory  fairly  bristles  with  the  rhetorical 
question:  "Is  life  so  dear  or  peace  so  sweet  as  to  be  pur- 
chased at  the  price  of  chains  and  slavery?  Forbid  it, 
Almighty  God!"  Such  a  direct  appeal  has  an  advantage 
over  the  declarative  form,  in  that  it  starts  the  mind  of 
the  listener  to  thinking  and,  even  though  the  question 
suggests  the  answer,  seems  to  permit  it  to  reach  its  con- 
clusion by  its  own  processes.  Interest  is  secured  by 
setting  the  listener's  mind  to  work  under  the  speaker's 
control.  In  the  debate  on  the  Swiss  military  plan,  notice 
further  how  the  negative  massed  a  series  of  interroga- 
tories in  a  summary,  to  implant  the  doubt  that  the  af- 
firmative had  proved  their  case: 

You  have  heard  the  whole  case  of  the  affirmative.  Have  they 
shown  what  tremendous  change  has  come  about  in  our  condi- 
tion that  we  are  forced  to  forsake  sober  thought  and  turn  to  so 
radical  a  proposal?  Have  they  shown  why,  when  we  consider 
the  problem  of  defense,  we  are  to  find  its  solution  in  a  slavish 
imitation  of  a  system  used  and  developed  by  a  little  landlocked 
European  state  the  size  of  Massachusetts?  Have  you  heard  any 
reason  why  we  are  to  lay  such  tremendous  emphasis  upon  that 
branch  of  our  defense  which  is  secondary  in  character,  namely, 
our  land  forces?  Have  they  justified  by  necessity  their  proposal 
to  compel  every  normal  American  to  let  his  time  be  confiscated 


228  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

by  the  state  for  this  type  of  defense?  Have  they  shown  how  it 
is  economical  to  train  eleven  million  men?  Have  they  proved 
why  we  must  expose  ourselves  to  the  dangerous  national  psy- 
chology which  universal  military  training  develops?  Have  they 
proved  that  under  the  system  they  propose  we  will  at  least  have 
adequate,  real  defense?  Will  their  plan,  whatever  its  faults 
and  exaggerations  in  principle  and  application,  stand  the  acid 
test  of  war,  and  guarantee  us  at  least  safety  against  a  possible 
foe?    The  answer,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  is  emphatically  "No." 

Notice,  too,  the  compelling  force  of  the  skilfully 
phrased  questions  in  this  British  "War  Poster,"  almost 
brutal  in  their  directness: 

FOUR  QUESTIONS  TO  MEN  WHO  HAVE  NOT  ENLISTED 

1.  If  you  are  physically  fit  and  between  19  and  38  years  of 
age,  are  you  really  satisfied  with  what  you  are  doing  to-day? 

2.  Do  you  feel  happy  as  you  walk  along  the  streets  and  see 
other  men  wearing  the  King's  uniform? 

3.  What  will  you  say  in  years  to  come  when  people  ask  you: 
"Where  did  you  serve  in  the  great  war?" 

4.  What  would  you  answer  when  your  children  grow  up  and 
say:  "Father,  why  weren't  you  a  soldier  too?" 

ENLIST  TO-DAY 

The  interrogatory  may  suggest  the  answer  yes  as 
well  as  no,  and  interest  the  mind  in  the  most  difficult 
and  important  phases  of  any  subject.  It  is  intended 
to  bring  a  strong  reaction. 

(2)  When  the  experienced  lawyer  says  to  the  court, 
"Turn  to  folio  304  and  you  will  find,"  so  and  so,  he  hopes 
to  prompt  the  court  to  obey  his  suggestion  and  examine 
the  evidence.  Likewise,  the  seasoned  debater  knows 
that  when  he  tells  his  audience  to  follow  him  figuratively 
to  a  certain  quarter  of  the  globe,  it  will  usually  be  in- 


INSTRUMENTS   OF   SUGGESTION  229 

clined  at  least  to  the  mental  act.  The  imperative  form, 
however,  is  often  varied  with  the  more  courteous  or 
concessive  "If  you  will  turn,  if  you  will  follow  me,  you 
will  find,"  etc. 

(3)  It  must  not  be  supposed  from  tliis,  however,  that 
the  h}'pothetical  sentence  form  always  or  even  usually 
implies  courtesy  or  agreement.  Indeed,  the  over-argu- 
mentative "If,  therefore,"  style  often  awakens  opposi- 
tion and  combativeness,  for  it  may  imply  quite  unin- 
tentionally some  distrust  in  the  Kstener  and  actually 
raise  the  doubt  which  it  would  down.  In  speaking  to 
an  audience  which  is  antagonistic,  as,  for  example,  to  a 
body  of  h}^henated  Americans  on  "Foreign-Born  Amer- 
icans Real  Americans,"  you  might  imply  distrust  by 
saying:  "//"  you  believe  in  the  greatness  of  our  mission, 
then  you  must  accept  our  problems  as  your  problems 
and  identify  our  life  with  your  own."  The  danger  of 
disapproval  would  at  least  be  lessened  by  saying  more 
diplomatically:  ^^ Since  you  beheve  in  the  greatness  of 
our  mission,  then  you  will  accept  our  problems  as  your 
problems  and  identify  our  Hfe  with  your  own." 

Climax. — -The  most  vivid  imagery  in  an  argument  is 
often  used  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  a  strong  final 
impression,  which  is  likely  to  be  the  most  lasting.  After 
clarif}ing  the  processes  in  a  discriminatory  way,  an 
idea  is  sometimes  effectively  driven  home  by  an  analogy 
or  a  metaphor,  thus: 

The  hand  of  Heaven  appears  to  have  led  us  on  to  be,  perhaps, 
humble  instruments  and  means  in  the  great  Providential  dis- 
pensation which  is  completing.  We  have  fled  from  the  poHtical 
Sodom;  let  us  not  look  back,  lest  we  perish  and  become  a  monu- 
ment of  infamy  and  derision  to  the  world !  For  can  we  ever 
expect  more  unanimity  and  a  better  preparation  for  defense; 


230  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

more  infatuation  of  counsel  among  our  enemies,  and  more  valor 
and  zeal  among  ourselves?  The  same  force  and  resistance  which 
are  sufficient  to  procure  us  our  liberties,  will  secure  us  a  glorious 
independence,  and  support  us  in  the  dignity  of  free,  imperial 
states.  We  cannot  suppose  that  our  opposition  has  made  a 
corrupt  and  dissipated  nation  more  friendly  to  America,  or 
created  in  them  a  greater  respect  for  the  rights  of  mankind. 
We  can,  therefore,  expect  a  restoration  and  establishment  of  our 
privileges,  and  a  compensation  for  the  injuries  we  have  received, 
from  their  want  of  power,  from  their  fears,  and  not  from  their 
virtues.  The  unanimity  and  valor  which  will  effect  an  honorable 
peace  can  render  a  future  contest  for  our  liberties  unnecessary. 
He  who  has  strength  to  chain  down  the  wolf  is  a  madman  if  he  lets 
him  loose  without  drawing  his  teeth  and  paring  his  nails. — {Samuel 
Adams.) 

Repetition. — Words,  phrases,  and  sentences  gain 
peculiar  power  through  repetition,  so  that  what  at  first 
w^e  know  not  and  care  not  for,  wdll  in  time,  through  the 
sheer  persistency  with  w^hich  it  is  forced  on  our  atten- 
tion, come  to  be  accepted  and  embraced.  Thus,  articles 
of  trade  are  successfully  exploited  by  advertising,  and 
poHtical  slogans  and  epigrams  casually  mentioned  at 
first,  come  gradually  to  be  accepted  and  extended  be- 
3'Ond  the  occasion  of  their  first  utterance.  Not  only 
that,  but  recurrent  sounds  and  forms,  as  in  the  litany 
or  in  many  devices  of  poetry  such  as  the  refrain  of  the 
old  ballads,  or  in  Burke's  ''I  impeach  huii,"  in  his  prose- 
cution of  Warren  Hastings,  have  a  pecuHar  effect  of 
monotony  which  fascinates  the  Hstener  into  quiescence. 
In  his  Reply  to  Hayne,  too,  Webster  uses  the  phrase, 
"I  understand  him  to  say,"  with  a  slightly  ironical  effect 
of  disapproval. 

No  element  of  debating  is  more  important  than  the 
keeping  of  the  main  ideas — arguments  and  facts — before 
the  mind  of  the  audience.    Repetition  of  subject,  repe- 


INSTRUMENTS   OF   SUGGESTION  231 

tition  of  phrases,  suggesting  the  main  reasons!  Indeed, 
debates  have  been  won  without  much  debating  abihty 
except  such  as  is  shown  in  a  frequent  restatement  of 
the  proposition  supported  by  three  main  reasons  as 
the  unified  scheme  of  proof.  We  may  even  forget  the 
absence  of  further  or  supporting  arguments  in  the  con- 
secutive din  of  the  "tliree  reasons."  They  alone,  so 
melodiously  phrased,  so  rhythmically  uttered,  so  con- 
fidently proclaimed,  will  remain  in  our  ears.  This,  of 
course,  is  more  likely  to  happen  if  the  question  is  such 
that  neither  side  can  prove  anything  about  it  with  cer- 
tainty. And  in  all  debates  on  matters  of  public  policy, 
it  must  be  remembered  that  we  can  never  establish  any- 
thing more  than  a  preponderance  of  probability.  If, 
however,  in  debating,  the  intellectual  is  to  predominate, 
it  is  far  better  that  the  main  ideas  should  be  emphasized 
through  a  development  of  consecutive  proofs  than  that 
the  emotions  should  be  besieged  by  a  quasi-poetic  re- 
petend.  The  debater  must  always  recognize  that  reasons 
qua  reasons  are  more  important  than  language.  This 
understood,  skilful  repetition  is  an  important  and  proper 
instrument  of  effectiveness;  for  frequency  of  occurrence 
acquaints  the  audience  clearly  and  fully  with  what  is 
of  most  importance.  Such  acquaintance  is  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  acceptance  of  a  case. 

Variety. — Ideas  arranged  in  good  sequence  may  be- 
come tiresome,  even  if  clearly  imaged.  Nothing  is  so 
fatal  to  interest  and  attention  as  monotony — monot- 
ony of  subject,  monotony  of  incident,  monotony  of 
style,  monotony  of  deUvery.  Vivid  imagery  gives  rest 
from  the  monotone  of  logical  sequence  and  suggests, 
through  the  laws  of  association,  obvious  detours  into 
bypaths  of  memory  or  feeling.     Whether  its  purpose, 


232  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

however,  is  to  adorn,  or  simply  to  inform  and  make  clear, 
the  use  of  imagery  must  take  into  account  this  funda- 
mental fact  of  the  psychology  of  the  human  mind,  that 
the  holding  of  attention  and  interest  demands  variety, 
r    Monotony  is  desirable  for  its  impressiveness,  but  when 
we  wish  to  avoid  the  fatigue  it  produces,  we  image  our 
ideas  in   various  ways.      Indeed,  repetition  of  phrase 
in  general  is  more  suitable  to  poetry  than  to  prose,  (i) 
There  is,  for  example,  an  advantage  in  the  parallel  struc- 
ture of  sentences  expressing  an  idea  from  the  same  view- 
point and  relating  to  the  same  subject,  as  in  the  preceding 
paraleipsis  of  Lord  Erskine.    There  is  here  no  monotony, 
no  exact  repetition,  only  a  suggestion  of  similarity:  "It 
is  not  my  purpose —    I  will  not  follow  the  example — 
I  will  not  call  your  attention — ."    The  classical  illustra- 
tion of  such  a  parallelism  perfectly  clear  and  effectively 
varied  is  Burke's  six  capital  causes  why  the  Americans 
love  liberty.     For  the  varied  literary  expression  of  the 
main  propositions  of  a  brief,  the  debater  will  derive  much 
profit  from  a  study  of  this  and  similar  masterpieces. 
(2)  But  even  where  there  is  exact  repetition,  the  words 
may  be  differently  spoken.     Both  manner  and  mood 
will  vary  meaning.     Mark  Antony,  for  example,  fre- 
quently repeats  the  suggestion  that  Brutus  is  an  honor- 
able man  in  exactly  the  same  words,  but  we  know  that 
he  must  have  gradually  altered  his  manner  and  voice, 
to  be  able  to  express  finally  the  irony  of  his  true  mean- 
ing.   Humor  pleases  us,  as  a  relaxation  from  a  serious 
strain.    Thus,  Falstaff  is  depicted  in  sharp  contrast  to 
the  other  main  characters  of  Henry  the  Fourth.    When 
he  propounds  to  himself  his  catechism  on  honor,  he  fixes 
his  attention  on  the  theme  and  repeats  the  word  honor 
often,  but  he  holds  our  interest  and  attention  by  his 


INSTRUMENTS  OF  SUGGESTION  233 

surprises  and  quick  turns.  We  even  find  real  amuse- 
ment in  a  droll  cynicism  with  which  we  do  not  wholly 
agree: 

Prince.    Why,  thou  owest  God  a  death. 

Falstaff.  'Tis  not  due  yet ;  I  would  be  loath  to  pay  him  be- 
fore his  day.  What  need  I  be  so  forward  with  him  that  calls 
not  on  me?  Well,  'tis  no  matter;  honor  pricks  me  on.  Yea,  but 
how  if  honor  prick  me  off  when  I  come  on?  how  then?  Can 
honor  set  to  a  leg?  no;  or  an  arm?  no;  or  take  away  the  grief 
of  a  wound?  no.  Honor  hath  no  skill  in  surgery,  then?  no. 
What  is  honor?  a  word.  What  is  that  word  honor?  air.  A 
trim  reckoning!  Who  hath  it?  he  that  died  o'  Wednesday. 
Doth  he  feel  it?  no.  Doth  he  hear  it?  no.  'Tis  insensible, 
then?  yes,  to  the  dead.  But  will  it  not  live  with  the  living? 
no.  Why.''  detraction  will  not  suffer  it.  Therefore  I'll  none 
of  it.    Honor  is  a  mere  scutcheon;   and  so  ends  my  catechism. 

Proceeding  further  with  an  analysis  of  the  sources 
of  variety,  we  find  (3)  that  we  may  hold  or  intensify 
interest  and  tend  to  reach  a  maximum  of  effectiveness 
by  diversifying  methods,  proofs,  and  illustrations.  Hav- 
ing shown  from  signs  that  a  fact  is  true,  we  may  give 
examples  showing  that  it  has  often  been  true  before,  or 
state  reasons  why  it  must  now  in  the  nature  of  the  case 
be  true.  Having  shown  one  effect  of  a  cause,  we  will 
specify  additional  effects;  having  supported  an  asser- 
tion by  the  opinion  of  one  authority,  we  will  add  others 
with  their  varying  opinions.  Now  we  may  appeal  to 
habit,  to  imitation,  to  desire,  to  ideahsm;  now  draw 
illustrations  from  one  field  and  now  from  another  more 
or  less  remote.  Now  we  are  slow  and  minute  in  style 
or  manner,  now  fast  and  sweeping  as  the  need  may  be, 
for  the  eye  may  move  as  easily  from  crag  to  crag  as  from 
petal  to  petal.  We  usually  like  the  speaker  who  holds 
his  subject  so  firmly  that  he  can,  if  need  be,  treat  it 


234  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBx\TE 

lightly,  illustrating  and  proving,  smiling  and  disapprov- 
ing; simply  letting  the  mind  of  the  audience  play  natu- 
rally about  the  subject,  sharply  focussing  the  attention 
only  on  what  is  really  important.  When  the  attention 
is  so  strained  as  to  be  unpleasant,  a  varied  appeal  tends 
to  bring  rest  and  delight. 

(4)  Finally,  a  variation  in  the  sources  of  sensory  ap- 
peal may  give  increased  power  of  effect.  Speech  is  in 
its  nature  primarily  auditory.  Though  the  mental  and 
emotional  associations  which  it  awakens  are  suggested 
to  the  ear,  it  converts  to  its  use  the  other  sources  of 
sensory  appeal.  When  it  does  not,  its  monotony  may 
be  due  to  a  narrow  range  of  suggestion.  Certainly,  the 
speaker  is  a  word-painter,  picturing  objects  to  the  sight 
by  the  use  of  saUent  characteristics  and  indicative  words. 
But  this  is  by  no  means  all.  He  should  on  occasion  in- 
tensify and  diversify  his  appeals  by  the  use  of  imagery 
which  enHsts  the  other  senses.  How  instinctively,  for 
instance,  that  master  of  expression  and  human  nature, 
Shakespeare,  varied  his  appeals  in  this  way: 

"Why,  man,  he  doth  bestride  the  narrow  world 
Like  a  Colossus;   .   .   . 

Brutus  and  CcBsar :  what  should  be  in  that  Casar? 
Why  should  that  name  be  sounded  more  than  yours? 
V/rite  them  together,  yours  is  as  fair  a  name; 
Sound  them,  it  doth  become  the  mouth  as  well; 
Weigh  them,  it  is  as  heavy;   conjure  with  them, 
Brutus  will  start  a  spirit  as  soon  as  Cesar. 
Now,  in  the  names  of  all  the  gods  at  once, 
Upon  what  meat  doth  this  our  Csesar  feed. 
That  he  is  grown  so  great?" 

The  whole  complex  origin  of  our  ideas  of  the  outside 
world  may  be  reflected  in  the  purely  audible. 


INSTRUMENTS  OF  SUGGESTION  235 

Let  us  contrast  speech  briefly  with  a  visual  art.  The 
mo\dng  scenes  of  the  vitascope  produce  an  illusion  of 
reality  and  vividly  portray  action  to  the  eye.  Yet  in 
a  motion-picture  of  a  great  drama  such  as  ''Hamlet," 
how  much  we  miss  the  power  of  the  human  voice,  espe- 
cially if  we  have  heard  the  play  rendered  by  a  noted 
actor !  The  auditory  art  of  speech  does  well  in  suggest- 
ing to  the  mind  both  action  and  visual  objects.  In  fact, 
it  has  been  found  that  the  great  orators  use  visual  imagery 
more  than  all  the  other  forms  combined. 

A  public  speaker  may  possibly  become  popular  chiefly 
because  of  his  pictorial  power,  as  well  as  for  his  rhythmic 
and  sonorous  effects,  his  literary  style,  his  argumen- 
tative skill,  or  his  extensive  knowledge,  y£t  such  popular- 
ity has  been  known  to  fade  away  as  quickly  as  it  came, 
because  of  a  violation  of  the  essential  principle  of  change 
which  underlies  all  sustained  human  interest.  Just  as 
statistics  may  be  overdone,  so  may  word-paintin,g;  in 
the  end,  variety  itself  may  become  monotonous.  In- 
deed, there  is  a  valid  basis  for  the  psychological  prin- 
ciple of  variety  as  well  as  for  the  psychological  prin- 
ciple of  monotony.  Its  effective  use  marks  the  climax 
of  art. 

Paraleipsis. — It  is  singular  that  the  figure  paraleipsis, 
or  omission,  so  highly  prized  by  the  ancient  orators, 
and  so  common  in  the  pubHc  speeches  of  to-day,  should 
have  failed  to  receive  a  notice  from  modern  text- writers. 
The  student  is  doubtless  familiar  with  the  aXka  ravra 
Tra/aaXei-v/ro)  of  Demosthenes  (but  these  things  I  pass 
by),  the  prccteriiio  of  Cicero,  and  the  colloquial  "not  to 
mention"  of  modern  speech.  By  paraleipsis,  a  speaker, 
while  bringing  ideas  forward  for  the  purpose  of  exclud- 
ing them,  fixes  the  attention  on  the  apparently  excluded 


236  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

ideas  in  such  a  skilful  way  as  to  secure  their  full  force 
and  effect.  Though  negative  in  form,  it  is  positive  in 
meaning;  it  has  the  force  of  paradox,  and  aptness  of 
irony. 

So  Webster  says:  "I  will  not  accuse  the  honorable 
member  of  violating  civilized  war;  I  will  not  say  that 
he  poisoned  liis  arrows.  But  whether  his  shafts  were 
or  were  not  dipped  in  that  which  should  have  caused 
rankling — there  was  not  quite  strength  enough  in  the 
bow  to  bring  them  to  their  mark."  This  figure  is  quite 
frequently  employed  in  the  address  to  the  jury,  as,  for 
example,  in  Lord  Erskine's  defense  of  Gordon  as  follows : 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  recall  to  your  minds  the  fatal  effects 
which  bigotry  has,  in  former  days,  produced  in  this  island. 
I  will  not  follow  the  example  the  crown  has  set  me,  by 
making  an  attack  upon  your  passions,  on  subjects  foreign 
to  the  object  before  you.  I  will  not  call  your  attention  from 
those  flames,  kindled  by  a  villainous  banditti  (which  they  have 
thought  fit,  in  defiance  of  evidence,  to  introduce),  by  bringing 
before  your  eyes  the  more  cruel  flames,  in  which  the  bodies  of 
our  expiring,  meek,  patient  Christian  fathers  were,  little  more 
than  a  century  ago,  consuming  in  Smithfield.  I  will  not  call 
up  from  the  graves  of  martyrs  all  the  precious  holy  blood  that 
has  been  spilled  in  this  land,  to  save  its  estabUshed  government 
and  its  reformed  religion  from  the  secret  villainy  and  the  open 
force  of  Papists.  The  cause  does  not  stand  in  need  even  of  such 
honest  arts;  and  I  feel  my  heart  too  big  voluntarily  to  recite 
such  scenes,  when  I  reflect  that  some  of  my  own,  and  my  best 
and  dearest  progenitors,  from  whom  I  glory  to  be  descended, 
ended  their  innocent  lives  in  prisons  and  in  exile,  only  because 
they  were  Protestants. 

We  may  suggest  our  ideas  through  concrete  illus- 
trations and  analogy,  we  may  state  them  in  highly  sug- 
gestive rhetorical  forms,  but  most  important  of  all  is 


INSTRUMENTS  OF  SUGGESTION  237 

what  we  image — what  we  put  into  our  imagery!  Webster 
used  paraleipsis  in  the  eulogy  of  his  State  beginning,  "I 
shall  enter  upon  no  encomium  of  Massachusetts,"  but 
the  real  power  of  the  passage  lay  in  its  content,  with 
its  skilful  allusion  to  that  which  existing  easily  in  memory 
would  quickly  touch  the  feelings  and  sentiment.  With 
what  strong  sense-appeal  does  Shakespeare  image  his 
reflections  on  the  possibilities  of  a  life  beyond,  in  the 
follo^ving: 

"Ay,  but  to  die  and  go  we  know  not  where; 
To  lie  in  cold  obstruction  and  to  rot; 
This  sensible,  warm  motion  to  become 
A  kneaded  clod;   and  the  delighted  spirit 
To  bathe  in  fiery  floods,  or  to  reside 
In  thrilling  region  of  thick-ribbed  ice; 
To  be  imprison'd  in  the  viewless  winds, 
And  blown  with  restless  violence  round  about 
The  pendent  world;   or  to  be  worse  than  worst 
Of  those  that  lawless  and  incertain  thought 
Imagine  howhng;  'Tis  too  horrible." 

If  any  one  should  miss  the  lofty  idealization  in  such 
passages  or  think  that  imagery  is  merely  a  use  of  fine 
words,  let  him  first  read  Dorothy  Wordsworth's  rambles 
about  Grasmere  and  then  her  brother  William's  "I  wan- 
dered lonely  as  a  cloud." 

Confidence. — If  a  debater  betrays  doubt  or  uncer- 
tainty with  reference  to  himself  or  to  his  case,  or  if  he 
exhibits  suspicion  or  distrust  toward  his  audience,  his 
state  of  mind  may  quite  unconsciously  react  on  his  au- 
dience with  disastrous  results.  Indeed,  no  principle  of 
eft'ectiveness  needs  to  be  more  generally  recognized 
than  that  confidence  begets  confidence.  Mr.  Roosevelt 
is  noted  as  a  campaign  speaker  for  the  vehemence  and 


238  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

force  of  his  utterances.     Speaking  in  Chicago  in  1916 
on  National  Duty  and  International  Ideals,  he  said: 

Every  nation  in  the  world  now  realizes  our  weakness,  and 
no  nation  in  the  world  believes  in  either  our  disinterestedness  or 
our  manliness.  The  effort  to  placate  outside  nations  by  being 
neutral  between  right  and  wrong,  and  to  gain  good-will  along 
professional  pacifist  lines  by  remaining  helpless  for  self-defense, 
has  resulted,  after  two  fatuous  years,  in  so  shaping  affairs  that 
the  nations  either  already  feel,  or  are  rapidly  growing  to  feel, 
for  us  not  only  dislike  but  contempt. 

On  the  other  hand,  Benjamin  Franklin  learned  hu- 
mility from  a  Quaker  friend,  and  preached  the  doctrine 
of  qualified  assertion  thus: 

I  made  it  a  rule  to  forbear  all  direct  contradiction  to  the  senti- 
ments of  others,  and  all  positive  assertion  of  my  own.  I  even 
forbid  myself,  agreeably  to  the  old  laws  of  our  Junto,  the  use 
of  every  word  or  expression  in  the  language  that  imported  a 
fix'd  opinion,  such  as  certainly,  undoubtedly,  etc.,  and  I  adopted, 
instead  of  them,  /  conceive,  I  apprehend,  or  /  imagine  a  thing  to 
be  so  or  so;  or  it  so  appears  to  me  at  present.  When  another 
asserted  something  that  I  thought  an  error,  I  deny'd  myself 
the  pleasure  of  contradicting  him  abruptly,  and  of  showing  im- 
mediately some  absurdity  in  his  proposition;  and  in  answering 
I  began  by  observing  that  in  certain  cases  or  circumstances  his 
opinion  would  be  right,  but  in  the  present  case  there  appeared 
or  seem'd  to  me  some  difference,  etc.  I  soon  found  the  advan- 
tage of  this  change  in  my  manner;  the  conversations  I  engag'd 
in  went  on  more  pleasantly.  The  modest  way  in  which  I  pro- 
pos'd  my  opinions  procur'd  them  a  readier  reception  and  less 
contradiction;  I  had  less  mortification  when  I  was  found  to 
be  in  the  wrong,  and  I  more  easily  prevail'd  with  others  to  give 
up  their  mistakes  and  join  with  me  when  I  happened  to  be  in 
the  right. 

Much,  of  course,  depends,  as  Webster  says,  on  the 
man,   the  subject,   and  the   occasion.     Temperaments 


INSTRUMENTS   OF  SUGGESTION  239 

differ.  The  orator,  like  the  artist,  may  at  times  need 
to  draw  with  broad  strokes  particularly  in  summaries, 
and  at  other  times  with  a  more  delicate  shading.  Some- 
times, too,  the  larger  the  audience  the  more  positive 
and  unqualified  the  assertion  required.  But  whenever 
a  debater  gives  rein  to  strong  assertion,  he  should  do 
so  only  from  a  profound  sincerity  of  belief  and  a  full 
knowledge  of  his  subject  based  on  investigation.  Other- 
wise, his  abilities  may  be  put  to  a  severe  test,  when  called 
upon  to  defend  himself  by  evidence  and  proof. 

Indeed,  the  value  of  mutual  confidence  for  practical 
results  and  the  idea  that  we  beget  confidence  in  others 
by  possessing  it  and  exhibiting  it  in  ourselves,  is  so  un- 
doubtedly true,  that  strong  assertions  which  are  utterly 
false  sometimes  receive  wide  credence  on  this  account. 
Witness  the  personal  rumors  and  stories  which  circulate 
during  hotly  contested  political  campaigns. 

Interestedness.^ — The  speaker  cannot  speak  well  un- 
less he  has  the  ear  of  his  audience,  nor  will  an  audience 
listen  long  to  a  speaker  who  does  not  possess  an  interest 
in  what  he  has  to  say.  Any  indifference  in  manner  of 
speaking,  or  in  treatment  of  subject  shown  in  inept 
words  or  in  poorly  formed  sentences,  or  in  the  use  of 
commonplace  ideas,  tends  to  produce  inattention  and 
listlessness.  What  you  give,  that  shall  you  receive.  The 
speaker's  concentration  of  attention  on  his  subject  and 
manifestation  of  interest  in  it  may  be  made  as  contagious 
as  confidence.  Such  a  manifestation  of  attention  will 
naturally  suggest  to  the  audience  the  attitude  of  lis- 
tening. It  will  thus  give  a  chance  to  the  magnetic  power 
of  the  speaker's  personahty  to  assert  itself,  which  alone 
may  fix  the  gaze  and  compel  interest,  and  so  make  pos- 
sible the  necessary  reaction  of  the  audience  from  the 


240  THE  FUNDAMENTALS   OF  DEBATE 

stimuli  employed.  At  all  events,  it  is  by  getting  the 
attention  of  an  audience,  and,  if  need  be,  of  holding  it 
on  the  important  ideas,  persistently  and  consistently, 
that  the  speaker  is  able  to  communicate  his  ideas  simply 
and  with  force. 

Thus,  after  a  debater  has  completely  saturated  him- 
self with  his  material,  and  ordered  it  for  the  end  in  view, 
his  presentation,  as  good  or  bad,  will  naturally  depend 
on  the  effect  which  it  produces  on  the  audience.  Or  per- 
haps I  should  say  on  the  unity  or  totality  of  its  effects. 
He  will  be  able  to  follow  the  scheme  of  his  brief  more 
effectively  if  he  holds  it  in  his  mind  neither  too  firmly 
nor  too  loosely  and  can  regard  it  readily  either  as  a  whole 
or  in  its  parts.  Practically,  a  centrality  of  topic  is  needed 
for  a  suggestive  development  adapted  to  the  occasion, 
of  each  phase  of  the  larger  theme.  He  should,  for  ex- 
ample, be  able  to  say,  "I  propose  to  speak  of  the  dan- 
gerous consequences  of  the  proposed  measures.  At  the 
outset  I  would  picture  the  magnitude  of  the  scheme," 
and  so  on.  Great  pains  should  be  taken  with  junctures 
and  transitions,  or  attention  and  interest  will  break  down. 
However  the  latter  may  have  been  originally  secured, 
they  can  hardly  be  maintained  without  rhetorical  clear- 
ness and  logical  relevancy.  Words  colored  with  mean- 
ing, and  collocated  into  sentences  full  of  association  or 
paragraphs  of  emotional  elation,  are  but  the  romance  of 
speech,  of  which  logic  and  evidence  are  the  stern  reali- 
ties. Indeed,  a  brilHancy  of  retort  in  debating,  even  if 
provocative  of  applause,  is  not  hkely  to  survive  a  mis- 
representation of  facts,  whether  accidental  or  intentional. 

Avoiding  Common  Defects  in  Delivery. — The  dangers 
in  manner  to  be  guarded  against  in  debate,  says  Pro- 
fessor Winter,  "are  wearying  monotony,  overhammer- 


INSTRUMENTS   OF   SUGGESTION  241 

ing — too  frequent,  too  hard,  too  unifonn  an  emphasis — 
too  much  or  too  continued  heat,  too  much  speed,  espe- 
cially in  speaking  against  time,  a  loss  of  poise  in  the 
bearing,  halting,  or  jumbling  in  speech,  nervous  tension 
in  action,  an  overcontentious  or  bumptious  spirit."  ^ 
To  the  same  effect  is  the  following  criticism: 

We  have  inherited  wrong  ideas  about  argumentative  delivery. 

Ninety  per  cent  of  college  debaters  seem  to  have  not  the 
slightest  knowledge  of  effective  presentation.  Their  speaking 
is  so  "preponderantly  boisterous  and  conclusive,  so  disfigured 
by  volcanic  fervor,  for  which  the  matter  ejected  affords  no 
adequate  excuse,"  that  our  sensibihties  are  paralyzed  and  ren- 
dered incapable  of  absorbing  the  evidence  they  produce. 

I  inveigh  against  the  prevalent  style  of  debate  for  several 
reasons.  First,  average  debating  is  not  good  public  speaking. 
Most  modern  authorities  will  accept  as  the  definition  of  public 
speaking,  "enlarged  and  dignified  conversation."  The  virtues 
of  good  address  are  clearness,  directness,  and  force.  But  what 
coach  can  have  these  principles  in  mind  and  allow  his  team  to 
pound  furiously  for  thirty  minutes  without  pause  or  variety? 
Confused  thinking  only  can  result.  How  many  debaters  can 
look  calmly  at  their  audience  and  say  implicitly:  "I  am  talking 
to  you  and  you  and  you.  I  want  this  idea  to  get  under  your 
skin"  ?  No !  There  is  a  torrent  of  speech  accompanied  by  vio- 
lent shakings  of  the  head,  a  flood  of  facts  and  quotations,  a 
fifteen-minute  speech  in  ten,  and  a  "Thank  you."  Now  the 
first  end  of  all  speech  is  to  make  itself  clear.  Lincoln  accused 
Douglas  of  being  like  a  cuttlefish,  a  fish  that  throws  out  a  dark 
substance  into  the  water  to  hide  its  exact  position.  Again,  he 
said  Judge  Douglas  reminded  him  of  the  little  Frenchman  he 
knew  in  the  northwest  whose  legs  were  so  short  that  when  he 
walked  through  the  snow  the  seat  of  his  trousers  rubbed  out  his 
footprints.  These  analogies  characterize  the  average  college 
debater.  His  speeches  also  lack  force.  Things  are  great  or  small 
only  by  comparison.  Ideas  are  made  important  by  contrast. 
The  speech  that  strikes  a  constant  key,  that  plunges  along  in 

*  "Public  Speaking,"  Irving  L.  Winter,  p.  47. 


242  THE   FUNDAMENTALS   OF   DEBATE 

the  same  channel,  orotund  and  extreme,  lacks  the  first  degree 
of  force.  Yes,  average  debating  is  not  good  public  speaking. 
There  is  nothing  of  the  human  quality,  no  conversational  style, 
no  sincere  personality.  Should  we  not  pay  more  attention  to 
debate  delivery  ? 

Secondly,  to  allow  this  style  of  speaking  is  to  lose  the  ideal 
of  training  a  student  to  think  on  his  feet.  To  roll  forth  auto- 
matically a  mass  of  highly  concentrated  data,  to  grind  along  mo- 
notonously for  ten  minutes  like  a  hand-organ,  to  recite  parrot 
fashion,  as  most  debaters  do,  is  not  thinking  on  one's  feet.  The 
chief  concern  of  our  profession — physical  and  psychical  correla- 
tion— is  totally  obscured. 

Last  of  all,  we  must  face  the  evident  lack  of  public  interest 
in  debating  and  overcome  it.  I  again  blame  poor  delivery.  An 
instructor,  asked  recently  to  judge  some  class  try-outs,  said: 
"Yes,  but  I  hate  debates,  they  are  bores."  He  served,  and  for 
two  hours  bravely  endured  the  agony  of  senseless  jargon  that 
rattled  upon  us  mercilessly  as  hailstones.  I  sympathized  with 
him.  Each  of  the  twenty  speakers  except  one  labored  under 
the  delusion  that  because  this  was  a  debate  try-out  he  must  rant 
and  yell  and  glare;  that  a  high,  sustained  key  and  lightning 
rapidity  was  a  proof  of  excellent  skill  and  training.  Shades  of 
Caesar!    If  they  could  learn  to  talk,  just  talk. 

I  plead,  therefore,  for  more  common  sense  in  debate  delivery, 
more  of  the  "just  human"  quality,  more  of  conversational  style. 
I  know  that  we  are  more  intense  and  excited  in  a  conversation 
over  Roosevelt  than  over  Longfellow,  that  barber-shop  con- 
versation contains  more  dynamite  than  after-dinner  talk — in 
short,  that  genuine  argument  is  the  expression  of  deep  feeling 
and  strong  conviction,  but  let  us  practise  more  moderacy.^ 

The  most  suggestive  delivery  is  usually  to  be  found 
in  the  man  who  (i)  has  reduced  his  case  to  the  simplest 
terms,  and  (2)  whose  habit  has  been  to  speak  extem- 
poraneously rather  than  to  deliver  memorized  orations. 
If,  for  instance,  his  own  case  and  that  of  his  opponent 

1  Quarterly  Journal  oj  Speech  Education,  IV,  3;  article  by  C.  F.  Linds- 
ley. 


INSTRUMENTS   OF  SUGGESTION  243 

have  been  placed  in  the  form  of  a  syllogism,  and  he  is 
properly  trained  in  the  value  of  the  concentrated  form 
of  attack,  his  delivery  is  not  so  Hkely  to  be  objection- 
able. The  fewer  tlie  points  the  better.  In  both  the 
first  speech  and  in  the  rebuttal  the  audience  will  be 
more  responsive  if  the  propositions  examined  are  hmited 
in  number.  Of  course,  they  must  be  fundaanental  and 
well  imaged.  No  scattered  fire  or  mere  sharpshooting! 
In  rebuttal,  indeed,  it  is  sometimes  possible  to  limit 
an  attack  to  a  single  point.  The  first  speaker  makes 
an  objection  which  is  followed  up  by  the  second  speaker 
and  then  by  the  third,  or,  to  make  a  football  allusion, 
the  first  speaker  starts  ''an  opening"  which  the  otliers 
enlarge  until  it  "looks  as  big  as  a  house."  Thus,  in 
opposing  the  formation  of  a  league  to  enforce  peace, 
I  heard  a  negative  team  win  a  decision  by  a  continuous 
bombardment  of  the  contradiction  contained  in  the 
phrase  "enforce  peace,"  and  on  another  occasion,  by 
an  equally  effective  artiUery-fire  against  "formal  al- 
liances." 

If  the  debater  has  also  been  in  the  habit  of  speaking 
extemporaneously  he  will  not  be  likely  to  yell,  and  rave, 
and  fan  the  air.  The  training  of  a  debater  should  in- 
clude (besides  an  immersion  in  the  subject-matter  of 
his  debate,  and  the  logical  organization  of  his  case) 
such  practice  in  speaking  as  will  require  him  to  think 
clearly  and  express  his  ideas  effectively  on  his  feet.  Given 
a  concept  containing  his  fundamental  reason,  he  should 
be  told  simply  to  image  that  on  the  mind  of  the  audience. 
He  will  learn  the  value  of  natural,  personal,  and  direct 
speech.  He  will  learn  to  hold  his  subject  in  mind,  but 
to  look  his  audience  in  the  eye,  and  to  speak  in  a  tone 
which  means  something.    He  will  perceive  and  feel  the 


244  THE  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  DEBATE 

responses  which  come  from  meeting  eye  with  eye,  and 
from  a  really  communicative  tone.  For,  speaking  is  but 
a  dialogue  with  an  audience,  whose  responses,  though 
silent  and  often  subconscious,  are  instructive  guides 
to  the  speaker.  The  extempore  speaker,  indeed,  simply 
converses  with  his  audience  on  his  topic,  until  he  feels 
sure  that  they  have  caught  his  meaning,  and  then,  and 
not  until  then,  passes  on  to  something  else.  We  image 
our  ideas,  according  to  Professor  Winans,  by  centering 
the  attention  of  the  audience  upon  it.  It  is  here  in 
delivery  that  the  "image  theory"  of  argument  as  pre- 
sented in  this  text  meets  the  "attention  theory"  of  Pro- 
fessor Winans.^    Each  supplements  the  other. 

The  Decision. — The  decision  of  a  board  of  judges  re- 
cords an  opinion  in  favor  of  the  afifinnative  or  negative 
sides.  The  judges  express  an  opinion  as  to  which  of  the 
two  sides  has  succeeded  in  satisfying  certain  reasonable 
expectations  or  standards.  These  include  such  ideas  as 
that  the  debaters  must  be  interesting,  awaken  sym- 
pathy, clarify  the  issues,  illustrate  view-points  common 
to  the  speaker  and  audience,  as  well  as  be  informing 
and  show  an  extensive  knowledge  of  the  subject-matter. 
They  must,  of  course,  exhibit  the  powers  of  reasoning — 
analysis  and  discrimination,  synthesis  and  abstraction. 
They  must  image  effectively  all  fundamental  reasons 
so  tliat  they  will  be  vividly  perceived  and  readily  be- 
lieved, and  bring  to  their  support,  whenever  necessary, 
reliable  authority.  They  must  exhibit  proper  platform 
manners  and  form,  good  literary  finish  and  style,  and 
always  be  quick,  ready,  and  skilful  to  down  an  opponent 
in  triumph,  with  fact,  authority,  reason,  phrase,  or  flash 
of  the  eye.    At  length  they  must  sum  up,  analyzing  the 

*  "Public  Speaking,"  J.  A.  Winans. 


INSTRUMENTS  OF  SUGGESTION  245 

opponent's  failure,  touching  on  the  weak  spots  and 
setting  forth  defects,  in  vivid  contrast  with  the  articu- 
lated proofs  of  their  own  side.  These  are  some  of  the 
reasonable  expectations,  based  on  customary  instruc- 
tions to  judges. 

No  exact  valuation,  so  far  as  I  know,  has  ever  been 
fixed  to  the  elements  of  good  debating.  Indeed,  it  seems 
doubtful  if  any  can  ever  be  made.  The  elements  are 
too  niunerous  and  too  uncertain  in  quantity,  quaHty, 
and  relation  to  make  it  practicable.  As  with  the  painter, 
one  false  detail,  for  instance  in  color,  may  change  the 
accent  of  the  entire  picture.  Facts  and  logic,  however, 
should  take  precedence  over  style  and  delivery. 

The  decision  should  always  be  a  measurement  of 
the  relative  debating  skill  shown  by  the  two  contesting 
teams.  Since  the  essence  of  the  art  of  debating  consists 
in  assertion  and  denial,  proof  and  counter-proof  with 
distinctions,  it  must  follow  that  memorized  speeches 
may  defeat  the  purpose  of  debate  and  are,  therefore, 
a  proper  object  of  penalty. 

Finally,  we  would  note  that  all  the  elements  of  the 
problem  of  decision  in  debating  are  variables;  and  that 
the  problem  itself,  abstractly  considered,  is  indetermi- 
nate; except,  perhaps,  that  we  may  say  that  a  decision 
records  a  victory  in  a  contest  of  supporting  suggestions 
and  attacking  inhibitions — arising  from  facts,  logic,  style, 
and  delivery — and  modified  further,  quite  subconsciously 
and  unintentionally,  by  suggestions  and  inhibitions,  aris- 
ing in  the  minds  of  those  exercising  the  judicial  func- 
tion. A  decision  is  a  sincere  personal  opinion  on  the 
^'merits  of  the  debate." 


APPENDICES 

APPENDIX  A 

Specimen  Briefs 

THE  FIRST  JUNIUS  LETTER 

This  letter  has  been  chosen  to  illustrate  brief-making  be- 
cause it  is  believed  to  be  one  of  the  most  remarkable  bits  of  ar- 
gumentative composition  in  our  language.  The  argument  is 
particularly  remarkable  in  that,  while  it  succeeds  in  arousing 
the  feelings,  it  adheres  closely  to  strictly  logical  processes,  in- 
geniously conceived  and  dexterously  expressed.  It  is  to  be  re- 
gretted that  such  a  brilHant  argument  is  sometimes  marred 
by  a  disregard  of  the  facts,  as  occurs,  for  instance,  conspicuously 
in  the  vicious  attack  upon  the  character  of  Justice  Mansfield. 

It  may  be  explained  that  the  first  two  paragraphs  of  this 
letter  contain  the  introduction,  the  third  being  transitional. 
The  fourth  paragraph  presents  the  main  proposition  to  be  proved 
and  the  main  syllogism.  The  main  proposition  is  supported 
further  by  the  proposition  advanced  in  the  fifth  paragraph,  to 
the  proof  of  which  the  rest  of  the  letter,  excepting  the  last  two 
paragraphs,  is  devoted.  These  two  paragraphs  sum  up  and 
enforce  the  conclusion. 

A  few  points  of  divergence  in  the  following  brief  from  the 
method  and  form  of  the  letter  may  be  mentioned: 

The  brief  follows  the  usual  sequence,  first  proposition,  then 
proof,  regardless  of  the  order  in  the  letter.  For  example,  the 
conclusion  of  the  main  argument  is  presented  after  the  premises 
in  the  last  sentence  of  the  fourth  paragraph;  while  in  the  brief 
it  is,  of  course,  stated  first  as  the  proposition  to  be  proved,  and 
is  followed  by  the  reasons  marked  A  and  B. 

247 


248  APPENDIX 

But  Junius  himself  sometimes  follows  the  order  (i)  proposi- 
tion, (2)  proof.  For  instance,  the  paragraphs  containing  the 
attack  upon  Mansfield  are  so  compact  and  coherent,  that  it  has 
been  possible  to  insert  in  the  brief  the  sentences  of  the  letter  with- 
out change  of  order  or  language.  Here,  therefore,  the  brief- 
maker  has  added  only  a  classification  of  the  proposition  (as  co- 
ordinate or  subordinate). 

Again  in  the  letter,  a  conclusion  is  sometimes  not  formally- 
stated  but  only  implied  from  a  chain  of  reasoning;  in  the  brief, 
such  an  implied  conclusion  is  formally  expressed.  Thus,  the 
proposition  at  the  head  of  the  introduction  does  not  appear  in 
the  letter,  except  as  an  insinuation  from  the  four  propositions  of 
the  first  paragraph. 

Finally,  in  all  cases  in  the  letter,  where  the  opposite  is  said 
from  what  is  meant,  as  in  the  criticism  of  Weymouth,  the  brief- 
maker  has  discarded  the  irony  and  used  the  direct  form  of  state- 
ment. 

The  following  brief  is  offered  for  use  and  criticism  in  study- 
ing the  principles  of  brief-making:  analysis,  classification,  ar- 
rangement, unity,  logical  sequence,  and  proportion. 

BRIEF  I 

Introduction 
The  abuse  of  our  loyalty  naturally  fills  us  with  resentment,  be- 
cause— 

[Note — This  proposition  is  the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism,  with  reason- 
ing supporting  each  premise.] 

Argument 
Our  present  ruinous  condition  is  due  to  government,  because 
I.     The  condition  of  the  people  in  a  state  is  due  to  government, 
II.     Our  people  at  present  are  in  a  ruinous  condition,  for 

A.  Perhaps  there  never  was  such  an  instance  of  a  change  as  that 

brought  about  by  the  misconduct  of  the  present  ministry. 

B.  After  a  rapid  succession  of  changes,  we  are  reduced  to  that  con- 

dition which  hardly  any  change  can  mend,  for 

1.  The  King's  folly  and  depravity  are  likely  to  have  produced 

it. 

2.  The  true  cause  of  our  misfortunes  lies  in  the  distribution  of 

the  departments  of  state,  for 


APPENDIX  249 

a.  The  treasury  has  been  intrusted  to  the  Duke  of  Grafton, 

who  is  incompetent. 

b.  Lord  North,  as  chancellor  of  the  exchequer,  is  without 

ability. 
[Note — Similarly  in  this  series  are  to  be  placed  the  attacks  on  c.  Hills- 
borough;  d.  Weymouth;    e.  Granby;  /.  Hawke;    g.  Mansfield.] 

Conclusion 

The  nation  is  in  a  deplorable  condition,  brought  about  by  govern- 
ment by  men  without  wisdom  and  capacity. 

[First  draft,  drawn  from  the  First  Letter  of  Junius,  to  be  studied  and 
expanded.  Note  carefully,  in  the  letter,  the  assumption  of  premises  not 
stated,  and  the  insinuation  of  conclusions  not  drawn.] 

Brief  I  Expanded 

Introduction 
The  abuse  of  our  loyalty  naturally  fills  us  with  resentment,  for 

A.  In  our  own  case,  there  has  been  an  abuse  of  loyalty,  for 

I.     A  free  people  obey  the  laws,  because 

I.  They  enacted  them — and 
II.     This  obedience  is  cheerful  and  almost  unlimited. 

III.  Such  obedience  to  the  guardian  of  the  laws  leads  to  a  strong 

affection  for  his  person. 

IV.  This  affection  has  often  been  excessive  among  Englishmen 

who  are  peculiarly  liable  to  a  strong  affection  for  his  per- 
son. 

B.  (All)  abuses  of  loyalty  naturally  fill  us  with  resentment. 

Body 
Our  present  ruinous  condition  is  due  to  government,  because 

A.  The  condition  of  the  people  in  a  state  is  due  to  government, 

I.     From  a  prosperous  condition  of  the  people  we  argue  that  their 

government  is  good,  and 
II.     From  a  ruinous  condition  of  the  people  that  their  government 
is  bad,  for 
I.  Such  a  ruinous  condition  does  not  depend  originally  on  the 
patient  multitude,  for 
a.  Their  indignation  and  excesses  are  effects  of  ill  usage  by 
government  rather  than  causes  of  a  ruinous  condition. 

B.  Our  people  at  present  are  in  a  ruinous  condition. 

I.     "Perhaps  there  never  was  an  instance  of  a  change  in  the  cir- 
cumstances and  temper  of   a  whole  nation  so  sudden  and 


250  APPENDIX 

extraordinary  as  that  which  the  misconduct  of  ministers  has 
within  these  very  few  years  produced  in  Great  Britain." 
I.  "When  our  gracious  sovereign  ascended  the  throne  we  were 
a  flourishing  and  contented  people." 
II,     After  a  rapid  succession  of  changes  we  are  reduced  to  that  con- 
dition which  hardly  any  change  can  mend,  for 
I.  The  King's  folly  and  depravity  must  have  produced  it. 
c.  His  plan  has  failed  to  produce  salutary  effects,  is  unwise, 
and  bad  in  design,  for 
(i)  It  involved  the  idea  of  uniting  all  parties,  of  trying 
all  characters,  and  distributing  the  offices  of  state 
by  rotation. 
(2)  It  showed  a  capricious  partiality  to  new  faces,  a  nat- 
ural turn  for  low  intrigue  and  the  treacherous  amuse- 
ment of  double  and  triple  negotiations. 

C.  The  true  cause  of  our  misfortunes  lies  in  the  distribution  of  the  de- 
partments of  state. 

I.  The  treasury  has  been  committed  to  the  Duke  of  Grafton, 

who  is  utterly  incompetent,  because 
(A)  He  is  already  ruined  by  play. 
(5)  He  became  minister  lay  accident,  and  is  an  apostate 

by  design. 
(C)    He  has  shown  no  business  ability,  unless  a  wayward  in- 
consistency be  a  mark  of  genius,  for 
I.  His  view  of  finance  is  to  distribute,  not  save,  the  public 
money,  and 
(Z?)  A  reliance  by  him  on  Lord  North,  chancellor  of  the  ex- 
chequer, would  not  deter  him  from  being  as  thought- 
less and  extravagant  as  he  pleases. 

II.  Lord  North  as  chancellor  of  the  exchequer  is  without  ability, 

for 
(A)  The  absence  of  any  proof  of  his  talents  cannot  mean  that 

he  has  voluntarily  concealed  them. 
(5)  There  is  such  an  absence  of  proof,  for 

1.  Since  he  has  been  in  office,  no  plan  has  been  formed 

for  the  relief  of  the  public  credit. 

2.  He  should  think  seriously  of  his  plan  to  increase  the 

public  debt,  for 

a.  The  people  will  not  bear,  after  a  six  years'  peace, 

to  see  new  millions  borrowed  without  a  diminu- 
tion of  debt  or  interest. 

b.  The  attempt  might  arouse  them  beyond  the  sacri- 
fice of  a  minister. 


APPENDIX  251 

3.  Moreover,  the  people  expect  that  the  debt  upon  the 

civil  list  will  not  be  paid  without  a  strict  inquiry, 
for 
a.  A  lottery  may  be  justifiable  for  war,  but  not  for 
the  prince's  expenses. 

4.  The  mismanagement  of  the  King's  affairs  in  the  House 

of  Commons  would  not  be  more  disgraced. 
a.  (Examples.) 

5.  Before  he  became  chancellor  he  was  not  derided  by 

his  enemies  or  pitied  by  his  friends. 
m.     At  a  most  critical  season,  Hillsborough  is  made  secretary  to 
govern  America,  and  he  is  without  capacity,  for 
(A)  The  season  was  most  critical  when  he  was  made  secre- 
tarj\ 
I.  A   series  of   inconsistent  measures   had  divided   the 
colonies,  for 
a.  This  division  resulted  from  the  spirit  and  argu- 
ment given  the  colonies  by  Lord  Chatham's  and 
Lord   Camden's   opposition   to   Mr.    Grenville's 
policies. 
{B)  He  is  without  capacity  or  superior  knowledge,  for 
I.  His  despatches  and  measures  determine  this,  for 

a.  His  despatches  are  bad, 

b.  His  measures  are  failures,  for 

(i)  The   people   have   been   driven   into   excesses 
little  short  of  rebellion,  for 
(a)  Petitions  have  been  hindered  from  reaching 

the  throne,  and 
(6)  An   "arbitrary  condition"   had  been   im- 
posed upon  the  General  Court  of  Mas- 
sachusetts which,  even  if  it  had  considered 
the   temper  of   the  people,  would  have 
availed  nothing. 
(2)  While  at  peace,  our  military  may  support  him, 
but  if  it  be  withdrawn  his  dismissal  would 
not  console  us,  outraged  and  abused. ; 
rV.     Weymouth  is  made  secretary  for  the  Southern  Department, 
for  which  he  was  wholly  unqualified. 
{A)  Drawing  lots  would  be  a  prudent  and  reasonable  mode 
of  appointment  compared  to  a  late  disposition  of  the 
secretary's  office,  for 
I.  Lord    Rochford   was   qualified  for  the  Southern  De- 
partment, Lord  Weymouth  for  neither  the  Southern 
nor  Home  Department;    yet,  by  caprice  Rochford 


252  APPENDIX 

was  appointed  to  the  Home  Department,  and  Wey- 
inouth  to  the  Southern. 
{B)  Weymouth  is  wholly  unqualified  for  the  Southern  De- 
partment, for 
I.  In  his  first  employment  as  secretary  of  the  Home  De- 
partment,  by    urging   the   magistrates   to   use   the 
military  if  certain  disturbances  in  the  streets  should 
continue,  he  acted  with  deliberation  in  carrying  out 
a  headlong  passion. 
V.    The   Marquis   of    Granby  as  commander-in-chief  is  incom- 
petent, for 
{A)  The   fashion   of  complimenting  the  commander-in-chief 
for  his  bravery  and  generosity  is  unwarranted,  for 

1.  His  bravery  is  marred  by  a  total  absence  of  feeling 

and  reflection. 

2.  His  generosity  is  lacking  in  disinterestedness,  inde- 

pendence, or  firmness  in  providing  lucrative  employ- 
ments or  in  granting  commissions  in  the  army. 
VI.     Sir  Edward  Hawke  as  secretary  of  the  navy  is  inefficient  and 

should  be  retired. 
VII.    Mansfield  as  chief  justice  is  pernicious  to  the  whole  country, 
for 
(A)  His  administration  has  not  been  pure  and  impartial,  for 

1.  The  pure  and  impartial  administration  of  justice  is, 

perhaps,  the  firmest  bond  to  secure  a  cheerful  sub- 
mission of  the  people,  and  to  engage  their  affections 
to  government. 

2.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  questions  of  private  right  or 

wrong  are  justly  decided,  nor  that  judges  are  su- 
perior to  the  vileness  of  pecimiary  corruption. 
a.  Jeffries  himself,  when  the  court  had  no  interest, 
was  an  upright  judge. 

3.  A  court  of  justice  may  be  subject  to  another  sort  of 

bias,  more  important  and  pernicious,  as  it  reaches 
beyond  the  interest  of  individuals,  and  affects  the 
whole  community. 
a.  A  judge  under  the  influence  of  government  may  be 
honest  enough  in  the  decision  of  private  causes, 
yet  a  traitor  to  the  public. 
(i)  When  a  victim  is  marked  out  by  the  ministry, 
this  judge  will  offer  himself  to  perform  the 
sacrifice. 
(2)  He  will  not  scruple  to  prostitute  his  dignity 
and  betray  the  sanctity  of  his  office  when- 


APPENDIX  253 

ever  an  arbitrary  point  is  to  be  carried  for 
government  or  the  resentment  of  a  court  to 
be  gratified. 
(B)  These  principles  and  proceedings,  odious  and  contemp- 
tible as  they  are,  in  efifect  are  no  less  injudicious. 

1.  A  wise  and  generous  people  are  roused  by  every  ap- 

pearance of  oppressive,  unconstitutional  measures, 
whether  those  measures  are  supported  openly  by 
the  power  of  government  or  masked  under  the  forms 
of  a  court  of  justice. 

2.  Prudence  and  self-preservation  will  oblige  the  most 

moderate  dispositions  to  make  common  cause,  even 
with  a  man  whose  conduct  they  censure,  if  they  see 
him  persecuted  in  a  way  which  the  real  spirit  of  the 
laws  will  not  justify. 

3.  The  facts  on  which  these  remarks  are  founded  are 

too  notorious  to  require  an  application. 

Conclusion 
I.     The  nation  is  in  a  deplorable  condition. 

II.     It  is  governed  by  councils  from  which  a  reasonable  man  can  ex- 
pect no  relief  but  death. 
III.     The  true  cause  of  our  deplorable  condition  is  due  to  government 
by  men  without  wisdom  or  integrity. 

BRIEF  II 

IN  DEFENSE  OF  DARNAY^ 

Introduction 
I.    The  arrest  of  Darnay  arose  from  the  fact  that  for  several  years  he 

had  been  travelling  between  France  and  England. 
II.  He  was  tried  for  treason,  it  being  declared  that  on  these  trips 
he  had  borne  information  to  the  French  concerning  the  English 
forces  in  America. 
III.  The  accused  admitted  that  he  had  been  a  frequent  traveller  across 
the  Channel,  but  was  unwilling  to  explain  the  trips  further  than 
that  they  were  of  a  private  nature  and  involved  the  interests  of 
others. 

IV.  WTiether  the  facts  charged,  if  proved,  legally  constituted  treason 

was  not  in  issue. 

V.  The  accused,  however,  denied  that  he  was  guilty  of  treason,  and 

'Prepared  from  material  in  Dickens's  "A  Tale  of  Two  Cities." 


254  APPENDIX 

argued  that  the  evidence  was  insuflBcient  to  establish  the  facts 
charged. 

Body 

Darnay  was  not  guilty,  because 

A.  The  testimony  which,  if  true,  might  be  damaging  was  false,  since 

I.     John  Barsad's  testimony  was  false,  for 

a.  In  the  cross-examination,  he  was  shown  to  be  untruthful 

and  altogether  bad,  for 

1.  He  probably  Ued  about  his  owning  "property,"  for 

(i)  He  would  not  specify  the  property  which  he  swore 

he  owned. 
(2)  He  too  willingly  adopted  the  suggestion  that  he  had 

acquired  it  by  inheritance. 

2.  He  admitted  that  he  had  been  in  a  "debtor's  prison," 

after  denying  that  he  had  been  in  "prison." 

3.  He  said  that  his  profession  was  simply  "gentleman." 

4.  He  admitted  that  he  had  "received  a  kick  at  the  top  of 

a  staircase  and  fell  down  of  his  o\vn  accord,"  after  deny- 
ing that  he  had  been  "kicked  down-stairs." 

5.  He  admitted  that  he  had  lived  somewhat  by  play  and 

sought  to  extol  it. 

6.  He  admitted  that  he  owed  the  accused  money,  but  denied 

that  he  was  actuated  by  any  other  motive  in  this  case 
than  "sheer  patriotism." 
n.     Roger  Cly's  testimony  was  false,  for 

o.  There  was  the  greatest  probability  that  Barsad  and  Cly 
were  in  league  and  hired  spies,  for 

1.  They  were  both  bad  characters,  since 

(i)  Cly  had  probably  committed  a  theft,  for 

(c)  He  admitted  having  been  maligned  about  steal- 
ing a  plated  mustard-pot. 
(6)  He  admitted  having  examined  Darnay's  pockets. 

2.  They  had  known  each  other  for  "seven  or  eight  years." 

3.  Their  testimony  was  similar  in  respect  to  the  motives 

assigned. 

b.  His  testimony  was  made  worthless  by  the  resemblance  of  the 

accused  to  Carton. 

B.  The  testimony  which  was  true  was  not  damaging,  since 

I.     It  was  indefinite  and  could  support  the  statement  that  Darnay 
was  travelling  on  private  business,  since 
a.  Lorry's  testimony  was  chiefly  as  to  the  prisoner's  travelling, 
and  the  existence  of  a  conversation  between  Darnay  and 
Lucy  Manette. 


APPENDIX  255 

b.  Lucy  Manette's  testimony  about  this  conversation  revealed 

nothing  damaging,  for 

1.  His  remark  that  England's  treatment  of  America  was  un- 

just was  unimportant,  for 
(i)  It  was  but  a  casual  remark. 

(2)  It  was  unlikely  that  a  traitor  should  express  his  sym- 
pathies openly  and  to  a  stranger. 

2.  His  remark  about  George  III  was  a  "monstrous  joke." 

c.  Doctor  Manette's  testimony  was  of  no  value,  for 
I.  He  remembered  nothing. 

d.  The  testimony  of  the  "garrison  and  dockyard"  witness  proved 

nothing  against  the  accused,  since 
I.  He  failed  to  identify  the  accused  as  the  man  in  the  coffee- 
house, for 
(i)  He  could  easily  have  mistaken  Darnay  for  Carton. 

Conclusion 
The  testimony  of  Barsad  and  of  Cly  was  false,  and  Damay  was  the 
victim  of  a  plot.  The  testimony  of  the  reputable  characters  corroborated 
Damay's  explanation  that  he  was  travelling  on  private  business.  More- 
over, the  trustworthy  witnesses  showed  sympathy  for  the  accused  and  a 
belief  in  his  irmocence.  The  evidence  has,  therefore,  been  insufl&cient  to 
prove  that  Damay  conveyed  the  alleged  information  to  the  French, 
and  thus  to  establish  the  charge  of  treason. 


APPENDIX  B 

Questions  and  Exercises 

I.    In  General 

1.  Explain  the  importance  of  imaginative  suggestion  in  pre- 
senting an  argument  to  an  audience. 

2.  Distinguish  between  the  following  terms:  the  productive 
and  reproductive  imagination,  an  image  and  an  idea,  an  image 
and  a  perception. 

3.  Write  briefly  a  paragraph  using  other  than  visual  imagery. 

4.  Illustrate  the  principle  of  description  that  the  character- 
istics of  an  object  which  will  most  readily  suggest  the  image  of 
that  object  is  the  one  most  readily  recalled  by  the  particular 
audience. 


256  APPENDIX 

5.  Select  a  story  or  anecdote  from  your  reading,  and  rewrite 
it  so  as  to  recall  a  person  or  situation,  and  also  establish  a  point. 

6.  What  are  the  tests  of  an  effective  image? 

7.  Write  a  brief  address  illustrating  the  perceptual  and  con- 
ceptual aspects  of  imagery  on  the  following  plan:  Image  some 
historic  scene;  draw  inferences  or  lessons  from  it  respecting 
human  life  or  conduct;  and  image  these  conceptions  within 
modern  experience  and  also  within  the  experience  of  the  chosen 
audience,  e.  g.,  Psalm  121. 

8.  Write  a  few  paragraphs  on  "divided  forces,"  illustrating 
the  principles  of  unity  and  variety. 

9.  Compare  the  imagery  of  a  eulogy  and  a  philippic  with  re- 
spect to  the  appeal  to  the  approving  or  the  disapproving  emo- 
tions. 

10.  Recalling  a  team-debate  which  you  have  recently  heard, 
(c)  suggest  how  the  issue  might  have  been  more  effectively  pre- 
sented by  the  use  of  an  analogy,  {b)  state  the  main  concepts  of 
each  of  the  three  speeches,  and  consider  how  each  might  have 
been  more  effectively  imaged,  and  (c)  show  how  imaginative 
suggestion  might  have  been  used  in  some  respect  so  as  to  heighten 
the  final  impression. 

II.    On  Specific  Speeches 

James  Otis  on  ''Writs  of  Assistance." — What  are  the  four 
reasons  which  Otis  states  in  order,  against  general  writs?  Does 
the  effectiveness  of  the  speech  really  depend  on  these  logical 
reasons,  or  on  the  process  of  imaging  the  idea  of  the  "tyranny 
of  the  writs  "  on  the  mind  of  his  hearers  ?  What  types  of  imagery 
does  he  use  other  than  auditory?  What  adjectives  does  the 
speaker  use  which  possess  an  emotional  coloring?  What  asso- 
ciation-reaction do  you  get  personally  from  the  phrase  "A 
man's  house  is  his  castle  "  ?  How  does  the  introduction  to  the 
speech  predispose  one  to  a  feehng  of  opposition  to  the  writs? 
Is  the  speech  as  a  whole  marked  by  sound  thinking,  by  thor- 
ough thinking,  and  by  effective  presentation? 

Patrick  Henry  in  the  Virginia  Convention,  March  28,  1776. — 
Make  a  brief  of  the  argument  proving  the  necessity  of  fighting. 
Viewing  the  central  idea  of  the  speech  as  the  "vanity  of  hope," 
how  does  he  image  it  on  the  mind  of  his  hearers  ?  How  does  he 
in  opening,  inhibit  the  suggestions  of  the  speaker  who  has  pre- 


APPENDIX  257 

ceded  him,  so  as  to  make  the  audience  susceptible  to  his  own 
suggestions,  and  to  be  able  to  state  clearly  the  issue  before  the 
country?  How  much  of  the  effect  of  the  speech  is  due  to  his 
suggesting  to  his  hearers  specific  past  events  or  acts  easily  re- 
called? How  much  to  his  constructive  imagination?  Point 
out  instances  of  Biblical  allusions;  of  tonal  imagery  (euphonious 
or  cacophonous);  also  of  illustrative  imagery,  and  classify  the 
latter  as  visual,  auditory,  kinesthetic,  etc.  What  effect  does 
his  use  of  the  interrogative  form  of  sentence  produce  upon  at- 
tention and  interest?  What  use  does  he  make  of  repetition  and 
of  positive  assertion?  Is  the  style  too  rhymical?  Does  the 
speech  as  a  whole  give  a  sufficient  reason  which  may  be  recalled 
and  stated  for  the  action  it  would  incite? 

Samuel  Adams  on  Ainerican  Independence  in  Philadelphia, 
August  I,  1776. — In  predisposing  his  hearers  to  his  point  of 
view,  what  common  ground  in  thought  and  feeling  does  Samuel 
Adams  seek  to  establish  in  the  introduction  to  his  speech  ?  Does 
he  image  this  idea  logically  as  well  as  emotionally?  In  the  body 
of  the  speech  does  he  really  deliberate  on  the  matters  he  dis- 
cusses, or  seek  simply  to  incite  to  action?  By  what  means  does 
he  inhibit  the  effect  of  the  talk  of  "our  obligations  to  Great 
Britain"?  In  answering  this  first  objection  are  his  arguments 
both  sound  and  effective?  By  what  illustration  or  analogy, 
appealing  to  common  experience,  does  he  finally  show  that  "the 
protection  we  received"  does  not  annul  our  rights  as  men ?  Why 
does  he  so  often  use  the  rhetorical  question  in  opening  a  line 
of  thought  and  positive  assertion  in  concluding  it?  Why  does 
he  seek  to  image  the  idea  of  the  justice  of  independence  before 
imaging  its  expediency?  In  opposing  "the  doctrine  of  depen- 
dence on  Great  Britain,"  point  out  his  use  of  images  of  the  pres- 
ent and  of  the  past  as  a  preliminary  to  the  suggested  image  of 
the  future  (anticipation  images).  Logically,  may  not  the  under- 
lying reasoning  here  be  called,  a  priori,  causal,  or  antecedent 
probability?  Does  the  argument  gain  in  force  by  associating 
it  with  the  idea  of  a  providential  dispensation?  What  value 
do  you  give  to  the  kinaesthetic  (muscular)  image  of  "chaining 
down  the  wolf  without  drawing  his  claws  and  paring  his  nails"? 
Note  the  force  of  the  contrasted  anticipation  images,  the  one 
based  on  independence,  the  other  on  "an  accommodation"  which 
would  mean  "the  ruin  of  the  country."    In  appealing  thus  both 


258  APPENDIX 

to  the  approving  and  to  the  disapproving  emotions,  was  the 
speaker  probably  correct  in  assuming  that  men  are  influenced 
by  their  fears  as  well  as  their  hopes?  Was  the  pathetic  over- 
done for  those  stirring  times?  Does  he  effectively  turn  the  ob- 
jections based  on  "dissensions  in  our  popular  system"  by  saying 
pithily:  "Suffer  yourselves  to  be  chained  down  by  your  enemies 
that  you  may  not  be  able  to  fight  your  friends  "  ?  Regarding  the 
speech  as  a  whole,  can  you  truthfully  characterize  the  argument 
as  sound  (being  mostly  causative  or  exemplative)  and  also  effec- 
tively imaged,  in  that  it  is  imaged  within  the  general  and  in- 
dividual experience  of  the  delegates  and  audience  of  the  Phila- 
delphia State-house  in  the  summer  of  1776? 

III.    In  Association-Reactions 

I.  Experiments  in  association-reactions  are  of  value  in  study- 
ing the  nature  of  the  processes  of  association. 

In  a  small  group  of  students  inclined  to  co-operate,  such  a 
list  of  words  as  the  following^  may  be  used: 

I.  table;  2.  dark;  3.  music;  4.  sickness;  5.  man;  6.  deep;  7.  soft; 
8.  eating;  9.  mountain;  10.  house;  11.  black;  12.  mutton;  13.  comfort; 
14.  hand;  15.  short;  16.  fruit;  17.  butterfly;  18.  smooth;  19.  command; 
20.  chair;  21.  sweet;  22.  whistle;  23.  woman;  24.  cold;  25.  slow;  26. 
wish;  27.  river;  28.  white;  29.  beautiful;  30.  window;  31.  rough;  32. 
citizen;  33.  foot;  34.  spider;  35.  needle;  36.  red;  37.  sleep;  38.  anger; 
39.  carpet;  40.  girl;  41.  high;  42.  working;  43.  sour;  44.  earth;  45. 
trouble;   46.  soldier;    47.  cabbage;    48.  hard;    49.  eagle;    50.  stomach. 

The  simplest  method  consists  in  asking  the  student  to  an- 
swer as  quickly  as  possible  the  first  word  which  comes  to  mind, 
on  hearing  the  stimulus-word  read.  Then,  before  proceeding, 
the  instructor  may  ask  the  group  such  questions  as  the  follow- 
ing: (i)  Was  the  reaction  a  percept  or  a  concept?  (2)  If  the 
former,  was  it  a  new  or  old  image?  (3)  Name  the  principle  of 
association  expressing  the  relation  of  the  reaction-word  to  the 
stimulus-word. 

II.  The  experiment  is  also  of  interest  if  applied  to  sentences. 

'  This  list  of  fifty  is  part  of  a  list  of  words  used  in  the  Kent  and  Rosanoff 
tests,  a  full  report  of  which  may  be  found  in  the  American  Journal  of  In- 
sanity, vol.  LXVII,  Nos.  I  and  2 — 1910. 


APPENDIX  259 

Ask  the  student  to  hand  in  a  list  of  aphorisms,  epigrams,  para- 
doxes, or  other  striking  phrases.  As  before,  the  instructor  may 
read  the  sentence,  and  ask  the  student  to  state  as  quickly  as 
possible  the  first  thing  which  comes  to  mind.  The  answer  may 
be  analyzed  as  before: 

Illustration:     Stimulus:  "A  rolling  stone  gathers  no  moss." 
Reaction:    i.  A  tramp.     2.  Aimlessness. 
The  first  answer  was  obviously  a  perception,  the  second 
(in  which  more  time  was  used)  a  conception. 
Illustration:     Stimulus:   "Slavery  closes  the  door  of  hope." 

Reaction:  Dante,  "AH  hope  abandon,  etc.,"  plainly  a 
memory  image. 
Illustration:  Stimulus:  "Distance  lends  enchantment  to  the  view." 
Reaction:  i.  The  future.  2.  A  girl.  The  former  is,  of 
course,  conceptual,  the  latter  perceptual,  the  associa- 
tion in  the  second  case  being  that  of  specific  and  gen- 
eral, etc. 

III.  In  trying  these  experiments  with  a  group,  it  is  interest- 
ing to  note  how  the  reactions  differ  among  individuals,  and  also 
change  with  a  change  of  mood;  e.  g.,  Stimulus:  "  Vanity  of 
vanities,  all  is  vanity."  Reaction:  i.  A  pretty  girl.  2.  Eccle- 
siastes.  The  instructor  should,  therefore,  in  analyzing  the  gen- 
eral results  of  his  experiments  call  attention  to  the  different 
type  of  answers  given  when  his  subjects  were  in  a  lighter  mood 
from  those  made  in  a  serious  frame  of  mind.  It  thus  affords 
an  excellent  opportunity  to  show  how  the  emotions  of  a  hearer 
influence  his  reaction. 

IV.  Indeed,  a  preliminary  study  of  audiences  may  be  made 
by  examining  the  reactions  had  from  a  single  sentence  stimulus. 
For  example,  we  may  classify  the  stimulus-sentence  as  the  dif- 
ficult or  the  easy;  the  abstract  or  the  concrete;  the  novel,  the 
familiar,  or  the  stale;  or  we  may  consider  the  association 
awakened  as  stimulated  by  curiosity,  surprise,  antagonism, 
suspense,  motive,  sympathy,  etc.,  and  also  the  influence  on  in- 
terest, attention,  and  conviction. 

V.  For  a  study  of  the  nature  and  force  of  imagery,  (i)  write 
a  statement  in  plain  language  in  the  form  of  a  reason  for  be- 
lieving a  proposition,  and  (2)  express  this  reason  in  figurative 
language.    Discuss  each  paper  (or  speech)  fully  in  conference. 


260  APPENDIX 

VT.  For  the  stimulation  of  interest  in  the  development  of 
a  vocabulary,  the  following  is  suggested  as  a  word-recognition 
test.  This  list  is  from  the  "Stamford  Revision  of  the  Binet- 
Simon  Tests,"  by  Professor  L.  M.  Terman,  published  by  Hough- 
ton Miffin  Company: 

I.  orange;  2.  bonfire;  3.  roar;  4.  gown;  5.  tap;  6.  scorch;  7.  puddle; 
8.  envelope;  9.  straw;  10.  rule;  11.  haste;  12.  afloat;  13.  eyelash; 
14.  copper;  15.  health;  16.  curse;  17.  guitar;  18.  mellow;  19.  pork; 
20.  impolite;  21.  plumbing;  22.  outward;  23.  lecture;  24.  dungeon; 
25.  southern;  26.  noticeable;  27.  muzzle;  28.  quake;  29.  civil;  30. 
treasury;  31.  reception;  32.  ramble;  33.  skill;  34.  misuse;  35.  insure; 
36.  stave;  37.  regard;  38.  nerve;  39.  crunch;  40.  juggler;  41.  majesty; 
42.  bnmette;  43.  snip;  44.  apish;  45.  sportive;  46.  hysterics;  47.  Mars; 
48.  repose;  49.  shrewd;  50.  forfeit;  51.  pecuharity;  52.  coinage;  53. 
mosaic;  54.  bewail;  55.  disproportionate;  56.  dilapidated;  57.  charter; 
58.  conscientious;  59.  avarice;  60.  artless;  61.  priceless;  62.  swaddle; 
63.  tolerate;  64.  gelatinous;  65.  depredation;  66.  promontory;  67.  frus- 
trate; 68.  milksop;  69.  philanthropy;  70.  irony;  71.  lotus;  72.  drabble; 
73.  harpy;  74.  embody;  75.  infuse;  76.  flaunt;  77.  declivity;  78.  fen; 
79.  ochre;  80.  exaltation;  81.  incrustation;  82.  laity;  83.  selectman; 
84.  sapient;  85.  retroactive;  86.  achromatic;  87.  ambergris;  88.  casuis- 
try; 89.  paleology;  90.  perfunctory;  91.  precipitancy;  92.  theosophy; 
93.  piscatorial;  94.  sudorific;  95.  parterre;  96.  homunculus;  97.  cameo; 
98.  shagreen;   99.  limpet;   100.  complot. 

In  order  to  get  the  entire  vocabulary  by  this  test  we  should 
multiply  the  number  of  correct  definitions  by  180.  The  Binet 
tests  are  found  to  be  "extremely  useful  in  determining  the  mental 
age  of  backward  children."  For  vocabulary-building  among 
college  students  the  following  method  is  suggested.  Ask  the 
student  to  write  down  the  figures  i  to  100  in  order  on  a  sheet 
of  paper  on  different  lines.  Then  the  instructor  may  call  out 
the  words  in  order,  with  its  number,  requiring  the  student  (who 
is  put  on  his  honor)  to  write  yes  or  no  after  each  number,  in- 
dicating whether  or  not  he  knows  the  word  sufficiently  to  use 
it.  This  test  may  be  varied  with  different  groups  by  requiring 
the  student  to  write  a  sentence  using  each  of  the  words. 

Whitney  says  that  "the  vocabulary  of  a  rich  and  long  culti- 
vated language  like  the  English  may  be  roughly  estimated  at 
100,000  words,  but  30,000  is  a  very  large  estimate  for  the  nuni- 


APPENDIX  2G1 

ber  ever  used  in  writing  or  speaking  by  a  well-educated  man; 
3,000  to  5, 000,  it  has  been  carefully  estimated,  cover  the  ordinary 
needs  of  a  cultivated  intercourse."  ^ 

It  appears  that  the  above  vocabulary  test  is  based  on  an  as- 
sumed maximum  of  iS.ooo  words  for  an  educated  person.  The 
fifteen  or  sixteen  thousand  words  (derived  from  experiments 
with  this  list  on  Princeton  juniors  and  seniors)  would  indicate 
a  much  higher  average  for  the  vocabulary  of  the  educated,  than 
Whitney's  figures  suggest,  were  we  not  to  make  the  distinction 
that  the  proposed  experiment  is  not  a  word-use  test  but  a  word- 
recognition  test. 

It  may  be  recalled  that  there  is  a  speaking  vocabulary  and 
a  writing  vocabulary,  and  that  the  latter  is  by  far  the  larger. 
The  visual  symbols  of  speech  are  greater  in  number  for  the 
average  person  than  the  auditory;  for  most  persons  are  visiles 
rather  than  audQes.  But  even  for  a  writing  vocabulary,  we 
cannot  determine  by  such  a  test  as  the  preceding  with  any  ac- 
curacy the  words  which  one  would  naturally  use  in  writing; 
for,  in  recording  any  such  test,  there  is  some  suggestion  that 
the  words  fisted  at  least  may  be  used,  and  some  inclination 
awakened  in  the  subject  to  make  the  effort.  The  above  experi- 
ment is  then  offered  as  a  word-recognition  test  to  stimulate 
vocabulary-building,  on  which  we  may  estimate  (i)  the  com- 
parative vocabulary  size  of  the  different  men  in  a  group,  and 
(2)  the  percentage  of  18,000  words  recognized  by  each  person. 


APPENDIX   C 

The  Special  Study  of  Imagery 

I.  Varied  Imagery  Appeals. — Since  the  public  speaker  and 
debater  must  prefer  the  concrete  to  the  abstract,  the  definite 
to  the  indefinite,  the  specific  to  the  general,  in  presenting  his 
ideas  to  others  for  decision  and  approval,  it  may  well  be  a  part 
of  the  work  of  the  advanced  student  to  investigate  the  various 
classes  of  imagery  (visual,  auditory,  tactile,  kinajsthetic,  etc.) 
with  a  view  to  determining  the  peculiar  force  of  the  several  kinds 

>  "Life  and  Growth  of  Language,"  by  W.  D.  Whitney,  p.  25. 


262  APPENDIX 

of  imagery.  By  such  investigations  and  by  frequent  practice 
in  writing  themes  illustrating  the  several  classes  of  imagery, 
the  student  will  learn  both  to  extend  his  range  and  to  diversify 
his  means  of  suggestion.  He  should  endeavor  not  only  to  visual- 
ize but  also  to  auralize,  to  kincesthetize,  to  tactualize,  to  olfactorize, 
and  to  gustatorize.  In  such  ways  will  he  learn  to  make  the  in- 
visible visible,  the  inaudible  audible,  and  to  explore  the  mys- 
tery of  the  subconscious,  so  as  to  return  to  the  threshold  of  con- 
sciousness with  its  treasures. 

11.  Auditory  Imagery  and  the  Disagreeable . — Adverting  now  to  a 
particular  phase  of  imaginative  suggestion,  I  shall  refer  to  auditory 
imagery  in  its  peculiar  connection  with  the  unpleasurable  emotions. 
I  had  asked  a  group  of  students  to  write  a  theme,  using  auditory  imagery 
to  the  exclusion,  if  possible,  of  all  other  forms  of  imagery.  The  results 
were  surprising,  in  that  all  the  auditory  images  which  they  used  dealt 
with  the  disagreeable.  We  at  once  recalled  other  instances  in  point, 
such  as  Patrick  Henry's  allusion  to  clanking  chains  on  the  plains  of  Bos- 
ton, and  John  Randolph's  reference  to  the  ringing  of  the  fire-bell  as  an 
alarm  associated  with  negro  uprisings,  when  it  occurred  to  us  that,  if 
there  was  any  vital  connection  between  the  emotions  arising  from  the 
sense  of  danger  and  their  auditory  expression,  it  should  appear  in  the 
stories  of  that  master  of  mystery,  Edgar  Allan  Poe.  Turning  then  to 
his  Tales  of  Horror  and  Death,  Vol.  VI  (Funk  and  Wagnalls  edition),  we 
read  on  the  first  page: 

"The  sentence — the  dread  sentence  of  death — was  the  last  of  distinct 
accentuation  which  reached  my  ears.  After  that,  the  sound  of  the  in- 
quisitorial voices  seemed  merged  in  one  dreamy,  indeterminate  hum. 
It  conveyed  to  my  soul  the  idea  of  revolution — perhaps  in  its  association 
in  fancy  with  the  burr  of  a  mill-wheel."  And  again,  "I  saw  them  writhe 
with  a  deadly  locution.  I  saw  them  fashion  the  syllables  of  my  name; 
and  I  shuddered  because  no  sound  succeeded."  We  were  reading  from 
"The  Pit  and  the  Pendulum,"  and  were  thus  quickly  rewarded.  A  little 
further  on,  we  found  the  climax  of  a  paragraph  of  fear  (describing  the 
sweep  of  the  pendulum,  razor-like,  and  heavy,  and  rapidly  descending) 
expressed  in  the  following  sentence:  "It  was  appended  to  a  weighty 
rod  of  brass,  and  the  whole  hissed  as  it  swung  thro'  the  air."  The  tale 
ends  thus:  "There  was  a  discordant  hum  of  human  voices  !  There  was 
a  loud  blast  as  of  many  trumpets !  There  was  a  harsh  grating  as  of  a 
thousand  thunders!    The  fiery  walls  rushed  back!  ..." 

Running  through  the  thirteen  tales  contained  in  this  volume  and 
glancing  at  the  last  paragraph  or  two,  we  found  that  the  climax  in  each 
tale  contained  auditory  imagery.    We  hear  the  "long,  wild,  and  con- 


APPENDIX  263 

tinuous  shriek  of  agony"  of  the  subterranean  night  in  "The  Premature 
Burial,"  the  "low  laugh"  and  the  "sad  voice"  and  the  "jingling  of  the 
bells"  in  the  catacombs  in  "The  Cask  of  Amontillado";  the  loud  din  of 
"voices"  in  "  The  Tell-Tale  Heart,"  including  "  the  beating  of  his  hideous 
heart";  the  "reverberation"  of  blows,  and  "screams"  and  "howls," 
in  "The  Black  Cat,"  which  in  "The  Fall  of  the  House  of  Usher"  become 
a  "fierce  breath  of  the  whirlwind"  and  "tumultuous  shouting  sounds." 
It  was  pleasing  to  pass  then  from  the  "shriek"  and  the  "rattling  sounds" 
of  "Berenice"  to  the  quieter  ending  of  "Eleanora."  "And  once — but 
once  again  in  the  silence  of  the  night — there  came  thro'  my  lattice  the 
soft  sighs  which  had  forsaken  me;  and  they  modelled  themselves  into  a 
familiar  and  sweet  voice  saying:  'Sleep  in  peace,  for  the  spirit  of  Love 
reigneth  and  ruleth.'  "  "Ligeia"  and  "  Morella  "  are  no  exceptions  to  the 
climactic  use  of  auditory  expressions  in  the  field  of  the  horrible.  The  last 
tale  in  the  volimie,  "Shadow — A  Parable,"  concludes  as  follows:  "And 
then  did  we,  the  seven,  start  from  our  seats  in  horror  and  stand  trembling 
and  shuddering  and  aghast,  for  the  tones  in  the  voice  of  the  shadow 
were  not  the  tones  of  any  one  being,  but  of  a  multitude  of  beings,  and 
varying  in  their  cadences  from  syllable  to  syllable,  fell  duskly  upon  our 
ears  in  the  well-remembered  and  familiar  accents  of  many  thousand 
departed  friends." 

Poe's  tales,  though  making  constant  use  of  other  imagery,  thus  con- 
firm the  value  of  auditor>'  imagery  for  the  expression  of  the  emotions 
of  fear  and  horror,  and  show  its  peculiar  fitness  to  express  great  heights 
and  depths  of  feeling.  I  find  that  Professor  Scott  has  observed  that 
"presentations  which  awaken  auditory  images  are  more  productive  of 
terror  than  those  which  awaken  images  of  sight."  Orators,  novelists, 
and  poets  in  general  use  visual  imagery  more  than  auditor,'.  In  this 
connection  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  such  a  poet  as  Browning 
in  "Childe  Roland"  uses  an  auditory  climax  in  a  poem  which  elsewhere 
is  almost  completely  visual.  Indeed,  we  are  justified,  I  think,  in  speak- 
ing of  the  peculiar  power  of  auditory  imagery  to  express  the  climax  of 
fear  and  terror. 

The  question  at  once  arises  as  to  why  this  should  be  the  case.  The 
first  explanation  which  occurred  to  me  was  suggested  by  Poe  also.  On 
one  occasion  when  the  menacing  danger,  in  "The  Pit  and  the  Pendulum," 
became  too  great,  the  prisoner  closed  his  eyes,  and  on  another  he  averted 
his  head.  It  may  well  be  that  we  have  very  little  stored-up  visual  imagery 
of  the  disagreeable,  because  of  our  desire  to  avoid  it  and  our  ability  to 
shut  out  the  sight  of  it.  We  instinctively  close  our  eyes  to  the  disagree- 
able, but  we  cannot  close  our  ears !  In  the  second  place,  a  large  part  of 
our  time  is  spent  in  darkness,  when  the  eye  cannot  see  impending  danger, 
and  the  ear  must  be  relied  on  to  give  the  warning.  For  such  physical 
reasons  it  would  seem  that  man  may  have  developed,  through  the  ages, 


264  APPENDIX 

his  peculiar  auditory  sensitiveness  to  danger,  with  its  accompanying 
emotional  apparatus.  So  the  imagination  of  the  artist  would  naturally 
describe  by  auditory  suggestion  scenes  too  horrible  to  be  optically  ob- 
served.' 

Images  of  fear  and  horror  may,  of  course,  be  other  than  audi- 
tory.   For  example: 

"I  have  almost  forgot  the  taste  of  fears 
The  time  has  been  my  senses  would  have  cooled  to  hear  a  night- 
shriek  !" 

There  are  doubtless  persons  who  will  think  of  the  phrase  "to 
taste  of  fear"  as  unreal,  just  as  there  are  persons  who  see  a  literal 
inaccuracy  in  Hamlet's  taking  up  arms  against  a  sea  of  trouble — 
a  phrase,  however,  accurately  marking  the  perturbation  of  his 
mental  state  when  contemplating  suicide.  During  the  strong 
excitation  of  fear,  indeed,  all  the  senses  will  of  course  be  affected, 
and  the  writer  is  unwilHng  to  admit  the  unreality  of  a  gustatory 
reaction  from  a  disagreeble  stimulus.  How  the  mouth  of  a  child 
expands,  for  instance,  when  fed  with  sugar,  and  draws  up  when 
it  is  given  medicine !  Again,  does  Shakespeare  use  this  gusta- 
tory image: 

"  Cowards  die  many  times  before  their  death, 
The  valiant  never  taste  of  death  but  once." 

A  close  study,  either  of  Shakespeare's  great  tragedies  or  of 
Poe's  tales  of  horror,  will  show  innumerable  ways  in  which  the 
effect  of  fear  on  the  human  frame  may  be  imaged.  The  mouth 
may  be  parched  and  dry,  the  throat  choked,  the  cheeks  blanched, 
the  eyes  start,  the  hair  stand  up,  the  voice  speechless,  the  muscles 
powerless  to  move;  and  as  the  blood  rushes  with  increasing 
force  through  the  veins,  the  only  conscious  thing  to  engage  us 
may  be  the  sound  of  the  beating  of  our  own  heart. 

III.  Auditory  Imagery  and  the  Agreeable. — Likewise,  audi- 
tory imagery  appealing  to  the  pleasurable  emotions  is  quite 
common: 

'  The  Qiiarterly  Journal  oj  Public  Speaking,  II,  2, 181,  by  H.  F.  Coving- 
ton. 


APPENDIX  265 

"Let  music  swell  the  breeze, 
And  ring  from  all  the  trees, 

Sweet  freedom's  song  1 
Let  mortal  tongues  awake, 
Let  all  that  breathe  partake, 
Let  rocks  their  silence  break, — 
The  sound  prolong." 

— America. 

In  the  description  of  the  dawn  in  Milton's  "L'Allegro,"  we 
hear  the  "lark"  startling  the  dull  night,  the  "cock"  with  his 
lively  din,  and  the  "ploughman"  whistling  o'er  the  furrowed 
land.  As  an  illustration  in  prose,  the  last  sentence  of  Lincoln's 
First  Inaugural  contains  auditory  imagery: 

The  mystic  chords  of  memory,  stretching  from  every  battle-field  and 
patriot-grave  to  every  living  heart  and  hearthstone  all  over  this  broad 
land,  will  yet  swell  the  chorus  of  the  Union  when  again  touched,  as 
surely  they  will  be,  by  the  better  angels  of  our  nature. 

Here,  such  phrases  as  "the  mystic  chords  of  memory,"  "the 
chorus  of  the  Union,"  etc.,  as  well  as  the  rhythmic  beat  of  the 
line,  produce  a  decidedly  agreeable  effect  on  the  emotions.  Tonal 
imagery  has  a  less  important  place  in  prose  than  in  poetry, 
and  in  argument  than  in  some  other  prose  forms,  but  even  in 
argument  it  may  play  an  important  part.  The  word  "muck," 
for  instance,  in  the  phrase  "man  with  a  muck-rake,"  expresses 
a  disapproved  idea  in  a  word  tonally  unpleasant;  so,  too,  "in- 
nocuous desuetude"  and  "profiteering."  On  the  other  hand, 
"selective  draft"  is  a  happy  substitute  for  the  rather  harsh  term 
"conscription." 

It  is  a  constant  source  of  surprise  to  find  how  little  auditory 
illustrative  imagery  is  used  even  in  spoken  discourse.  This 
may  be  due  in  part  to  the  fact  that  the  rhythm  of  speech  makes 
it  appeal  to  the  ear.  At  all  events,  we  should  encourage  a  variety 
of  appeal  through  diversified  forms. 

IV.  Mixed  Imagery  Types. — Scientific  investigations  of  an 
important  character  have  already  been  made  of  mental  imagery. 
The  results  tend  to  show  marked  differences  in  the  kind  of 
imagery  used  by  different  persons,  and  by  the  same  persons 
under  changed  conditions.    A  report  of  the  psychological  experi- 


266  APPENDIX 

ments  conducted  by  Doctor  Fernald,  in  which  eleven  trained 
students  of  imagery  were  the  subjects,  should  be  of  interest. 
In  general: 

The  individual  differences  in  imagery  are  too  complex  to  be  stated 
adequately  in  terms  of  difiference  in  "type"  unless  this  type  is  carefully 
explained  for  each  individual  case.  An  adequate  statement  of  an  in- 
dividual's imagery  type  would  involve  an  account  of  the  kinds  of  imagery 
used  in  various  representative  situations,  with  an  estimate  of  their 
relative  importance  and  a  discussion  of  the  characteristics  of  such  imagery 
under  the  varying  conditions.^ 

The  investigator,  however,  was  able  to  divide  her  eleven  sub- 
jects into  two  groups: 

(i)  The  more  versatile,  who  seem  to  use  visual-auditory  and  vocal- 
motor  forms  with  perfect  ease,  changing  from  one  to  another  with  change 
in  the  material,  or  using  all  forms  in  handling  one  kind  of  material. 

(2)  The  other  group  consists  of  those  subjects  who  have  certain 
specially  favored  kinds  of  imagery  which  they  use  with  considerable 
constancy  in  the  various  tests,  and  who  practically  omit,  as  far  as  actual 
use  is  concerned,  certain  other  forms.^ 

Visual  imagery,  as  might  be  supposed,  was  found  to  be  most 
extensively  and  consistently  used,  with  auditory  imagery  rank- 
ing next  in  order. 

In  the  first  place,  one  positive  result,  which  is  of  considerable  im- 
portance for  our  general  diagnosis,  is  the  discovery  that  none  of  our 
subjects  report  an  absolute  lack  of  visual  illustrative  imagery.  More- 
over, all  but  three  report  at  least  occasional  instances  of  auditory,  and 
these  three  express  themselves  not  as  absolutely  certain  of  its  absence, 
but  rather  as  exceedingly  dubious  of  its  presence.* 

Again: 

Investigation  shows  a  decided  preponderance  of  visual  imagery  over 
the  auditory  for  the  majority  of  subjects.  In  no  case  did  the  auditory 
images  surpass  the  visual  in  amount.* 

>  "  Mental  Imagery,"  by  Mabel  Ruth  Fernald.    The  Psychological 
Monographs,  vol.  XIV,  No.  58,  p.  130. 
-Ibid.,  pp.  131-132. 


APPENDIX  267 

Moreover: 

Again  and  again  where  auditory  imager>'  is  suggested,  only  the  visual 
image  of  the  sounding  object  appears.  In  certain  cases  the  significance 
of  a  phrase  is  even  changed  to  favor  the  visual  rather  than  the  auditory. 
Thus,  both  G.  and  T.  report,  independently  of  one  another,  that  the 
"low-crying  birds"  of  passage  were  thought  of  as  "low-flying  birds" 
with  appropriate  visual  imagery.  G.  also  transformed  the  "drowsy 
tinklings"  of  No.  20  into  twinklings  of  star  lights. 

In  general,  then,  we  may  say,  for  the  majority  of  our  subjects,  that, 
under  the  conditions  of  reading  and  listening,  a  greater  susceptibility 
is  shown  to  the  suggestion  of  accompanying  visual  imagery  than  to  that 
of  accompanjnng  sounds.  We  cannot  state  with  certainty  the  explana- 
tion of  this,  but  in  all  probability  several  causes  conspire  together  to 
produce  the  effect.  It  may  be  true,  as  Segal,  Meumann,  and  others  have 
said,  that  visual  is  the  prevailing  form  of  concrete  imagery  throughout 
the  thinking  of  the  majority  of  persons,  because  visual  objects  have 
a  much  greater  practical  significance  for  most  of  us  than  do  sounds.  It 
may  also  be  due  to  the  fact  that,  while  we  constantly  experience  visual 
objects  which  give  no  sound,  we  seldom  experience  sounds  without  some 
sounding  object  which  can  be  or  has  been  seen.  In  the  reading  process, 
the  fact  that  most  of  our  subjects  have  a  running  accompaniment  of 
auditory-vocal-motor  verbal  imagery  may  help  to  account  for  the  de- 
ficiency in  auditory  concrete  imagery,  since  one  of  these  may  inhibit 
the  other.  Another  consideration  seems  pertinent,  that  sounds  may 
get  a  fairly  adequate  representation  through  changes  in  the  inflection 
in  reading  and  through  the  onomatopoetic  effect  of  many  of  the  words — 
a  representation  which  the  visual  entirely  lacks.^ 

Other  forms  of  imagery,  as  revealed  in  the  above  investigation, 
are  commented  upon  specifically,  as  follows: 

With  regard  to  the  other  forms  of  possible  imagery  the  best  we  can 
do  is  to  note  their  presence  or  absence  in  the  few  cases  of  more  or  less 
vivid  description.  Cold,  for  example,  is  introduced  in  a  very  striking 
way  in  No.  7,  yet  only  one  subject  reported  any  temperature  imagery, 
though  some  observed  organic  reactions  (shivering,  etc.),  or  visual  rep- 
resentation of  its  effects.  Cold  is  also  an  element  of  the  situation  in 
No.  24,  in  connection  with  the  wet,  and  in  No.  28,  in  the  reference  to 
the  wind,  yet  we  find  it  mentioned  by  only  one  subject  in  the  former 
case  and  then  as  questioned,  and  in  the  latter  case  only  three  report  it. 
Warmth  is  mentioned  in  several  passages  but  appears  most  vividly  in 

'  Ibid.,  pp.  41-44. 


268  APPENDIX 

No.  24,  where  it  appears  twice — in  the  reference  to  the  heat  of  the  night 
and  in  the  account  of  the  touch  of  the  warm  animal — yet  none  of  the 
subjects  report  it  for  the  first  case  and  only  four  for  the  latter.  For 
contact,  No.  24  again  gives  us  the  best  instance.  Here  there  are  two 
very  striking  references — the  touching  of  the  animal  and  the  feeling  of 
the  tongue  on  the  palm.  Most  of  the  subjects  get  at  least  one  of  these, 
and  all  commented  on  the  cleverness  of  the  description.  Olfactory 
material  is  fairly  well  suggested  in  at  least  four  selections,  yet  there  is 
noticeably  little  imagery  aroused.  With  kincpsthetic  and  organic  material 
we  have  the  same  sort  of  problem  that  we  had  with  the  vocal-motor, 
that  of  distinguishing  between  imagery  and  actual  reinstatement  of 
sensations.  Again,  aside  from  the  certainty  that  in  many  cases  it  is 
the  latter,  we  have  had  to  leave  the  problem  unsolved.^ 

Two  of  the  passages  used  in  Doctor  Fernald's  tests  are  given 
below — (7)  and  (24).  The  first  may  illustrate  the  little-used 
imagery  of  cold,  and  the  second  of  warmth,  as  well  as  many  other 
kinds  of  imagery. 

(7)     "St.  Agnes'  Eve— ah,  bitter  chill  it  was! 
The  owl,  for  all  his  feathers,  was  a-cold; 
The  hare  limp'd  trembling  through  the  frozen  grass, 
And  silent  was  the  flock  in  woolly  fold; 
Numb  were  the  Beadsman's  fingers  while  he  told 
His  rosary,  and  while  his  frosted  breath, 
Like  pious  incense  from  a  censer  old, 
Seem'd  taking  flight  for  heaven  without  a  death. 
Past  the  sweet  Virgin's  picture,  while  his  prayer  he  saith.'' 
— Keats:  "St.  Agnes'  Eve,"  1st  stanza.^ 

(24)  An  oppressive  slumber  hung  about  the  forest  branches.  In 
the  dells  and  on  the  heights  was  the  same  dead  heat.  Here  where  the 
brook  tinkled  it  was  no  cool-hpped  sound,  but  metallic,  and  without 
the  spirit  of  water.  .  .  .  The  breathless  silence  was  significant,  yet 
the  moon  shone  in  a  broad  blue  heaven.  Tongue  out  of  mouth  trotted 
the  httle  dog  after  him;  couched  panting  when  he  stopped  an  instant; 
rose  weariedly  when  he  started  afresh.  Now  and  then  a  large  white 
night-moth  flitted  through  the  dusk  of  the  forest.  ...  All  at  once  the 
thunder  spoke.  .  .  .  Then  there  were  pauses,  and  the  lightning  seemed 
as  the  eye  of  heaven,  and  the  thunder  as  the  tongue  of  heaven,  each 
alternately  addressing  him;  filling  him  with  awful  rapture.  .  .  .  Lower 
down  the  lightened  abysses  of  air  rolled  the  wrathful  crash;   then  white 

^  Ibid.,  pp.  41-44.  '  Ibid.,  Appendix. 


APPENDIX  269 

thrusts  of  light  were  darted  from  the  sky,  and  great  curving  ferns,  seen 
steadfast  in  pallor  a  second,  were  supernaturally  agitated  and  vanished. 
Then  a  shrill  song  roused  in  the  leaves  and  herbage.  Prolonged  and 
louder  it  sounded,  as  deeper  and  heavier  the  deluge  pressed.  A  mighty 
force  of  water  satisfied  th^  desire  of  the  earth.  Even  in  this,  drenched 
as  he  was  by  the  first  oatpouring,  Richard  had  a  savage  pleasure. 
Keeping  in  motion,  he  was  scarcely  conscious  of  the  wet,  and  the  grate- 
ful breath  of  the  weeds  was  refreshing.  Suddenly  he  stopped  short,  lift- 
ing a  curious  nostril.  He  fancied  he  smelt  meadow-sweet.  .  .  .  He  was 
sure  he  smelt  it  fresh  in  dews.  .  .  .  .After  two  or  three  steps  he 
stooped  and  stretched  out  his  hand  to  feel  for  the  flower,  having,  he 
knew  not  why,  a  strong  wish  to  verify  its  growth  there.  Groping 
about,  his  hand  encountered  something  warm  that  started  at  his  touch, 
and  he,  with  the  instinct  we  have,  seized  it,  and  lifted  it  to  look  at  it. 
The  creature  was  very  small,  evidently  quite  young.  Richard's  eyes, 
now  accustomed  to  the  darkness,  were  able  to  discern  it  for  what  it  was, 
a  tiny  leveret.  ...  He  put  the  httle  thing  on  one  hand  in  his  breast, 
and  stepped  out  rapidly  as  before. 

The  rain  was  now  steady:  from  every  tree  a  fountain  poured.  So 
cool  and  easy  had  his  mind  become  that  he  was  speculating  on  what 
kind  of  shelter  the  birds  could  find,  and  how  the  butterflies  and  moths 
saved  their  colored  wings  from  washing.  .  .  .  He  was  next  musing  on 
a  strange  sensation  he  experienced.  It  ran  up  one  arm  with  an  inde- 
scribable thrill,  but  communicated  nothing  to  his  heart.  It  was  purely 
physical,  ceased  for  a  time  and  recommenced,  till  he  had  it  all  through 
his  blood,  wonderfully  thrilling.  He  grew  aware  that  the  little  thing 
he  carried  in  bis  breast  was  licking  his  hand  there.  The  small  rough 
tongue  going  over  and  over  the  palm  of  his  hand  produced  the  strange 
sensation  he  felt. — {Meredith:  "  Richard  Feverel,"  chap.  XLII.)i 


APPENDIX  D 

The  Imagery  oe  Argument  and  of  Poetry 

By  contrasting  the  sermons  of  Jonathan  Edwards  relating 
to  hell  with  the  treatment  by  Dante  of  the  same  theme  in  the 
"Inferno,"  Doctor  DeWitt  makes  clear  the  purely  incidental 
function  of  imagery  in  argument  and  its  prime  function  in 
poetry.  He  cites  in  illustration  the  passage  when  Dante  was  sail- 
ing through  the  Lake  of  Mud  in  the  Fifth  Circle  of  Hell.    The 

■  Ibid.,  Appendi.x. 


270  APPENDIX 

latter,  it  will  be  recalled,  made  reply  to  Philippe  Argenti:  "Mas- 
ter, I  should  like  to  see  him  ducked  in  this  broth  before  we  de- 
part from  the  lake." 

There  is  nothing  in  Edwards  which,  so  far  as  I  can  judge,  equals  this 
in  its  horrid  imagery  and  suggestion.  And  yet  men  enjoy  Dante  and 
the  "Inferno."  They  do  not  "execrate"  him  for  a  "monster,"  as  Doctor 
Allen  says  they  do  Edwards.  And  in  his  great  essay  on  Dante,  Mr. 
James  Russell  Lowell  makes  this  very  scene  the  text  of  an  eloquent  lauda- 
tion of  Dante's  moral  quaUty,  in  which  he  says  of  him:  "He  beheved 
in  the  righteous  use  of  anger,  and  that  baseness  was  its  legitimate  quarry." 
Why  is  it  that  the  attitude  of  the  general  public,  thus  represented  by 
Mr.  Lowell,  toward  the  hell  of  Dante  is  so  different  from  the  attitude 
of  the  same  public  toward  the  hell  of  Edwards?  I  think  we  shall  find 
an  answer  to  this  question  in  what  I  may  call  Edwards's  spiritual  realism. 
Of  course,  Dante  is  a  realist  also.  How  often  this  quality  of  his  poem 
has  been  pointed  out  to  us !  But  Dante's  is  the  realism  of  the  artist, 
the  poet  who  appeals  to  our  imagination.  Our  imagination  being  grati- 
fied, we  enjoy  the  picture  and  even  the  sensations  of  horror  which  the 
picture  starts.  Of  all  this  there  is  nothing  in  Edwards.  There  is  no 
picture  at  all.  There  is  scarcely  a  symbol.  Here  and  there  there  is  an 
illustration.  But  the  illustrations  of  Edwards  are  never  employed  to 
make  his  subject  vivid  to  the  imagination.  They  are  intended  simply 
to  explicate  it  to  the  understanding.  The  free,  responsible,  guilty,  and 
immortal  spirit  is  immediately  addressed;  and  the  purely  spiritual  ele- 
ments of  the  hell  of  the  wicked,  separated  from  all  else,  are  made  to  ap- 
pear in  their  terrible  nakedness  before  the  reason  and  the  conscience. 
The  reason  and  the  conscience  respond.  We  are  angry  because  startled 
out  of  our  security.  And  we  call  him  cruel,  because  of  the  conviction 
forced  on  us  that  we  are  in  the  presence  of  a  terrible,  even  if  mysterious, 
spiritual  reality.  Edwards  always  spoke,  not  to  the  imagination,  but 
to  the  responsible  spirit.  Men  realized  when  he  addressed  them  that 
because  they  are  sinners  their  moral  constitution  judicially  inflicts  upon 
their  personality  remorse;  and  that  remorse  is  an  absolute,  immitigable 
and  purely  spiritual  pain,  independent  of  the  conditions  of  time  and 
space  and,  therefore,  eternal.' 

Imagery  is  merely  an  instrument  used  in  communicating  our 
ideas  to  others.  The  chief  function  of  Dante's  imagery  was  to 
make  vivid;  that  of  Edwards  generally  to  explicate.  The  latter, 
moreover,  appealed  to  the  reason,  the  understanding,  and  the 

1  "Jonathan  Edwards,  a  Study,"  by  John  DeWitt, 


APPENDIX  271 

responsible  will.    This,  indeed,  is  "the  serious  business"  of  argu- 
ment, as  expounded  by  the  philosopher  Kant: 

The  arts  of  speech  are  rhetoric  and  poetry.  Rhetoric  is  the  art  of 
carrying  on  a  serious  business  of  the  understanding  as  if  it  were  a  free 
play  of  the  imagination;  poetr>'  the  art  of  conducting  a  free  play  of  the 
imagination  as  if  It  were  a  serious  business  of  the  understanding. 

The  orator  then  promises  a  serious  business,  and  In  order  to  entertain 
his  audience  conducts  it  as  if  It  were  a  mere  play  with  ideas.  The  poet 
merely  promises  an  entertaining  play  with  ideas,  and  yet  It  has  the  same 
effect  upon  the  understanding  as  if  he  had  only  intended  to  carry  on 
its  business.' 

The  same  authority  recognizes  the  impressiveness  of  per- 
suasion, but  condemns  its  use  before  judgments  are  formed: 

Rhetoric,  In  so  far  as  this  means  the  art  of  persuasion,  i.  e.,  of  deceiv- 
ing by  a  beautiful  show  (ars  oratorla),  and  not  a  mere  elegance  of  speech 
(eloquence  and  style),  Is  a  dialectic,  which  borrows  from  poetry  only  so 
much  as  is  needful  to  win  minds  to  the  side  of  the  orator  before  they 
have  formed  a  judgment  and  to  deprive  them  of  their  freedom;  It  cannot, 
therefore,  be  recommended  either  for  the  law-courts  or  the  pulpit.' 

The  legitimate  use  of  persuasion  has  been  previously  dis- 
cussed; rhetoric  is  not  deceptive  and  need  not,  of  course,  be 
employed  to  "win  minds  to  the  side  of  the  orator  before  they 
have  formed  a  judgment."  Verily,  truth  and  justice  may  as 
well  surrender  in  despair,  if,  for  instance,  we  deprive  the  speaker 
of  the  right  to  induce  in  the  hearer  a  willingness  to  listen  in- 
cluding an  interest  in  doing  so,  or  the  right  to  implant  a  wish 
to  know  what  is  true  and  just. 

Indeed,  though  Kant  always  fears  and  often  assumes  the 
abuse  of  persuasion,  he  recognizes  its  use  as  legitimate  and  proper 
when  employed  "in  a  lively  sympathy  with  what  is  truly  good  ": 

The  man  who,  along  with  a  clear  Insight  into  things,  has  in  his  power 
a  wealth  of  pure  speech,  and  who  with  a  fruitful  imagination  capable 
of  presenting  his  ideas  unites  a  lively  sympathy  with  what  Is  truly  good, 
is  the  vir  bonus  dicendi  periliis,  the  orator  without  art  but  of  great  im- 
pressiveness, as  Cicero  has  it;  though  he  may  not  always  remain  true 
to  this  ideal.' 

'  "Kant's  Kritik  of  Judgment,"  translated  by  J.  II.  Bernard,  p.  207. 


272  APPENDIX 

Further,  we  may  agree  with  Kant  in  his  appreciation  and 
glorification  of  poetry,  without  accepting  his  implications  as 
necessary,  in  so  far  as  they  involve  the  honesty  of  the  orator. 
Oratory  is  no  more  illusory  or  deceptive  than  poetry.  It  is  dif- 
ficult to  conceive,  for  instance,  how  the  penumbrations  of  con- 
notative  words  are  more  Hable  to  mislead  in  prose  than  in  the 
rhythmic  beats  of  verse.  Certainly,  we  may  properly  image  a 
concept  in  prose;  soundly  as  respects  the  truth,  honestly  as 
respects  the  individual  who  utters  it,  and  effectively  as  respects 
the  hearer,  if  driven  home  with  all  the  sensible  and  supersen- 
sible instruments  of  utterance  which  God  has  given  us  to  make 
the  truth  prevail !  At  all  events,  in  debating,  the  preliminary 
analysis  and  investigation  of  all  the  material  relating  to  a  sub- 
ject and  the  opportunity  for  the  immediate  detection  and  ex- 
posure of  error  by  means  of  the  rebuttals  are  sufficient  preven- 
tives of  misrepresentation.  The  debater  who  is  careless  or  dis- 
honest carries  within  him  the  seeds  of  his  own  destruction. 


APPENDIX   E 

Addresses 
I 

"PEACE  FOUNDED  ON  THE  ROCK  OF  VINDICATED 
JUSTICE  "1 

Lloyd  George's  Guildhall  Address 

My  Lord  Mayor,  my  Lords,  Ladies,  and  Gentlemen:  The 
chancellor  of  the  exchequer  [Bonar  Law]  in  his  extremely  lucid 
and  impressive  speech  has  placed  before  you  the  business  side 
of  this  proposal,  and  I  think  you  will  agree  with  me,  after  hear- 
ing his  explanation  of  his  scheme,  that  he  has  offered  for  sub- 
scription a  loan  which  possesses  all  the  essential  ingredients  of 
an  attractive  investment.     They  are  the  most  generous  terms 

1  This  address,  which  was  delivered  at  the  Guildhall,  London,  January 
II,  1917,  appealed  primarily  for  subscriptions  to  the  new  war  loan,  but 
also  touched  largely  upon  questions  in  the  peace  discussions. 


APPENDIX  273 

that  the  government  can  offer  without  injury  to  the  taxpayer. 
I  agree  that  the  chancellor  was  right  in  offering  such  liberal 
terms  because  it  is  important  that  we  should  secure  a  big  loan 
now,  not  merely  in  order  to  enable  us  to  finance  the  war  effec- 
tively, but  as  a  demonstration  of  the  continued  resolve  of  this 
country  to  prosecute  the  war;  and  it  is  upon  that  aspect  of  the 
question  that  I  should  like  to  say  a  few  words. 

The  German  Kaiser  a  few  days  ago  sent  a  message  to  his 
people  that  the  Allies  had  rejected  his  peace  offers.  He  did  so 
in  order  to  drug  those  whom  he  could  no  longer  dragoon.  Where 
are  those  offers?  We  have  asked  for  them;  we  have  never  seen 
them.  We  were  not  offered  terms;  we  were  offered  a  trap  baited 
with  fair  words.  They  tempted  us  once,  but  the  lion  has  his  eyes 
open.  We  have  rejected  no  terms  that  we  have  ever  seen.  Of 
course,  it  would  suit  them  to  have  peace  at  the  present  moment 
on  their  terms.  We  all  want  peace;  but  when  we  get  it  it  must 
be  a  real  peace. 

The  allied  powers  separately  and  in  council  together  have 
come  to  the  same  conclusion.  Knowing  well  what  war  means, 
knowing  especially  what  this  war  means  in  suffering,  in  burdens, 
in  horrors,  they  have  still  decided  that  even  war  is  better  than 
peace  at  the  Prussian  price  of  domination  over  Europe.  We 
made  it  clear  in  our  reply  to  Germany;  we  made  it  still  clearer 
in  our  reply  to  the  United  States. 

Before  we  attempt  to  rebuild  the  Temple  of  Peace  we  must 
see  now  that  the  foundations  are  solid.  They  were  built  before 
upon  the  shifting  sands  of  Prussian  faith;  henceforth,  when 
the  time  for  rebuilding  comes,  it  must  be  on  the  rock  of  vin- 
dicated justice. 

I  have  just  returned  from  a  council  of  war  of  the  four  great 
allied  countries  upon  whose  shoulders  most  of  this  terrible  war 
falls.  I  cannot  give  you  its  conclusions;  they  might  be  informa- 
tion to  the  enemy.  There  were  no  delusions  as  to  the  magni- 
tude of  our  task;  neither  were  there  any  doubts  about  the  re- 
sults. 

I  think  I  can  say  what  was  the  feeling  of  every  man  there. 
It  was  one  of  the  most  businesslike  conferences  I  ever  attended. 
We  faced  the  whole  situation,  probed  it  thoroughly,  and  looked 
its  difiQculties  in  the  face,  and  made  arrangements  to  deal  with 
them.     We  separated  feeling  more  confident  than  ever.     All 


274  APPENDIX 

felt  that  if  victory  were  difficult,  defeat  was  impossible.  There 
was  no  flinching,  no  wavering,  no  faint-heartedness,  no  infirmity 
of  purpose. 

There  was  a  grim  resolution  at  all  costs  that  we  must  achieve 
the  high  aim  with  which  we  accepted  the  challenge  of  the  Prus- 
sian military  caste  and  rid  Europe  and  the  world  forever  of  her 
menace.  No  countrj'^  could  have  refused  the  challenge  without 
the  loss  of  honor.  None  could  have  rejected  it  without  impair- 
ing national  security.  No  one  would  have  failed  to  take  it  up 
without  forfeiting  something  which  is  of  greater  value  to  every 
free  and  self-respecting  people  than  life  itself.  Those  nations 
did  not  enter  into  the  war  lightly.  They  did  not  embark  upon 
this  enterprise  without  knowing  what  it  really  meant.  They 
were  not  enticed  by  the  prospects  of  immediate  victory. 

Take  this  country.  The  millions  of  our  men  who  enlisted  in 
the  army  enlisted  after  the  German  victories  of  August,  1914, 
when  they  knew  the  accumulated  and  concentrated  power  of 
the  German  military  machine.  That  was  when  they  placed 
their  lives  at  the  disposal  of  their  country.  What  about  the 
other  lands?  They  knew  what  they  were  encountering;  that 
they  were  fighting  an  organization  which  had  been  perfected 
for  generations  by  the  best  brains  of  Prussia — perfected  with 
one  purpose,  the  subjugation  of  Europe. 

Why  did  they  do  it?  I  passed  through  hundreds  of  miles 
of  the  beautiful  land  of  France  and  of  Italy,  and  as  I  did  so  I 
asked  myself  this  question:  Why  did  the  peasants  leave  by 
myriads  these  sunny  vineyards  and  corn-fields  in  France  ?  Why 
did  they  quit  these  enchanting  valleys,  with  their  comfort,  their 
security,  their  charm,  in  order  to  face  the  grim  and  wild  horrors 
of  the  battle-field?  They  did  it  for  one  purpose,  and  one  pur- 
pose only.  They  were  not  driven  to  the  slaughter  by  Kings. 
These  are  great  democratic  countries.  No  government  would 
have  lasted  twenty-four  hours  that  had  forced  them  into  an 
abhorrent  war  against  their  own  free  will.  They  embarked 
upon  it  because  they  knew  the  fundamental  issue  had  been  raised 
which  no  country  could  shirk  without  imperiUing  all  that  has 
been  won  in  the  centuries  of  the  past  and  all  that  remains  to 
be  won  in  the  ages  of  the  future. 

That  is  why,  as  the  war  proceeds  and  the  German  purpose 
becomes  more  manifest,  the  conviction  is  becoming  deeper  in 


APPENDIX 


:.'/£) 


the  minds  of  those  people  that  they  must  work  their  way  through 
to  victory  in  order  to  save  Europe  from  an  unspeakable 
despotism.  That  was  the  spirit  that  animated  the  allied  con- 
ference in  Europe  last  week. 

But  I  tell  you  one  thing  that  struck  me,  and  strikes  me  more 
and  more  each  time  I  attend  these  conferences  and  visit  the 
Continent:  the  increasing  extent  to  which  the  allied  peoples 
are  looking  to  Great  Britain.  They  are  trusting  her  rugged 
strength  and  great  resources  more  and  more.  She  is  to  them 
like  a  great  tower  in  the  deep.  She  is  becoming  more  and  more 
the  hope  of  the  oppressed  and  despair  of  the  oppressor;  and  I 
feel  more  and  more  confident  that  we  shall  not  fail  the  people 
who  put  their  trust  in  us. 

But  when  that  arrogant  Prussian  caste  flung  the  signature 
of  Britain  in  the  treaty  in  the  waste-paper  basket  as  if  it  were 
of  no  account,  they  knew  not  the  pride  of  the  land  they  were 
treating  with  such  insolent  disdain.  They  know  it  now.  Our 
soldiers  and  our  sailors  have  taught  them  to  respect  it.  You 
had  an  eloquent  account  from  my  colleague,  the  chancellor  of 
the  exchequer,  of  the  achievements  of  our  soldiers;  our  sailors 
are  gallantly  defending  the  honor  of  the  country  on  the  high 
seas.  They  have  strangled  the  enemy's  commerce;  they  will 
continue  to  do  so  in  spite  of  all  the  piratical  devices  of  the  foe. 

In  1914  and  191 5,  for  two  years,  a  small,  ill-equipped  army 
held  up  the  veterans  of  Prussia,  with  the  best  equipment  in 
Europe;  in  1916  hurling  them  back  and  delivering  a  blow  from 
which  they  are  reeling.  In  191 7  the  armies  of  Britain  will  be 
more  formidable  than  ever  in  training,  in  efiiciency,  in  equip- 
ment; and  you  may  depend  upon  it,  if  you  give  them  the  neces- 
sary support,  they  will  cleave  a  road  to  victory  through  the 
dangers  and  perils  of  the  next  few  months. 

But  we  must  support  them;  they  are  worth  it.  Have  you 
ever  talked  to  a  soldier  who  has  come  back  from  the  front? 
There  is  not  one  of  them  who  will  not  tell  you  how  he  is 
encouraged  and  sustained  by  hearing  the  roar  of  the  guns  be- 
hind him. 

I  will  tell  you  what  I  want  to  do.  I  want  to  see  checks  hur- 
tling through  the  air,  fired  from  the  city  of  London;  fired  from 
every  city,  town,  and  village  and  hamlet  throughout  the  land; 
fired  straight  into  the  intrenchments  of  the  enemy. 


276  APPENDIX 

Every  well-directed  check,  well  loaded,  properly  primed,  is 
a  more  formidable  weapon  of  destruction  than  a  twelve-inch 
shell.  It  clears  a  path  to  the  barbed-wire  entanglements  for 
our  gallant  fellows  to  march  through.  A  big  loan  helps  you, 
insures  victory;  a  big  loan  will  help  shorten  the  war;  it  will 
help  save  lives;  it  will  help  save  the  British  Empire;  it  will 
help  save  Europe;   it  will  help  save  civilization. 

That  is  why  we  want  the  country  to  rise  to  this  occasion  and 
show  that  the  old  spirit  of  Britain,  represented  by  those  great 
men  [pointing  to  the  monuments  in  the  hall]  you  have  here,  is 
still  alive,  alert,  and  as  potent  as  ever. 

I  want  to  appeal  to  the  men  at  home — yes,  and  to  the  women. 
I  want  to  appeal  to  both;  they  have  done  their  part  nobly  in 
this  war.  A  man  who  has  been  a  munitions  minister  for  twelve 
months  must  feel  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  the  women  for  what 
they  have  done.  They  have  helped  to  win  the  war,  and  with- 
out them  we  could  not  have  done  it;  but  I  want  to  make  special 
appeal,  or  rather  to  enforce  the  special  appeal  of  the  chancellor 
of  the  exchequer. 

Let  no  money  be  squandered  in  luxury  and  indulgence  which 
can  be  put  into  the  fight  and  which  counts — every  penny  of 
it;  every  ounce  has  counted  in  this  struggle.  Do  not  waste  it, 
do  not  throw  it  away;  put  it  there  to  help  the  valor  of  our  brave 
young  boys.  Back  them  up!  Let  every  one  contribute  to  as- 
sist them,  with  greater  pride  in  it  than  in  costly  garments.  It 
will  become  them;  they  will  feel  prouder  of  it  to-day,  and  their 
pride  will  increase  in  the  years  to  come,  when  the  best  garment 
they  have  got  will  have  rotted,  when  the  glisten  and  glitter  of 
it  will  improve  with  the  years.  They  can  put  it  on  in  old  age 
and  say,  "This  is  something  I  contributed  in  the  great  war," 
and  they  will  be  proud  of  it. 

Men  and  women  of  England,  Scotland,  Wales,  and  Ireland ! 
The  first  charge  upon  all  your  surplus  money,  over  your  needs 
for  yourselves  and  your  children,  should  be  to  help  those  gallant 
young  men  who  tendered  their  lives  to  the  cause  of  humanity. 
The  more  we  get  the  surer  the  victory;  the  more  we  get  the 
shorter  the  war;  the  more  we  get  the  less  it  will  cost  in  treasure, 
and  the  greatest  treasure  of  all  is  brave  blood.  The  more  we 
give  the  more  you  will  be  enriched  by  your  contribution,  by 
your  sacrifices  of  extravagance. 


APPENDIX  277 

I  want  to  bring  this  home  to  every  man  and  woman.  This 
extravagance  during  the  war  has  cost  blood — valiant  blood, 
the  blood  of  heroes.  It  will  be  worth  millions  to  save  one  of 
them — the  big  loan  will  save  myriads  of  them.  Help  them  not 
merely  to  win;  help  them  to  come  home,  to  shout  for  the  vic- 
tory which  they  have  won. 

It  means  better  equipment  for  our  troops,  it  means  better 
equipment  for  the  Allies  as  well;  and  this  I  say  for  the  fiftieth, 
if  not  the  hundredth,  time:  this  is  a  war  of  equipment.  That  is 
why  we  are  appealing  for  your  assistance.  Most  of  us  could 
not  do  more,  but  what  we  can  do  it  is  our  duty,  it  is  our  pride, 
to  do. 

I  said  it  was  a  war  of  equipment.  Why  are  the  Germans 
pressing  back  our  gallant  Allies  in  Rumania?  It  is  not  that 
they  are  better  fighters;  they  certainly  are  not.  The  Rumanian 
peasant  has  proved  himself  to  be  one  of  the  doughtiest  fighters 
in  the  field  when  he  has  the  chance — he  never  had  much — and 
as  for  the  Russian,  the  way  in  which,  with  bared  breast,  he  has 
fought  for  two  years  and  a  half,  with  inferior  guns,  insufiicient 
rifles,  inadequate  supplies  of  ammunition,  is  one  of  the  tales 
of  heroism  of  the  world. 

Let  us  help  to  equip  them,  and  there  will  be  another  story 
to  tell  soon;  but  it  is  for  us  to  do  so,  and  that  is  why  I  am  glad 
to  follow  the  chancellor  of  the  exchequer  in  the  appeal  he  has 
made  to  the  patriotism  of  our  race — but  with  true  Scottish  in- 
stinct he  put  the  appeal  to  prudence  first.  He  had  a  good  founda- 
tion for  patriotism,  and  reserved  that  for  his  peroration.  I  am 
going  to  reverse  the  order,  belonging  to  a  less  canny  race.  I 
want  to  say  it  is  a  good  investment,  after  all;  the  old  country 
is  the  best  investment  in  the  world.  It  was  a  sound  concern 
before  the  war;  it  will  be  sounder  and  safer  than  ever  after  the 
war,  and  especially  safer. 

I  do  not  know  the  nation  that  will  care  to  touch  it  after  this 
war.  They  had  forgotten  what  we  were  like  in  those  days,  and 
it  will  take  them  a  long  time  to  forget  these.  It  will  be  a  safer 
investment  than  ever,  and  a  sounder  one. 

Have  you  been  watching  what  is  going  on?  Before  the  war 
we  had  a  good  many  shortcomings  in  our  business,  our  com- 
merce, our  industry.  The  war  is  settling  them  all  right  in  the 
most  marvellous  way.     You  ask  a  great  business  man  like  my 


278  APPENDIX 

friend,  Lord  Pirrie,  what  is  going  on  in  those  great  factories 
throughout  Great  Britain  and  Ireland.  Old  machinery  is 
scrapped;  the  newest,  the  best,  and  the  latest  is  set  up;  slip- 
shod and  wasteful  methods  are  scrapped,  and  hampering  cus- 
toms discontinued.  Millions  are  brought  into  the  labor-market 
to  help  to  produce  who  were  before  purely  consumers. 

I  do  not  know  what  the  national  debt  will  be  at  the  end  of 
this  war,  but  I  will  make  a  prediction:  whatever  it  is,  what  is 
added  in  real  assets  to  the  real  riches  of  the  nation  will  be  in- 
finitely greater  than  any  debt  we  ever  acquire.  The  resources 
of  the  nation  in  every  direction  have  been  developed  and  di- 
rected; the  nation  itself  disciplined,  braced  up,  quickened,  has 
become  a  more  alert  people.  We  have  thrown  off  the  useless 
tissues;  we  are  a  nation  that  has  been  taking  exercise.  We 
are  a  dififerent  people. 

I  will  tell  you  another  thing:  the  Prussian  menace  was  a  run- 
ning mortgage  which  detracted  from  the  value  of  our  national 
security.  Nobody  knew  what  it  meant.  We  know  too  well 
now.  You  could  not  tell  whether  it  meant  millions  or  hundreds 
of  millions  or  thousands  of  millions,  or  how  many  of  them.  You 
could  not  tell  that  it  would  not  mean  ruin. 

That  mortgage  wiU  be  cleared  off  forever — better  security 
on  a  better  foundation,  safer  security,  and  at  a  better  rate  of 
interest.  The  world  will  then  be  able,  when  this  war  is  over, 
to  attend  to  its  business  in  peace.  There  will  be  no  war  or  rumors 
of  war  to  disturb  and  to  distract.  We  can  build  up,  we  can  re- 
construct, we  can  till,  we  can  cultivate  and  enrich,  and  the  burden 
and  terror  and  waste  of  war  will  have  gone. 

The  peace  and  security  for  peace  will  be  that  the  nations  will 
band  themselves  together  to  punish  the  first  peacebreaker  who 
comes  out. 

As  to  the  armies  of  Europe,  every  weapon  will  be  a  sword 
of  justice  in  the  government  of  men;  every  arm  will  be  a  con- 
stabulary of  peace.  There  were  men  who  had  hoped  to  see  this 
achieved  in  the  way  of  peace.  We  were  disappointed.  It  was 
ordained  that  you  should  not  reach  that  golden  era  except  along 
the  path  which  was  paved  with  gold — yea,  and  cemented  with 
valiant  blood.  There  are  millions  who  have  given  of  the  latter 
who  are  ready — nay,  millions  more  ready,  myriads  more  ready 
— for  the  sacrifice,  if  the  country  needs  it. 


APPENDIX  279 

It  is  for  us  to  contribute  the  former.  Let  no  man,  no  woman, 
in  this  crisis  of  the  nation's  fate,  through  indolence,  greed, 
avarice,  or  selfishness,  fail.  If  they  are  doing  their  part,  then, 
when  the  time  comes  for  the  triumphal  march  through  the  dark- 
ness and  terror  of  the  night  into  the  bright  dawn  of  the  morn- 
ing of  the  new  age,  they  will  each  feel  that  they  have  done  their 
share. 


n 

"FORCE  TO  THE  UTMOST"* 

President  Wilson's  Speech 

Fellow  Citizens:  This  is  the  anniversary  of  our  acceptance 
of  Germany's  challenge  to  fight  for  our  right  to  live  and  be  free, 
and  for  the  sacred  rights  of  freemen  everywhere.  The  nation 
is  awake.  There  is  no  need  to  call  to  it.  We  know  what  the 
war  must  cost,  our  utmost  sacrifice,  the  lives  of  our  fittest  men, 
and,  if  need  be,  all  that  we  possess. 

The  loan  we  are  met  to  discuss  is  one  of  the  least  parts  of  what 
we  are  called  upon  to  give  and  to  do,  though  in  itself  imperative. 
The  people  of  the  whole  country  are  alive  to  the  necessity  of 
it,  and  are  ready  to  lend  to  the  utmost,  even  where  it  in- 
volves a  sharp  skimping  and  daily  sacrifice  to  lend  out  of  meagre 
earnings.  They  will  look  with  reprobation  and  contempt  upon 
those  who  can  and  will  not,  upon  those  who  demand  a  higher 
rate  of  interest,  upon  those  who  think  of  it  as  a  mere  commercial 
transaction.  I  have  not  come,  therefore,  to  urge  the  loan.  I 
have  come  only  to  give  you,  if  I  can,  a  more  vivid  conception 
of  what  it  is  for. 

The  reasons  for  this  great  war,  the  reason  why  it  had  to  come, 
the  need  to  fight  it  through,  and  the  issues  that  hang  upon  its 
outcome,  are  more  clearly  disclosed  now  than  ever  before.  It 
is  easy  to  see  just  what  this  particular  loan  means,  because  the 
cause  we  are  fighting  for  stands  more  sharply  revealed  than  at 

*  This  address  was  delivered  in  the  5th  Regiment  Armory,  Balti- 
more, April  6,  191 8,  at  the  opening  of  the  Third  Liberty  Loan  Cam- 
paign. 


280  APPENDIX 

any  previous  crisis  of  the  momentous  struggle.  The  man  who 
knows  least  can  now  see  plainly  how  the  cause  of  justice  stands, 
and  what  is  the  imperishable  thing  he  is  asked  to  invest  in.  Men 
in  America  may  be  more  sure  than  they  ever  were  before  that 
the  cause  is  their  own,  and  that,  if  it  should  be  lost,  their  own 
great  nation's  place  and  mission  in  the  world  would  be  lost  wit'h 
it. 

I  call  you  to  witness,  my  fellow  countrymen,  that  at  no  stage 
of  this  terrible  business  have  I  judged  the  purposes  of  Germany 
intemperately.  I  should  be  ashamed  in  the  presence  of  affairs 
so  grave,  so  fraught  with  the  destinies  of  mankind  throughout 
all  the  world,  to  speak  with  truculence,  to  use  the  weak  language 
of  hatred  or  vindictive  purpose.  We  must  judge  as  we  would 
be  judged.  I  have  sought  to  learn  the  objects  Germany  has  in 
this  war  from  the  mouths  of  her  own  spokesmen,  and  to  deal 
as  frankly  with  them  as  I  wished  them  to  deal  with  me.  I  have 
laid  bare  our  own  ideals,  our  own  purposes,  without  reserve 
or  doubtful  phrase,  and  have  asked  them  to  say  as  plainly  what 
it  is  that  they  seek. 

We  have  ourselves  proposed  no  injustice,  no  aggression.  We 
are  ready,  whenever  the  final  reckoning  is  made,  to  be  just  to 
the  German  people,  deal  fairly  with  the  German  power,  as  with 
all  others.  There  can  be  no  difference  between  peoples  in  the 
final  judgment,  if  it  is  indeed  to  be  a  righteous  judgment.  To 
propose  anything  but  justice,  even-handed  and  dispassionate 
justice,  to  Germany  at  any  time,  whatever  the  outcome  of  the 
war,  would  be  to  renounce  and  dishonor  our  own  cause,  for  we 
ask  nothing  that  we  are  not  willing  to  accord. 

It  has  been  with  this  thought  that  I  have  sought  to  learn 
from  those  who  spoke  for  Germany  whether  it  was  justice  or 
dominion  and  the  execution  of  their  own  will  upon  the  other 
nations  of  the  world  that  the  German  leaders  were  seeking.  They 
have  answered — answered  in  unmistakable  terms.  They  have 
avowed  that  it  was  not  justice,  but  dominion  and  the  unhin- 
dered execution  of  their  own  will.  The  avowal  has  not  come 
from  Germany's  statesmen.  It  has  come  from  her  military 
leaders,  who  are  her  real  rulers.  Her  statesmen  have  said  that 
they  wished  peace,  and  were  ready  to  discuss  its  terms  when- 
ever their  opponents  were  willing  to  sit  down  at  the  conference 
table  with  them.    Her  present  chancellor  has  said — in  indefinite 


APPENDIX  281 

and  uncertain  terms,  indeed,  and  in  phrases  that  often  seem 
to  deny  their  own  meaning,  but  with  as  much  plainness  as  he 
thought  prudent— that  he  believed  that  peace  should  be  based 
upon  the  principles  which  we  had  declared  would  be  our  own 
in  the  final  settlement. 

At  Brest-Litovsk  her  civilian  delegates  spoke  in  similar  terms; 
professed  their  desire  to  conclude  a  fair  peace  and  accord  to 
the  peoples  with  whose  fortunes  they  were  dealing  the  right  to 
choose  their  own  allegiances.  But  action  accompanied  and 
followed  the  profession.  Their  military  masters,  the  men  who 
act  for  Germany  and  exhibit  her  purpose  in  execution,  pro- 
claimed a  very  different  conclusion.  We  cannot  mistake  what 
they  have  done — in  Russia,  in  Finland,  in  the  Ukraine,  in  Ru- 
mania. The  real  test  of  their  justice  and  fair  play  has  come. 
From  this  we  may  judge  the  rest. 

They  are  enjoying  in  Russia  a  cheap  triumph  in  which  no 
brave  or  gallant  nation  can  long  take  pride.  A  great  people, 
helpless  by  their  own  act,  lies  for  the  time  at  their  mercy.  Their 
fair  professions  are  forgotten.  They  nowhere  set  up  justice, 
but  everywhere  impose  their  power  and  exploit  everything  for 
their  own  use  and  aggrandizement,  and  the  peoples  of  conquered 
provinces  are  invited  to  be  free  under  their  dominion ! 

Are  we  not  justified  in  believing  that  they  would  do  the  same 
things  at  their  western  front  if  they  were  not  there  face  to  face 
with  armies  whom  even  their  countless  divisions  cannot  over- 
come? If,  when  they  have  felt  their  check  to  be  final,  they 
should  propose  favorable  and  equitable  terms  with  regard  to 
Belgium  and  France  and  Italy,  could  they  blame  us  if  we  con- 
cluded that  they  did  so  only  to  assure  themselves  of  a  free  hand 
in  Russia  and  the  East? 

Their  purpose  is,  undoubtedly,  to  make  all  the  Slavic  peoples, 
all  the  free  and  ambitious  nations  of  the  Baltic  Peninsula,  all 
the  lands  that  Turkey  has  dominated  and  misruled,  subject  to 
their  will  and  ambition,  and  build  upon  that  dominion  an  empire 
of  force  upon  which  they  fancy  that  they  can  then  erect  an  em- 
pire of  gain  and  commercial  supremacy — an  empire  as  hostile 
to  the  Americas  as  to  the  Europe  which  it  will  overawe — an 
empire  which  will  ultimately  master  Persia,  India,  and  the 
peoples  of  the  Far  East. 

In  such  a  programme  our  ideals,  the  ideals  of  justice  and  hu- 


282  APPENDIX 

manity  and  liberty,  the  principle  of  the  free  self-determination 
of  nations,  upon  which  all  the  modern  world  insists,  can  play 
no  part.  They  are  rejected  for  the  ideals  of  power,  for  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  strong  must  rule  the  weak,  that  trade  must  follow 
the  flag,  whether  those  to  whom  it  is  taken  welcome  it  or  not, 
that  the  peoples  of  the  world  are  to  be  made  subject  to  the 
patronage  and  overlordship  of  those  who  have  the  power  to 
enforce  it. 

That  programme  once  carried  out,  America  and  all  who  care 
or  dare  to  stand  with  her  must  arm  and  prepare  themselves  to 
contest  the  mastery  of  the  world — a  mastery  in  which  the  rights 
of  common  men,  the  rights  of  women  and  of  all  who  are  weak, 
must  for  the  time  being  be  trodden  under  foot  and  disregarded 
and  the  old,  age-long  struggle  for  freedom  and  right  begin  again 
at  its  beginning.  Everything  that  America  has  lived  for  and 
loved  and  grown  great  to  vindicate  and  bring  to  a  glorious  real- 
ization will  have  fallen  in  utter  ruin  and  the  gates  of  mercy  once 
more  pitilessly  shut  upon  mankind ! 

The  thing  is  preposterous  and  impossible;  and  yet  is  not  that 
what  the  whole  course  and  action  of  the  German  armies  has 
meant  wherever  they  have  moved  ?  I  do  not  wish,  even  in  this 
moment  of  utter  disillusionment,  to  judge  harshly  or  unright- 
eously. I  judge  only  what  the  German  arms  have  accomplished 
with  unpitying  thoroughness  throughout  every  fair  region  they 
have  touched. 

What,  then,  are  we  to  do?  For  myself,  I  am  ready,  ready 
still,  ready  even  now,  to  discuss  a  fair  and  just  and  honest  peace 
at  any  time  that  it  is  sincerely  purposed — a  peace  in  which  the 
strong  and  the  weak  shall  fare  alike.  But  the  answer,  when 
I  proposed  such  a  peace,  came  from  the  German  commanders 
in  Russia  and  I  cannot  mistake  the  meaning  of  the  answer. 

I  accept  the  challenge.  I  know  that  you  accept  it.  All  the 
world  shall  know  that  you  accept  it.  It  shall  appear  in  the  utter 
sacrifice  and  self-forget  fulness  with  which  we  shall  give  all  that 
we  love  and  all  that  we  have  to  redeem  the  world  and  make  it 
fit  for  freemen  like  ourselves  to  live  in.  This  now  is  the  mean- 
ing of  all  that  we  do.  Let  everything  that  we  say,  my  fellow 
countrymen,  everything  that  we  henceforth  plan  and  accom- 
plish, ring  true  to  this  response  till  the  majesty  and  might  of 
our  concerted  power  shall  fill  the  thought  and  utterly  defeat 


APPENDIX  2S3 

the  force  of  those  who  flout  and  misprize  what  we  honor  and 
hold  dear. 

Germany  has  once  more  said  that  force,  and  force  alone,  shall 
decide  whether  justice  and  peace  shall  reign  in  the  affairs  of 
men,  whether  right  as  America  conceives  it  or  dominion  as  she 
conceives  it  shall  determine  the  destinies  of  mankind.  There 
is,  therefore,  but  one  response  possible  from  us:  force,  force 
to  the  utmost,  force  without  stint  or  limit,  the  righteous  and 
triumphant  force  which  shall  make  right  the  law  of  the  world 
and  cast  every  selfish  dominion  down  in  the  dust. 


APPENDIX   F 

Bibliography 

The  following  list  of  books,  including  manuals,  books  of 
specimens,  and  works  referring  to  special  phases  of  the  sub- 
ject, may  be  found  useful: 

Adam,  G.  Mercer,  "Speeches  of  Abraham  Lincoln." 
Adams,  C.  K.,  and  Alden,  John,  "British  Eloquence." 
Alden,  Raymond  M.,  "The  Art  of  Debate." 
Askew,  John  Bertram,  "Pros  and  Cons." 
Bacon,  Corinne,  "Debaters'  Handbook  Series." 
Baker,  George  P.,  "Specimens  of  Argumentation." 
Baker,  G.  P.,  and  Huntington,  H.  B.,  "The  Principles  of  Argu- 
mentation." 
Bradley,  Cornelius  P.,  "Orations  and  Arguments." 
Brookings,  W.  D.,  and  Ringwalt,  R.  C,  "Briefs  for  Debate." 
Buck,  Gertrude,  "Argumentative  Writing." 
Curry,  C.  C,  "Imagination  and  Dramatic  Instinct." 
Denny,    Duncan,    and    McKenny,    "Argumentation    and   De- 
bate." 
Foster,  William  T.,  "Argumentation  and  Debate." 
George,  A.  J.,  "Select  Speeches  of  Daniel  Webster." 
Harper,  George  McLean,  "President  Wilson's  Addresses." 
Hibbefi,  John  Grier,  "Logic— Deductive  and  Inductive." 
Holyoake,  George  J.,  "Public  Speaking  and  Debate." 


284  APPENDIX 

Houghton,  Harry  Garfield,  "The  Elements  of  Public  Speak- 
ing." 
Johnston,  Alexander,  "American  Orations." 
Ketcham,  Victor  A.,  "The  Theory  and  Practice  of  Argumenta- 
tion and  Debate." 
Kleiser,  Grenville,  "How  to  Argue  and  Win." 
Lee,  Guy  Carleton,  "Principles  of  Public  Speaking." 
MacEwan,  Elias  J.,  "Essentials  of  Argumentation." 
Maxcy,  CarroU  L.,  "The  Brief." 
Miller,  Irving  Elgor,  "The  Psychology  of  Thinking." 
Nichols,  Egbert  Ray,  "Intercollegiate  Debates,"  vols.  I-VII. 
O'Neill,  Laycock,  and  Scales,  "Argumentation  and  Debate." 
Perry,  Bliss,  "Lincoln,"  "Webster,"  in  "Little  Masterpieces." 
Phillips,  Arthur  Edward,  "Effective  Speaking." 
Ringwalt,  Ralph  Curtis,  "Briefs  on  Public  Questions." 
Robinson,  Frederick  B.,  "Effective  Public  Speaking." 
Scott,  Walter  DiU,  "The  Psychology  of  Pubhc  Speaking,"  "In- 
fluencing Men  in  Business." 
Shurter,  Edward  Du  Bois,  "How  to  Debate."     (191 7-) 
Stephen,  Sir  James  Fitzjames,  "Digest  of  the  Law  of  Evidence." 
Stone,  A.  P.,  and  Garrison,  S.  L.,  "Essentials  of  Argument." 
Thomas,  Ralph  W.,  "A  Manual  of  Debate." 
Titchener,  Edward  B.,  "A  Text-book  of  Psychology." 
Wigmore,  John  Henry,  "Principles  of  Judicial  Proof." 
Winans,  James  Albert,  "Pubhc  Speaking." 
Winter,  Irving  Lester,  "Public  Speaking  and  Practice." 


APPENDIX   G 

Resolutions  for  Debate 

Resolved: 

That  after  the  present  war  the  United  States  should  take 
steps  to  secure  the  adoption  of  the  programme  of  the  League 
to  Enforce  Peace. 

That  the  federal  government  should  adopt  a  permanent 
policy  of  price  control. 

That  a  war  tax  of  twenty  per  cent  should  be  levied  on  all  in- 
comes over  two  thousand  dollars. 


APPENDIX  285 

That  after  the  war  an  international  police  force  should  be 
created  to  preserve  peace. 

That  the  successful  prosecution  of  the  war  requires  that  all 
citizens  of  Germany,  Austria,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  now  re- 
siding in  the  United  States  be  interned  until  peace  is  declared. 

That  the  war-time  scope  of  federal  regulation  should,  in  prin- 
ciple, be  continued  in  times  of  peace. 

That  the  administration  be  granted  absolute  censorship  of 
the  press  in  time  of  war. 

That  Congress  should  enact  legislation  providing  for  the  com- 
pulsory arbitration  of  interstate  public  utility  disputes  as  a 
permanent  policy. 

That  the  federal  government  should  require  compulsory  ar- 
bitration (with  power  to  enforce  decision)  of  disputes  between 
organized  labor  and  interstate  public  service  corporations,  con- 
stitutionaUty  granted. 

That  the  States  should  adopt  the  cabinet-parliamentary  form 
of  government. 

That  the  government,  in  financing  the  war  for  the  future, 
should  obtain  a  larger  percentage  of  its  funds  from  taxes  than 
from  bonds. 

That  the  Japanese  should  be  admitted  to  the  United  States 
and  to  citizenship  therein  on  the  same  basis  as  foreigners  of 
other  nations. 

That  the  federal  courts  should  be  deprived  of  the  power  to 
declare  acts  of  Congress  unconstitutional. 

That  conscription  of  labor  should  be  adopted  by  the  govern- 
ment. 


INDEX 


Accent,  fallacy,  loi. 

Adams,  C.  K.,  170. 

Adams,  John,  210. 

Adams,  Samuel,  230,  App.  B, 

Adaptation,  the  principle,  g. 

Adjectives,  personal,  221. 

Advertising,  suggestion  in,  190. 

Ames,  Fisher,  171. 

Amphibology,  loi. 

Anecdote,  the,  167. 

Antecedent  probability,  42. 

Anticipation  images,  162. 

Argument — definition,  4,  39;  classes 
of,  39;  incomplete,  40;  relations 
in,  not  always  known,  41;  names 
applied,  42. 

Aristophanes,  155. 

Arnold,  Matthew,  29. 

Assertion,  115. 

Association-reactions,  App.  B. 

Attention  theory,  the,  244. 

Auditory  images,  163,  App.  B. 

Authority,  132,  135. 

Bacon,  Sir  Francis,  165. 

Bank  referendum,  133. 

Bardell  vs.  Pickwick,  109. 

Beecher,  Henry  Ward,  72,  77,  166, 
199. 

Benton's  "Debates  of  Congress,"  137. 

Best,  W.  M.,  113,  121. 

Blackstone,  Sir  William,  53. 

Brief,  the,  defined,  16;  analysis, 
classification,  and  arrangement, 
17-23;  unity,  logical  sequence,  and 
proportion,  25-26;  language  in  a, 
28;  parallel  structure  in  a,  29;  two 
laws  of  structure,  31;  rules  for  a, 
32;  three  parts  of  a,  32;  specimen 
briefs,  34,  App.  A. 

Briefs,  specimen.  Lord  Chatham  on 
the  removal  of  troops,  34;  first 
Junius  letter,  App.  A;  in  defense 
of  Darnay,  App.  A. 

Brink,  C.  M.,  205. 

Brooke,  Stopford  A.,  48. 

Browning,  Robert,  App.  B, 


Bryan,  Wm.  J.,  198. 

Burden  of  proof,  3,  126. 

Burke,  Edmund,  learning,  16;  "Con- 
cihation,"  29,  142,  180,  232;  theory 
of  representation,  54;  resemblance, 
69;  vindication  of  natural  society, 
74;  taxation,  108;  citation  of 
authority,  142;  imagery,  169; 
Warren  Hastings,  230. 

Cabots,  the,  162. 

Caine,  Hall,  155. 

Calhoun,  John  C,  So. 

Camden,  Lord,  54. 

Causal  relation,  argument  from,  87; 
rule  of  adequacy,  88;  interaction  of 
cause  and  effect,  90;  partial  and 
temporary  causes,  91;  multiplicity 
of  causes,  91;  relative  value  of 
causes,  92 ;  causal  and  other  sources 
of  reasoning,  92;  differences  of 
view-point,  93. 

Chatham,  Lord,  34,  54. 

Choate,  Rufus,  222. 

Cicero,  235. 

Circumstantial  evidence,  118. 

Classics,  the,  212. 

Climax,  24,  30,  229. 

Clinton,  H.  L.,  174. 

Coleridge,  Samuel  Taylor,  31. 

Columbus,  162. 

Common  ground,  in  argument,  102. 

Composition,  fallacy,  loi;  a  basis  of 
debate,  8. 

Concept,  8,  14,  166,  182. 

Conceptual  view-point,  the  advantage 
of  the,  to  the  debater,  182. 

Confidence,  237. 

Consciousness,  appeal  to,  192. 

Consistency,  127. 

Constructive  thinking,  g. 

Contrast,  a  principle  of  association  in 
argument  from  example,  by  rc- 
ductio  ad  absurdum,  the  dilemma, 
and  the  method  of  the  residue,  09. 

Creative  imagination,  the,  159. 

Curtis,  (Jeorge  W.,  52. 


287 


288 


INDEX 


Dana,  Edward  S.,  123. 

Dante,  App.  D. 

Darnay,  in  defense  of,  App.  B. 

Dartmouth  College  case,  52. 

Darwin,  Charles,  135. 

Debate,  meaning  of  term,  i,  4,  201; 
universality  of,  i;  informal  and 
formal,  2;  how  it  originates,  3,  4; 
varied  background,  4;  a  presenta- 
tion of  ideas,  8. 

Debater  himself,  the,  12. 

Decision,  the,  244. 

Deduction,  97;  supplemented  by  in- 
duction, 97;  a  method  of  criticism, 
q8;  the  syllogism,  q8;  the  enthy- 
meme,  99;  the  chain  of  reasoning, 
100. 

Delivery,  common  defects  in,  240. 

Demosthenes,  235. 

DeWitt,  John,  App.  D. 

Dickens,  Charles,  109,  214,  App.  B. 

Dilemma,  the,  79;  two  kinds,  80;  its 
use,  81;  how  answered,  81. 

Dionysius,  51. 

Direct  evidence,  118. 

Division,  fallacy,  loi. 

Documents,  their  interpretation,  139. 

Draper,  Sir  William,  74. 

Ehbinghaus,  Hermann,  205. 

Emerson,  O.  F.,  208. 

Emerson,  Ralph  Waldo,  226. 

Emotions,  the,  11,  197,  221. 

Epictetus,  100. 

Equivocation,  fallacy,  loi. 

Erskine,  Lord,  53,  61,  128,  160,  214, 
236. 

"Eugene  Aram,"  119. 

Euripides,  155. 

Everett,  Edward,  137. 

Evidence,  a  basis  of  debate,  4;  mean- 
ing of  term,  113;  need  of,  113;  need 
of  assumptions,  116;  classes  of, 
118;  jury  verdicts  upon  circum- 
stantial, 120;  personal,  real,  and 
documentary,  121;  the  law  of,  126; 
examining  testimony,  127;  use  of 
evidence  outside  the  courts,  130; 
debaters'  chief  source  of,  132; 
authority,  two  classes  of,  132;  ex- 
amining evidence  from  authority, 
135;  suggestions  for  reporting  evi- 
dence, 140;  the  reasonableness  of  an 
opinion,  143;  the  danger  of  partial 
quotation,  144;  the  card  system, 
14s  • 


Example,  argument  from,  based  on 
resemblance,  50;  by  generalization, 
50;  by  analogy,  66;  based  on  con- 
trast, 69;  always  involves  a  prin- 
ciple, 52;  table  showing  steps  in  the 
process,  57;  definition,  and  rules  of 
relevancy,  58;  need  of  support  by 
other  arguments,  61;  fallacy,  beg- 
ging the  question,  62;  answering  a 
causal  argument  by  alleging  a  dif- 
ferent cause,  6s;  special  types  of 
example  used  in  refutation,  69. 

Fallacies,  two  classes  of,  loi. 
Femald,  M.  R.,  App.  B. 
Fletcher  vs.  Peck,  52. 
Fox,  W.  J.,  84. 
Franklin,  Benjamin,  238. 
Freeman,  E.  A.,  143. 
Frequency,  190. 

Gales  and  Seaton's  Reports,  137. 
George,      Lloyd,     address,     "Peace 

Founded  on  the  Rock  of  Justice," 

App.  E. 
Gesture  images,  202. 
Gibbon,  Edward,  217. 
Goodrich,  Charles  A.,  7.  160.  214- 
Grattan,  Henry,  78,  214. 
Greenleaf,  Simon,  113. 
Greenough,  James  B.,  45. 
Gustatory  images,  163. 

Hamerton,  P.  G.,  135- 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  167. 

Hans,  Clever,  43. 

Hazlitt,  William,  160. 

Henry,  Patrick,  51,  19S.  227,App.  B. 

Hibben,  President  John  G.,  59.  q8- 

Hill,  A.  S.,  143- 

Houghton,  H.  G.,  204. 

Hugo,  Victor,  168,  217. 

Huxley,  T.  H.,  13S.  224. 

Idea,  an,  158. 

Ignoralio  elenchi,  102. 

Image  ad  absurdum,  the,  199. 

Imagery,  an  imperfect  means,  210. 

Imagery,  illustrative,  217. 

Imagery  of  argument  and  poetry, 
App.  D. 

Imagery,  the  special  study  of;  varied 
appeals;  auditory,  and  the  dis- 
agreeable; auditory  and  the  agree- 
able; mixed  types;  other  forms  of, 
App.  C. 


INDEX 


289 


Imagery,  tonal,  213. 

Images,  types  of ,  163, 1S3,  213,  App.  B. 

Imagination,  8,  150;  need  of,  150; 
psychological  view-point  and  proc- 
esses, 154;  images,  a  psychological 
inference,  157;  mental  processes, 
158;  the  creative  imagination,  159; 
the  poverty  of  mere  facts,  160; 
the  vision  of  new  ideas,  161;  an- 
ticipation images,  162;  perceptual 
aspect  of  imagery,  163;  imaging  a 
concept,  166;  an  analogy,  167; 
a  cause,  168;  a  conclusion,  169; 
affection  and  desire,  172;  in  a  team 
debate,  175;  in  general,  178;  the 
advantage  of  the  conceptual  view- 
point to  the  debater,  182;  types  of 
imager>',  183. 

Imperative,  the,  228. 

Imperfect  induction,  g6. 

Independence  of  the  Philippine 
Islands,  4. 

Inductive  argument,  93;  the  inevita- 
ble assumption,  95;  the  formula, 
9S;  induction,  the  scientific  method 
of  investigation,  96;  kinds  of  in- 
duction, 96. 

Inhibitions,  9,  189;  hurtful  admis- 
sions, 195;  immediate  removal  of, 
19s;  logical  fallacies  as,  197; 
removing  an  inhibiting  wish,  199; 
the  inhibiting  function  in  debating, 
201. 

Instruments  of  suggestion,  188,  201, 
212. 

Interest  and  belief,  as  ends  in  debate, 

193- 
Interestedness,  239. 
Interrogatory,  the,  227. 
Invective,  197. 
Irony,  74,  197. 
Irving,  Henry,  134. 
Issue,  3;  types  of  issues,  11. 

Jacoby,  Dr.  George  W.,  44. 
James,  WilUam,  103. 
Jefferson,  Thomas,  210. 
Jevons,  W.  Stanley,  6. 
Johnson,  Dr.  Samuel,  98,  106. 
Junius,  6,  24,  29,  48,  76,  App.  A. 

Kant,  Immanuel,  App.  D. 
Keats,  John,  App.  C. 
Kinaesthetic  images,  App.  B. 
Kittredge,  George  L.,  45- 
Knowledge,  matters  of,  122. 


La  Fontaine,  the  Fables  of,  63. 

Lamb,  Charles,  152. 

Laughter,  197. 

Law  of  evidence,  the,  126. 

Law  of  the  mental  level,  208. 

Laws  of  structure,  31. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  Cooper  Institute, 

3;   analogies,  67;    contrast,  69,  70; 

Dred  Scott,  70;    dilemma,  79,  82; 

imagery,    157,    167;    ad  absurdum, 

200;  personalities,  219;  the  phrase, 

226. 
Lindsley,  C.  F.,  242. 
Locke,  John,  54. 
Logic,  a  basis  of  debate,  6. 
Logical  organization,  13. 

Macaulay,  T.  B.,  72,  98,  116. 

Major  premise,  99. 

Mandeville,  Sir  John,  135. 

Mansfield,  Lord,  54. 

McCosh,  James,  194. 

Media  or  symbols,  the,  9. 

Memory,  8,  28,  141,  158, 166, 178, 184. 

Mental  level,  the,  208. 

Meredith,  George,  App.  C. 

Method  of  the  residue,  the,  82-86. 

Milton,  John,  App.  C. 

Minor  premise,  99. 

Monroe,  James,  133. 

Napoleon,  184. 
Non  causa  pro  causa,  102. 
Non  sequilur,  18,  102. 
Norton  and  Sackville,  152. 
Nullification,  80. 

Olfactory  images,  164,  App.  B. 
Onomatopoeia,  213. 
Opinion,  matters  of,  112;  reasonable- 
ness of  an,  143. 
Oratory,  a  basis  of  debate,  8. 
Otis,  James,  App.  B. 

Paraleipsis,  235. 

Peace,  a  league  to  enforce,  191. 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  84. 

Perceptual  aspect  of  imagery,  163. 

Perfect  induction,  96. 

Peroration,  the,  174. 

Perry,  Bliss,  159. 

Personalities,  115,  218. 

Persuasion,  11,  188,  App.  D,  271. 

Pelilio  principii,  loi. 

Phillips,  A.  B.,  193. 

Phrase,  the,  225. 


290 


INDEX 


"Pickwick  Papers,"  log. 
Pinkney,  William,  141,  222. 
Plan,  need  of  a,  15. 
Plato,  the  Republic  of,  85. 
Pliny,  135. 

Plurium  inlerrogationum,  102. 
Poe,  E.  A.,  49,  App.  B. 
Polo,  Marco,  163. 
PrcBteritio,  235. 
Presentation,  the,  13,  150. 
Primary  evidence,  125. 
Prison  reform,  report  on,  9. 
Proof,  the,  112. 
Proposition,  a,  6. 
Psychological  inference,  157. 
Psychological  moment,  the,  208. 
Psychology,  a  basis  of  debate,  9. 

Quarterly  Journal  of  Public  Speaking, 

App.  B. 
Quarterly  Journal  of  Speech  Education, 

242. 
Questions  or  exercises,  146,  App.  B. 
Quotation,  danger  of  partial,  144. 

Randolph,  John,  App.  B. 

Recency,  igo. 

Reduclio  ad  absurdum,  69;  illustra- 
tions, 69;  manner  of  treatment,  73; 
how  answered,  76. 

Reference  to  experience,  183. 

Refutation,  the,  104;  preparation, 
105;  selection,  106;  fundamental 
criticism,  108;  two  general  methods 
of,  109;  special  types  of,  iii; 
avoiding  and  removing  inhibitions 
in,  194. 

Repetition,  230. 

Reproductive  imagination,  the,  158. 

Resemblance,  a  principle  of  associa- 
tion in  argument  from  example 
by  generalization  and  by  analogy, 

SO- 
Response,  188,  202,  App.  B. 
Rhythm,  214. 
Ringwalt,  R.  C,  63. 
Robert  of  Gloucester,  i. 
Roosevelt,  Theodore,   167,   192,   214, 

237- 
Rowland,  E.  H.,  217. 
Ruskin,  John,  159,  180. 
Russell,  Lord  William,  120. 
Ruyssen,  Theodore,  89. 

Sacken,  von  Osten,  44. 
Saint  Matthew,  179. 


Saint  Paul,  223. 

Scott,  General  Hugh  L.,  65 

Scott,  Sir  Walter,  1,2. 

Scott,  Walter  Dill,  189,  216. 

Secondary  evidence,  125. 

Sentence  forms,  227. 

Shakespeare,  0th.,  47,  124;  M.  of  V., 
118,  164;  Macb.,  124,  App.  C;  Jul. 
Caes.,  124,  165,  232,  234,  App.  C; 
Rom.  and  Jul.,  159;  Temp.,  182; 
Hen.  IV,  223,  232;  Ham.,  235, 
App.  C;  Meas.  for  Meas.,  237. 

Ship  subsidies,  200. 

Sidis,  Boris,  209. 

Sign,  argument  from,  defined,  43; 
early  form  of  mental  activity,  43; 
words  as  signs,  44;  various  defini- 
tions, 45;  force,  47;  scientific  use 
of,  47;  observation  and  inference, 
49;  common  sources  of  error,  50; 
sign  reasoning  in  constructive 
thinking,  9;  signs  as  the  back- 
ground of  an  argument,  157. 

Sincerity,  211,  239. 

Smith,  L.  W.,  206. 

Smith,  Sidney,  224. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  68. 

Stephen,  James  F.,  5,  113,  129. 

Stevenson,  R.  L.,  217. 

Story,  Justice  Joseph,  52. 

Subconscious,  the,  188,  App.  C. 

Suggestion  in  argument,  8,  188;  laws 
of,  and  their  use  in  debating,  189; 
instruments  of  suggestion,  201 ;  ges- 
ture images  as  instruments  of,  202; 
word  images,  204;  variability  of 
meanings,  207;  imagery  an  imper- 
fect means,  210. 

Summary,  the,  34,  230. 

Swift,  J.,  74- 

Swiss  miUtary  system,  175. 

Switzerland,  the  military  organization 
of,  59- 

Syllogism,  the,  98. 

Tactual  or  tactile  images,  163,  App. 
B. 

Taft,  William  H.,  192. 

Telegraph-lines,  government  owner- 
ship of,  46. 

Tell,  WiUiam,  137. 

Terman,  L.  M.,  App.  B. 

Testimony,  127. 

Thucydides,  137. 

Thurston,  Senator,  180. 

Transition,  the,  240. 


INDEX 


291 


Types,  of  audiences,  ii;  of  issues,  ii; 
of  mind,  lo. 

Udall,  Nicholas,  152. 

Variety,  231. 

Verrazzano,  162. 

Visual  images,  163,  App.  B. 

Vividness,  190. 

Vocabulary   development,    204,    212, 

App.  B. 
Vocal  shadings,  207. 

Washington.  George,  133,  226. 

Webster,    Daniel,    bank    credit,    71 
on    South    Carolina    doctrine,    89 
reply  to  Hayne,  136;  memory,  141 
the  great  expounder,  107;  eulogy  of 
his  State,  185;  mental  sketch-map, 
217;  personalities,  21S;  irony,  230; 


paraleipsis,  236;  sentiment  and 
memory,  237. 

Whately,  Archbishop,  by,  74. 

Whitney,  W.  D.,  App.  B. 

Wilson,  President  Woodrow,  imagery, 
157;  the  apt  story,  167;  for  a 
league  to  enforce  peace,  192,  209; 
an  immortal  phrase,  226;  his 
Baltimore  address,  "Force  to  the 
Utmost,"  App.  E. 

Winans,  James  A.,  244. 

Winter,  Irving  L.,  241. 

Wish,  199. 

Wit,  197. 

Word  images,  204. 

Word-recognition  test,  App.  B. 

Words,  connotation  of,  44;  as  instru- 
ments of  suggestion,  201,  204,  212. 

Wordsworth,  Dorothy,  237. 

Wordsworth,  William,  225. 


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